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Summary of thesis
The study examines issues surrounding the social incorporation of im-
migrants in Greece, focusing on a particular city, Thessaloniki, and on
two migrant groups, Albanians and Bulgarians. The research is set
within the debates about migration and globalisation, and more specifi-
cally within the regional context of Balkan transnational migration.
The thesis is the outcome of fieldwork research that involved struc-
tured questionnaires, in-depth interviews, background sources and sys-
tematic observation. It addresses the factors shaping immigrants’ lives
through combined methodologies and an interdisciplinary approach
that goes beyond oversimplifying accounts of exclusion-inclusion;
rather, these are seen as dynamic processes connected to the wider so-
cial reality. The concept of incorporation is employed in order to ana-
lyse both the ways by which migrants organise their lives in the host
society and the structural, institutional and cultural contexts that condi-
tion them. The analytical framework distinguishes between several in-
terrelated modes of incorporation: social/political responses; labour-
market integration; living conditions and social space; coping strategies
and community formation. A number of additional factors are also
considered: the composition of the migrant populations; migratory pat-
terns and dynamics; the role of social networks; issues of access; and
questions of identity.
The findings provide an empirical account of the immigrants’ char-
acteristics, uncovering a high degree of heterogeneity that unavoidably
determines incorporation patterns. ‘Immigrants’ become a social cate-
gory constructed on the basis of the exclusionary mechanisms: the re-
strictive immigration policy, the spread of xenophobic attitudes, and
the particular space immigrants occupy in the labour market. However,
immigrants do make a living in the host society: by adopting certain in-
tegration ‘strategies’; by relying on (mostly informal) social networks;
and by interacting in various ways with the local population. Incorpora-
tion is subject to time and place: gradually, immigrants become organic
elements of the host society, which shapes, but is also being shaped by,
migration.
The findings suggest that the Greek urban experience of immigra-
tion is an interesting example of contemporary processes of globalisa-
tion, migration and incorporation in urban contexts. Firstly, because
some of the chief characteristics of international migration are re-
flected in the Greek case. Secondly, because the Greek economy and
Greek society have experienced immigration during a period of transi-
tion and of increasing exposure to the international environment.
Thirdly, because of certain features of transnational mobility emerging
in the Balkan space, determined by proximity and cultural/historical
ties. Within this context, Thessaloniki is becoming a new home for im-
migrants from the Balkans. With a long past of multicultural coexis-
tence and trans-local importance in the Balkan region, Thessaloniki
now searches for new identities and reclaims its old role through the
contradictions of a rapidly changing reality.
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1 Introduction
Migration is nothing new; it is embedded in the history of human so-
cieties. However, as a social phenomenon, it reflects, and is determined
by, the historical era in which it takes place. At the dawn of the twenty-
first century, processes of international migration are characteristic of
the present historical context of globalisation. In contrast to migration,
globalisation appears indeed as a historical novelty, implying qualitative
changes in the dynamics of the world system: the restructuring of the
global economy, the interconnectedness between various kinds of net-
works, the interdependence between states and communities, the in-
creasing interaction, deterritorialisation and fusion of existing cultural
forms. Contemporary international migration, its implications and its
associated phenomena, are part and parcel of these transformations.
By the end of the past century, Greece had emerged in the European
landscape as a new migrant-receiving country. Even in the Greek case,
however, this was not new; in fact, migration, in several forms and di-
rections, has long been linked to the fate of the modern Greek nation-
state. Soon after gaining independence in 1832, tiny new Greece started
attracting Christians from the Ottoman provinces of Thessaly and Ma-
cedonia, as well as members of the European and Mediterranean dia-
sporic bourgeoisie. The Balkan wars were marked by displacements
and resettlements of people, both voluntary and forced, which peaked
with the great population exchange between Greece and Turkey after
the former’s defeat in the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-1922. Ever since,
national homogenisation processes have been marked by conscious po-
licies of the Greek state to assimilate various populations into the na-
tional narrative and to stimulate ethnic density, particularly in the ‘na-
tionally dangerous’ areas of Macedonia and Thrace. Meanwhile, thou-
sands of people were ‘on the move’: mountain-dwellers from Epirus
and Macedonia made their way down to the lowlands, while islanders,
as well as peasants from Thessaly and the ‘New Lands’, moved to the
growing industrial centres of Athens and Piraeus; some for a short
time only before embarking for the New World. In 1949, the civil war
that succeeded the German occupation ended with thousands of those
who had fought with the defeated Communists fleeing to the Soviet
Union and other countries of the Eastern Bloc. The 1950s and 1960s
were marked by large-scale internal and external movements; during
this period the main urbanisation phase took place, as well as interna-
tional migration: initially to the US and Australia, and later intra-Eur-
opean, mainly to West Germany.
By the mid-1970s, emigrants started returning home, followed by re-
patriating political refugees and ethnic Greeks from the former Soviet
Union in the 1980s. In parallel, the first foreign workers were begin-
ning to be recruited, initially in the shipping and fishing industries, la-
ter also in agriculture. With the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the
developments after 1989, immigration flows intensified, especially
from Eastern European and neighbouring Balkan states, with Albania
being by far the major sending country. The situation spiralled out of
control in the early 1990s as governments failed not only to address,
but also to acknowledge the new migratory pressures and the presence
of many migrants within Greek territory. The only measures taken
were rather reactionary and repressive, resulting in hundreds of thou-
sands of people living under clandestine status, in harsh conditions,
and at the margins of mainstream society.
At present, fifteen years later, it appears that many of the initial pro-
blems have gradually faded out, while new ones have arisen. Migrants
have become ‘visible’, and currently the public debates raise concerns
regarding the issue of integration. Xenophobia, exploitation and social
polarisation have been the milestones marking Greece’s path to diver-
sity. However, the migrants are ‘here’, to prove that Greece has de facto
become a multiethnic, pluralistic society. They live, work and consume
in Greece; their children go to Greek schools; most importantly, they
increasingly interact with the local population, producing not only new
social tensions, but also new kinds of relationships, new patterns of
mobility, new types of cultural expression and exchange. Contemporary
trends in migration and integration in Greece differ from any past ex-
perience in the history of the country; but they also largely differ from
past European and other experiences. On the other hand, there is a
range of processes, practices and phenomena resembling other con-
temporary cases, especially Southern European ones, with which
Greece shares many common characteristics, while there are still un-
iquely Greek expressions and manifestations.
The above concisely suggests the novelty of the phenomenon. This
is primarily a study of immigration and the incorporation of migrants
in Greece. I focus on the two largest migrant groups, Albanians and
Bulgarians, both from neighbouring Balkan countries of different
though comparable migration experiences; and on the second largest
Greek city, Thessaloniki, geographically close to the migrants’ homes
and with a longstanding history of multiethnic coexistence and trans-
national ties. My secondary theoretical focus is to ‘read’ the patterns
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and processes of migration and incorporation within the context of so-
cietal change in Greece; also, to locate the Greek case on the global
map of contemporary social phenomena; and to explore the links be-
tween local/national processes and the trends observed at the interna-
tional level.
The principal aim of this study is to examine the parallel but oppos-
ing processes of social exclusion and integration of Albanian and Bul-
garian immigrants in Thessaloniki. However, my objective is not to
present a series of data to support conclusions of the kind ‘immigrants
in Greece are well integrated’, or ‘they live under conditions of social
exclusion’. What I consider important is to identify, describe and ana-
lyse the patterns and the processes that condition the ways migrants or-
ganise their lives in the host country and in the local community
where they live and work. To do so, I look at both objective and percep-
tual factors relating to the characteristics of the migrants themselves;
aspects of their lives in different social spheres; their own understand-
ings of their collective and individual experiences and of the various
ways they interact with the local population. These issues are to be ana-
lysed in relation to the contexts within which different processes of in-
tegration/exclusion take place and with reference to the dominant ma-
terial and ideological conditions immigrants face in the host country.
With respect to the practical achievement of these aims and to the
carrying out of the research itself, the first task was to identify the fun-
damental issues that the study aims to address. Two key sets of re-
search questions were selected:
– What are the conditions and/or the processes shaping immigrants’
lives in Greece? What are the obstacles put by structural, institu-
tional or cultural factors?
– How do immigrants overcome such obstacles (if so)? How do they
manage to organise their lives (in terms of work, residence, inter-
personal relationships, etc.) in the host country and in the specific
locality where they are found?
Looking at factors of exclusion and patterns of integration requires first
an account of what they involve and of how they can be measured. The
explanatory framework ascribes the conditions of exclusion/inclusion
to the broader process of ‘incorporation’, which takes place within inter-
related contexts, conceptually ‘separated’ for the purposes of the analy-
sis. Economy, policy, culture or space can be seen as such contexts,
shaping immigrants’ lives and determining the dynamics of their in-
corporation: for instance, the local labour market where immigrants
are looking for work; the policy framework that conditions their entry,
work and legal presence in the country; racist hostility (or, on the con-
trary, friendly reception), which affects people’s everyday relationships;
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the place of residence (or leisure, or work), which becomes the terrain
where migrants build their lives and develop their sense of belonging.
However, all these different but interconnected spheres of social exis-
tence are not ahistoric, nor unchangeable. They are historically devel-
oped and subject to transformation, and they are interacting with the
dynamics of migration, whether invisible social structures, faceless in-
stitutions, hidden cultural attributes or common daily practices. The in-
formal labour market seems to absorb immigrant labour, but not with-
out serious effects; immigration policy is revised in order to deal with a
rapidly changing reality; old perceptions of identity are now challenged
by the presence of the ‘other among us’; the urban space attains new
social uses, creating thus new images of place. In that sense, the study
of incorporation gives birth to additional questions that may lie in the
background but cannot be avoided completely:
– How are the dynamics of migration linked to the processes of social
change? What possible changes related to immigration can we ob-
serve in the Greek case? How are these effects manifested in Thes-
saloniki? Which are the patterns of interaction between immigrants
and locals?
Obviously the focus is on a local, urban society; it is impossible though
to separate this case from its wider national context. But again, ulti-
mately and increasingly, local and national realities are being restruc-
tured and deeply transformed as they are more and more exposed to a
changing international environment. Processes related to globalisation
and restructuring might be abstractly hidden in the background, but
they do influence regional and national contexts, and they are mani-
fested in particular ways in specific localities, whether directly or via
the national layer. Migration itself can be seen as one of these forces
that produces outcomes where transnational, national and local con-
texts get fused or interact. Market dynamics are less and less subject to
social control; national policies are influenced or directed by interna-
tional organisations; old certainties of belonging lose their meaning.
Space is also transforming, since localities are superseding their regio-
nal or national scope, and they are themselves internationalising, with
visible alterations in their landscape, while on the other hand their po-
pulations are becoming more mixed, culturally and ethnically, and in-
creasingly mobile. Similar patterns of change can be then observed be-
tween different countries or different places, although they are ex-
pressed in distinctive and concrete ways in each case. Therefore, there
is an additional set of secondary questions of a more theoretical direc-
tion that are also going to be addressed:
– Can we compare what is taking place in Thessaloniki in respect to
migration to the experiences of other countries or to other cases in
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Europe or elsewhere? Can we identify common patterns in the dy-
namics of migrants’ incorporation, and which of these forms part
of wider global processes?
– How do these broader processes, developments and trends deter-
mine the dynamics of migration in the case of Greece and Thessa-
loniki? In what forms does the global affect the local in respect to
migration and incorporation? How can we generalise from our case
study, and what theoretical conclusions can we draw?
The answers I seek to find are neither given nor prescribed. The objec-
tive is to describe and analyse the current situation and to identify and
explain the emerging trends. Above all, I seek to address the issue of
the incorporation of Albanian and Bulgarian migrants in Thessaloniki
by identifying the mechanisms of exclusion and the patterns of integra-
tion. Finally, my case study aims to provide a basis for comparison and
generalisation. Therefore the framework of analysis has been designed
carefully in order to apply to other cases without sacrificing its local
scope and empirical thrust. Similarly, the methodology is not based on
specific principles or epistemological commitments; it rather came out
of the practical necessities of the research itself and the theoretical im-
plications underlying the study.
The structure of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 is a background
chapter. The purpose is to set out a starting point for this study by de-
fining my general perspective and by placing contemporary migration
to Greece in a broader context. The chapter elucidates the way I inter-
pret (some of) my findings by developing a perspective to which I am
going to return at the end of the book in an attempt to theorise from
my results. The discussion then turns more specific and locates the
Greek experience within the Southern European ‘immigration model’
by highlighting its uniqueness – to a great extent due to the country’s
position in the Balkans – and by briefly overviewing the main socio-
economic characteristics and policy developments.
Chapter 3 is about my analytical and methodological considerations.
It starts by building up a framework for the analysis of immigrants’ in-
corporation and by specifying my own approach. It proceeds by identi-
fying the limits in the existing literature and the gaps in recent re-
search in order to explain the contribution my thesis has to offer. A de-
scription of the research design and the methodological tools used
follows, including a personal account of the fieldwork experience. The
practicalities of data collection and analysis are discussed, before mov-
ing to a brief introduction to the city of Thessaloniki by sketching out
its main demographic, socio-economic, socio-spatial and historical fea-
tures.
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In Chapter 4, I start presenting and discussing my findings. I first
draw the profile of the migrants, explaining similarities and differences
but also highlighting the heterogeneity observed. The characteristics of
the participants in the survey research (demographic, geographic, edu-
cational, etc.) are presented and discussed. I then analyse the reasons,
patterns and dynamics of migration. The migrants’ characteristics and
the dynamics of migration play a potentially important role in the in-
corporation process and help us explain similarities and differences be-
tween various groups of migrants.
The next four chapters constitute the empirical core of the thesis.
Chapter 5 discusses the polity’s and society’s responses to immigration,
as experienced by the migrants themselves. It begins with an account
of how the migrants have been affected in practice by the restrictive
policy framework, before and after regularisation, identifying common
problems of discrimination, bureaucracy and unfair treatment. Their
problematic relationship with the authorities is analysed. It then moves
to an anatomy of xenophobic discourses and attitudes, commenting
also on the emergence of positive initiatives from local civil-society
groups.
Chapter 6 deals with the employment of migrant labour. Through
the analysis of immigrants’ experiences in the Greek labour market, it
explains how they satisfy an increased demand for cheap and flexible
labour. The evolutionary account of the migrants’ conditions from their
early years in Greece to the time of the fieldwork allows us to under-
stand their employment trajectories, from situations of extreme exploi-
tation to an overall improvement of their position in the labour mar-
ket.
Chapter 7 is about space. It examines the basic issue of housing and
draws a map of the residential and employment geographies of migra-
tion in Thessaloniki. It also looks at the migrants’ experiences of urban
space in terms of leisure and consumption, and comments on the im-
portance of public space. It shows how, despite exclusionary mechan-
isms, the city has become a new home for migrants.
Chapter 8 refers to other spheres of the migrants’ social life. It starts
by addressing the extent to which they have been able to access basic
services, like education and health, and the paths they undertook. It
also looks at a series of aspects related to their general living condi-
tions. It examines the role and character of formal and informal social
networks and describes how migrant communities are beginning to
emerge. It then deals with a range of material and perceptual/identifi-
cational issues related to the migrants’ everyday practices and coping
strategies.
Chapter 9 discusses the key findings from a theoretical perspective,
returning to the broad issues raised early in the thesis. The multiple
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and contradictory pathways of immigrants towards incorporation are
discussed, and the key explanatory factors are analysed. The narrative
then turns to wider theoretical issues regarding the forms through
which general processes of migration and globalisation are reflected in
the Greek case. Aspects of the global-local interaction are identified
with respect to the incorporation of migrants. Migration in the Balkan
context is understood in a wider framework of transnational mobility.
The spatial and identificational implications of the transformation of
Thessaloniki into a multicultural city are finally explored with respect
to the city’s cosmopolitan past.
The thesis ends with a conclusion, Chapter 10, in which the main ar-
guments are summarised, the strengths and weaknesses of the study
are outlined, and important future steps to research are identified.
Introduction 23

2 Locating our case in a world of change
After a brief introduction, this much longer chapter sets out the theore-
tical and geographical background of my thesis in more detail. It is in
two main parts. In 2.1, I place immigration to Greece within the broad-
er context of debates on globalisation, international migration and the
links between the two. Although migration is increasingly regarded as
a global phenomenon (Castles & Miller 1998), the precise linkages be-
tween migration and globalisation have rarely been explicitly analysed;
I seek to do this here. In 2.2, the focus narrows in on Greece, Southern
Europe and the Balkans. I look at the extent to which Greece conforms
to what has been described by King (2000a) as the ‘Southern European
immigration model’ and sketch out the main details of Greece’s recent
experience of immigration, including its (much delayed) policy re-
sponses.
2.1 Studying migration in the contemporary world
The objective of this first section is to place international migration
within the present historical context and to explore the links between
migration and globalisation. To do so, two things are necessary: firstly,
to give an account of the major theories of migration; secondly, to de-
fine globalisation and describe briefly what it entails. Obviously, it is
impossible to include a complete review of the vast literature on both
topics. What is important and more relevant to the framing of this re-
search is to build a conceptual framework for understanding globalisa-
tion through the critical reading of some key texts, keeping in mind
that the target is to link globalisation processes with current migration
trends. The explanatory limits of dominant theories are exposed in an
attempt to address contemporary phenomena and to reflect on ap-
proaches to the study of migration in the global era.
2.1.1 An overview of migration theories
How is migration defined? Is it simply the movement of people from
one place to another, or does it involve more parameters than the cross-
ing of a distance in space? And how can it be explained? What are the
factors producing it, and what are the motives leading people to leave
their homes and look for another one somewhere else? There is no sin-
gle theory for explaining international migration; a starting point, how-
ever, requires an understanding of its causes. An introduction to the
most prominent migration theories is essential before any attempt to
clarify my own point of view. My short overview briefly presents the
two traditions that dominated migration theory for years: the neoclassi-
cal or voluntarist-functionalist, and the Marxist or historical-structural-
ist. Despite fundamental differences between the schools of thought
that inspired them, both perspectives are characterised by a determinis-
tic account of causes and effects (Papastergiadis 2000); therefore, I
proceed by outlining more recent approaches that take into considera-
tion aspects previously neglected. The focus is on the root factors of
migration; the effects on, and implications for, host and sending socie-
ties and the migrants themselves are not addressed here. They are not
underestimated though, and many are touched on throughout the the-
sis, especially in relation to the empirical findings1. I have drawn mate-
rial from various key texts, but the well-known article by Massey et al.
(1993) summarises and categorises most theories and has been used
extensively2.
The voluntarist-functionalist approach, inspired by neoclassical eco-
nomic theory, defines migration as the outcome of individuals’ deci-
sions, based on the rational calculation of the factors pushing people
out of their countries and/or those attracting them to the destination
places. The article by Harris & Todaro (1970) is a key text of neoclassi-
cal migration studies. Individuals are assumed to act rationally within
a world dominated by the laws of supply and demand; imbalances
reach equilibrium through the unhindered operation of the market. At
the macro level, the factors causing migration may vary from develop-
mental gaps (e.g. different GDPs per capita), wage differentials and dif-
ferences in employment opportunities, to international trade3 and
FDI4. At the micro level, individuals decide whether to migrate or not
on the basis of a rational calculation of the migration costs (costs of tra-
vel or adaptation, financial or psychological, etc.) and the expected ben-
efits from migration5. It is assumed that after emigration the effects on
both host and sending economies (effects on wages, employment, liv-
ing and consumption standards, human capital, etc.) will reduce the
disparities between countries, and a new equilibrium will be achieved.
The whole migration issue is thus seen within the wider context of eco-
nomic development and growth, especially in the countries of origin,
and of international trade. Governments should not intervene, accord-
ing to this approach; the only way to reduce migration flows is through
measures promoting the free operation of the market and free trade.
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Neoclassical theory has been the target of much criticism question-
ing in depth most of its assumptions: the extent to which the ‘ration-
ally acting individual’ is always the key actor in the migration process;
the way equilibrium is achieved ‘automatically’ via market forces; the
failure to explain the persistence of migration flows when disparities
between countries reduce; the question whether free trade truly re-
duces migration flows instead of actually enhancing them; the ahistori-
cal analysis that neglects the development of inequalities between re-
gions and countries as an outcome of relations of dependency and ex-
ploitation. To an extent, part of this criticism has been developed
within orthodox economics. For instance, the new economics of migra-
tion (see Stark 1991) stresses the role of the family/household in the
migration decision: often larger social units, not only individuals, act
collectively to maximise income, and most importantly to minimise
risks and to loosen constraints associated with a variety of market fail-
ures. This approach also clearly distinguishes between the different
characteristics of developed and developing economies, and it further
explains why migration waves do not stop when wage differentials are
eliminated, as they also depend on imperfect markets in the sending
countries. The potential role of the government is here emphasised:
state intervention for managing migration is welcome not only for reg-
ulating the labour markets, but also the credit, insurance and capital
markets; the state should also have a more active role in income redis-
tribution. Despite its valuable contribution, however, the ‘new econom-
ics’ theory shares many of the limitations of the neoclassical approach.
The main criticism of neoclassical theory comes from the Marxist/
structuralist camp. In his own critique of political economy, Marx him-
self made a small contribution to the study of migration, which he saw
as a phenomenon embedded in the capitalist mode of production: capi-
tal searches for exploitable labour worldwide, mobilising itself, but also
labour, to move where capital needs it. In her classic Marxist analysis,
Potts (1990) explained how the development of the world labour mar-
ket has been connected to global capitalist expansion in two broad
phases: firstly, the emergence and development of the world market for
labour power under colonialism (with settlers, African slaves, Chinese
and Indian coolies, etc.); and secondly, the industrialisation process
and the direct incorporation of the capitalist metropole into the world
labour market. Dependency and world-systems theorists6 explained
how the industrialised countries of the core tend to need labour for
their productive and developmental needs, which is supplied to them
from the dependent developing countries of the periphery in the form
of migration: the ‘surplus population’ in the peripheries constitutes an
‘industrial reserve army’ which is deemed necessary for capitalist ex-
pansion. Migration is a result of the dislocations produced through the
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penetration of capitalist productive relations within peripheral societies
and the appropriation of their productive factors (land, raw materials
and labour) by capital and its agents (colonial and imperial powers,
multinational firms, dependent governments). Moreover, the economic
measures imposed by organisations such as the IMF or the World
Bank may also have displacement effects, since they expose developing
countries to international trade and investment, distorting thus indi-
genous productive and employment structures.
Further migration is generated through material and ideological
links created by the processes of capitalist penetration, like transporta-
tion and communication infrastructure, colonial languages and reli-
gions, Westernised consumerist lifestyles, etc. (Sassen 1999). In gener-
al, once a migration flow has been initiated there are several factors
contributing to its continuation, leading to a cumulative causation effect
(Massey et al. 1993). Out-migration and return may negatively affect
the distribution of income or land, the regional distribution of human
capital and the organisation of agrarian production in sending coun-
tries. The literature on migration, return and development has contrib-
uted much in analysing such possibilities (e.g. Swanson 1979; King
2000b). For example, the selectivity of the migration process usually
results in the devastation of migration areas in terms of human capital,
since these are emptied of the dynamic young and skilled labour force
and thus their productivity shrinks. Moreover, return migration may
create situations of relative deprivation, i.e. worsening of the position
of the poor in relation to the wealthier migrants’ families or returnees
(rather than becoming actually poorer), which further distorts an un-
even income distribution. The unproductive use of land bought by mi-
grants’ families and returnees in agrarian communities (e.g. as a sym-
bol of status) distorts the employment structure, leading to local unem-
ployment. All these may result in continuing or reproducing migration
flows.
Despite their essential differences, most of the above theories tend
to overemphasise the role of supply. Whether limited on the supply
side or focusing on the operation of the system as a whole, traditional
theories fail to understand a series of existing problems, for instance,
the phenomenon of having immigration inflows to countries with high
unemployment. A more comprehensive approach has been proposed
on the basis of dual labour market theory (Piore 1979), focusing on the
demand side by analysing labour markets in receiving countries. M. J.
Piore explained why developed countries seem to have a constant need
for cheap labour supply, partly covered by migrants, as an outcome of
labour-market segmentation, which results from the dual character of
the capital-labour relationship. Accordingly, there exist a capital-inten-
sive sector (with stable employment, skilled jobs, better wages, train-
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ing, trade-union protection, social security and prospects) and a labour-
intensive one (with unstable employment, unskilled, low-status and
badly paid jobs, no training, no union protection and without social se-
curity). Three basic features of developed economies contribute further
to this increased demand for migrant workers: structural inflation, mo-
tivational problems and the demography of labour supply. Sassen’s ana-
lysis of labour markets and employment structures in the so-called glo-
bal cities (1991; 1996) is largely based on this analytical framework.
Dual labour market theory generally concludes that governments can-
not reduce immigration flows without deep organisational and struc-
tural economic reforms. Its weakness lies in the loss of the whole pic-
ture of the migration process by neglecting the reasons making people
leave their countries; also, it is quite difficult to situate the fragmented
structure of labour markets empirically.
Deterministic theories of causes and effects fail to address the deter-
minants of migration once it has started, in time and space, and to link
micro issues with the macro level of analysis. Meso-level approaches
propose frameworks to connect the structural context and the indivi-
dual experience by emphasising the role of social ties, social networks
and social capital, or even institutions, in the migration process. The
institutional school contributed by stressing the role of humanitarian
organisations, on the one hand, and profit-making enterprises such as
the trafficking networks, on the other, in shaping contemporary migra-
tory patterns as a result of the contradiction between growing numbers
of people ‘on the move’ and increasing barriers to migration (Massey et
al. 1993). Network theory sees migration as an individual or collective
decision process, whereby the acts of migrants at one point influence
future migration decisions. Networks reduce the costs and risks of mi-
gration and thus increase the likelihood of further migration (chain mi-
gration), making it ‘progressively independent of the factors that ori-
ginally caused it’ (Massey et al. 1993: 449). Social networks function as
‘sources for the acquisition of scarce means, such as capital and infor-
mation’ and as ‘social bridges’ (Portes 1995: 8, 22): between those who
migrated and those left behind, between different members of a mi-
grant community, and between immigrants and locals; they constitute
sources of social capital that support migrants in the host country. The
recent debates on contemporary diasporas and transnationalism are
based on the role of networks (Smith & Guarnizo 1998; Vertovec & Co-
hen 1999; Kivisto 2001). Transnational networks, relationships and
practices of today, facilitated by transport, communication and informa-
tion technologies, point to new patterns of mobility, involving constant
movement backwards and forwards, rather than the traditional migra-
tion cycle.
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Ultimately, there is a tendency in both theory and empirical research
to link different perspectives, to look at parallel phenomena from dif-
ferent angles, to take into account various factors and abandon single
disciplinary approaches. Migration systems theories (School 1998), for ex-
ample, examine migration between two (or more) specific countries (or
two or more groups of countries) by focusing on various factors and by
looking at several links (economic, political, social, demographic, cul-
tural). Such links determine migration patterns between the countries
involved on the basis of a complex set of push and pull factors and
through various kinds of networks and institutions, all playing a role
in the ongoing migration process. Clearly then, migration theories
have been evolving to follow the development of the phenomena in
question, reflecting also the period in which they are born. Ammassari
& Black (2001) categorise migration studies into three main genera-
tions: (a) studies exploring the push and pull factors for migration; (b)
studies emphasising the structural relationship between core and per-
ipheral countries, connected in a system characterised by flows of capi-
tal, labour, goods, services and information which are facilitated by his-
torical and cultural links and the operation of migrant networks; and
(c) studies on contemporary international migration in the context of
globalisation, where areas of origin and of destination are linked to-
gether in transnational spaces. The characteristics of migration in the
contemporary era and their implications for theory and research are
going to be discussed after a brief introduction to the globalisation de-
bate.
2.1.2 Globalisation: key issues and a conceptual framework
There are several ways of interpreting globalisation (Held & MacGrew
1999). Within the vast academic literature, various perspectives pro-
pose different understandings and areas of focus. Sklair (1999) cate-
gorises the main approaches to globalisation according to four main
clusters of studies: world systems theory7, the global culture approach8,
the global society model9 and the global capitalism perspective10. These
perspectives are not necessarily contradictory, since they tend to high-
light different aspects. Obviously, they come from competing theoreti-
cal traditions, and perhaps they imply different political-ideological
standpoints; nevertheless, they may all contribute positively to a con-
ceptual understanding of globalisation. In addition, it has been argued
that globalisation is only a phase in a wider process of transition to-
wards a new form of social organisation. For example, Castells’ (1996:
1-2) description of the ‘network society’ highlights characteristics that
are also addressed by the theories mentioned above: 1) globalisation of
strategically decisive economic activities; 2) flexibility and instability of
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work and individualisation of labour; 3) a culture of virtual reality, con-
structed by a pervasive, interconnected and diversified media system;
and 4) transformation of the material foundations of life, space and
time, through the constitution of a ‘space of flows’ and of ‘timeless
time’ as expressions of dominant activities and controlling elites.
There are strong arguments against the globalisation thesis11. Some
challenge the exaggerations of globalisation proponents, providing evi-
dence, for instance, suggesting that the current phase of the world
economy is actually less ‘global’ than during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries (Hirst & Thompson 1996). Others claim that
the concept itself is artificially constructed in order to provide a satis-
factory description of the state of the world in the post-Cold War era
and/or to serve the dominant ideology of neoliberalism and the inter-
ests of the economic, political and intellectual elites (Vergopoulos
1999). In the sceptics’ criticism, globalisation is often misleadingly
confused with ‘internationalisation’; it is therefore essential to distin-
guish between the two terms12. Internationalisation may not involve
any qualitative change, but implies a quantitative growth and geo-
graphic expansion of national economies, as well as the openness and
integration of markets. In fact, internationalisation, mostly concerning
economic processes, is both a dimension and an indicator of globalisa-
tion, which is a far broader and more multidimensional process. One
could observe additional trends indicating that something has indeed
changed; such trends cannot be traced by economistic quantitative ac-
counts, nor can they be seen simply as ‘constructions’ of the dominant
rhetoric.
Qualitative changes in the dynamics of the world system are so im-
portant as to suggest that we are currently living through a period of
transition. Such changes have occurred in the organisation of the pro-
duction process and the geography of production; in the character of la-
bour and capital, and the relationship between the two; in the declining
power of nation-states and the increased role of TNCs and other insti-
tutions on the international scene; and in the forms of cultural produc-
tion and interaction. Globalisation is the prominent term describing
the current phase, and as such it certainly serves the prevailing neolib-
eral ideology in the way it is used by the media, think-tanks and policy
makers, though it entails far more than being simply a terminological
or ideological tool. Multiplying and intensifying cross-border flows (of
capital, goods, services and people, but also of media images, ideas, or
pollution) are key indicators of a new historical phase; transnational
networks (of corporations, markets, governments, NGOs, crime syndi-
cates or cultural communities) are its key organising structure, and
modern information and communication technologies are its key tools
(Castles 2000: 271).
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Information is now the main source of productivity and power (Cas-
tells 1996). Flows of information, as well as capital, goods, services
and people, which increasingly characterise the contemporary world,
are facilitated and speeded up by technological innovations stimulated
by the microelectronics revolution. Money and information can now be
moved between distant places by simply pressing a key on a computer.
Borders are increasingly penetrable to trade and investment, and some
national economic instruments are crucially controlled by suprana-
tional organisations; only migration is partly held down, dependent on
rigid nation-state regulations. Common cultural values and sets of
rules are being disseminated on a global scale. Neoliberalism has
emerged as the only dominant ideology seeking to give answers and
drive evolution. Neoliberal policies, however, build on the defeat of the
alternative paradigm that divided the world until recently and on the
successive retreat of anti-systemic movements as a majority choice.
The collapse of the authoritarian regimes and centralised economic
systems in the former Eastern Bloc (notably without any significant so-
cial unrest) and China’s transition to capitalism13 (without major politi-
cal reforms) have led to the dismantling of the post-war geopolitical
balance of the Cold War and made possible the incorporation of these
regions in the global market system14.
Two additional elements are indicative of the contemporary period
and are often highlighted as both symptoms and outcomes of globalisa-
tion processes. One has to do with the shifting role and significance of
the nation-state; the other concerns the new form of the global-local re-
lationship. The nation-state, as a historical model of territorial-political
organisation connected to capitalist development, was based on three
organic elements: the nation, the state and a corresponding geographic
territory (Hobsbawm 1992). Today, these elements are not that dis-
tinctly defined: many of the state’s traditional powers have been eroded
and transferred beyond the national level; its ethnic and cultural homo-
geneity is undermined, its legitimacy weakens, its autonomy and sover-
eignty are seriously challenged15. This crisis of the nation-state results
from its failure to manage successfully matters at the international le-
vel, such as capital movements, environmental protection and the guar-
antee of human rights (Strange 1999)16. It now appears ‘too small to
deal with the big matters and too big to deal with the small ones’
(Klein 1997). As a result, the local space seems to separate from the
national one and come into direct interplay with the global: places, in-
dependently from states, are increasingly interconnected in multilateral
networks (Castells 1996); cities and communities now compete directly
with each other in an uneven international terrain (Budd 1998). Some
emerge as crucial intersections in transnational spaces and become glo-
bal or regional centres of economic, political and cultural activity. Glo-
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bal flows are filtered through specific places, where international forces
are reflected or expressed by taking particular forms. The major cities
of the world have achieved global reach (Sassen 1991); they are in more
direct contact with each other than with the rest of their national
economies; they have become administrative centres of the global econ-
omy and concentrate the headquarters of most major corporations. The
polarisation between financial/cultural services and labour-intensive ac-
tivities is represented in these large cosmopolitan centres more than
anywhere else.
It is crucial to acknowledge the historicity of globalisation and under-
stand it as a historical process: its historical origins are to be traced in
modernity and capitalism17. In his pioneering work on globalisation,
Robertson (1992) has seen its dynamics developing together with the
expansion of Europe (economic, geographic, political, scientific, cultur-
al, etc.)18, certainly connected to the evolution of modernity. Thus, glo-
balisation can be understood as a consequence of modernity, constantly
unfolding to gradually embrace the entire world; Giddens (1991) de-
scribes it as a phenomenon of late modernity (which is ‘inherently glo-
balising’). Similarly, the economic dynamics of globalisation have been
structurally embedded in the process of the development and expan-
sion of the world capitalist system, whose origins lie back in fifteenth-
century Europe (Wallerstein 1974). Its seeds can be found in capital’s
non-national nature (Marx) and in the international division of labour
under capitalism (classical economists). The development of a world la-
bour market went hand in hand with capitalist expansion (Potts 1990),
passing from colonialism to the industrial revolution, the making of
nation-states and the twentieth-century labour migrations. Industriali-
sation and the development of national economies in Western Europe
over the nineteenth century led to the establishment of an international
system of nation-states, which enjoyed an early form of economic ‘glo-
balisation’ (Hirst & Thompson 1996). Imperialism, as a phase of late
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century capitalism, had many common
features with contemporary globalisation19, but the period after the
First World War was characterised by the prevalence of monopoly capit-
alism and national economic development.
How has the world economy arrived at its current stage? The basic
changes that led to what appears to be a linear trend towards the gra-
dual ‘unification’ of the globe20 have been embedded in a wider process
of restructuring (of production and consumption, capital and labour)
on a global scale. The turning point is almost indisputably located in
the changes brought by the economic crisis that followed the 1973 oil
shock. The dramatic increases in energy costs in the developed coun-
tries generated this crisis, with long-lasting effects: slowing-down of
productivity, declining profitability, rising unemployment. The Fordist
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model21 had reached a dead-end. The labour process and international
economic relations were the basic factors underlying this deep structur-
al crisis (Allen 1996). The first (supply) factor was related to the inabil-
ity of mass-production methods to realise further productivity gains
within manufacturing, as well as their limited applicability to the grow-
ing services sector. The latter (demand) factor had to do with the chan-
ging patterns of post-war global demand, since, with the devaluation of
the dollar (and the breaking up of the Bretton Woods monetary sys-
tem), international competition intensified (as countries like Japan and
West Germany saw their economic power augmenting), leading to in-
creasing global economic instability.
The capitalist system found a way out of the crisis through the radi-
cal transformation of its inner dynamic: although capitalist productive
relations remain the same, deep qualitative changes occurred in the
structures of the system, stimulating productivity and profitability. In
the West, the new post-Fordist regime of flexible accumulation presup-
poses efficiency and adaptability with a focus on technology, quality,
planning, innovation and ‘just in time’ strategies, which now constitute
critical elements for the competitiveness of enterprises (Murray 1989).
Restructuring involves three major shifts in the structure and organisa-
tion of labour and production (King & Rybaczuk 1993: 182-183)22: (a)
from the Fordist system of mass production for mass consumption
(economies of scale) to the post-Fordist regime of flexible production
in small and specialised units (economies of scope); (b) from the preva-
lence of heavy industry to the increasing importance of high-tech man-
ufacturing; and (c) the labour process has undergone important
changes, mainly due to increased automation and informationalisation
of production. In addition, we can identify three basic dimensions of
the transformations brought by the restructuring process.
The first concerns the inner dynamics of the system. Contemporary
capitalism is marked by the transition from the industrial to the infor-
mational mode of development (Castells 1989), since knowledge and
information have replaced energy-machinery as central elements in the
accumulation process and have become strategic resources, apart from
being products themselves (Castells 1989; 1996; Allen 1996)23. Infor-
mationalisation shrinks social and spatial distances and compresses
time, facilitating the development of networks between corporations
(Castells 1996). New technologies intensify the mobility and speed of
financial capital and have contributed to the consequent emergence of
new financial systems, markets and instruments (Harvey 1989). The
bulk of financial capital has grown in relation to the growth rate of the
real economy, and it is increasingly invested in ‘parasitic’ activities (Fro¨-
bel et al. 1983; Vergopoulos 1999). In parallel, the tertiary sector grows
in size and importance as financial, research and managerial activities
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become central to the operation of the system, but also as the demand
for personal and low-skilled services increases, especially in cities (Sas-
sen 1991; 1996), and the voluntary sector also augments (Rifkin 1995).
Informationalisation, de-industrialisation, tertiarisation and the domi-
nation of financial capital have led scholars to emphasise the post-in-
dustrial character of economic restructuring. To an extent, material pro-
duction has lost part of its importance, since ‘what is increasingly pro-
duced are not material objects, but signs’, i.e. information, brands,
trademarks and labels (Lash & Urry 1994: 4).
The second dimension has to do with changes in class relations as
these reflect the transformation of production structures and relations,
and they are also manifested in new consumption patterns. Class oppo-
sition is no longer based solely on the possession and control of the
means of production, but increasingly on the access to information
and its uses (Touraine 1971). In addition, the patterns of social stratifi-
cation have changed significantly and traditional class divisions are not
that easily distinguishable today24. Increased income aspirations, high-
er living standards and welfare regimes in developed countries have
led to the formation of a wide middle class, in terms of both income
and mentality (Gorz 1980), with two important effects on the patterns
of demand: consumers now look more at the quality, rather than the
cost, of products and services (Reyneri & Baganha 1999), while the de-
mand for personal services, both basic and highly specialised ones, is
increasing (Sassen 1996)25. This latter development has contributed to
the formation of new ‘servile’ classes, offering personal and other ser-
vices to middle-class strata as well as to the traditional elites (Gorz
1980; Sassen 1996). As a consequence, labour markets are increas-
ingly characterised by segmentation and dualism26, which lead to the
casualisation of employment relations, to new forms of employment
(temporary, part-time) and hence to new types of workers (Sassen
1996; Psimmenos 1995). Together with joblessness and structural un-
employment, these developments contribute to new types of social po-
larisation, which reproduce capitalist productive relations through a si-
tuation of constant tension between a narrow economic elite and a
growing population at the bottom of the pyramid, with a fragile middle
class in between.
The third dimension is political and relates to changes in both gov-
ernmental policies and forms of social resistance. The mainstream pol-
icy discourse and practice shifted from Keynesianism, characteristic of
the Fordist era, to neoliberalism. Increasingly, Western governments
have adopted policies promoting ‘less state’ and deregulating the mar-
kets. This transition came as an outcome of the ideological and politi-
cal ‘defeat’ of the alternative (socialist) paradigm, as it had been practi-
cally adopted (in a rather distorted way) in the countries of the erst-
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while Eastern Bloc. But it is also connected to the crisis of the state,
both material (since it lost its ability to autonomously control the na-
tional economy, and it is further undermined by globalisation forces)
and ideological (since it is losing legitimacy in people’s minds and poli-
tical behaviour). On the other hand, social resistance and alternative
paradigms shifted from traditional working-class struggle to identity
politics and new social movements (Touraine 1971; Castells 1997). New
claims, which have their origins in the 1960s tradition – women’s
emancipation, environmental protection, consumers’ rights, racial
equality, human rights – have emerged in the agenda of contemporary
social movements, and are currently interconnecting in a growing glo-
bal network of grassroots bodies and NGOs to challenge the neoliberal
character of globalisation27.
Identifying the qualitatively new elements that globalisation brings
should not lead to exaggerations regarding the importance and role of
‘new’ phenomena. Endogenous (historical) processes should not be un-
derestimated: states and places are undisputedly shaped by the history
of the country to which they belong, and they are linked to its fate; the
nation-state is transforming, rather than fading (Mann 1993). In addi-
tion, the information-based society ‘is no more post-industrial than the
industrial society was post-agrarian’ (Castells 1989: 367). Even the new
high-tech and information industries themselves require some un-
skilled and semi-skilled labour for both productive and supportive jobs,
such as office cleaning, catering facilities, etc. (Sassen 1996; Samers
1998). Capital-intensive strategies, information-based production and
automation coexist with labour-intensive activities, often in the same
economic sectors. Industrial capital might have lost its centrality, but
the global industrial output is augmenting: it is rather industrial em-
ployment that shrinks, especially with the de-industrialisation process
in the West and the relocation of heavy industry outside the erstwhile
traditional centres of industrial development (Samers 1998). On a glo-
bal scale, mass production has not ceased, but it is technically more
automated, organisationally more flexible, and geographically diffused
all over the world, so that we can refer to a global Fordist system (Li-
pietz 1987).
The global economy is being both geographically and institutionally
reorganised. The past few decades have been marked by a trend to-
wards the liberalisation of economic activity, trade and investment. Gi-
ven the international hierarchy of power and development, the main
beneficiaries are clearly the wealthier actors, those who control the
rules of the game. Investment is relocated in favour of developed
economies (Fro¨bel et al. 1983) and, despite liberalisation, trade takes
place on the basis of international agreements (GATT, NAFTA, etc.)
that seem to impose a kind of new protectionism and control by Eur-
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ope, the US and Japan, disadvantaging developing countries (Hettne
1990)28. Today, more than ever, capital can choose where to locate: not
only as a result of the speed and instantaneity of financial transactions,
but also due to the mobility of productive capital. Multinational and
transnational corporations have grown enormously in size and ‘their
global reach has expanded dramatically’ (Sklair 1999: 146-147)29. Such
companies have achieved the spatial and organisational separation of
labour-intensive practices and material production from administrative-
managerial and research functions (Findlay 1996) through several in-
creasingly popular strategies (outsourcing, subcontracting, etc.). Ad-
ministration, management and research activities, and the high-tech
industries are concentrated mostly in the core areas of the developed
world and in global cities (Sassen, 1991). Labour-intensive production
is relocated to the peripheries of the traditional industrial centres and
increasingly to the South and, since 1989, to the East. Given the mobi-
lity of capital, the position of countries or regional blocks within the
world system and international migration trends, global economic re-
structuring presupposes and imposes a new international division of
labour (Fro¨bel et al. 1983).
As the crisis becomes a permanent structural element of the system,
the new division of labour generates inequalities both between and
within states. The West is the centre of the dynamics of change, but its
social net, characterised by relative cohesion in the post-war era, is now
undermined. At the same time, globalisation and restructuring affect
the rest of the world in similarly contradictory ways. The (erstwhile)
‘Second World’ faces serious economic and social problems, generated
by the process of transition; Western states and multinationals see it as
a virgin market with a potentially exploitable cheap labour force. Un-
employment has risen and living conditions have fallen below pre-
1989 acceptable standards; social polarisation is deepening, with the
emergence of small indigenous elites composed of those who have
grasped new opportunities or inherited privileges from their bureau-
cratic past, among them many who have connections with organised
crime30. On the other hand, the chronic problems of the so-called
‘Third World’ persist, despite development programmes adopted dur-
ing recent decades. Conflicts, famine and malnutrition (sub-Saharan
Africa), demographic explosion and its consequences (China, India)
and the debt crisis (Latin America) are the basic problems that less-de-
veloped countries are facing at present (Hettne 1990). Although some
areas have experienced positive economic change, resulting in a rear-
rangement of their peripheral position within the world system31, in
most cases, restructuring has altered production structures with distort-
ing socio-economic effects. The reawakening of aggressive national-
isms and religious fundamentalisms has partly replaced previous ideo-
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logical paradigms; new oppressive regimes, wars and social conflicts in
many areas exhibit few signs of a way out of this crisis.
To conclude, globalisation remains a phase in the ongoing processes
of capitalist development, but the qualitative changes it entails are indi-
cative of a period of global transformation. To assume, however, a
homogeneous integrated global economy would be an exaggeration;
and to take recent developments as consolidated, definite situations
suggesting that we live in a brand new world is blindness at best. It is
rather wiser to talk about emerging trends consisting of bigger quanti-
ties and new qualities: new and old forms coexist in contradictory ways
and are fused or interconnected in both time and space. After all, the
new always brings malfunctions and destabilisation, creating fragmen-
ted patterns of development and producing contradictions; globalisa-
tion concerns a set of processes, which at the same time homogenise
and differentiate32. New and older forms are both part of the system;
in times of crises its internal dynamics stimulate new discoveries, new
mechanisms, new ways of exploiting labour and natural resources, but
also new ways of life and social resistance. Globalisation is more of a
trend towards the internationalisation of economies, integration of
markets, multiplication of flows, unification of networks, fusion of cul-
tures, etc. Contemporary international migration is part of it: it is
shaped by, and partly shapes its e´poque, and it is impossible for it to
be studied in isolation.
2.1.3 Migration and globalisation: exploring the links
Scholars have recently suggested that a careful study of contemporary
migration should take into account the changes brought by globalisa-
tion. Papastergiadis (2000: Ch. 1) has talked about the ‘twin processes’
of migration and globalisation; Castles & Miller (1998: 5) have written:
‘international migration is part of a transnational revolution that is re-
shaping society and politics around the globe.’ At the turn of the cen-
tury, migration has emerged as a central issue on the international eco-
nomic and political scene and has become a major factor in societal
change and a crucial area of policy for many countries (Castles & Mill-
er 1998; Castles 2000). Globalisation and capitalist restructuring have
altered the patterns of international migration, but they are themselves
affected by the new multidimensional migration trends. Exploring the
links between migration and globalisation is not just one more inter-
esting but useless academic riddle. It can stimulate a worthy debate
and provide a framework for a better understanding not only of con-
temporary migration trends, but also of an aspect of the world in
which we live. And it may also reveal certain implications for both pol-
icy-making and everyday life.
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The causes of emigration from the South and the East of the globe
are clearly rooted in the problems briefly mentioned earlier: inequal-
ities between and within countries, together with political (wars, op-
pressive governments), cultural (gender inequalities, oppression of reli-
gious beliefs), and environmental (natural disasters, environmental de-
gradation) factors. But new types of mobility are also multiplying
across the globe and remain relatively little analysed by scholarly re-
search: specialised transients and world tourists, skilled migrants, sin-
gle women, young ‘adventurers’ and international students33. The di-
versity and intensity of today’s population movements, despite barriers
to immigration imposed by the West (to migrants from developing and
‘transition’ countries), suggest that labour, too, seems to follow the
rules of the market; though it is not strictly ‘the market’ that deter-
mines contemporary migration patterns, but rather a variety of factors
associated with a wide range of causes and motivations. Migrants, in
the broad sense of the term, clearly have their position within the new
international division of labour (Cohen 1987; Harris 1995), although
on their own they do not form a homogenous global work force. More-
over, migrants and a variety of people ‘on the move’, and their actions,
practices and relationships, increasingly characterise and shape societal
forms and norms in an ever-growing number of countries, cities and
places. Although old forms coexist with new ones, the characteristics of
contemporary international migration differ from those of the past.
The prevailing trends can be summarised as follows34:
1. The increasing heterogeneity of both sending and receiving coun-
tries, reflecting a new geography of international migration35 (King
1993), and the growing interdependence between countries of ori-
gin and destination through economic, political and cultural bonds
(Castles & Miller 1998; Sassen 1999).
2. The variety of migration channels and routes, such as the role of
trafficking networks (IOM 2001; 2002), and the degree and scale of
‘illegal’ migration (Ghosh 1998), as a result of tightened controls
and restrictive polices, and the increasing importance of several
forms of migration less represented in the past.
3. The changing characteristics of the migrants themselves: (a) nota-
bly, it is not mainly the poorer who migrate (Castles & Miller
1998); (b) ‘brain drain’ trends are being generated (Harris 1995); (c)
mobility of elites and specialists is also on an upward trend (Findlay
1995); (d) the participation of women as independent actors in the
migration process is growing (Phizacklea 1998).
4. The shifting patterns of immigrant employment in destination
places (Piore 1979), especially in cities, as migrants are increasingly
employed in the service sector (Pugliese 1993), and, to a large ex-
tent, in personal services (Sassen 1996a), including informal (i.e.
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jobs performed in the secondary labour market) or even illegal activ-
ities (e.g. sex work, drug-dealing, etc.)36.
5. The emergence of new ethnic minorities (Castles et al. 1984) chal-
lenging the traditional basis of nation-states (Soysal 1994) and giv-
ing birth to hybrid deterritorialised identities (Papastergiadis 2000),
and the generation of transnational practices and mobility among
‘new’ and older migrants, leading to the consolidation of ‘diasporic’
communities across transnational spaces (Smith & Guarnizo 1998;
Vertovec & Cohen 1999).
Again, it is important to stress the qualitative aspects: exploring the
new trends requires the analysis of structures and processes rather
than focusing on numbers. After all, numbers and percentages are very
poor means to express social change: despite the increase in the total
number of migrants all over the world, from 75.2 million in 1965 to
174.8 million in 2000, their share in the global population grew by
only 0.6 per cent (Zlotnik 1999: Table 1; UNPD 2002: Table 1). In re-
cent research, Tapinos & Delaunay (2000) have argued that a compari-
son of available statistical data does not show any increase in the mi-
gration flows, comparing them to the flows of capital, goods and ser-
vices during the last three decades. As expected, however, statistics are
about the registered ‘foreign born’ or ‘migrant’ populations; they can-
not always count the numerous ‘undocumented’ nor the children of
migrants who have been born and grow up in the host countries.
Moreover, there exist several other forms of migration that remain un-
recorded: students who work during and/or after their studies; tourists
or travellers who stay for employment in the destination place; cross-
border ‘shuttle’ migrants, etc. Apart from the insufficiency of data, the
relatively low growth of the global migrant population is explained
partly by the paradoxical context in which migration takes place today.
While the trend is towards the liberalisation of markets for goods, ser-
vices and capital, with migration what happens is rather the contrary:
although many political and technical barriers to the movement of peo-
ple have been eliminated, dominant policy trends in developed coun-
tries at present clearly restrict immigration. From a historical point of
view, the largest (voluntary) migration wave remains the one that took
place between 1815-1914. Even so, migration flows are ultimately ra-
pidly increasing: in the last decade (1990-2000) the number of people
residing outside their country of birth grew by 13.5 per cent (UNPD
2002: 2).
Contemporary migration is part and parcel of globalisation pro-
cesses, and the characteristics presented above clearly suggest the mul-
tiplication, diversification and transnationalisation of flows. From a
geographical point of view, mapping global migration has become an
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extremely difficult task; if there exists a global migration system, then
this is definitely a non-linear one. It would be impossible to draw the
turbulent flows of today: the diversity of paths and the complexity of
movements would lead us to a rather chaotic map of global migration
(Papastergiadis 2000). However, it is not only the structure and pat-
terns of movement that are changing, but also crucially the economic,
political and cultural implications of contemporary migration pro-
cesses. From a geopolitical perspective, migration has now become a
global issue: sending countries increasingly need to combine their emi-
gration and return policies with their development projects; receiving
states face growing immigration pressures and have to deal with the
existing migrant populations. At the economic level, as we have seen,
globalisation stimulates important systemic changes (internationalisa-
tion, informalisation, tertiarisation, changing structural and organisa-
tional patterns, etc.). The key task in exploring the relationship be-
tween globalisation and migration is to look for the linkages between
these changes and the new characteristics of international migration
presented above. Indeed, the changes in immigrant employment, the
emergence of new paths and new types of migrants, etc., reflect devel-
opments in the global economy that are expressed similarly in different
social formations and suggest that migratory processes today take place
within an increasingly globalising environment. Migration is thus part
of the dynamics of globalisation, as it has a structural function in the
dynamics of the capitalist system (Cohen 1987; Harris 1995): although
labour is less mobile than capital, contemporary capitalist globalisation
creates the conditions for the ‘transnationalisation’ of labour (Portes
1997).
Moreover, migration ‘involves a stretching across space of both the
social relations of production and the more personal networks of indi-
vidual people and ethnic communities’ (King 1995: 7). Migrants estab-
lish human links between places and their interpersonal networks pro-
vide a basis for social action in transnational spaces (Vertovec & Cohen
1999), where cultures are often fused and identities are hybridised (Pa-
pastergiadis 2000). Transnational practices increasingly characterise
processes of migration and integration, and many migrants today can-
not fit within past conceptions of the permanent or long-term ‘settler’
but actually lead lives between ‘here’ and ‘there’; transnational flows,
involving frequent moves between countries or communities, are more
and more the case for growing numbers of people (Smith & Guarnizo
1998; Vertovec & Cohen 1999). The advent of transnational migration
today has led scholars to refer to a form of ‘globalisation from below’
(Portes 1997). Clearly, past migrations together with recent technologi-
cal advances made possible the generation and spread of various forms
of transnationalism. Such developments have partly undermined the
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territorial, cultural and political foundations of the traditional nation-
state: not only are national borders increasingly porous to human
flows, despite the barriers, but also the homogeneity of Western na-
tions is no more and the patterns of social and political membership
are moving beyond the national level (Soysal 1994; Sassen 1996b),
questioning the context and content of citizenship (Baubock 2002).
Global or ‘globalising’ cities (Sassen 1991) are attracting various cate-
gories of migrants, hence they increasingly become multicultural enti-
ties characterised by pluralism and diversity (Papastergiadis 2000).
Globalisation and migration forces are uniquely reflected in large cos-
mopolitan centres, where they produce polarisation and tensions (Sas-
sen 1996a), but also coexistence and fusions that result in ‘many cities
within a city’. Thus urban societies become mirrors of the world (Men-
dieta 2001).
In this globalising world, characterised by constant interaction and
increasing interdependence between distant societies, processes and
patterns of international migration are becoming more complex than
ever before. Migration is now a global phenomenon, one of the visible
aspects of globalisation and one of its major forces. Talking about ‘the
globalisation of migration’ would certainly be an exaggeration, since
much of today’s transnational mobility remains local or regional in
scale (as the case of Albania and Greece illustrates; see, for instance,
Baldwin-Edwards 2004b; King & Mai 2004). However, the brief analy-
sis in this chapter clearly shows that, today more than ever, migration
processes have intensified and have far more implications than the
simple spatial movement and resettlement of people, whether tempor-
ary or permanent. It affects both sending and receiving societies, and
the migrants, of course, but also those left behind and the host popula-
tions. A multifaceted process in itself, and yet a dynamic one, interna-
tional migration shapes and is being shaped by globalisation forces,
through several kinds of flows and various linkages and forms of ex-
change between countries or places, cultures, economies and people.
The study of migration today can be a challenging and exciting experi-
ence, since it may be seen as a ground for understanding broader or re-
lated phenomena. But it also constitutes an area that may stimulate
rich theoretical discussions and can offer potential for methodological
and analytical innovation. Past theoretical traditions, analytical meth-
ods and conceptual frameworks now seem inadequate to explain the
changing patterns of global migration and the phenomena associated
with it. Their understanding of social change is rather poor, as they ap-
pear inefficient in describing the various forms of flows, the new types
of migrants, the linkages that are being established, the networks oper-
ating at several levels, the hybridisation of cultures, identities and so-
cial forms.
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Massey et al. (1993) have argued that the theories presented earlier
are not necessarily contradictory, since they are concerned with differ-
ent problems, examine different levels of analysis (macro, micro,
meso), or are drawn out of different empirical cases. A comprehensive
approach to contemporary migration processes should thus be based
on a combination of different perspectives, or, at least, of those that are
more appropriate to the specific interests of a particular research. The
history of migration studies clearly shows an evolution and enrichment
of migration theory over time (Ammassari & Black 2001), through in-
fluences from both the social context in which it is produced and the
useful contributions of various fields in the social sciences. Therefore,
interdisciplinary approaches can be useful in enlightening aspects of
the phenomenon that have remained in darkness as a result of aca-
demic overspecialisation. As King (2002: 101) puts it, addressing the is-
sues of contemporary migration requires a comparative and ‘interdisci-
plinary approach, which also recognises paradigmatic plurality and the
value of mixed methodologies’. Comparative research is necessary not
simply for assessing similarities and differences between migrant
groups, countries or localities. It is crucial for understanding the rele-
vance of the broader context as it might be reflected in common fea-
tures and processes, and for capturing the intrinsic beauty of possibly
unique cases as well as the novelty of potential emerging trends.
As the global context is rapidly and radically transforming, social
science should break away from the certainties of the past and from
the linear deterministic perceptions of reality. Studying migration today
will reveal the complexities of social processes that are increasingly in-
terconnected. As processes of societal transformation across the world
take place with the advent of globalisation, it is necessary to under-
stand the dialectics of migration; i.e. the relationship between migra-
tion and social change on all possible scales (global, regional, national,
local), all levels (economic, social, political, cultural, spatial), and the
patterns of interaction between these. Needless to say, it is crucial to in-
corporate a critical element into any kind of analysis: critical towards
those who control economic and political power; to the way ‘things
work’ and to the form they appear in, as well as to the way they are
commonly perceived. Lastly, one needs to be careful not to lose the
most important element involved in the migration process: the human
one. As King (1995: 31) has written, the study of migration may reveal
the ‘inequalities and human dramas that lie at the heart of the process
of globalisation’. Linking the structural context and the individual ex-
perience of migration not only underlines the central role of the in-
equality structures, but also implies that attention should be focused
on the personal experiences and the voice of the migrants themselves.
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But what is the relevance of the above rather theoretical and abstract
analysis to the specificities of recent immigration to Greece and the
particularities of the case studied in the thesis? How do globalisation
forces affect given social formations and people in specific localities? It
should be stated beforehand that such an impact is rather indirect and
relates to specific manifestations of global processes at the local/na-
tional level (e.g. the way Greece has been experiencing the rise in the
global demand for cheap labour; see Psimmenos 1995), or how it is fil-
tered through regional ‘layers’, which obviously play a more important
role than abstract mechanisms of the global economy (e.g. Greece’s EU
membership and the process of European integration, the Southern
European developmental particularities, the new regional position of
Greece in the post-1989 Balkan space). These issues are examined in
the first few pages of the section that follows and they are revisited at
the end of the thesis in Chapter 9.
2.2 The Greek case in international perspective
Several characteristics of contemporary global and European migration
can be observed in the Greek case (see Fassmann & Mu¨nz 1994; Cas-
tles & Miller 1998; Koser & Lutz 1998; Muus 2001). Firstly, the diver-
sity in the origin of the migrants: the 2001 census recorded nationals
of more than 200 countries, although the ‘East-West’ migration pat-
terns (which for Greece are actually from North to South in compass
terms) are dominant by far. Secondly, there exist various categories of
migrants: returning former emigrants or diaspora Greeks and repa-
triated political refugees; highly skilled professionals and unskilled la-
bour immigrants; international students and tourist workers; refugees
and asylum seekers; sex workers; and transit migrants heading to other
EU countries. Women, but also children, constitute important shares
in the migrant ‘stock’, whether as victims of trafficking, dependent fa-
mily members or independent actors. The channels, routes and types
of migration are heterogeneous: visa overstays of tourists and students,
family migration, cross-border circular and seasonal movements, traf-
ficking and large-scale clandestine migration. Lastly, immigrants’ em-
ployment in the service sector appears to be of particular importance
and the informal sector plays a crucial role in their economic integra-
tion.
The transformation of Greece into a new destination for interna-
tional migrants coincided with a series of parallel developments that
have signalled processes of increasing exposure to global trends. In
fact, migration can be seen as one of the factors indicating Greece’s
particular experience of globalisation; other factors may include:
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– The redefinition of the regional position and role of Greece in the
Balkans, in the advent of post-1989 developments in Eastern Eur-
ope and the former USSR.
– The ongoing process of European integration and the transfer of
certain powers to European bodies, especially in respect to Greece’s
membership in the Common Market, the eurozone and the Schen-
gen Area.
– The general trends of restructuring and internationalisation of the
national economy, as expressed, for example, by: the privatisation of
key state companies and the process of de-industrialisation; the lib-
eralisation of exchange rates; the growing amount of Greek capital
invested abroad and the relocation of production; the further tertiar-
isation of the economy, particularly regarding banking, finance,
business and IT services, etc.
Within this context, Greece is radically transforming into a multicultur-
al society, with all the implications this might have for the economic,
spatial, cultural and political spheres of social life. Again, recent trends
and developments generally resemble past and present European ex-
periences, including social tensions and xenophobic hostility or socio-
spatial segregation and exclusion at several levels, but also informal or
organised forms of solidarity and reciprocity, as well as various transna-
tional types of mobility and practice. Above all, however, the Greek ex-
perience of immigration shares common characteristics with the rest
of the Southern EU member states. This section proceeds with details
of the Southern European transition from emigration to immigration.
The uniqueness of Greece within the Southern European immigration
model (King 2000a), partly resulting from its geographic position in
the Balkans, is also addressed. Section 2.2.2 offers a description of cur-
rent immigration trends with reference to key characteristics of the
Greek economy and Greek society. The chapter ends with an overview
of the development of the immigration policy framework.
2.2.1 Greece in Southern Europe and the Balkan dimension
Much of what is associated today with globalisation takes a particular
form in groups of countries sharing similar socio-economic characteris-
tics. The transformation of Southern Europe into a new destination re-
gion for migrants during the last few decades is related to the changing
character of the international division of labour and the important shift
of the region’s position within it (King & Rybaczuk 1993; King et al.
1997; Castles & Miller 1998; King 2000a). The parallel emigration his-
tories of Portugal, Italy, Spain and Greece are not the only common
feature that has marked their similar patterns of social and economic
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development. Despite their particularities, regional exceptions and dif-
ferent national histories, these countries share common contradictions
indicating their distinct path to capitalist development, reflected in si-
milar productive and employment structures as well as in similar poli-
tical and cultural characteristics (Giner 1985; Leontidou 1990; Min-
gione 1995).
Giner (1985: 310) has identified four common historical contradic-
tions of Southern European societies: (a) cultural universalism and lo-
cal and kinship bonds of patronage; (b) religious legitimation of public
institutions and militant secularism; (c) classless and doctrinaire politi-
cal commitments and uncompromisingly class-bound ideologies; and
(d) dependent industrialisation and a substantial degree of national ca-
pitalism. On these grounds, Mingione (1995) has argued that Southern
European countries provide examples of a distinct model of capitalist
development, characterised by late industrialisation, persisting impor-
tance of agriculture and traditional activities, heavy reliance on tour-
ism, limited proletarianisation of the labour force, prevalence of family
micro-businesses and high rates of self-employment, large under-
ground economies and widespread informal employment arrange-
ments. Leontidou (1990; 1996) has written that this particular South-
ern European version of capitalism has led to common processes of ur-
ban development, historically characterised by spontaneity and
informality rather than planning: (a) Mediterranean cities have com-
pact landscapes reflecting their long histories, with narrow streets, tall
buildings and suburbs fairly close to the centre; (b) land use is rela-
tively mixed, rather than divided in zones; (c) social classes are gener-
ally not horizontally segregated across the urban space, despite a ten-
dency of the more affluent to live in city centres, but there is a ‘vertical’
expression of social differentiation (the rich on the upper floors). Fer-
rera (1996) and Symeonidou (1999) have underlined the particularities
of Southern European welfare regimes, which can be seen as a distinct
model situated between the ‘liberal’ and the ‘conservative’/‘corporatist’
ones37, characterised by late development, clientalism, fragmentation
and mainly participatory benefits of low value. The role of the family is
crucial in social support, and the care of children and the elderly is
mostly performed by women, compensating for the insufficiency of the
welfare state.
In the course of the past thirty years or so, all four countries have
been undergoing more or less similar processes of economic restruc-
turing and political change, which to an extent coincided with their
transformation into migrant-receiving states (Hadjimichalis 1994; Min-
gione 1995; Vaiou & Hadjimichalis 1997). The interaction of internal
and external factors has contributed to the gradual formation of the ne-
cessary material conditions for the attraction of foreign labour to these
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erstwhile migrant-sending countries. International economic and poli-
tical trends, the development of domestic economies, political, histori-
cal and cultural factors, demography and geography sketch the basic
reasons that explain this transition. Common patterns and features al-
low us to speak of a distinct Southern European model of immigration
(King 2000a); these are briefly analysed in the following paragraphs38.
On the one hand, there is the effect of international developments. By
the mid-1970s increasing unemployment and the rise of xenophobia
and extreme Right activism combined with the growing concern of the
international community and the EU about issues of terrorism, smug-
gling, drug trafficking, and (later) immigration led the traditional re-
ceiving states to increasingly restrictive measures of policing and bor-
der control (Salt 1992; Mousourou 1993; King & Rybaczuk 1993). The
fact that prospective migrants were facing closed doors at the ‘old’ des-
tinations is considered one of the chief factors that stimulated the shift
of Southern European countries from transit states to ‘waiting rooms’
and, finally, to host societies (Mousourou 1993; Fakiolas 1995; Sole´
1995; King et al. 1997; King 2000a). The collapse of the command
economies in Central and Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Un-
ion, and the problems of economic and political transition, generated a
new migration trend from East to West (Kupiszewski 1996), whereby
Southern European countries became a major destination (Baganha &
Fonseca 2004). Political instability and corruption, together with post-
1989 conflicts in the Balkans and elsewhere in the former ‘socialist’
camp, apart from producing refugee and migratory waves, have created
a transnational space serving criminal networks involved in the traf-
ficking business (IOM 2001; 2002), through which part of the global
movements of today is channelled towards Southern European coun-
tries. In the meantime, the persistence of inequalities, unemployment,
lack of opportunities etc. on the European periphery (North Africa, the
eastern Mediterranean), and also in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia,
coupled with demographic explosion, continue to generate population
pressures on Southern Europe (King & Rybaczuk 1993; King 2000a).
On the other hand, internal political, social and economic changes have
been at the heart of this transition. National political environments
changed with democratisation and EU membership in Greece, Spain
and Portugal, and with the rise of progressive forces into power in all
three countries. Despite the persistence of regional inequalities (Hadji-
michalis 1994), economic development within the EU has led to rising
prosperity and relative convergence of macroeconomic indicators close
to EU averages. The widening of the middle classes resulted in rises in
personal consumption and diversified consumption preferences. To-
gether with improved living standards, the mass expansion of tertiary
education has led to higher employment aspirations, which, given the
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persistence of strong family bonds, delays the labour-market integra-
tion of the young (King & Rybaczuk 1993; Mousourou 1993; King
2000a). The trend towards the feminisation of the labour force has
produced a household deficit in child or elderly care and domestic
work (King & Zontini 2000). Decreasing fertility and the ageing of the
population create labour shortages in specific sectors or areas. The dry-
ing up of internal post-war rural-to-urban and intra-rural migration has
also left empty vacancies in certain areas in both rural and urban sec-
tors (King et al. 1997).
Such changes explain the rise in demand for the type of cheap and
flexible labour now provided largely by migrant workers: with the la-
bour force shrinking and growing old, with no more ‘hordes’ of un-
skilled rural residents making it to the cities, with many young people
waiting for qualified positions and women increasingly participating in
the labour market (both more and more unwilling to accept unskilled
manual posts), certain regions and sectors have been left bereft of vital
labour supply. In addition, the persistence of strong underground
economies and the proliferation of informal economic practices39 have
functioned as an important pull factor for migration (Reyneri 1999;
Reyneri & Baganha 1999). The highly seasonal character of certain sec-
tors of crucial importance for Southern European economies (agricul-
ture, tourism, construction), especially, and the fact the many of these
activities tend to rely mostly on casual and labour-intensive practices,
make it difficult for the state to gain full control and thus provide a
space for the employment of unregistered labour.
Moreover, the particular geographic characteristics and position of
Southern EU member states is a factor of crucial importance (King &
Rybaczuk 1993; King 2000a). The northern mountainous borders of
Greece, where controlling the entire borderline is an extremely difficult
task, are easily crossable, especially on foot. Also, the long coastlines
and numerous islands are very difficult to patrol and can be easily ac-
cessed by boat, and thus they are in a sense ‘open’ to clandestine arri-
vals from the Balkans, Turkey or North Africa. Since Southern Europe
has been incorporated into the ‘developed block’, the Mediterranean be-
comes Europe’s Rio Grande, a dividing line both imaginary (demo-
graphic, cultural, developmental) and physical (geographical), unfold-
ing from Istanbul to the Straits of Gibraltar and crossing Cyprus, Crete,
Sicily and Sardinia (King 2000a).
Finally, historical and cultural bonds between the countries of destina-
tion and the sending countries also play an important role (King
2000a). Such bonds originate, on the one hand, from former colonial
links, as is the case of immigration from Latin America and the former
Portuguese colonies to the Iberian Peninsula (Sole´ 1995). On the other,
there are ethno-cultural and religious ties, for instance in the case of
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Pontian ethnic Greeks from former Soviet republics who migrate into
Greece, or the role of the Catholic Church in migration to Portugal,
Italy and Spain (King 2002a).
Immigration trends into Southern European countries develop as
the forces of change related to global economic restructuring gradually
take shape (King & Rybaczuk 1993; Anthias & Lazaridis 1999). Both
an ‘El Dorado’ and a ‘fortress’ (King et al. 2000), Mediterranean Eur-
ope turns multicultural, with phenomena of polarisation and exclusion
(Anthias & Lazaridis 1999) emerging in parallel to ‘new cultural en-
counters’ (King 2001), and with its cities transforming into post-mod-
ern multiethnic metropolises (Malheiros & Ribas-Mateos 2002). The
Greek case should be understood within this context; its particularity,
however, is in the first place determined by its geographic location.
The country’s position at the south-eastern corner of the EU, its up-
graded role in the Balkan region, the generation of various kinds of
flows between Greece and its neighbouring countries and the over-
whelming shares of nationals from these countries, especially from Al-
bania, in the total immigrant population, are all factors indicating the
uniqueness of the Greek experience within the Southern European im-
migration model. On the one hand, as Labrianidis and his colleagues
argue (2004), in the new European geopolitical conjuncture, Greece
appears to be playing the role of the ‘North’ in the Balkans, while at
the same time it remains the ‘South’ in relation to advanced capitalist
countries. On the other hand, this geographic dimension appears as an
additional aspect of the transnational cross-border dynamics that condi-
tion migration in Greece, this time on a smaller regional scale.
Immigration flows into Greece intensified in the early 1990s, i.e. in
the post-1989 East-West context, with massive clandestine waves of mi-
grants from Albania. At the same time, it underwent another impor-
tant shift: from a net receiver of FDI it became a net exporter of capital,
with the Balkans being the privileged destination of direct investment
abroad (Labrianidis et al. 2004). Factors such as the pursuit of cheap
labour and natural resources, the avoidance of tariff impediments, the
issue of geographic and cultural proximity and the presence of ethnic
Greek communities, the ‘virginity’ of the local markets and the initial
hesitation of large multinationals contributed significantly in attracting
Greeks to invest in the Balkans. In 1998, the great majority (81.7 per
cent) of about 1,270 investment projects was concentrated in the three
countries from where immigrants come, Albania, Bulgaria and Roma-
nia, about half of them in Bulgaria. The majority of Greek investment
projects are commercial enterprises and industrial plants, with a small
but significant presence of service companies (Labrianidis 2000).
Although there are numerous investors, the bulk of capital is owned by
ten companies only, which account for about 64 per cent of total Greek
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investments in Balkan countries, while more than half of the total capi-
tal is invested by a few publicly owned firms, with Greek Telecom
(OTE) having 46 per cent on its own (Labrianidis et al. 2004). We have
thus two kinds of FDI: in terms of volume, a few large companies with
high-value investment dominate; in terms of numbers, the typical
small Greek enterprise prevails.
Greek investment in the Balkans clearly reflects the productive struc-
ture of the Greek economy. The vast majority of projects is based on
the activities of small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs), with or
without a parent company in Greece, which move to the Balkans in or-
der to overcome competitive problems at home and to avoid high la-
bour costs (Labrianidis et al. 2004). It is the same type of company
that mostly employ immigrants in Greece, as a strategy to overcome
their competitive problems and to survive in the market by reducing la-
bour costs. The Greek economy relies to a large extent on such small
productive units, which are often family run, apply labour-intensive
methods, use low- and middle-level technology and are mostly based
on indigenous resources (Fakiolas 2000: 60). Faced with increased
non-salary labour costs (e.g. high taxation, costly contributions), but
also with difficulties in modernising themselves in the face of interna-
tional competition, such companies ‘invest’ in cheap labour to over-
come their crisis (Labrianidis et al. 2004). Since the early 1990s, the
Balkans have been supplying Greece with a cheap labour force,
whether domestically, with immigration, or abroad through FDI and
relocation, depending on the activities and capacities of individual com-
panies. In that sense, both immigration and FDI appear to be two sides
of the same coin, reflecting the demand for cheap, low-skilled, flexible
and unprotected labour by Greek capital (Labrianidis et al. 2004).
2.2.2 Basic socio-economic aspects of immigration in Greece
Through practices of tax evasion and non-payment of social security
contributions, small and medium-sized enterprises and family micro-
businesses feed the shadow economy in Greece considerably40; to an
extent, it is this demand that migrant labour has been covering
throughout the 1990s. Taking also into account the high shares of self-
employment, applying to nearly one fourth of the labour force at the
end of 2003 (NSSG, Labour Force Survey), the potential demand for
cheap and unregistered labour increases. In addition, increased living
standards, as manifested, for instance, in rises in household consump-
tion41 also generate part of this demand for migrant labour. With more
than one fifth of the migrants recorded in the 2001 census working in
the obscure category ‘other services’ (see Table A1, in Appendix A), the
role of private households and the self-employed appears to be crucial,
50 MIGRATION IN CONTEMPORARY GREECE
especially for female employment. Other sectors concentrating high
shares of migrant workers are construction, agriculture and the pri-
mary sector, manufacturing, trade and repair, hotel and catering (again,
see Table A1). Clearly, many of the activities involved are labour inten-
sive and some, due to their very nature (agriculture, tourism, construc-
tion, small retail trade, work in bars and restaurants, household ser-
vices) easily escape state regulations through informal arrangements.
With an estimated size of the underground economy at between 30
and 45 per cent of the GDP (Fakiolas 1999: footnote 4), the informal
sector has absorbed migrant labour, benefiting from its much-needed
flexibility. Among 212,860 regular immigrants in early 2000, 47 per
cent were registered with IKA (the largest insurance fund), 26 per cent
with OGA (the fund for those employed in agriculture), and 1 per cent
with TEBE (the fund for service providers and business owners)42. A
year later, the census counted nearly 400,000 foreign workers; this
shows that still, at the time, insurance and hence registered employ-
ment was the case for only slightly more than half of the migrants. In
that regard, things do seem to be improving, after extensive legalisation
programmes and with a more realistic policy approach, as we are going
to see in the next section. By September 2003, the number of foreign
nationals registered with IKA alone had increased to 245,913 people,
which, estimating on the basis of the rates above, means that more
than 520,000 immigrants were insured at the end of 2003, mirroring
the regularisation procedures. This, however, has been a very recent de-
velopment.
The needs of small businesses, the self-employed and individual
households for flexible, low-cost labour prepared to work informally
and hard offer one side of the explanation. The ‘accommodation’ of mi-
grant labour has been based on gaps and shortages in labour supply in
specific economic sectors and geographical regions, in posts that were
left vacant or in new ones created by the advent of economic restructur-
ing and social change. Looking at the supply side will help us under-
stand why this demand could not be fully satisfied by the indigenous
labour force. Certain jobs that are today performed largely by migrants
– in tourism, bars and restaurants, construction, manufacturing, agri-
culture, etc. – used to be done (and still are, to an extent) by specific
segments of the population. For decades, internal migrants from rural
areas had been supplying the urban sectors before and after the Second
World War (Leontidou 1990). Temporary movements of poor mountain
people, Roma or Muslims from Thrace towards the richer lowlands
covered the increased seasonal needs of harvesting and other agricul-
tural jobs (Vaiou & Hadjimichalis 1997; Labrianidis & Lyberaki 2001).
In the 1970s and 1980s, the work of women supported the flourishing
of clothing and garment industries in northern Greek cities (Chronaki
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et al. 1993; Vaiou & Hatzimichalis 1997). Many young people, some
unskilled but also students or recent graduates, still head for work in
the tourist industry during the summer or in bars, restaurants and
fast-food outlets in urban areas in the winter (Labrianidis & Lyberaki
2001).
Much of this supply has been shrinking over recent decades, while
new needs have emerged. Low fertility rates and population ageing are
responsible for important decreases in the growth rate of the total la-
bour force (NSSG 2003; see Figure A1 in Appendix A). Fertility rates
follow a downward route, decreasing by 0.76 percentage points be-
tween 1971-2001. The share of children up to fourteen years old in the
total population has fallen by about 10 percentage points since 1971,
while the share of people aged over 64 increased by more than 6 per-
centage points. In the meantime, internal migration has been slowing
down since the 1970s, and today it mostly concerns mobility of skilled
or highly educated people, while intra-rural seasonal movements have
also ceased (Vaiou & Hadjimichalis 1997). Especially in rural Greece,
out-migration and population ageing have almost emptied certain areas
of people of productive age, not only leaving jobs vital for the commu-
nities in the hands of the old, but also leading to the extinction of cer-
tain traditional working skills (Labrianidis & Lyberaki 2001; Kasimis et
al. 2003). At the same time, women’s participation in the labour force
and in tertiary education is continuously rising (Linardos-Rylmon
1993; Symeonidou 1999; Fakiolas & Maratou-Alipranti 2000). The ex-
pansion of tertiary education, increasingly at a postgraduate level, has
created high employment aspirations, leading many young people to
late entrance in the labour market, since increased prosperity and
strong family ties can support them until the time they will find a ‘dig-
nified’ job matching their qualifications (Hadjiyanni et al. 1999; Lab-
rianidis & Lyberaki 2001). Additional social and cultural factors also
play a role: the continuous enlargement of the housing space, the in-
adequate number of state kindergartens and care facilities for the el-
derly, the still low participation of men in housework and middle-class
perceptions of status attributing prestige to the employment of a for-
eign maid (Fakiolas & Maratou-Alipranti 2000).
The above suggest that the transformation of Greece into a host so-
ciety took place during a period of increasing labour needs, despite ris-
ing unemployment rates and relatively slow growth rates. After all, a
large percentage of the unemployed (and a growing number of the
part-time employed) are young people and women, particularly the
most qualified ones (see for instance NSSG’s Labour Force Surveys
and IKA statistics). Taking into account the jump of GDP growth rates
from about 1 per cent annually between 1979-1995 to 3 per cent since
then, and despite the fact that this is primarily attributed to the net in-
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flow of EU structural funds (about one third of recent growth; see Fa-
kiolas 2003: 539-540), one can understand how crucial migrant labour
has been43. This, however, took place under highly exploitative condi-
tions, profiting from the vulnerability of migrant workers partly as a re-
sult of their undocumented status. The combination of labour-market
structures with an unrealistically restrictive policy framework, police
brutality and xenophobic hostility have contributed to the large-scale
marginalisation of immigrants: the study of social exclusion was
among the first topics that attracted scholarly interest (see Section
3.1.2). Apart from being ‘trapped’ in the secondary labour market and
in hard and badly paid jobs that the locals reject, migrants, and espe-
cially Albanians, also became the ‘others’ whom the collective imagina-
tion saw as responsible for many of Greece’s contemporary misfor-
tunes: crime, unemployment, falling real wages, etc.
Today, the numbers of foreign citizens in Greece are possibly exceed-
ing one million, counting recent arrivals, ethnic Greek migrants (who
are subject to different legal status) and refugees; this means that
Greece, and especially certain areas within it, is now a multiethnic so-
ciety. Between 2000-2002, 14,262 asylum applications were lodged
(UNHCR 2003: Table 1). Ethnic Greeks from the former Soviet Union,
most of Pontian origin, are estimated at around 110,000 (103,000 of
whom were naturalised by the end of 2001), while ethnic Greeks from
Albania are thought to be between 40,000 and 60,000 people (Fakio-
las 2003: Table 1)44. The 2001 census recorded nearly 800,000 foreign
nationals living in Greece, making up 7.3 per cent of the total popula-
tion; more than half are from Albania and another 16.2 per cent are
from the Balkans, Eastern Europe and the former USSR; Bulgaria,
Georgia and Romania are included in the five main countries of origin,
followed by the US, Cyprus and Russia45 (see Table A2 in Appendix A).
The picture seems to have changed slightly since the 1998 regularisa-
tion statistics: Albanians and Bulgarians were again in first and second
place in shares similar to the present ones, but they were followed by
Romanians, Pakistanis, Ukrainians and Poles. According to census
data (Table A3, Appendix A), half of the migrants are concentrated in
Attica and more than one third in Athens, while about 14 per cent live
in the region of Central Macedonia, and 9 per cent in Thessaloniki.
The data from the first regularisation vary slightly: about 40 per cent
of the applicants were located in the Athens region, with Thessaloniki
coming second with 7.2 per cent. The largest regional concentrations,
where the share of migrants exceeds 7 per cent among the local popu-
lation, are in the Southern Aegean and Ionian islands, Peloponnese
and Attica, with immigrants in Athens making up 8.5 per cent of the
capital’s residents (Table A3).
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2.2.3 Greek immigration policy at a glance
The influx of large numbers of immigrants at the dawn of the 1990s
found the Greek government totally unprepared; the existing legal fra-
mework at the time dated back to 1929 (Law 4310), and it mostly con-
cerned the out-migration of Greeks, the diaspora and the repatriation
of emigrants. In a period of political instability, repeated elections and
frequent government changes (1989-1993), the New Democracy (con-
servative) government introduced a new immigration policy with Law
1975 of 1991, which determined all matters of entry, work and resi-
dence of immigrants in Greece throughout almost the whole decade46.
This was characterised by a strict ‘police’ logic, since the principal re-
sponsibilities fell upon the Ministry of Public Order, and by a failure to
address the new situation realistically, as there were no provisions for
the legalisation of migrants already present in the country (see Karydis
1996; Kourtovic 2001). The result was hundreds of thousands of immi-
grants living under clandestine status, hence without any rights and
destined to work informally. Before 1998, the number of ‘regular’ for-
eigners had not exceeded 120,000 people, one third of them being eth-
nic Greek migrants or Greek Cypriots. In addition, as Karydis (1996)
has pointed out, the law’s repressive spirit and emphasis on combating
‘illegal’ migration through arrests and deportations partly contributed
to the stigmatisation of migrants in Greece, by connecting – rhetori-
cally and practically – clandestine status to criminality, building thus
the stereotypical equation ‘illegal immigrant equals criminal’. At a prac-
tical level, the law provided for the establishment of a repressive me-
chanism for immigration control, which involved frequent police op-
erations and massive numbers of arrests and deportations of undocu-
mented migrants which were dubbed the inventive and deeply
offensive term ‘skoopa’ (from the Greek word skoύpa, ‘broom’). Be-
tween 1991-2001, the average number of expulsions was 230,000 a
year (Fakiolas 2003: Table 1).
The first attempt of the successor PASOK (centre-left) government
to address the issue was a bilateral agreement signed between Albania
and Greece, regulating the possibility of the invitation of Albanian
workers on a temporary (seasonal) contract basis (Law 2482/1997),
which in practice affected a very limited number of people. This initial
step was followed by the first legalisation programme, decided in 1996
by Law 2434 and launched by Presidential decrees 358 and 359 of
199747. A two-stage process started the following year, with a tempor-
ary ‘White Card’ being issued initially, followed by a longer-lasting
‘Green Card’ (one to three years) for applicants satisfying certain re-
quirements. The programme was administered by the Organisation for
the Employment of the Labour Force (OAED). This separation of the
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process in two stages, with tight criteria in the second, was one of the
issues that attracted criticism and partly resulted in deterring many mi-
grants from applying; another problematic matter was the (large) num-
ber of social security stamps required, given that unregistered employ-
ment was the only option for the undocumented majority48. After var-
ious extensions of the period of the programme, 371,641 immigrants
had applied, 65 per cent of them Albanians (Cavounidis & Hatzaki
1999). By the end of January 2001, 201,882 had been granted the tem-
porary stay permit (Labrianidis & Lyberaki 2001: 117); in total, 219,024
migrants were issued a Green Card (Fakiolas 2003: Table 4). So far,
this first amnesty programme has been followed by another two (2001,
2004), while special arrangements for the renewal of previously
granted stay permits have been taking place in the meantime. During
the 2001 regularisation, 367,860 people applied and, by June 2003, a
total number of about 580,000 immigrants were legalised (Fakiolas
2003: Tables 1, 3). The more recent programme (2004), said to be the
last by Ministry of the Interior officials (since the process is going to
change after ‘as many as possible’ immigrants are regularised), was ex-
pected to grant legal status to about 250,000 people, bringing the total
number of regularised migrants up to about 750,00049.
The fact that regularisation procedures have been put into a kind of
repetitive schedule is indicative of the new, more pragmatic spirit char-
acterising the Greek polity’s approach to immigration at the beginning
of the 2000s: with Law 2910/2001, the state recognises the presence
of immigrants as a de facto reality. The revised legal framework shifts
responsibilities from police authorities to the ministries of the Interior
and Labour and to local governments: it initiates a more organised
management of immigration flows, with emphasis on border control
and with provisions for guest-worker invitation schemes through state
agencies and bilateral agreements. Immigration is not regarded any
more as a purely security/national issue, but it is also connected to the
problems of the Greek labour market: the new legal framework sepa-
rates work from residence permits. In addition, the law includes mea-
sures aimed at the integration of immigrants (see Section 8.1) and pro-
visions for family reunification, as well as legal arrangements for the
transferability of pension rights. Certain negative features of the pre-
vious law persist: the time period stay permits are valid for is short,
starting from six-month Green Cards, which apply to the majority, and
the regulations for renewals are strict (before one has the right to a
two-year permit, s/he has to have five annual renewals, while ten years
of continuous legal residence is a prerequisite for a permanent permit).
Obviously, arrests and deportations have not ceased, although now they
take place at a more organised level: a new police body, the Border
Guard, has been established to perform inspections and patrols. In
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2001, nearly 220,000 people were arrested for illegal entry/residence,
79 per cent of whom were Albanians (Fakiolas 2003: 548). The costs,
however, of enhanced security and control are sky high: Baldwin-Ed-
wards (2004a) reports that, in 2002 alone, 600 million euros were
spent on border measures.
In the meantime, a different set of measures applicable to ethnic
Greek migrants has been undertaken, pointing to what Triandafyllidou
& Veikou (2001) have called ‘national considerations in immigration
policy’. However, the framework for ethnic Greeks is rather fragmen-
ted, containing different provisions for different groups. Pontian
Greeks from former Soviet republics were treated as ‘returning mi-
grants’ (supposedly to their ancestral fatherland) and most were imme-
diately granted citizenship, while some also passed through a special
programme of reception and support for integration. For Greek-Alba-
nians, the situation was rather ambiguous in the early 1990s, due to
unclear and unstable provisions, but it later developed to its current
state: all those who were able to legally prove their Greek origins have
now got the ‘Special Identity Card for Ethnic Greeks’, which gives
them certain rights, more a ‘half citizenship’ status rather than a stay-
permit one. Finally, Sarakatsani Greeks from Bulgaria have been
granted a special status from the beginning, initially giving them two-
month visas, which are now annually renewable.
The development of Greek immigration policy so far has evolved in
three phases (Sitaropoulos 2003): (a) from 1991 to 1998 the framework
was determined by the particularly restrictive Law 1975/1991; (b) be-
tween 1998-2001, it was marked by the first regularisation pro-
gramme; (c) since then, a more realistic and coherent, although not
unproblematic, approach has been initiated with Law 2910/2001. Com-
mentators have acknowledged the impact of Greece’s EU membership
on the development of the policy framework (Baldwin-Edwards & Fa-
kiolas 1999). In its initial stage, with an exaggerated emphasis on poli-
cing, immigration policy-making had been influenced, at least partly
and indirectly, by the ‘Fortress Europe’ ideology that had emerged in
the EU policy agenda (Karydis 1996). Greece’s full participation in the
Schengen system, although a ‘blessing’ for its citizens, has put serious
obstacles to the rights and life chances of newcomers by aiming at ef-
fective border control to reduce migration flows (see Samatas 2003); a
task that involves collaboration with both EU and third countries (e.g.
Turkey). However, as far as integration measures are concerned, Greek
policy-making lags far behind the relevant EU legislation and the steps
forward made by other member states: in this field, it is only recently
and at a limited level that the positive impact of Europeanisation can
be traced (Meintanis 2004).
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3 Methodology and analytical framework
It is now time to set out the specifics on which the thesis is based,
stepping from the macro topics that have dominated the discussion so
far to the micro social level of two particular migrant groups in a parti-
cular place. As set out in the introduction, the core of the thesis is the
presentation and analysis of empirical research concerning the me-
chanisms of exclusion and the pathways to integration of Albanian and
Bulgarian immigrants in Thessaloniki. The analysis is based upon a
general explanatory framework that may apply to other cases too. Hav-
ing outlined in the introduction what the thesis is about, the objective
here is to draw the analytical and methodological framework upon
which the research has been based and the discussion relies. Moreover,
I locate the limits of existing knowledge and approaches and explain
my own contribution. Then, I describe the fieldwork itself, its concerns
and problems and the way it evolved, as well as the nature of the mate-
rial collected and the analytical tools used. Finally, I introduce the read-
er to the economic and socio-spatial specificities of the local context. In
other words, here I explain how I am approaching my topic (3.1.1);
where the gaps are in the existing literature and what I can add (3.1.2);
by which means I obtained my data (3.2.1) and how I worked with them
(3.2.2); and where (3.3) the research took place.
3.1 A framework for the analysis of migrants’ incorporation
In this section I describe the analytical framework that forms the basis
for the discussion later on. The key terms and concepts that I use are
defined here, and their theoretical implications are briefly discussed in
order to clarify my own perspective and approach to the topic. The lim-
its of the existing literature on immigration to Greece are exposed in
order to identify the contribution of my thesis.
3.1.1 Analytical framework: social exclusion versus integration
‘Exclusion’ and ‘integration’ are simply terms that I use without any
theoretical or epistemological commitment, and they have no explana-
tory power as such. I acknowledge that in the relevant literature both
concepts appear to be relative and problematic. Criticism varies from
the very fact that, in Europe at least, social exclusion is a fashionable
topic for research that attracts funding (Tsiakalos 1998), to the accusa-
tion of (policies and projects for) inclusion as a means of ‘controlling
the poor’ (Samers 1998). Therefore it is necessary to briefly reflect on
some theoretical implications the two concepts may have and to clarify
my personal approach in accordance with the aims of the thesis.
In its general use, the term ‘social exclusion’ became popular after it
was adopted in the discourse and policy guidelines of the European
Commission and of a series of EU programmes (Tsiakalos 1998; Room
1999). It gradually came to replace the concept of ‘poverty’ for describ-
ing and analysing various forms of inequality and of social disadvan-
tage for groups or individuals (Room 1999). From a theoretical point
of view, exclusion may be vertical, originating from the social structure
itself, or horizontal, based on the form and the morphology of society
(Alexiou 1999). In addition, it can be understood as a process (the set of
mechanisms leading to a situation of disadvantage) or as a condition
(the condition of disadvantage itself). It can also be seen as a lack of
means and resources necessary for a ‘decent’ life or as a lack of access
to these means and resources. Such different and sometimes contradic-
tory interpretations are due to several conflicting perspectives on exclu-
sion. Ratcliffe (1999), for instance, outlines the main approaches to so-
cial exclusion, which is seen either as a ‘determinate and static social
position’ (with the conservative version attributing it to conscious ac-
tions of the ‘excluded’ themselves), or as a social and economic process,
depending thus on forces beyond the individuals which may have dif-
ferential impacts on different social formations and different social
groups. Furthermore, Silver (1994) distinguishes between three main
paradigms in the social sciences literature on exclusion. Firstly, the ‘so-
lidarity’ paradigm, apparent in the French republican discourse, de-
fines exclusion as rupture of the social bonds between individuals and
social networks, which results in a lack of access to solidarity mechan-
isms and to welfare resources. Secondly, the ‘specialisation’ paradigm,
prominent in the Anglo-Saxon debate, focuses on the unequal distribu-
tion of income and resources as a consequence of specialisation and of so-
cial differentiation, which originate from the economic division of la-
bour. Thirdly, according to the ‘monopoly’ paradigm, inspired by the
Marxian and Weberian traditions, exclusion ‘arises from the interplay
of class, status and political power and serves the interests of the in-
cluded’ (Silver 1994: 543). However, Silver reckons that in some cases
the above may not apply, due to historical/political reasons (e.g. dicta-
torships) but also because of the persistence of traditional structures
and of the dominance of vertical social divisions (e.g. kinship ties), as,
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for instance, in Southern European countries. Finally, some scholars
focus on the spatial dimension, whereby exclusion either manifests it-
self in space, for instance by segregation in cities, or it is directly linked
to specific places such as ghettos (Musterd et al. 1998; Ratcliffe 1999).
For obvious reasons, immigrants are one of the groups threatened
by, or actually experiencing, social exclusion. ‘Integration’, on the other
hand, is regarded as the reverse process, through which migrants ‘ad-
just’, or ‘integrate’, or are ‘inserted’, ‘included’ or ‘adapted’ into the host
society. Here, again, we see various approaches and definitions, which
make ‘integration’ a very relative term. Its interpretations vary from ‘a
mechanism that activates social participation’ (Musterd et al. 1998) to
‘a process through which the indigenous population and a minority
group settled in the same place gradually intermingle and move to-
wards equality on the socio-economic, cultural and political levels’
(King & Rodriguez-Melguizo 1999). Conflicting intellectual traditions
are apparent here as well. For neoclassical economists (and theorists
inspired by the neoclassical paradigm), integration is the successful
economic performance of immigrants (whom they see as rationally act-
ing individuals): this depends on the human capital migrants possess,
the length of stay in the host society, their language skills, etc. (see, for
instance, Chiswick 1978; Borjas 1994). On the other hand, sociologists
tend to approach immigrants as ‘members of groups and participants
in broader social structures that affect in multiple ways their mobility’
(Portes 1995: 24), and locate the process (or processes) of integration
accordingly. In general, migration theorists and researchers have ad-
dressed the issue of integration from various perspectives. There is a
vast empirical literature looking at specific cases of various forms of
migrant integration at different levels: labour market, housing, identity,
citizenship, etc.
To my understanding, there is a basic problem associated with the
use of the terms, related to the ambiguous definition of ‘embedded-
ness’ (or non-embeddedness) they imply. Exclusion from what? Inte-
gration into what? What is to be conceived as the ‘whole’ from which
certain segments of the population are excluded? Which are the struc-
tures, or institutions, or the cultural framework, where distinct social
groups like migrants in general are to be included? Should, then, both
majority and minority social groups be conceived as static and homoge-
neous entities? And are, consequently, social formations, whether
states or specific localities, to be understood as given and unchanging,
into which alien groups or individuals may be inserted or excluded
from? These are concerns that should be taken into account in order to
clarify my intentions and to set out the analytical framework on which
the discussion that follows is based.
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Both exclusion and integration should be understood in the first in-
stance as dynamic processes, which are related to the dynamics of the
system itself, in general structural terms, but also regarding the specifi-
cities of different national and local realities. This is something recog-
nised anyway by scholars from conflicting backgrounds. According to
Room (1999: 172), ‘social exclusion is a normal and integral part of the
power dynamics of modern society.’ From a different point of view,
Alexiou (1999) locates the dynamics of exclusion in the process of capi-
talist development: for him, social exclusion refers to phenomena aris-
ing from the social structure and its endemic trends, which lead to the
marginalisation of certain social groups. Such a systemic interpretation
implies that the social margin does not emerge accidentally, but is
rather produced by specific forms/structures of economic and societal
organisation, within which it plays a specific social role. Therefore, ex-
clusion is not studied here as a process or condition per se: the focus is
on the trends, mechanisms, reactions and so forth that deny a ‘decent’
and ‘normal’ life to immigrants.
Turning now to integration, this can be seen as a process that takes
place anyway, because at the end, and in various ways, migrants do
make a living in the destination places. They can be assimilated, par-
tially integrated, differentially excluded or ‘trapped’ in ghettos, but they
are there and they are ‘included’, in one form or another and to varying
degrees. Immigrants then may or may not be integrated in the domi-
nant structures or institutions of the host country, and they may or
may not share the dominant cultural values, but this is also the case for
certain distinct social or cultural groups within the host country’s po-
pulation. In that sense, neither migrants nor locals should be regarded
as homogeneous entities. It is rather the exclusionary mechanisms
themselves (economic organisation, class structures, legal norms, cul-
tural boundaries, etc.) that produce such dichotomies between unified
and solid social categories and establish distinctive lines between ‘us’
and ‘them’. Yet, neither ‘we’ live under unchanging conditions, nor are
‘they’ coming into static societies. From the very micro-level of the local
community to the macro processes of globalisation, our world is made
up of many worlds, marked by fluidity and constant motion. Therefore,
pathways of integration and processes of exclusion are linked to the dy-
namics of social change, in our case the patterns of transformation of
local and national contexts by internal (historical) or external (interna-
tional, global) forces of change.
Let me expand a little at this point on the contradiction between the
‘system’ and the ‘lifeworld’, that is, between the abstract and general so-
cial structures that constitute the system and its internal logic, and the
everyday life experiences of people in specific places (referring to Ha-
bermas 1984; see also Sayer 2000). On the one hand, there are sys-
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temic structures and processes of change, global forces of interaction
and transformation. On the other, people’s lives are linked to specific
places, to everyday experiences and to the happy and sad moments of
the life course. In respect to the migratory phenomenon, while it may
be reduced to placeless flows of people at a macro-level, on a micro-
scale and in respect to each individual migrant’s personal experiences,
it takes place-specific characteristics (King 1995: 27). Russell King re-
fers to Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of habitus to highlight the importance
of space and address the meaning of place for migrants (King 1995:
28). Living between ‘here’ and ‘there’, migrants become human links
between places on which their material existence and their images de-
pend: from their working life to their personal time-space experiences
and from their geographic and cultural background to their networks
of social relationships. The lifeworld then of migrants can be conceived
as a process which entails all that is ‘natural’ in everyday life and the
perceptions individuals have about it (see Lazaridis & Psimmenos
2000: 170-171): daily experiences, identity, networks and the meaning
of place. In addition, it should also embrace the diverse ways by which
migrants respond, individually or collectively, to the situations they are
faced with. It is therefore essential to move beyond the schemata of vic-
timisation-proletarianisation that were common in studies of the past
(Papastergiadis 2000): this conception created distorted views of rea-
lity, not because it was not true but because it overemphasised this as-
pect of the migrant’s identity and experience, losing thus other impor-
tant elements. This requires us to regard migrants as actors, according
to Touraine’s (2000) definition of the term, i.e. ‘autonomous beings’
and ‘agents of transformation’ of their immediate environment and
their own situation. Such a parallel account of both systemic and more
concrete human factors of everyday life allows us to address what King
(2002: 101) calls ‘the double embeddedness of migration’: migration is
embedded in societies and social processes, but also in the individual
migrant’s life course.
Having all these background theoretical points in mind, I refer to
the concept of incorporation in order to link lifeworlds and system-
worlds and to analyse in parallel the ways migrants organise their lives
in the host community and the structural, institutional and cultural
contexts that condition them. Scholars have employed the term with a
variety of meanings. Castles (2001; also see Castles & Miller 1998) gen-
erally refers to different ‘models’ of community formation and incor-
poration: the history of migration passed from assimilation, dominant
in the long-distance pre-war movements, to differential exclusion dur-
ing post-war labour flows and finally to the pluralist model of today.
Portes (1995: 24) talks about ‘the process of insertion of immigrants
into various contexts/reception levels’. Soysal (1994: 30-31), referring
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mostly to political participation, defines incorporation as a ‘macro-level
process whereby a guestworker population becomes part of the polity
of the host country’, ‘a wider process that takes place independently of
the integration of individuals or perceptions of such integration’. De-
spite the differences in disciplines, perspectives, research interests or
goals, such definitions have one thing in common: they point to a set
of non-linear processes, as well as practices, relations, etc., acknowled-
ging and assigning thus agency and action to the migrants themselves,
without implying prescribed outcomes (e.g. ‘inclusion’ or ‘exclusion’),
but rather evolving, dynamic, interrelated and interacting phenomena.
To an extent, similar conceptualisations have been proposed through
the use of other concepts, or of ‘integration’ itself as a much more con-
ventional term1. It should be acknowledged that ‘incorporation’ can be
an equally vague and relative concept, as its various uses in the litera-
ture mentioned above suggest. But there is a need, however, on the
one hand, to capture as many elements as possible, and on the other,
to distance ourselves from monolithic linear accounts. The conven-
tional understanding of ‘integration’, especially in policy and public dis-
courses, implies a linear process through which migrants adjust to the
host society. The concept of ‘incorporation’ is being proposed in order
to avoid such assumptions; instead, by being a less widely used term, it
is value-free and thus allows us to examine the mutual relationship be-
tween immigrants and the host society without implying any pre-
scribed outcomes. This relationship is a non-linear one and may have
both positive and negative aspects: the process of social incorporation
entails both exclusion and integration, as these might apply to different
mechanisms, or pathways of different categories of immigrants or dif-
ferent individuals. In other words, the concept refers to a process, or
set of processes, through which immigrants are incorporated into (i.e.
become part of) the social ‘body’ of a given society, and the mechan-
isms through which this society responds, reacts, or changes because
of this development. The former does not imply that this process will
necessarily lead towards a successful integration; the latter addresses
the ways the host society adjusts itself to new situations, which might
redefine the position of the migrants in various ways. In short, incor-
poration refers both to: (a) the ways migrants organise their lives in
specific localities (a somehow ‘natural’ process in the real world); and
(b) the factors that condition their lives (from the locals’ response to
forces beyond individuals/communities, whether endemic – historical
– conditions in the host country, or exogenous – i.e. influenced by glo-
bal systemic transformations).
Therefore, the concept of incorporation allows us to look beyond
one-way paths through which immigrants are ‘inserted’ in, or are
pushed to the margins of a static host society, as terms like ‘cultural ad-
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justment’, ‘labour-market integration’ or ‘social exclusion’ assume. On
the contrary, ‘incorporation’ rather implies complex processes that take
place at various overlapping levels and under conditions formulated in
different but interrelated contexts. It is linked to factors originating
from different aspects of social life, but which are in constant and dy-
namic interaction with each other. It entails both the ‘obvious’, ‘visible’
side of everyday life, its morphology and phenomenology, and what lies
beyond, in the spheres of social structure, social organisation and social
praxis, and in the fields of geography, identity and historical/cultural
attributes. It has to do with both objective and subjective situations that
determine immigrants’ lives in host societies, while they simulta-
neously shape host societies themselves as constantly changing social
formations. The study of incorporation may allow us, then, to under-
stand the dynamics of interaction between the global and the local, the
macro and the micro, lifeworlds and systemworlds, structure and
agency, immigrants and locals. Therefore, it is a useful concept to ad-
dress the dialectics of migration according to the aims of the thesis.
But how are we to capture incorporation? How can we study, mea-
sure and analyse it? Given the above theoretical considerations and in
respect to the needs and purposes of my thesis, I draw from the in-
sights, explanatory patterns and empirical approaches presented in
other relevant works. Portes (1995: 24-25), for instance, distinguishes
between three ‘modes of incorporation’ which affect individuals
through both structural (polity and society) and relational (commu-
nities and networks) forms of embeddedness: (i) governmental policy,
(ii) civil society and public opinion, (iii) ethnic community and social
networks. Similarly, Ribas-Mateos (2000) describes the three contexts
that influence the incorporation of immigrants, namely, (i) governmen-
tal policy and welfare, (ii) labour market and (iii) the construction of
ethnic community and cultural identity; external factors shape these
contexts as well, such as the international environment and the condi-
tions in the sending countries. Furthermore, Musterd et al. (2000)
write on how the ‘modes of integration’ – for them, market exchange,
redistribution and reciprocity – take place within broader contexts de-
termined by local, regional, national and increasingly global factors: re-
spectively, economic restructuring, welfare state and solidarity/social
networks, emphasising also the importance of the spatial context. Also
of relevance here is Heckman’s (2004) distinction between different
‘dimensions’ of integration: (i) ‘structural integration’ means the acqui-
sition of rights and access (legal status, education, housing, labour
market, etc.); (ii) ‘acculturation’ refers to cognitive, behavioural and atti-
tudinal change; (iii) ‘social integration’ points to private relations and
group membership; and (iv) ‘identification’ has to do with senses of be-
longing. Finally, Sole´ (1999), in her account of the impact of immigra-
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tion on Southern European countries, proposed the following factors
that are useful as well: characteristics of the migratory flow; material
conditions (labour market, sectors of employment, housing); institu-
tional responses; and the role of the media.
On this basis, and having already outlined the socio-economic con-
text and the policy framework (sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3), I examine the
parallel but opposing processes of exclusion and integration at four dif-
ferent, though interconnected, levels:
– Governmental policy and welfare. This has to do with the policy con-
text of immigrants’ reception and their degree of integration into
the social state. The focus is on the effects of immigration policy
and the relevant legal framework (Section 5.1), as well as on the de-
gree of immigrants’ access to basic welfare services, such as health
and education (8.1).
– Civil society, public opinion and culture. This is about the social ‘re-
sponse’ to immigration (5.2). The role of various social actors (im-
migrants’ associations, political parties, NGOs, etc.) is discussed
and the widespread beliefs of the locals are analysed, touching also
on the issue of racism and the role of the media.
– Socio-economic structures and employment. The interest here lies in
the economic integration of immigrants (Chapter 6). The analysis
takes into account the productive structure and employment rela-
tions in the local labour market and the implications of the pro-
cesses of restructuring.
– Socio-spatial dynamics and place. The dynamics of urban social geo-
graphy is of relevance here (Chapter 7). Housing conditions and re-
sidential trajectories, as well as broader socio-spatial experiences are
discussed in relation to transforming uses and changing percep-
tions of urban space.
So the multifaceted process of the incorporation of immigrants takes
place within the above contexts; to put it in other words, the question
of how migrants organise their lives in the host society, in terms of
work, residence, relationships, etc., depends on factors born and evol-
ving within these contexts. For each one of them, I am going to identi-
fy the exclusionary mechanisms and show how and to what extent they
are interrelated. Some of these mechanisms have solely local features,
while others are nationally applicable; there are, however, also interna-
tional forces shaping local and national contexts, whose implications
are examined in Chapter 9 in an attempt to revisit the broad theoretical
concepts addressed in Chapter 2 and to draw generalisations and theo-
rise from my findings. The analysis is also concerned with the various
private and collective practices that migrants commonly employ in or-
der to build a life in Thessaloniki and their own perceptions/under-
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standings of their migration experience. These are discussed anyway in
relation to the situations with which immigrants are confronted in
each of the above contexts, but there are certain issues requiring spe-
cial attention. The role of migrant networks is highlighted at several
points throughout the analysis; but their character and implications in
respect to the emergence of migrant communities are specifically ad-
dressed in Section 8.2.2. Additional issues related to the migrants’ liv-
ing conditions, daily practices, coping strategies and negotiations of
identity are also crucial to the process of incorporation (Section 8.2.3).
But in order to understand incorporation processes, it is first necessary
to have an idea of the composition, patterns and dynamics of migration
in the specific case studied here; this is done through the description
of the basic background empirical findings in Chapter 4.
3.1.2 Incorporation of immigrants in Greece: the limits of existing literature
During the past decade, interest in migration to Greece and in a wide
range of related issues has been growing, resulting in a large amount
of relevant research and publications by both Greek and other scholars.
Listing and reviewing this literature in detail would be an enormous
task superseding the capacities and escaping the aims of this thesis;
therefore, apart from my own readings, a detailed bibliographical essay
by Petronoti & Triandafyllidou (2003) has been of great help2. The pur-
pose of this section is to briefly overview the main topics addressed
and to identify the limits and gaps in the existing literature, especially
in relation to the issues that are relevant to my own work. The aim is
to locate my study within existing knowledge and to explain the contri-
bution my own research has to offer.
The relevant literature started developing in the early 1990s and fo-
cuses on a variety of issues that can be categorised into five main broad
themes: (i) migration trends, characteristics and patterns; (ii) immigra-
tion policy; (iii) economy and labour-market integration; (iv) social ex-
clusion/inclusion; and (v) issues of identity and culture. Depending on
the disciplinary focus, as well as the character and objectives of each
study, some of these topics are looked at simultaneously, crosscut by
specific issues, whether these are the primary focus or remain in the
background: ethnicity, gender, social networks, media, racism, educa-
tion, etc. Early publications tended to rely on observations, assump-
tions and estimations, given the lack of available data. With the excep-
tion of a few theoretical works (Mousourou 1991; 1993), most publica-
tions were mainly descriptive and particularly concerned with either
the demographic and/or economic characteristics of immigrants (Petri-
nioti 1993; Linardos-Rylmon 1993; Katsoridas 1994; Fakiolas 1995), or
with their rights and legal status (e.g. Theodoropoulos & Sykiotou
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1994). Many studies of this generation failed to understand the trans-
formation of Greece into a receiving country, by assuming that the phe-
nomenon was temporary, thus neglecting the implications for integra-
tion until at least the middle of the decade (Glytsos 1995). At the same
time, a separate branch of the literature focused on ‘returning’ ethnic
Greeks, especially Pontians from the former Soviet Union (e.g. Kasima-
ti et al. 1992; Markou 1994).
Studies multiplied during the second half of the 1990s, especially
after the 1998 regularisation programme and the publication of the
first official statistics (Cavounidis & Hatzaki 1999). One can observe a
loose disciplinary division between economic studies (Lianos et al.
1996; Markova & Sarris 1997; Sarris & Zographakis 1999; Lyberaki &
Pelagidis 2000; Hatziprokopiou et al. 2001), on the one hand, and a
series of works on the other that can be labelled as sociological ones (e.
g. Psimmenos 1995; 1998; King et al. 1998; Fakiolas & Maratou-Ali-
pranti 2000), combining however a variety of social science traditions
ranging from historical accounts (Fakiolas & King 1996) to political
economy (Droukas 1998; Fakiolas 1999; Baldwin-Edwards & Safilios-
Rothschild 1999) and human geography (Iosifides & King 1998), and
from criminology (Karydis 1996) to education (Damanakis 1997; Koi-
liari 1997; Tsiakalos 2000). In parallel, the interest in the legal frame-
work and the policy implications remained strong (Triandafyllidou
1996; Lazaridis 1996; Baldwin-Edwards 1999; Baldwin-Edwards & Fa-
kiolas 1999; Lazaridis & Poyago-Theotoki 1999), while much research
started focusing on specific migrant groups3. In the meantime, an in-
creasing number of publications emerged on ethnic Greeks (Pontians
and Greek-Albanians) and on refugees. Moreover, migration also fea-
tured in studies not directly concerned with the phenomenon4.
Research output has grown further in the 2000s, spreading across
the whole spectrum of the social sciences and involving both qualita-
tive and quantitative studies and interdisciplinary works. The migrants’
voice is increasingly being heard as a number of empirical studies are
addressed directly to immigrants. Apart from individual or co-authored
publications, a number of edited volumes offer combined and com-
parative accounts on several migration-related topics, including ele-
ments previously neglected and factors underestimated, such as gender
and agency, respectively (e.g. King et al. 2000; Marvakis et al. 2001;
Naxakis & Hletsos 2001; Amitsis & Lazaridis 2001; Tastsoglou & Mara-
tou-Alipranti 2003). Exclusion and integration are now central themes
in research agendas and debates. Integration is discussed in relation to
the labour market (e.g. Fakiolas 1999; Maratou-Alipranti 2002), lan-
guage and identity (Koiliari 1997), ethnic mobilisation (Petronoti 2001)
and recent policy steps (Fakiolas 2003); often, the focus is on specific
migrant groups (e.g. Lazaridis & Romaniszyn 1998; Markova 2001;
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Labrianidis & Lyberaki 2001). Exclusion, on the other hand, attracts
much of the focus, and criticism is targeted towards the legal frame-
work that led to migrants’ stigmatisation (Karydis 1996), the public
discourse reflecting the exclusionary construction of Greek national
identity (Veikou 1998; Triandafyllidou 2000), socio-economic and so-
cio-spatial mechanisms (Psimmenos 1995; 1998; Mavreas 1998; Iosi-
fides & King 1998; Lazaridis & Psimmenos 2000; Halkos & Sala-
mouris 2003), or education (Katsikas 1998).
However, as Petronoti & Triandafyllidou (2003) note, the patterns of
interaction between migrants and locals remain largely under-re-
searched, while the literature generally lacks thorough interpretations
and linkages between empirical research on migration to Greece and
broad theoretical discussions on globalisation, capitalism, multicultur-
alism and modernity. In my view, this is because the existing literature
approaches the phenomenon mainly from two perspectives, in many
cases simultaneously apparent or even fused, but still lacking coherent
frameworks and theoretical concern:
(a) From the perspective of the host society. The interest here is either in
the effects of immigration on the host economy, society and culture,
or in the Greek reactions/responses to immigration (policy, xeno-
phobia, etc.).
(b) From the perspective of the migrants themselves. This includes studies
focusing on the characteristics and living conditions of the mi-
grants, on issues of identity, etc. In a sense, many works can be
seen as attempts to ‘know’ the newcomers, to ‘defend’ them against
xenophobic arguments and to ‘respond’ to exaggerations and ‘in-
form’ the (Greek) public.
No conscious efforts have been made to synthesise dialectically the two
perspectives and develop a coherent and prismatic framework of analy-
sis in order to understand the dynamism of the phenomenon, its con-
tradictions and the patterns of interaction. Both the host society and
the immigrants are largely treated as unitary and homogeneous enti-
ties, limiting our capacity to locate and explain change in either case.
Despite their qualities, many studies fail to address the dynamism of
migration-related developments and give rather static pictures captur-
ing the ‘moment’, which are then reproduced in the literature with a
distorted version of reality as a result5. In addition, despite the criti-
cisms against the policy framework, racism or exploitation, references
to Greece as a ‘multiethnic’ or ‘multicultural’ society are scarce and
only recently have the implications of this started to be discussed.
Moreover, the migrant is frequently portrayed as a victim – of the legal
framework or the police, of employers, or of xenophobic attitudes and
abstract social structures – and agency and action (through informal
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strategies, social networks, or associational action and unionisation) are
underestimated and often ignored. This one-sided ‘victimisation’ repro-
duces, to an extent, binaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and – despite ob-
vious good will towards the migrants – contributes to the consolidation
of new stereotypes (e.g. the migrants as excluded, or as destined to per-
form the jobs Greeks reject)6.
Furthermore, several elements remain under-researched or totally
neglected. Few publications have so far studied the phenomenon in re-
lation to issues of space, and equally scarce are any attempts to under-
stand the relevance of place. Although many of the empirical studies
are actually conducted in specific locales, rarely are the implications of
the peculiar local socio-economic characteristics taken into considera-
tion, and conclusions are usually generalised at a countrywide level.
Apart from rare acknowledgments of the obvious dichotomy between
urban and rural migrant employment (see Baldwin-Edwards & Safilios-
Rothschild 1999), detailed analyses of the importance of the local set-
ting are rather exceptional, limited to a few recent publications. It is
worth mentioning the research of Kasimis et al. (2003) on migrants in
rural Greece, which compared the dynamics of migration and develop-
ment in three different rural areas; also, my own publications (2003b;
2004a) where I highlight the relevance of place to the dynamics of in-
corporation. Moreover, the relationship between migration and the city
and the spatial aspects of exclusion and integration (housing, segrega-
tion, public/private space, etc.) are also rarely addressed. The work of
Psimmenos (1995; 1998; 2001) has been pioneering: he found that the
labour market and housing experiences of undocumented migrants
‘entrap’ them into exclusionary – ‘periphractic’ – spaces. Iosifides &
King (1998) have also analysed the processes of socio-spatial exclusion
of immigrants in Athens. Halkos & Salamouris (2003), in their survey
of Pontians from the former USSR in western Attica, also acknowledge
the role of the spatial context in social exclusion. In the case of Thessa-
loniki, Labrianidis & Lyberaki (2001) have a whole chapter on the hous-
ing conditions and residential distribution of Albanian migrants, while
Pavlou (2001) has studied the implications of local media discourses
on crime, city marketing, and the presence of immigrants, regarding
the use of the urban space; my personal accounts of socio-spatial issues
stemming out of this thesis research should be mentioned as well
(2003b; 2004a and b).
In addition, Thessaloniki, the second largest city in Greece, has at-
tracted little interest thus far in respect to its migration experience –
particularly striking, if we consider the city’s multicultural past (Sec-
tion 3.3) – with two notable exceptions (Labrianidis & Lyberaki 2001;
Pavlou 2001). Also, the issues of identity usually lie in the disciplinary
focus of purely sociological or anthropological studies and are exam-
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ined strictly in relation to cultural attributes, racism or national/ethnic
references, without conscious attempts to discuss them with respect to
the broader socio-economic context of integration, to investigate the
meaning of place and the extent to which transnational or hybrid fea-
tures are beginning to emerge. Finally, the role of social networks re-
mains poorly researched, and there is one single study on social net-
works as resources that also determine the patterns of migrant settle-
ment in Greece, emphasising the role of culture and of historical trans-
local connections (Sinte`s 2002). Above all, despite recent efforts, re-
search on migration in Greece lacks coherent theoretical frameworks
of analysis and reference, for instance, to understand the role of both
market and non-market forces, agency and structure, identity and insti-
tutions, space and place. We need an interdisciplinary focus, prismatic
views and dialectical understandings in order to capture the patterns of
interaction between migrants and locals; to locate the interplay be-
tween migration, incorporation and social change; and to explain the
impact of global developments, internationalising forces and systemic
transformation.
The innovativeness and originality of my research are to be found in
the analytical framework outlined in the previous section and in the
combination of various methodologies as described in the following
one, as well as in the findings themselves and the way they are inter-
preted throughout the thesis. From an empirical point of view, my re-
search offers an account and comparison of the characteristics of two
migrant groups, uncovering a high degree of heterogeneity in all as-
pects, but also identifying common experiences and patterns that apply
to all. It emphasises the role of the local setting and the urban dy-
namics of incorporation and looks at the relevance of time. It explains
the transformation of Greece into a multicultural society through the
example of Thessaloniki in its historical dimension and by taking into
account its geographic location and its potential role in the wider Bal-
kan area. From a methodological/theoretical point of view, the thesis is
an attempt to approach the issue of migrants’ incorporation in its total-
ity, by looking separately at different levels, contexts or modes of recep-
tion and by identifying the ways these are interconnected. The mi-
grants are seen as actors rather than victims, although much of their
experience entails negative aspects (illegality, unfair treatment, racism,
exploitation), and the analysis is concerned with explaining how ‘they’
are ‘constructed’ as a homogeneous social category through political,
ideological and structural mechanisms. The patterns of interaction are
understood through a dynamic perspective, linking the issues of incor-
poration to the dynamics of social change, of which migration now
forms part. The relevance of international developments and global
forces is explored, in order to understand the extent to which the Greek
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immigration experience shares common characteristics with other
cases and to identify the form that the global-local interaction takes in
this particular case of migration, incorporation and social transforma-
tion.
3.2 Research design and methodology
The research for this thesis has been based on a wide range of techni-
ques and on a mixture of methodologies. No single approach has been
used; my analytical framework provided the basis for a multi-paradig-
matic methodological perspective, and the methods finally employed
have been designed accordingly to fit the requirements of this particu-
lar research. At a technical level, I have consulted general guidelines
presented in some introductory textbooks on social research methods:
Judd et al. (1991), Bryman (2001), Robson (2002). In this section, I
outline the main methods and data collection techniques I used and
my sources of secondary data; I then move on to a description of the
fieldwork itself and refer to the ethical issues that arose while conduct-
ing the research; finally, I discuss the ways I analysed qualitative and
quantitative data.
3.2.1 Sources, methods and techniques
The collection of data came from a variety of sources, depending on
the nature of the information needed: on-site field investigation, official
statistics, press material, documents and leaflets, empirical and theore-
tical literature. Literature research and reading went on until the very
end of the writing of the thesis. In the prior chapters, and in the analy-
sis that follows, there are plenty of references to empirical studies and
theoretical texts that provided important background information and
were also used in order to confirm findings, draw comparisons, sup-
port arguments and generalise. A series of documents, such as laws
and governmental provisions, as well as leaflets and brochures from a
number of associations, organisations and programmes have also been
taken into account, and they are respectively mentioned in the relevant
parts of the analysis. A considerable amount of material from the daily
press has also been collected and will be used, with respect to specific
events, or generally in relation to the discourse about immigration, mi-
grants’ living and working conditions, attitudes and perceptions to-
wards them, racism and xenophobia, etc. No structured and detailed
discourse analysis of press and other printed material is employed
since that would have taken the scope and the purposes of the study
too far from its aims. The analysis is largely based on primary material
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gathered after on-site fieldwork investigation, supported by secondary
data and some of the material drawn out of the sources mentioned be-
fore. Secondary sources are used throughout the thesis, especially the
following:
– Official statistics on immigration, such as the 2001 census (NSSG),
data from the first regularisation programme (Cavounidi & Hatzaki
1999), or other sources (NSSG, e.g. Labour Force Surveys, IKA,
NTO, various ministries, etc.), including empirical studies using of-
ficial statistics (Lianos 2001; 2003; Fakiolas 2003) and newspaper
articles. In addition to this, I include a series of raw data on hospital
admissions of foreign nationals obtained by the administrative of-
fices of one of Thessaloniki’s largest hospitals (see Section 8.1.1).
– Published empirical material of relevant surveys and project reports.
There are many studies on Albanian immigrants, but of particular
value has been the large survey by Labrianidis & Lyberaki (2001),
focusing on Thessaloniki. Research on Bulgarian immigrants in
Athens was published by Markova (2001) and Markova & Sarris
(1997), while at a country level there is the work of Minev et al.
(1997). A countrywide survey by Hatziprokopiou et al. (2001) focus-
ing on the demand side (Greek perceptions and experiences), has
also been taken into consideration7.
The fieldwork research aimed exclusively at the collection of qualitative
and quantitative primary material, according to the needs and purposes
of the research. However, a significant amount of additional informa-
tion, qualitative in nature, has been gathered in the course of the field-
work itself through observation and note-keeping. In this respect, my
physical presence in the city and my engagement with the field re-
search gave me a first-hand experience of the daily life of immigrants
anyway. But apart from this ‘automatic’ benefit, I went through a
rather more systematic observation, which allowed me to map the mi-
grants’ lifeworlds in terms of work, residence and leisure, to under-
stand better the actual conditions and to conceptualise social reality re-
levant to my work. To be precise, systematic observation involved the
following:
– Frequent walks and drives all over the city, visits to places with high
concentrations of migrants and places of interaction with locals,
such as meeting-points in squares, parks, cafe´s, open markets, etc.,
as well as informal chats with both immigrants and locals.
– Visits to public services dealing with immigrants, such as the po-
lice’s Department of Aliens, the prefecture’s Department of Employ-
ment and Labour (responsible for the issue of work permits) and
the Department of Aliens of the Region of Central Macedonia
(which controls part of the stay-permit procedure).
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– Monitoring of the activities of organisations like the free language
courses programme of the NGO Odysseas, the Anti-racist Initiative
of Thessaloniki, or the Albanian Association Thessaloniki.
– Information-gathering about the above and other organisations and
associations which are run by, provide services for, or deal in var-
ious ways with migrants, through (a) the collection of printed mate-
rial (information leaflets, newsletters and brochures); and (b) infor-
mal interviews with representatives and key informants.
The main source of primary data, and the basic original research done
throughout the fieldwork, was a survey of 208 Albanian and Bulgarian
immigrants living and working in the city, which employed two com-
bined instruments of data collection, namely structured questionnaires
and in-depth interviews. In all, 159 questionnaires were administered,
with 108 Albanian and 51 Bulgarian respondents, while the interviews
totalled 49, with 30 and 19 Albanian and Bulgarian interviewees re-
spectively, although the Albanian interview sample also included peo-
ple related to the principal interviewees (husbands/wives, children).
The questionnaire generated mostly quantitative, ‘measurable’ data,
while the interviews were aimed at producing more detailed and quali-
tative information. Both techniques were designed to collect informa-
tion about the demographic profile of the migrants (nationality, ethni-
city, gender, age, family) and to address issues such as: the conditions
of migration (when, why, how) and the patterns of mobility; the mi-
grants’ housing situation and residential trajectories; their labour-mar-
ket conditions; their education, skills and employment history; aspects
of their general conditions and daily lives.
Apart from such ‘objective’ characteristics, the respondents/intervie-
wees were also asked to give their opinion, to expose their perceptions
and subjective understandings of their migration, housing and labour-
market experiences, to tell stories of unfair (or fair) treatment by host
institutions, services and people, and to comment on cultural aspects
of their life abroad. While the main ‘unit’ was meant to be the indivi-
dual migrant, the questionnaires were aimed at gathering some infor-
mation about other people too, basically members of the respondent’s
family, in order to grasp the general picture of the conditions of the mi-
grant household. The nature of the questions in the interview schedule
also stimulated similar responses.
The questionnaire was initially designed in early 2001 in English,
then it was translated into Greek and pilot-tested with ten Albanian re-
spondents in April 2001. In its final version, produced after changes
and corrections inspired by the testing, the questionnaire was eight
pages long and composed of the following six sections: A. Personal
Profile, B. Migration Data, C. Housing Conditions, D. Employment
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Conditions, E. Living Conditions, F. Additional Information. Most of
the items (questions) were expressed in close-ended formats, with
boxes to tick corresponding to different answers. Series of categories,
dichotomous ‘yes/no’ formats and simple ranked items like ‘friendly-
neutral-hostile’ were the most common answer formats employed.
Where it was necessary, there was also additional space provided for
‘other’ or ‘comments’. There were, however, a few open-ended answers,
which provided a vast amount of further detail afterwards. These have
been taken into account to an extent, but have not been used in their
totality, nor have they been coded. Apart from the profile of the respon-
dents, most of the questions aimed at grasping the condition of the im-
migrants at the time of the interview; in a few cases, questions ad-
dressed their migration history (year of entry, legal status upon arrival,
first accommodation in Greece, settlement history and previous occu-
pations). A copy of the original questionnaire that was administered in
Greek and its English translation have been included in Appendix B1.
The interviews were based on a guide designed for the purposes of a
research project on ‘Social Exclusion of Albanians in Italy and Greece’,
which was funded by the Leverhulme Trust and carried out by two re-
search teams at the universities of Sussex and Dundee. My supervisor,
Russell King, was the principal investigator of this project. There was
an initial section on demographic data and details of the interview time
and place that had to be completed on a form. The rest of the interview
was tape-recorded and consisted of five groups of questions: (1) Migra-
tion Dynamics; (2) Exclusion (labour market, formal and informal net-
works and institutions of support/welfare, housing, participation in
networks of support/solidarity); (3) Racism and Identity; (4) Cultural
Integration/Exclusion (Media); and (5) Future Plans. The interview
guide is available in Appendix B2. The schedule was a semi-structured,
open-ended one, and the sequence of questions did not always follow
the guide, since the aim was to get in-depth information and therefore
it was intended to leave the interviewee free to speak without many in-
terruptions. Although it did not really employ the ‘life history’ inter-
viewing technique, the schedule addressed biographic material also,
since all sections contained questions about the personal stories of the
interviewees, in respect to their decision to emigrate, their legal status,
housing, employment and relationships with locals. All interviews are
kept on tape and were fully or partly transcribed into MS Word docu-
ment files.
3.2.2 Conducting the fieldwork: a report from the front
In total, a period of a year and a half was devoted to research in the
field. Questionnaires and interviews with Albanian immigrants were
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done between October 2001 and July 2002, following a one-month pi-
lot phase in April 2001. Questionnaires and interviews with Bulgarian
immigrants started in November 2001 but progressed slowly, and a
great share of them were conducted between September 2002 and Feb-
ruary 2003. The slow progress of the fieldwork has to be attributed to
factors such as: problems of coming into contact with immigrants; un-
willingness of some to participate; and unavailability due to work/fa-
mily responsibilities. Most of the meetings had to take place during
afternoons and/or weekends, when the interviewees had some spare
time and were willing to dedicate it to me and to my research. The
chief practical difficulty I faced in the beginning, as well as at some
points during the course of the fieldwork, was meeting the desired
number of potential respondents and interviewees. I was aware that
the ‘snowball effect’ would solve this problem, but I had to establish
some initial contacts first. Therefore, a period had to be spent initially
in finding possible sources from where I could ensure a number of
first interviewees/respondents. I started by mobilising my personal net-
works, trying to contact migrants I knew, or people who had some sort
of relationship with immigrants (past and present employers, land-
lords, neighbours, friends, colleagues, etc.). This resulted in unexpect-
edly many people who were willing to help by bringing me into contact
with potential respondents/interviewees. However, apart from these in-
itial individual resources, I found it easy to go through other ‘safe’
channels, such as NGOs, translation businesses, meeting places, etc.
Some important contacts that resulted in significant proportions of the
total sample were the following:
– The NGO Odysseas, a free Greek language school for immigrants
and refugees hosted by the Macedonian Institute of Employment
(MAKINE, home also of the INTEGRA ‘Programme for the Recep-
tion and Support of Immigrants and Refugees’). I met some of the
volunteer teachers involved and gained access to the classes, and so
I had the opportunity to speak to some of the students.
– The Albanian Association of Thessaloniki, which runs, among other
activities, Albanian language courses for migrants’ children every
Sunday morning. After being introduced by the association’s repre-
sentatives, it was a good opportunity to conduct questionnaires or
interviews with parents who were waiting for their children.
– A group of students from various departments of the University of
Macedonia, who are Albanian nationals and who responded posi-
tively to an advertisement I placed at the university. They volun-
teered to help me by bringing me into contact with relatives and
friends, and, in some cases, by undertaking to administer a small
number of questionnaires themselves.
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– A central Thessaloniki cafe´, which operates as a meeting place for a
small Bulgarian community in the absence of any formal organisa-
tion of Bulgarians in the city. The owner, after having been inter-
viewed herself, offered a great amount of help by introducing me to
friends and relatives, as well as customers.
Once some initial contacts had been established, the snowball effect
started working, as many respondents/interviewees were able to intro-
duce me to at least one relative, friend or colleague who was eager to
participate. I generally tried to avoid contacting migrants directly, being
aware of a series of problems that could possibly arise, as they actually
did some of the few times I attempted to do so. Such problems were
associated with the lack of trust between an immigrant in Greece and
a ‘local asking questions’ without the mediation of a person who could
act as a ‘referee’ for me as the researcher. This can actually be inter-
preted as an additional manifestation of the ‘life in fear’ experienced by
many immigrants in Greece due to unfair or racist attitudes towards
them (see Chapter 5). On a few occasions though, I had no alternative
to going out on the street, to piazzas, where immigrants gather every
morning to seek work; to cafe´s, where they meet after work or at week-
ends; to translation offices; or to the doors of the Albanian and Bulgar-
ian consulates. This strategy was particularly followed when I was fa-
cing serious problems in meeting the required number of respondents,
especially Bulgarian migrants, in the final stage. In general though,
the fieldwork progressed steadily without significant difficulties.
The vast majority of questionnaires and all interviews were con-
ducted personally by myself and were face to face. The questionnaires
were completed in open public places, coffee shops, or in rooms at the
offices of the organisations involved. On some occasions, more than
one questionnaire was administered at the same time. Interviews, on
the other hand, were conducted by appointment, and in most cases at
the homes of the interviewees. Some of the interviews were joint ones,
while in a few cases there were other persons present at the time of
the interview (husbands/wives, other relatives, friends/flatmates, em-
ployers, etc) who sometimes intervened in the discussion. The time
needed to complete a questionnaire varied between fifteen and thirty
minutes, while interviews lasted from about thirty minutes to two
hours, depending on the willingness of the interviewee to speak. The
language used could not be other than Greek. Most of the respon-
dents/interviewees were able to communicate at a comprehensive level
of Greek, and I did not face serious problems of mutual understand-
ing. For the interviews though, I tried to ensure meeting only people
above a certain level of Greek-language competency. In a few cases,
other languages were employed (English, French), depending on the
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respondents’/interviewees’ knowledge, in order to clarify points that
could not be well understood. One interview took place entirely in Eng-
lish, because the participant felt more comfortable in this language. In
a few cases, third persons who were present during the interview acted
as translators in order to clarify my questions or to help the respon-
dents to phrase their answers.
3.2.3 Ethical considerations
I decided as a matter of principle to briefly explain to all participants
who I am, what I do and what the objectives of my research are. Some
people would then ask me questions about the purposes of the survey,
who I was doing it for and if it was going to be published and become
known and influential to policy makers. In such cases, I tried to keep
quite a low profile by explaining that parts of it would certainly be pub-
lished, and it would be ‘a very nice thing’ if it had an impact at all; but
I felt I should be realistic by sticking to the point that they were actu-
ally being asked to help me to do my fieldwork and obtain a D.Phil.
In general, I received a great variety of reactions from actual and po-
tential interviewees, although I can say that most of the people were
generally positive, friendly and talkative. Many migrants really wanted
to speak for various reasons, mostly to address problems they were fa-
cing; some were even more talkative than was actually needed, with a
certain degree of exaggeration. On the other hand, there were cases of
people who were laconic, or who didn’t find it easy to speak about cer-
tain things; a young woman burst into tears while recalling her experi-
ence of crossing the border illegally. Finally, I came across many who
were just hostile or afraid to participate. They would accordingly chal-
lenge the importance of the research as a whole, or would express their
fears by questions of the kind ‘Will I be followed by Interpol?’, or ‘You
are not working for the police, eh?’. I generally tried not to put the in-
terviewees/respondents under pressure and to respect their own will
and availability to participate in my research.
The administration of questionnaires, and especially the interviews,
presupposed the establishment of a relationship based on mutual con-
fidentiality. I mentioned before the channels through which I moved
in order to contact potential respondents/interviewees: these channels,
organisations and individuals were my ‘guarantee’ of confidentiality.
Moreover, I felt I should offer my help by spreading information when
I could see it was needed: accordingly, I informed some people about
the existence of organisations and programmes of support/solidarity (e.
g. free language courses, available welfare provisions, etc.). This would
usually happen during the discussion that in many cases followed the
interviews and contributed further to building relationships of trust. In
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addition, the assurance of the anonymity of the participants has been a
key strategy that helped me in establishing this kind of relationship.
The clandestine status of some immigrants was by itself a sensitive is-
sue that required particular care. The questionnaire was anonymous by
design, since it did not ask for names or contact details. The interviews
were more problematic in that respect, because I had arranged appoint-
ments by phone and in many cases visited interviewees at their homes.
I had to assure the participants that their contact details would be kept
strictly confidential, and that no third persons would have any kind of
access to the names, addresses or phone numbers of the people I had
interviewed. However, I decided not to change the names of the inter-
viewees in the quotes used throughout the thesis. Given the fact that
only first names are used, quite common to an extent, and after having
discussed it with some of the interviewees, I am confident that there is
no potential danger of the participants being identified.
3.2.4 Sampling and data analysis
Despite the differences between the two data-collection techniques, I
decided to treat the sample as a whole, as a single quantitative survey,
part of which also contains qualitative and detailed information. There-
fore, the quantitative material (profile, details on entry, legal status, em-
ployment, housing, etc.) that came out of the interviews has been
added to the rest of the (questionnaire) data. No particular statistical
sample design has been employed. As mentioned already, the sampling
process relied almost exclusively upon the snowball effect, and this has
been the only available means for assuring a random sample. There
are two main reasons for this:
– Firstly, the official statistics are rather poor and were even poorer at
the time of the fieldwork: the only published source was the 1998
regularisation statistics, since the 2001 census data appeared online
only in late 2003. The Albanian and Bulgarian migrants in Greece
and Thessaloniki can be considered, from a statistical point of view,
as ‘hidden populations’. Even if more complete and accurate statis-
tics were available, the total number of (all) immigrants would re-
main unknown, since many of them are still undocumented and
since a significant number of people are believed to be following
circular migration patterns. The existence of a fragmented legal fra-
mework, which treats in a differential manner different categories
of migrants (ethnic Greeks, seasonal workers, dependent family
members, asylum seekers, etc.), affects in turn the collection, avail-
ability and accuracy of official data.
– Secondly, because of the objectives of the research itself and its
methodological and analytical thrusts. The intention was not simply
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to describe the characteristics of the groups studied, but rather to
explore and analyse the processes of incorporation, as defined ear-
lier. Thus, there was no overwhelming need for assuring statistical
representativeness, since I was not planning to go into sophisticated
statistical analysis of the data as such; rather, I discuss the data in or-
der to answer my initial research questions on the basis of the ana-
lytical framework set out earlier in this chapter. The quantitative
data is analysed in relation to the qualitative material and in parallel
to my other sources, in an attempt to relate my case study to other
cases of migration and incorporation. In that sense, even the over-
representation, for instance, of migrants with certain characteris-
tics8, is not thought to be a serious problem, because it reveals addi-
tional factors in the study of incorporation.
Accordingly, the concept of external validity should be treated as a very
relative one, especially in multi-method non-statistical research like the
one employed in my thesis, where quantitative and qualitative ele-
ments are constructively combined. Hence, the only criterion used in
the selection of the sample was that respondents should be working or
have worked in Greece. There has been an effort, though, to keep a bal-
ance between the different channels for meeting potential respondents,
regarding the share of some of the sub-groups in the sample (e.g. the
ethnic Greeks). Having made all these caveats, however, a comparison
of the characteristics of my sample with the available statistics and with
the findings of other empirical surveys confirms a certain degree of re-
presentativeness and allows meaningful statistical generalisations.
All data were processed into MS Excel, which has been used in the
first instance to calculate frequencies and percentages. The basic data
(quantitative) were coded into key-variables and then transferred to
SPSS in order to perform simple descriptive/exploratory statistical pro-
cedures more easily. Given the fact that most of the questionnaires had
been administered by myself (or had been carefully explained in full
detail in the few cases where other people volunteered to help), no pro-
blems of misunderstanding or misinterpretation were faced. There
were, however, a few difficulties during the processing of the data, as
regards the coding of some variables9. The majority of the questions
were answered; there exists however some missing information, which
becomes rather significant in questions concerning money (i.e. rent,
wage, household income, remittances, investment, bank account) or re-
garding some other specific details (accommodation size, floor, etc.).
Apart from frequencies and percentages, I compare means to high-
light differences where appropriate and make use of cross-tabulations,
chi-square tests and correlations to summarise data and to explore or
confirm relationships between variables, when these were implied by
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the analysis itself, suggested by the qualitative material, or when I had
the impression that a relationship could exist. Chi-square was helpful
for being a non-parametric, distribution-free test, suitable for categori-
cal variables, while for continuous numeric variables the Pearson’s cor-
relation co-efficient has been used. A series of dichotomous variables
related to the migrants’ living conditions were synthesised into an in-
dex in order to summarise the data into one single continuous variable
(see Section 8.1.3)10.
As already stated, interviews were conducted face to face and were
tape-recorded. The ones with Albanians were fully transcribed (some
with the kind assistance of other people) and then translated into Eng-
lish, as they were also needed for the purposes of the Leverhulme re-
search project mentioned earlier. The rest of the interviews were partly
transcribed in accordance with the needs of the analysis. No specialised
software package has been employed to analyse the interview material.
Being aware of the limits of ‘the human as analyst’ (see Robson 2002:
460), I decided to proceed by doing the analysis myself after consider-
ing the role and the weight of the interviews in my research as a
whole. The number of interviews was not so large that it would be dif-
ficult or very time-consuming for me to analyse them all. Moreover,
the memory of each individual interview was kept alive and was sup-
ported by detailed notes, which made it easy for me to go through a
careful reading/listening without missing important points. My re-
search is based on a combination of methods anyway, thus it does not
rely exclusively on interviews in the sense that a very thorough compu-
ter-based qualitative analysis would be necessary. Lastly, any possible
bias and misleading first impressions are believed to have been avoided
at the end by cross-relating qualitative findings with quantitative data,
by testing hypotheses also on a quantitative basis, and by discussing
conclusions in the light of other empirical and theoretical works.
As I mentioned earlier, the interview sample itself should not be re-
garded as statistically representative; after all, quantitative generalisa-
tions are made possible by the analysis of the survey as a whole. It
rather consists of a rich selection of separate cases, which allow a look
at a variety of individual experiences that are discussed and conceptua-
lised in relation to quantitative findings and to what is already known
from the literature and other sources. In that sense, the qualitative ma-
terial drawn out of the interviews has been used in order to frame or
re-frame hypotheses, to explore relationships, to construct and/or sup-
port arguments and to further interpret the raw numeric evidence com-
ing out of the rest of the survey. Therefore, no special attention is given
to the discourse or the wording/phrasing of the answers; what was pri-
marily the focus of the interview analysis was the content of the an-
swers as such, regarding ‘objective’ conditions and ‘subjective’ under-
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standings of the interviewees’ migration experiences. The qualitative
material is incorporated into the discussion, with references to general
findings and descriptive summaries of parts of the narratives, while
specific extracts from individual interviews are included according to
the needs of the analysis.
Ethnographic-like analysis of this kind can reveal interesting qualita-
tive elements, which apply in general to Albanian and Bulgarian immi-
grants in Greece and to an extent to other migrant groups, especially
when discussed in the light of existing knowledge. As King, Iosifides
and Myrivili (1998: 159) put it, the ‘real experts on migration are the
migrants themselves’ and qualitative analysis of interviews may thus
help us to ‘capture the richness of the human experience of migration’
(in the words of King, 2002: 101). By ‘giving a voice’ to migrants, and
by analysing their experiences and perceptions on the basis of the
structural, institutional and cultural contexts in the specific locality
where they live, we can conceptualise their lifeworld. On the other
hand, the purpose of quantitative analysis is not simply to describe the
characteristics of immigrants in Thessaloniki, but rather to explore re-
lationships, confirm hypotheses and give statistical relevance to argu-
ments articulated on the basis of the qualitative material and/or theory.
In general, quantitative and qualitative elements are critically combined
and mixed in a constructive synthesis of both methods, with the weight
moving from one to the other, depending on the arguments developed.
Each method supports, complements and fills in the gaps of the other,
or uncovers different aspects of the issues discussed, allowing thus for
general and holistic interpretations. In addition, the analysis of inter-
views provides the biographic material needed for a dynamic account
of the migration experiences of the participants, while the question-
naire data give a more static picture of the respondents’ characteristics
at the time of the fieldwork. The question of time is crucial in the un-
derstanding of the dynamics of incorporation and will appear in several
parts of the discussion: it is highlighted by qualitative evidence, and
confirmed to an extent through statistical comparisons between mi-
grants who came in different periods.
The unit of study concerns the two particular immigrant groups stu-
died, although later I refer to migrants in general, in an attempt to the-
orise my results. The right way of describing the study population
would be perhaps ‘migrants from Albania and Bulgaria’, since both
groups include significant shares of ethnic Greek migrants (Greek-Al-
banians or ‘Northern Epirotes’ and Sarakatsani Bulgarians). The unit of
analysis, meaning the chief target of the empirical research and the
principal source of information, is basically the individual migrant,
although there is also some material pertaining to the migrant house-
hold. The scale of study and analysis is the city itself. Regarding both the
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fieldwork and the official data used, what I call Greater Thessaloniki is
officially called the ‘Greater Thessaloniki Area’, which is geographically
half of Thessaloniki Prefecture, and also includes semi-urban areas. By
metropolitan area, I mean the peri-urban zone, most likely destined to
form the metropolitan area in the near future. Other ‘units’ that appear
are the Thessaloniki conurbation, (the built-over urban surface) and the
municipality of Thessaloniki (basically, the inner city)11.
3.3 The research setting: a socio-economic profile of
Thessaloniki
Greater Thessaloniki is the most important economic centre in north-
ern Greece, and the second most important one in the country, produ-
cing more than 11.7 per cent of the total national GDP and about 66.9
per cent of the regional GDP in Central Macedonia in 200212. During
the same year, the GDP per capita in Thessaloniki Prefecture was high-
er than the national one by 18 percentage points. During 1994-1995,
manufacturing accounted on average for 25.9 per cent of production
and services for 70.5 per cent. At the end of 2003, the area was concen-
trating about 8 per cent of the total (national) labour force. Vaiou and
Hadjimichalis (1997: Table 4.9) describe Greater Thessaloniki as an
‘urban-industrial’ labour market where traditional, informal, labour-in-
tensive activities coexist with modern, formal and capital-intensive
ones. It comprises skilled, ‘central’ and unionised labour employed in
industries and services of both the private and the public sectors, seaso-
nal employment in small- and medium-scale enterprises and in inten-
sive agriculture, ‘female’ employment in sectors of diffused industriali-
sation, and informal employment in construction, trade and various
services.
Currently, manufacturing accounts for slightly more than one third
of the total number of companies in Thessaloniki Prefecture (ICAP
2003), making the area the second most important industrial complex
in the country after Athens. In 2000, 16.3 per cent of Greece’s manu-
facturers and 13.9 per cent of industrial employment were concentrated
in the prefecture. The principal industries are shoes and clothing, tex-
tiles, tobacco, food and beverages, transportation means, furniture and
metal machinery. The most dynamic sectors during the early 1990s,
with high shares of contribution to the country’s industrial GDP, were
shoes and clothing, textiles, food and beverages and plastics and chemi-
cals, while the ones declining at the time were the wood and furniture,
and metallurgy and metal-machinery industries. The average company
size in the mid-1990s was calculated at 6.5 employees per unit (Kafka-
las et al. 1996: 55). Chronaki et al. (1993) report that a significant part
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of industrial activity remains unrecorded, especially for smaller enter-
prises, often family-owned and family-run, which also tend to apply la-
bour-intensive practices. The tertiary sector is of particular importance
for Thessaloniki’s economy; trade alone accounted for about 60 per
cent of services in 2001 (ICAP 2003: Figure 2). Historically, commer-
cial activities have been the cornerstone of the city’s economic life
(Moskov 1978).
From the late 1980s, the rise in labour costs and the rigidities of the
Greek labour market, increasing international competition and the in-
ability of small enterprises to modernise interrupted the fragile dyna-
mism of the previous decades and led to crisis (Chronaki et al. 1993;
Vaiou & Hadjimichalis 1997). The 1990s witnessed many enterprises
shutting down and a rapid growth in unemployment. From 8.2 per
cent at the beginning of the decade (1991 census), the unemployment
rate in the metropolitan area reached 13.4 per cent in 1999, and re-
mains high (10 per cent in early 2003; NSSG, Labour Force Surveys).
Restructuring processes combined with the overall ‘good’ performance
of the Greek economy during the second half of the 1990s (reaching
EU standards and entering the monetary union) gave way to a new dy-
namism well manifested in the local economy. Forms of neo-industria-
lisation have appeared, with an internationally competitive and dy-
namic industrial complex developing in the area (Komninos & Sefertzi
1998). The urban economy itself is currently undergoing trends of
further tertiarisation and informationalisation, and larger companies
based on capital-intensive methods are being developed (Giannakou &
Kafkalas 1999). Personal consumption increased significantly in the
city over the past three decades, and is currently characterised by two
major trends (Giannakou & Kafkalas 1999): (i) the persistence of mas-
sive demand for ‘Fordist-type’ products and services, and (ii) the shift
towards more individualised forms of demand.
A population of nearly 1.1 million was recorded in the prefecture dur-
ing the 2001 census; nearly 80 per cent in the metropolitan area, over
70 in the conurbation and over one third in the municipality13. One in
five prefecture residents have post-secondary or tertiary education. The
share of university graduates jumped from 8.4 per cent of the popula-
tion above 19 years old in 1991 to 11.8 per cent in 2001, with the share
of women possessing a degree rising by 4.1 percentage points. Nearly
two thirds of the labour force are employed in services: about 20 per
cent in trade, 13 per cent in education and health, 7.1 per cent in real
estate, 6.3 per cent in transportation, communications and storing, 6.1
per cent in intermediate financial organisations and other service-pro-
viding companies, 5.7 per cent in public administration and insurance
services, 5.4 in hotels and restaurants. Employment in manufacturing
concerns 18.5 per cent of the working population, while 7.7 per cent
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work in construction and 5.5 per cent in agriculture. Entrepreneurship
and self-employment are the case for respectively 12.2 per cent and
12.3 per cent of the labour force (9.4 per cent and 21.3 per cent respec-
tively in 1991). The higher shares of employers are found mostly in the
trade sector, but also in manufacturing and the hotel and catering in-
dustry, while the self-employed are concentrated in agriculture, trade
and real-estate services. The unemployment rate in 2001 was 11.3 per
cent, which for women rises to 14.1 per cent, and for young people be-
tween 15-29 exceeds 20 per cent. For people aged 15-39 years old, un-
employment drops to 16.8 per cent, but it is obviously still high; nota-
bly, this is the better-educated section of the labour force, with 40 per
cent possessing a university degree (61.5 per cent of women in this
group). High shares of part-time employment are also observed among
this age group (38 per cent, about 42 per cent for women).
About 80 per cent of the foreign population in the prefecture live in
Greater Thessaloniki, more than half in the municipality. The principal
sectors for the 31,989 immigrants who are employed are construction
(23.3 per cent), manufacturing (21.1 per cent), agriculture (7.4 per cent)
and services (41.3 per cent). Compared to the figures for all immi-
grants, employment in services drops to 36.9 per cent among Bulgar-
ians and to 31 per cent among Albanians, while agriculture weighs
more for both nationalities (11 and 13 per cent, respectively) and con-
struction is much more important for Albanian nationals (28.3 per
cent). About 60 per cent of women work in services, with the ‘hotel
and restaurants’ sector weighing more for Bulgarians (30.2 per cent),
and the category ‘other services’ being more important for Albanians
(49 per cent). The share of employment in manufacturing among Al-
banian women exceeds its equivalent among the total number of for-
eign workers (24.6 per cent), but it is much lower in agriculture (5.8
per cent), in contrast to that of female Bulgarians (12.5 per cent).
Industrial production is mainly located in two main areas/complexes
(Sindos to the west and Thermi to the east), but small manufacturing
units can be found all over the city (see Chronaki et al. 1993). Commer-
cial activities are even more diffused, although inner-city neighbour-
hoods are generally characterised by small retail trade while large com-
mercial outlets tend to concentrate mostly on the outskirts. Similarly,
the spatial distribution of other service activities (leisure, finance, pub-
lic services, etc.) is generally marked by an over-representation in the
city centre, followed by the central areas of various districts/municipali-
ties and, depending on the type of activity, certain concentrations in
suburban locations. The centre itself concentrates diverse activities, var-
ious types of workers and the highest proportion of tenants as opposed
to homeowners, since it attracts more people looking for relatively tem-
porary residence (public servants, for example, or students, and in-
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creasingly immigrants). This relative diffusion of economic activities is
accompanied by a relative mixture of social classes.
As the city geographically spreads along the coast, its social map is
divided between the prosperous, more expensive and better-conserved
areas of the south-eastern part and the downgraded, poorer and cheap-
er areas of the north-west, with a socially mixed centre in between (the
municipality). There exist relatively ‘downgraded’ (i.e. overpopulated,
with older buildings, cheaper rents, etc.) neighbourhoods within the
municipality (in the northern and western districts: e.g. Kassandrou
Street, Vardaris) and in eastern Thessaloniki (e.g. Foinikas), but by no
means can they be characterised as ‘clusters of poverty’, while there are
also ‘nice’ areas in the north-west (e.g. Oraiokastro). Tsoulouvis (1996)
has noticed a high concentration of social groups living in relatively
vulnerable conditions in the north-western part of the metropolitan
area (immigrants, Roma, drug addicts, single-parent families, unem-
ployed). Unemployment rates for instance, according to the 2001 cen-
sus, exceed 12 per cent in most north-western areas (with two excep-
tions: Pefka and Triandria) and in one case (Efkarpia) approach 16 per
cent. However, even in such neighbourhoods the population remains
ethnically and socially mixed. In general, social divisions in Thessaloni-
ki are not as sharp as in other urban concentrations, due to the exis-
tence of a wide middle class, which is geographically dispersed all over
the city (Leontidou 1990: Ch. 5; Labrianidis & Lyberaki 2001: Ch. 7).
As shown in Figure A2 (Appendix A), the majority of immigrants re-
corded during the 2001 census live in inner-city neighbourhoods, with
higher concentrations in the north-western districts of the conurbation.
The general feature of vertical social differentiation in terms of resi-
dence (the wealthier segments of the population living on the upper
floors), noted by Leontidou (1990; 1996), is to an extent evident in the
case of Thessaloniki (Labrianidis & Lyberaki 2001: Ch.7). The inner
city and the surrounding areas, especially to the north-west, are gener-
ally marked by older buildings, more compact urban structure and
high population density. According to a study by Velentzas et al. (1996:
Table 6.1), the percentage of buildings built before 1970 ranges from
64.3 per cent to 85.2 per cent in the central neighbourhoods (the his-
torical centre and the neighbourhoods at its west and north); only 23
per cent of the blocks in the Thessaloniki conurbation were built after
1980. Also, the north-western districts have resulted from the ‘anar-
chic’ urbanisation of the previous decades, while construction patterns
in the eastern areas have generally followed a more planned path. Late-
ly, there has been a marked trend of rents going up in most parts of
the city, particularly in the centre and the popular eastern districts and
suburbs; Velentzas et al. (1996) noted this happening already by the
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end of the 1980s, but rents have grown very considerably since their
study.
Historically, Thessaloniki has been an important commercial port
and a major city in two empires: the Byzantine and the Ottoman. Un-
der Ottoman rule it was one of the first industrial centres in both the
Empire and the transnational area that later formed the Greek nation-
state; in fact, Thessaloniki was the most important centre until Athens
took off in the 1870s (Leontidou 1990: Ch. 2). Today it exhibits most of
the characteristics of the classic Mediterranean city (Leontidou 1990;
1996), with one notable exception: history. Two peculiarities have to do
with that. The first is that what was once the ‘historical centre’ is now
limited to scattered old buildings, while the core of the city is com-
prised of relatively newly built blocks, as a result of the Great Fire of
1917, the earthquake of 1978, and especially urban-planning policies
since the 1960s (Leontidou 1990: Ch. 4-5). The second is that the city’s
history is no longer visible in the urban landscape, with the exception
of some recently restored Byzantine churches and the ‘Upper Town’,
the old Muslim quarter. The historian Mark Mazower (2004: 12) de-
scribes it evocatively as ‘A forest of densely-packed apartment blocks
and giant advertising billboards sprouted where in living memory had
been cypresses and minarets, stables, owls and storks.’ His description
points to the city’s multicultural and polyglot history, which lasted for
nearly 500 years, from its conquest by the Ottomans in 1430 to the
elimination of the erstwhile prevalent Jewish element by the Nazis dur-
ing the Second World War.
Thus it was not by chance that one of the names the city once bore
was ‘La Sefarade des Balcanes’ (= the Sephardite of the Balkans; Vein-
stein 1993). Thessaloniki hosted large numbers of Sephardic Jews after
the Reconquista re-established Christian rule in the Iberian Peninsula,
leading to the expulsion of those unwilling to convert. Jews formed the
majority of the city’s population, followed by Muslims and Christians.
For centuries its life was characterised by coexistence between the var-
ious communities, on the basis of the hierarchy imposed by the Otto-
man elite. At the end of the nineteenth century, it was characterised by
contradictory forces of westernisation and tradition; apart from the
three main communities, already distinctively identified as Greeks,
Turks, etc., it hosted a mosaic of peoples from the Balkans, and also
Central and Eastern Europe. Following Mazower, quoting from a novel
(2004: 9):
Leon Sciaky’s evocative Farewell to Salonica, the autobiography of
a Jewish boy growing up under Abdul Hammid, begins with the
sound of the muezzin’s cry at dusk. Albanian householders pro-
tected their Bulgarian grocer from the fury of the Ottoman gen-
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darmerie, while well-to-do Muslim parents employed Christian
wet-nurses for their children and Greek gardeners for their fruit
trees. Outside the Yalman family home the well was used by
‘the Turks, Greeks, Bulgarians, Jews, Serbs, Vlachs and Alba-
nians of the neighbourhood’.
This history, well embodied in the urban landscape until not so long
ago, has now faded after less than a century within the borders of the
Greek nation-state: the Muslims left with the exchange of the popula-
tions that followed Greece’s defeat in the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-
1922, and the Jews were deported (and most of them killed) by the Na-
zis during the Second World War. But it was not only modernisation,
capitalist development and urbanisation that contributed to this; as Ma-
zower argues, it was also the result of conscious attempts to redraw the
city’s identity on the basis of national and religious considerations, as
well as political and electoral interests. Today, the city seems to be re-
gaining part of its lost multicultural character, as it increasingly hosts
people of diverse origins and becomes a new home for migrants from
the Balkans and elsewhere. The study of immigrants’ incorporation
within this urban context may help us to understand the contradictions
through which such a process may be taking place.
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4 Structure, patterns and dynamics of migration
Thus far I have outlined both the general and the specific contexts of
migration and immigrants’ integration in Greece. The previous chapter
ended with a description of the productive and employment structures
and the urban geography of Thessaloniki, with a brief reference to the
city’s multicultural past. The broad issues related to the Greek experi-
ence of migration, including an overview of the basic economic and so-
cial features regarding immigrant employment and an account of the
relevant policy framework, were addressed in the latter half of Chapter
2. Before starting to analyse the processes of incorporation themselves
(what happens once the migrants are in Greece), it is necessary to talk
a little about the background factors underlying the specificities of im-
migration from Albania and Bulgaria, according to the findings of the
field research. In this chapter, therefore, I refer to the structure of the
migrant population in terms of its demographic characteristics, human
capital, geographic and cultural origins, as well as to the reasons for
migration, the modes of entering the country, the geographic trajec-
tories within Greece and the patterns of final settlement in Thessaloni-
ki. This information is important not simply as a ‘description of the
sample’ (i.e. who are the migrants questioned, why, when and how
they came, from where, and so forth), but crucially because it draws
the general picture of the dynamics of migration. Migratory dynamics
are not only essential to understand the patterns of integration, but
also have direct effects on the incorporation process as such. This chap-
ter has this dual task: on the one hand, to describe the sample and
sketch the migration profile of the respondents; on the other, to identi-
fy the basic patterns and dynamics in this newly formed migration sys-
tem(s), highlighting their relevance to the incorporation process.
4.1 Immigrants’ profile: a description of the sample
The information presented in this section is quantitative and concerns
the ‘profile’ of the participants in the research. Firstly, I describe the
demographic composition of the sample, in terms of gender, age and
family status, geographic origin, ethnic and religious background. Sec-
ondly, I present the immigrants’ employment and educational skills; in
other words, their human capital characteristics at the time of the field-
work. Comparisons between the two migrant groups as well as be-
tween the subgroups on the basis of gender and ethnic origin are also
made.
4.1.1 Demographic characteristics, geographical and cultural background
The sample consists of 138 Albanian and 70 Bulgarian respondents,
whose demographic characteristics are summarised in Table 4.1. The
share of women is 29.7 per cent among Albanian and 50 per cent
among Bulgarian migrants. Approximately half of the persons ques-
tioned belong to the 30-49 age group; about one third (36.2 of the Al-
banians and 31.4 of the Bulgarians) are young people between 18-29
years old. The percentage of older people (of 50 years or more) is nota-
bly higher among Bulgarians (21.4 per cent compared to 13.8 among
Albanians). This variation in age between the two migrant groups may
imply differences in their patterns and reasons of migration, as we are
soon going to see. Turning to family status, 61.6 per cent of the Alba-
nian migrants and 52.9 per cent of the Bulgarians are married, with
more than half of both groups having children. Slightly more Alba-
nians are single (37.6 per cent), while a significant share of the Bulgar-
ians are divorced (ten people, all women) and one Albanian is wi-
dowed. Finally, it appears that only a few of the Albanian respondents
have their close family in their home country: only 5 per cent said their
husbands or wives live in Albania and about 7 per cent said their chil-
dren are there. The picture is different for Bulgarian immigrants: for
14.3 and 28.6 per cent of them, their spouses and children respectively
live in Bulgaria (with a lower response rate, however).
About one third of the Albanians and 28.6 per cent of the Bulgar-
ians are of ethnic Greek origin (Table 4.1), but, given the lack of official
data on ethnic Greek migrants, it is difficult to estimate the relevance
of the sample characteristics to their actual population in Thessaloniki.
With respect to their religious background, the overwhelming majority
of immigrants from Bulgaria are Orthodox. Albanians appear to be a
much more heterogeneous population in terms of religion: 60 per cent
said they are Orthodox, 11 per cent declared themselves Muslims and 6
per cent Catholic, while a significant share (21.5 per cent) declared ‘not
religious’1. Notably, about 10 per cent of both groups have been bap-
tised in Greece, which might reflect specific integration ‘strategies’, as
we will see in Section 8.2.3.
It is interesting to have a closer look at the differences between the
subgroups in the sample, namely in respect to gender and ethnic ori-
gin. Regarding the former, we observe that females are more repre-
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sented among Bulgarians, a picture not that far from the reality of
available statistics and other sources2. The sample thus reflects a ‘de-
pendent’ pattern in Albanian female migration: women usually follow
men, as dependent family members, or are left behind. This is particu-
larly true for non-ethnic-Greek Albanian migrants: the share of women
is higher among Greek-Albanians (40.4 per cent), perhaps due to the
more ‘familial’ character of this group’s emigration patterns. On the
other hand, the higher participation of women in the Bulgarian section
of the sample implies a more ‘independent’ pattern of female migra-
tion in their case. The significant share of people who are divorced in
the Bulgarians’ case consists exclusively of women, which might imply
a hidden aspect of this particular migration stream: migration arises as
a solution for divorced women, usually themselves responsible for their
children, who decide to go abroad in order to improve their situation3.
In total, while more than half of the female Bulgarians are single or di-
Table 4.1 Immigrants in Thessaloniki: demographic characteristics
All Ethnic Greeks Non-Greek Origin
female male total female male total female male total
Albanian Migrants
age
18-29 36.6 36.1 36.2 36.8 17.9 25.5 36.4 43.5 41.8
30-39 31.7 24.7 26.8 36.8 17.9 25.5 27.3 27.5 27.5
40-49 24.4 22.7 23.2 10.5 28.6 21.3 36.4 20.3 24.2
50+ 7.3 16.5 13.8 15.8 35.7 27.7 0.0 8.7 6.6
family status
single 34.2 39.2 37.7 36.8 17.9 25.5 31.8 47.8 44.0
married 63.4 60.8 61.6 63.2 82.1 74.5 63.6 52.2 55.0
widowed 2.4 – 0.7 – – – 4.6 – 1.1
all
Total (N) 41 97 138 19 28 47 22 69 91
Total (%) 29.7 70.3 100.00 40.4 59.6 (34.1)* 24.2 75.8 (65.9)*
Bulgarian Migrants
age
18-29 20.0 42.9 31.4 25.0 33.3 30.0 18.5 47.8 32.0
30-39 34.3 25.7 30.0 37.5 16.7 25.0 33.3 30.4 32.0
40-49 22.9 11.4 17.1 12.5 16.7 15.0 25.9 8.7 18.0
50+ 22.9 20.0 21.4 25.0 33.3 30.0 22.2 13.0 18.0
family status
single 25.7 37.1 31.4 37.5 16.7 25.0 22.2 47.8 34.0
married 45.7 60.0 52.9 37.5 83.3 65.0 48.2 47.8 48.0
divorced/widowed 28.6 2.9 15.7 25.0 0.0 10.0 29.6 4.4 18.0
all
Total (N) 35 35 70 8 12 20 27 23 50
Total (%) 50.0 50.0 100.0 40.0 60.0 (28.6)* 54.0 46.0 (71.4)*
* Share of ethnic group within each nationality
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vorced, this is the case for only one in three Albanian women; also,
non-ethnic-Greek female Albanians are more likely to be married,
which adds to the argument about dependent migration patterns in
their case. Bulgarian women, on the other hand, appear to be generally
older (than both their male compatriots and female Albanians), with
an average age of 38.8 years (36.4 for men), in contrast to the Albanian
migrants’ characteristics (Albanian migrant women are generally
younger than men, but here the age gap is not that sharp).
Albanian ethnic Greeks appear to be on average older than the rest
of the Albanian nationals (and are the ‘oldest’ group in the sample):
half of them are 40 years old or more, compared to about 30 per cent
of the rest who belong to this age group. This is mostly the case for
male ethnic Greeks, contrasting with their non-ethnic-Greek male com-
patriots, who form the youngest section with nearly 45 per cent being
less than 30 years old. Notably, the only women above fifty are of eth-
nic Greek origin. The percentage of Greek-Albanians who are married
is also higher, and this is basically the case for male ethnic Greeks,
while women show similar characteristics with the rest of the Albanian
sample. On the other hand, the majority of Bulgarian ethnic Greeks
(seventeen out of twenty) belong to the Sarakatsani cultural group: ele-
ven are men, in their forties on average, and all but one are married
but without having their families in Greece; despite the small number
of people in this group, which does not allow for statistical generalisa-
tions, their characteristics (together with other elements that will ap-
pear later in the thesis) indicate a predominantly male-dominated mi-
gration in their case. One man and one woman are of (what is per-
ceived in Greece as) ‘local Macedonian’ origin: Slavophones, whose
families crossed the border after the civil war. The last one is the
daughter of a (now separated) mixed couple (Greek father and Bulgar-
ian mother).
Regarding the geographic origin of the participants, 30 per cent of
the Albanian immigrants come from the city of Korc¸e¨, in south-east Al-
bania, 23.5 per cent from the capital Tirana, and nearly 8 per cent from
Elbasan in the centre of the country. Another 16.2 per cent are from
the south, mostly from Gjirokaster and Sarande¨, where the ethnic
Greek minority is mainly concentrated, but also from Vlore¨ on the
coast. The rest come from various central areas, while the northern re-
gions are far less represented (8.8 per cent, one in four from the city
of Shkodre¨). The share of Albanian women coming from the north is
far lower than that of men; a greater percentage comes from southern
Albania, reflecting the higher representation of female migrants
among ethnic Greeks. All Greek-Albanians come, or originate, from
the southern part of the country and many are from Korc¸e¨, usually
those of Vlach background. Bulgarian immigrants have a more diverse
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geographical origin: 13 per cent come from the capital Sofia, 13 per cent
from the city of Sliven and 10 per cent from Plovdiv. Another 13 per
cent are from big and medium-sized cities of the north (more than half
of them from Ruse), and 7.1 per cent from Varna on the north-east
coast. There is a greater representation of females from Sofia, Varna
and the Burgas-Yanbol-Sliven area to the east. Sarakatsani come from
various places on the southern side of the long mountainous line that
divides Bulgaria (Pernik, Samokov, Karlovo, Plovdiv, Chirpan, Kazav-
luk, Sliven), while the two Greek-Macedonian interviewees are from
the border town of Petrich.
To summarise: the figure of the ‘young single male Albanian’ no
longer represents the ‘typical’ immigrant in Greece – at least not in the
case of Thessaloniki, according to my findings. By contrast, the sample
is characterised by a great heterogeneity: gender, age and family status
play a role, as well as ethnic origin or geographic and religious back-
ground. In addition, many migrants have urban roots: both in the capi-
tals of the respective countries and in other towns. In the following
paragraphs, I highlight the similarly heterogeneous human capital
characteristics of the respondents, which, again, seem to challenge
common Greek stereotypes.
4.1.2 Human capital: education level and professional experience
Given the considerable period most of the migrants had already spent
in Greece, possibly also due to bias in the selection of the sample, the
respondents’ language skills seem to be quite good. The majority spoke
and understood Greek at an intermediate level (56.5 per cent of the Al-
banians and 45.7 of the Bulgarians), and significant shares were fluent
speakers (33.3 per cent and 42.5 per cent, respectively). Some of the re-
spondents had the opportunity to take language courses in Thessaloni-
ki (see Section 5.2.2). The educational level of the respondents at the
time of the fieldwork is shown in Table 4.2.
Slightly more than 30 per cent of the Albanians are university gradu-
ates (with five people possessing postgraduate degrees), about one
fourth have had some sort of secondary technical or post-secondary
professional training and another 30.4 per cent have completed sec-
ondary education; only 15.3 per cent had not finished secondary school.
Although fewer Bulgarian immigrants hold university degrees (21.4
per cent, three people having done postgraduate studies), a greater
share has technical/professional qualifications (41.4 per cent), and
there are fewer people who have only completed primary education
(5.7 per cent). Women from both countries appear to have better educa-
tional qualifications than men. Nearly 40 per cent of female Albanians
are university graduates, and some 12.2 per cent hold post-secondary
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professional degrees, compared to 27.8 and 6.2 per cent respectively in
the case of men. The equivalent figures for Bulgarian migrants are 31.4
and 11.4 per cent for women and 11.5 and 11.4 per cent for men, respec-
tively. The share of university graduates exceeds 50 per cent among
ethnic Greek Albanians and four out of five Albanians with postgradu-
ate qualifications belong to this group, in which men appear to be bet-
ter educated than women. A much lower percentage of non-ethnic
Greeks, especially men, are university graduates; far more have techni-
cal/professional qualifications. Among ethnic Greek Bulgarians, only
four have university degrees: two men used to be teachers, now retired,
and one young woman came to Greece to study law (assisted by a spe-
cial scholarship for Sarakatsani).
Regarding the respondents’ employment skills before emigration,
key data are summarised in Table 4.3. A significant percentage of Alba-
nian migrants had not been working before coming to Greece, and this
has to be attributed to their young age at the time of emigration: many
were school pupils or university students. Of those working, and given
the above figures regarding education, the shares of skilled workers
and qualified employees in both groups are quite important. Approxi-
mately one quarter were skilled or specialised workers, whether in fac-
tories or as technicians, craftsmen, drivers, nurses and policemen. One
in four Albanians and one in five Bulgarians used to be office employ-
ees, teachers, or army professionals. One in four Albanians was a
highly qualified professional (senior public servants, scientists, engi-
neers, artists, etc.); only 11.3 per cent of the Bulgarians belonged in this
category. A significant percentage of Bulgarian migrants (25.8 per cent)
worked as waiting, restaurant and hotel staff or as store clerks in Bul-
garia, sectors much less important for the employment of Albanians
before emigration (8 per cent). The shares of unskilled factory and
other blue-collar workers are relatively low, at 10.3 and 12.9 per cent for
Albanians and Bulgarians respectively. Previous work in agriculture
was also limited – 8 per cent for Albanian respondents and 3.2 per cent
Table 4.2 Immigrants’ education level
Albanian Immigrants Bulgarian Immigrants
female male all GR* female male all GR*
primary 2.4 5.2 4.4 .– .– 8.6 4.3 10.0
not completed secondary 14.6 9.3 10.9 4.3 2.9 .– 1.4 .–
secondary 19.5 35.1 30.4 23.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 25.0
technical 12.2 16.5 15.2 10.6 22.9 37.1 30.0 35.0
professional 12.2 6.2 8.0 10.6 11.4 11.4 11.4 5.0
university 36.6 23.7 27.5 42.6 25.7 8.6 17.1 25.0
postgraduate 2.4 4.1 3.6 8.5 5.7 2.9 4.3 .–
* GR = ethnic Greek migrants
92 MIGRATION IN CONTEMPORARY GREECE
for Bulgarians. What the table does not show is that 3.6 per cent of the
Albanians and 7.1 per cent of the Bulgarian migrants had had various
jobs before emigrating; of them, two Albanians had been self-employed
and one Bulgarian used to run a bar.
It is worth looking in detail at the differences observed in the sam-
ple. Higher shares of Albanian men had been working in skilled posi-
tions: slightly less than 30 per cent were highly qualified employees
(ten of them engineers, two economists, the rest were senior public ser-
vants and other specialists) and another 20.6 per cent used to be tea-
chers (seven), accountants (three) or army professionals (three). More
than 22 per cent were factory workers, half of them skilled, including
two drivers; nearly 15 per cent were technicians and craftsmen, plus
two policemen; 8 per cent worked in retail shops or in restaurants and
cafe´s; the share of former farmers and agricultural workers is low, 6.3
per cent. Male ethnic Greeks had higher shares of highly skilled/quali-
fied positions before emigration and the percentage of those among
them who were never employed is far lower than the rest of the re-
spondents in the Albanian sample. Female Albanians used to work as
white-collar employees (two secretaries, an accountant), schoolteachers
(four), specialised professionals (a university teacher, a social scientist,
an engineer), nurses/midwives (three), retail shopkeepers (two); six
worked in factories, three of them as skilled workers; three worked in
agriculture (one was a supervisor in a state-owned farm). The picture is
different in the case of Bulgarian migrants. Bulgarian women used to
work as highly qualified professionals (five), white-collar employees
(seven), teachers (two), retail shopkeepers (six), waitresses and hotel
staff (three) and factory workers (four, three of them skilled); there was
also a driver, a technician and a nurse. Only two male Bulgarians fit in
Table 4.3 Main occupation in the country of origin
Sector/Profession of Those Employed Albanian Migrants Bulgarian Migrants
agriculture & cattle-breeding 8.1 3.2
unskilled factory & blue collar 10.3 12.9
skilled factory & drivers 11.5 19.4
leisure & catering, retail trade 8.1 25.8
technicians & craftsmen, nurses, policemen 13.8 6.5
white collar, teachers, army professionals 24.1 21.0
highly qualified/specialised professionals 24.1 11.3
total employed (N) 87 62
total employed (% of total) 63.0 88.6
not working (N) 43 3
of whom (% of total)
school pupils 23.9 1.4
university students 7.3 2.9
missing data 8 5
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the ‘highly qualified’ category: a musician and an engineer. The share
of blue-collar workers among Bulgarian men is significant, as is that of
bar, cafe´ and restaurant staff (six, one was the owner himself); five
were drivers, and there were also two factory workers, two electricians,
two army professionals, two teachers, one street-trader and two cattle
breeders. These latter were of Sarakatsani origin, having their own ani-
mal stock and occasionally working in factories; all but one were em-
ployed in Bulgaria before emigrating. Finally, five Bulgarian partici-
pants, four of ethnic Greek origin, are retired and receive their pen-
sions back in Bulgaria: for those, the decision to emigrate was in order
to supplement their income (e.g. to support their children’s studies).
The findings presented above reflect some of the chief differences in
the labour markets of the two countries, suggesting how one should
understand the dynamics of migration in each of the two cases. For Al-
banians, who witnessed a massive devaluation of their professional at-
tributes after the collapse of the system, emigration arose as a solution
to an immediate necessity: initially at least, they had to go abroad sim-
ply because they could not do otherwise, and the scale of the phenom-
enon was so massive that it touched all sections of the population. For
Bulgarians, the situation was rather different: some may have lost their
previous jobs, usually jobs in factories, especially in northern Bulgaria
(Markova 2001); most would have made a living in Bulgaria, but they
decided to emigrate in order to improve their financial situation. In
this case, those with a high educational level and qualified jobs form a
special category and can be described as ‘elites’: this consists of women
related to or involved with Greek men before leaving Bulgaria, and
thus their migration has been directed by reasons of love and marriage;
and of specialised professionals (two musicians, a businessman-engi-
neer, a swimming coach), whose decisions came as a career option.
These differences between the two migrant groups, and the particulari-
ties observed in smaller groups of people, are picked up in the coming
section in the light of additional issues concerning the participants’ mi-
gration decisions and routes.
4.2 Migration patterns and dynamics
Here, I give an account of some key features of the respondents’ migra-
tion histories: the main reasons that shaped their decision to emigrate,
when they entered Greece, the way they crossed the border and the
routes they followed before settling in Thessaloniki. I outline both the
similarities and main differences between the two migrant groups, and
compare the heterogeneous experiences of men and women, ethnic
Greeks, etc. Some qualitative elements drawn from the interview mate-
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rial are also incorporated into the discussion, to highlight aspects that
quantitative data are unable to capture and to bring out the migrants’
own perceptions.
4.2.1 Reasons for and patterns of migration to Greece
General economic reasons (push factors) dominated the decision to mi-
grate: 74.6 per cent of the Albanian respondents and 81.4 per cent of
the Bulgarians mentioned economic problems in their countries as
being at the heart of their decision to emigrate. For some Albanians of
the initial wave though (5.8 per cent), political reasons were also impor-
tant. Quite surprisingly, only half of the Greek-Albanians considered
their ethnic origin as a crucial factor that bore upon their decision to
leave Albania. Their Greek origin was even less important for Sarakat-
sani, although most of them mentioned that their knowledge of the
Greek language played a role in deciding to come to Greece. Further-
more, an important minor share of respondents selected the option
‘other’ to state additional factors that shaped their decision. For 7.2 per
cent of the Albanians who did so, such reasons comprised joining rela-
tives who were already abroad, studies, or simply the desire to see the
‘outside world’.
The picture becomes clearer if we look at the reasons for migrating
to Greece in particular (and not to some other country). Economic rea-
sons (pull factors) are not that significant any more, while other factors
play a more important role. Only 37.7 per cent of the Albanian mi-
grants and 51.4 per cent of the Bulgarians considered economic condi-
tions in Greece that favourable. Instead, geographic proximity emerges
as the most important reason for half of the Albanian respondents and
for almost one third of the Bulgarians. Over 28 per cent of the Alba-
nians mentioned ‘ease of entry’ as an important factor, but this was
much less crucial in the Bulgarians’ case (5.7 per cent). Thus, emigra-
tion may have arisen as a necessity for many people, but migration to
Greece became an option mainly because of the easy-to-cross borders
and the geographic closeness to a relatively more developed country. In
addition, ethnic origin did play an important role for 68 per cent of the
Greek-Albanians and for fifteen of the Sarakatsani: for most of them
Greece was a first choice, and it was easier anyway, due to governmen-
tal policies that were more favourable towards ethnic Greek migrants.
There is a small share of Albanian migrants (6.5 per cent) who consid-
er Greece as a transit country, and who intend to migrate later for a
second time to some other state4. Finally, many respondents men-
tioned network factors, namely friends and/or relatives who had mi-
grated earlier, which seem to have conditioned their patterns of settle-
ment within Greece, as we are soon going to see in more detail. On
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the other hand, the 15.7 per cent of Bulgarians who mentioned addi-
tional factors uncovered more ‘hidden’ features of the migration pat-
terns in the Bulgarian case. As already mentioned, there is a minority
of qualified professionals who had contacts in Greece, which, together
with their professional achievements, played an important role in their
migration, which can be seen as a ‘career development’ strategy. An-
other aspect of Bulgarian mobility is also migration because of love/
marriage: five women got married to Greek men and four more people
said that they came because their mothers were married to Greeks5.
This multiplicity of reasons and factors for migration to Greece,
which suggests a more complex migration story than that told by ‘push’
and ‘pull’ accounts, is highlighted in the following interview quotes
(the first five are from Albanian migrants and the remaining three are
from Bulgarians):
We decided to come to Greece because we were not in a good
economic situation. We had stopped working in Albania … In
the beginning, my husband came alone, he came with a forged
passport … he worked for a year, then he returned to Albania.
We were thinking of starting a business with the little money he
had earned here, but we realised we couldn’t do anything … so
then we were forced … we couldn’t live separately because we
were married, with two children, so we decided to take the chil-
dren and come here, all the family. (Lela)
I can say that it was not a purely economic motivation, but also
a psychological one … For instance, I was a student, my parents
were working. I didn’t have a direct need to work … But, back at
that time … everybody was leaving, that was it. And we students
could see that in the future, when we would graduate, there
wouldn’t be any jobs, nothing … So we decided to leave. (Dalina)
One reason to come to Greece was for economic reasons. Sec-
ondly, because we are close, Greece to Albania; and thirdly and
most basic, because we are of Greek descent, I believed we
would find the lost homeland … This was the basic reason why I
came to Greece, besides the economic … cause. (Spyros)
The basic reason is that, before I came to Greece, some other
guys had come. They said that Greece is fantastic … Relatives,
people from my village, friends … And I said to myself ‘Why
don’t I go to try my luck there?’ I was single, I was not married
… so I told my mother ‘I’m going to Greece.’ (Maria)
I came here because Nadi, my brother, was here … back then
there was an insurrection – how can I explain this to you? – in
our country … It was in 1997… With pyramids [referring to the
collapse of pyramid banking schemes in Albania, and the subse-
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quent financial crisis]. So, my father and my mother were afraid,
and Nadi was here. (Adriana)
[Because of ] lack of work in Bulgaria … I have chosen Greece be-
cause I am of ethnic Greek origin, I knew the language, and
then I also knew some people here who could help me. (Soul-
tana)
The job was the leading factor. The market was closed and any
development in a professional way … was completely impossible
… On the other side, the company for which I was working
decided that my potential to cover this territory was quite good
… I was already working with Greece two years before I came.
(Alexander)
There were many reasons, but … the most important one was
that I wanted to change myself and my life, basically. To have a
change, because … things there, as I could see, were not going
to get better and I was young, I wanted to try … And then, I had
another thought: to come to Greece, to make some money and
then set out for some other place, basically it was not that much
that I wanted to come particularly to Greece. (Milen)
In total, 68 and 56 per cent of the Albanian and Bulgarian participants
respectively had been in Greece for five years or more, and approxi-
mately one third of both nationalities had already spent a period of
more than nine years; long-term residence plays a crucial role in incor-
poration and the impact of time will reappear throughout the thesis.
Figure 4.1 illustrates schematically the migratory waves followed by the
participants, according to the year they entered the country. More than
one third of the Albanian respondents migrated during the ‘great Alba-
nian exodus’ of the early 1990s (1990-1992). After 1992, the migratory
wave slowed down, but continued steadily and reached a second peak
after the financial crisis that followed the collapse of the pyramid bank-
ing schemes in 1997: another 21.4 per cent came to Greece between
1997 and 1998. Since then, the numbers of people emigrating each
year have declined notably. Women seem to ‘follow’ men, confirming
again the initially male-dominated character of Albanian migration and
the dependent female migratory patterns. The majority of ethnic Greek
Albanians came during the early phase: their migration continued to
have small peaks in the following years, mostly due to later arrivals of
women.
Bulgarian migration followed a different pattern. Firstly, because
there never was a large emigration outflow, apart from the Turkophone
Muslims who left the country in large numbers for Turkey at an early
stage. The first shock of 1989, as expected, produced outward move-
ments (see Figure 4.1): 18.6 per cent of the interviewees emigrated dur-
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ing 1990-1991. The numbers decline considerably throughout the dec-
ade, but they pick up again in 1997-1998, with 28.6 per cent of the
survey’s participants having emigrated in these particular years, as a re-
sult of Bulgaria’s 1996 crisis that led many factories to close. Secondly,
in contrast to the Albanian case, Bulgarian migration goes on in rela-
tively significant numbers after 1998: despite the time difference be-
tween the administration of questionnaires and interviews with Alba-
nians (finished July 2002) and those with Bulgarians (went on until
February 2003), it is rather notable that 30 per cent of the Bulgarian re-
spondents arrived between 1999 and 2002. Thirdly, what the figure
does not show is the feminine side of Bulgarian migration: in this case,
women do not clearly ‘follow’ men. Only a relatively small proportion
of them followed a pattern similar to the Albanian one, with male ‘pio-
neers’ and female ‘followers’. Finally, another difference between the
two migrant groups is the existence of mobility between Bulgaria and
Greece before the 1990s. Four Bulgarian respondents had migrated be-
fore 1990, three of them during 1988-1989, when the signs of change
were quite apparent, and one much earlier, in 1978, following her
Greek husband after he finished his studies in Sofia6. As for the other
three people who came before 1990, they are all professionals from So-
fia. What these specific cases reveal is the different outward mobility
patterns between Albania and other Eastern European countries: the
Iron Curtain was ‘harder’ in the Albanian case, while in Bulgaria peo-
ple belonging to certain social classes had more opportunities to move
abroad.
Regarding the conditions of entering Greece (see Table 4.4), about
30 per cent of all immigrants crossed the border illegally; of them, one
in five said that they went through trafficking networks and had to pay.
The percentage of Albanians who entered the country illegally was 37.5
per cent, while the share of Bulgarian immigrants is much lower (17.1
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Figure 4.1 Immigrants’ year of entry by nationality (N)
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per cent)7. The relatively higher percentage of Bulgarians who used
trafficking channels corresponds to both men and women and should
be attributed to the organised cross-border criminal networks that in-
creasingly developed throughout the 1990s. These networks also con-
trolled other illicit activities (smuggling, prostitution), sometimes in
collaboration with corrupt state and police officials. Prices varied from
177 euros in 1996 (Pantelis) to between 200-300 euros in 1997 (Kos-
tas, Lefteris, Ivan); payment was in German marks or US dollars,
sometimes in drachmas as well. A broad idea of how this worked is gi-
ven in the following quotes:
We travelled, five or six people together. We came on foot, we
passed through Skopje [Macedonia] … all the way to Polykastro
… then we took a taxi, for which we paid 50,000 drachmas [150
euros] … until Thessaloniki … We paid a guy to bring us here,
someone like a ‘trader’ – how can I say it? … we left our village,
and he brought us all the way down here … We paid him two
hundred dollars each … half the money, I paid it then … the rest
… I was working, and I paid it after a period, because then I
didn’t have all the money. (Ivan, came in 1997.)
There was a guide. There are Albanians who collaborate with
the Greeks. We crossed your border, we entered your country,
then we’d been travelling for two days and two nights. We’d
been walking during the night and we were hiding during the
day, because we were afraid that somebody could see us and tell
the police to arrest us … A lorry was waiting for us in the street,
there, on the mountain, in Greece, and all twenty-seven people
got in the lorry. All of us came to Thessaloniki. (Pandelis)
It should be noted that what is commonly understood as ‘trafficking’ is
not necessarily connected to criminal syndicates; this was especially
true during the early phase of intra-Balkan mobility. It was common
for Albanians in the early 1990s to travel in groups of people originat-
ing from the same place; the guides, however, who helped them to
cross the mountainous border-zone on foot, were often people who just
‘knew the way through the mountains’8:
The first time, I came on foot. We were walking for five or six
days … We had my brother with us, who had come in 1991, he
knew the way and we came. (Gjion)
We came illegally. We came through Skopje [Macedonia]. We
crossed the border on foot … That night there were nine people
… relatives … and friends … My cousin … knew the way. (Val-
bona)
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However, the majority of all respondents (about half) entered Greece
legally with a visa. Coming with a tourist visa (and extending the stay
after it had expired) was the case for 41.3 per cent of the Albanians and
35.7 per cent of the Bulgarians, especially for women. A common strat-
egy for Bulgarian migrants was to travel in organised groups, coming
by coach as tourists. Some Albanians (7.3 per cent) used forged travel
documents, passports and visas bought on the black market, a strategy
absent in the Bulgarians’ case. Some 12.3 per cent of the Albanians
came with non-tourist visas: only two people gave details and they had
come to study. In the Bulgarian case, the issue of non-tourist visas was
limited to the professionals mentioned above, or to women who were
married to Greeks and therefore had a special status. Greek-Albanians
who benefited from special provisions for people of ethnic Greek origin
are rather statistically insignificant (two people): ethnic Greeks initially
followed the same migration paths as the rest of their co-nationals, de-
spite their ‘privileged’ treatment by the authorities9. Bulgarian Sarakat-
sani, on the other hand, received special treatment from the very begin-
ning, since they were entitled to special temporary visas. Two further
differences between Albanian and Bulgarian migration can be ob-
served: (a) 7.1 per cent of the Bulgarians entered Greece already posses-
sing a stay permit, as a result of their professional status or because
they were related to a Greek citizen; (b) a small number of Bulgarians
who entered Greece during the last couple of years were not subject to
border controls, since after 2000 Bulgarian nationals were entitled to
travel within the Schengen Area without visas. In general, it appears
that gradually, the patterns of migration have become more institutio-
nalised: ‘trafficking’ peaks during the mid-1990s, and, since 1998-
1999, legal entry has become the case for the majority of the migrants.
Table 4.4 Immigrants’ mode of entry into Greece when they first migrated
Albanian Immigrants Bulgarian Immigrants All
female male all female male all
illegal entry 12.2 39.2 31.2 11.4 8.6 10.0 24.0
illegal entry (trafficking) - 8.3 5.8 5.7 8.6 7.1 6.3
falsified documents 9.8 6.2 7.3 - - - 4.8
tourist visa 48.8 38.1 41.3 40.0 31.4 35.7 39.4
non-tourist visa 29.3 5.15 12.3 2.9 2.9 2.9 9.1
married to a Greek - - - 8.6 - 4.3 1.4
seasonal worker 1.0 0.7 - - - - 0.5
Greek origin 2.1 1.5 17.1 37.1 27.1 10.1
stay permit - - 8.6 5.7 7.1 2.4
free (legal entry) - - 5.7 5.7 5.7 1.9
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4.2.2 Migration routes and settlement in Thessaloniki
The research implicitly assumed the absence of previous migration ex-
perience among the respondents; the small number of people who had
indeed been in other countries, however insignificant as a percentage
of the sample as a whole, may represent an interesting aspect of East-
West European mobility patterns in general10. What was expected, by
contrast, was that many migrants would have passed through different
places in Greece before settling in Thessaloniki. Apart from the various
routes some took when they first entered Greece, reaching border vil-
lages initially and then arriving at their destination with several stops
on the way (to work or visit relatives and friends for assistance), it was
also common for some to settle in a specific place for a period and
then re-migrate within the host country itself, in many cases with a
rural-to-urban direction. Although the majority (61.5 per cent) came di-
rectly to Thessaloniki, 23.6 per cent had spent considerable periods in
some other place, while 16 per cent had been to two or more places
since they first arrived in Greece. The patterns appear to be similar for
both groups with one notable exception: the higher share of Bulgarian
migrants who had stayed in more than three places (11.4 per cent, com-
pared to only 3.6 per cent among Albanians) is due to the weight of
Sarakatsani, who had been following ‘cyclical’ migration routes, coming
and going frequently for seasonal, usually agricultural, work in various
rural areas, before moving to Thessaloniki. Given this, how are we to
understand Thessaloniki as a final (?) destination in the migratory
‘journeys’ of the respondents? This question is not only a rhetorical
one, since the place of settlement, as will be extensively argued
throughout the thesis, shapes the migrants’ incorporation patterns.
It has been argued that the decision of immigrants to move to a spe-
cific locality within the host country is subject to push and pull factors
similar to the ones conditioning their decision to migrate to a particu-
lar country anyway (see, for instance, Stark 1991). More specifically,
Lianos (2003: Ch. 3) has attempted an econometric estimation of the
factors conditioning the geographical distribution of immigrants in
Greece, based on official statistics. His conclusion highlights the im-
portance of regional GDP rates, urbanisation level versus agricultural
production, and distance from the border in conditioning the place of
settlement of immigrants in Greece. Immigrants can probably be fully
aware of the last-named factor only, which, however, is rather overesti-
mated in Lianos’ study. Avoiding border regions, which are more
tightly controlled and thus a migrant is more likely to get arrested,
does not necessarily mean avoiding big towns or rural areas close to
the border and does not apply equally to the whole migrant population
anyway (cf. legal immigrants, women, ethnic Greeks). In addition, peo-
Structure, patterns and dynamics of migration 101
ple don’t have ‘perfect’ information about economic indicators (like re-
gional GDP rates): they can only have impressions about how ‘rich’ a
place is from their own experience or from the words of others. Thus
the only source of information about the economic and social features
of a particular place is first-hand experience, and, most importantly,
the feedback of others, via their social networks. As we have seen,
Thessaloniki is far behind Greater Athens regarding migrants’ concen-
tration, but this is more likely to reflect the centralised character of the
Greek state and the prevalence of Athens in the economic geography
of the country; after all, Thessaloniki remains the second major desti-
nation for immigrants in Greece.
From one point of view, this is logical: immigrants enter a country
which has given geographic characteristics and for Thessaloniki, the
second largest Greek city, it is reasonable to expect it to attract large
numbers of migrants. But the issue of proximity should not be under-
estimated, and this refers to both geographical and cultural closeness.
If we look at the origins of the migrants of a given nationality, it ap-
pears that migrants from specific areas in the sending countries are
more represented in particular localities within the receiving state. In
Thessaloniki this seems to be true, for example, for Albanians coming
from the city of Korc¸e¨. The links between places of origin and destina-
tion can be economic or geographic, cultural or relational. Sometimes
there are old historic bonds connecting places, and this is also a factor
that determines migrants’ final destination. Also, sometimes social net-
works are based upon the remnants of old links: first-comer migrants
are attracted to particular localities within the host country for histori-
cal reasons, and their settlement there is a reason for others to come.
In the Albanians’ case, an interesting study by Sinte`s (2002) suggests
that modelling the diffusion of the immigrants within Greece accord-
ing to the country’s economic and population geography cannot alone
give an adequate explanation for high concentrations of people in cer-
tain places. Sinte`s studied the migratory trajectories of different groups
of Albanians (Muslims, Orthodox, Vlachophones, Grecophones) from
specific villages and found that they had been directed towards particu-
lar places in Greece, initially at least, either where they had relatives
from whom they had been separated by the border for decades, or of
which they ‘knew about’ due to trans-local contacts dating from before
the Second World War. He argues that kinship and identity, when acti-
vated through the migrants’ networks, may be used as a resource in
the migration process, determining thus the patterns of settlement in
ways that push and pull factors are unable to interpret. In the Balkan
region, which historically saw various groups of people (e.g. Vlachs,
Sarakatsani, Roma, but also merchants, shepherds, travellers, etc.)
moving for several reasons between places within the common space
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of the Ottoman Empire and was later divided by the borders of nation-
states, this should not be surprising at all. This argument is to be de-
veloped further in the next section, taking the Albanian city of Korc¸e¨ as
an example.
Thus, answering the question ‘Why Thessaloniki?’ requires us to
take into consideration all of the above matters: demography, economic
and social geography, productive and employment structures; but also,
the location of a city quite close geographically to the sending coun-
tries, or to certain localities of origin, with some of which there have
been pre-existing links, due to the city’s erstwhile role in the Balkans,
now reinforced by the migrants’ networks of social relationships. These
are well reflected in the participants’ accounts of the reasons that led
them to Thessaloniki. More than half of all respondents said that they
came because they had friends and relatives who had settled in the city
earlier, from whom they received help in the beginning. Nearly 80 per
cent, slightly more in the case of the Albanians, had some initial con-
tacts in Thessaloniki, usually relatives or friends, and many women fol-
lowed their husbands who had emigrated before, while about 10 per
cent of both migrant groups came after they had been invited by Greek
friends or employers, and less than 10 per cent came ‘alone’. In addi-
tion, 18.8 and 31.4 per cent of the Albanians and Bulgarians respec-
tively mentioned that their contacts had informed them specifically
about working opportunities, and some of them actually came after a
job was already guaranteed. Geographic proximity to countries and
places of origin was also a reason; in the words of Ivan from Bulgaria:
‘If something happens … I can be home in five hours.’ Three ethnic
Greek Albanians (two from Korc¸e¨ and one from Gjirokaster) had ances-
tral origins in Thessaloniki, and they had distant relatives or even prop-
erty in the city. A small number of migrants also highlighted some of
the features of the city itself: a ‘big city’, but ‘much quieter than
Athens’, a ‘nice city by the sea’, etc. The city was also ‘imagined’ in his-
torical terms, according to some individuals’ family history, or simply
their knowledge and perceptions about it:
In Bulgaria, we call Thessaloniki ‘Solun’ … Kyril and Methodi …
who made the Bulgarian alphabet, we call them ‘the Solun
brothers’. (Albena)
I came to Thessaloniki because one of my grandfathers used to
live in America. He had worked there for many years and made
a small fortune … He had some properties here [Thessaloniki] …
I stayed in the islands, until those [people] who were renting our
house moved, and when they moved, we came here and stayed
in our property. (Stavros)
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Proximity is thus a crucial factor shaping both mobility between Greece
and its neighbouring countries and – to an extent – the incorporation
of immigrants in Thessaloniki. Apart from conditioning people’s initial
migration decisions, it also facilitates contact between migrants in
Greece and their places of origin. Despite the barriers, visits ‘back
home’ have been frequent for a significant number of people, either
for holidays (see Section 8.1.3) or for reasons of necessity. Quite signifi-
cant are the numbers of those who have been to their home countries
for reasons other than holidays and for periods exceeding three
months: 22.5 per cent of the Albanians and 21.4 per cent of the Bulgar-
ians mentioned such experiences of temporary return migration. In
the case of the Albanians, for five people it was not an option: they had
been expelled. Another five had to sort out matters concerning their
travel documents or visas. Four people returned after having faced fi-
nancial difficulties or unemployment in Greece, while another three re-
turned to work for a period. Some were coming and going because of
their studies or for professional reasons. In general, though, family rea-
sons can be seen as the main factor making immigrants return for sig-
nificant periods. This was mentioned by some of the Bulgarians as
well, but some of them also referred to an additional factor: that of ill-
nesses or health problems, which they prefer to address in their home-
land where health services are cheaper and possibly covered by social
insurance (Section 8.1.1). However, the percentage of Bulgarians who
have returned temporarily is higher because of the ‘back and forth’
movements of the Sarakatsani.
4.2.3 A case study: Thessaloniki and Korc¸e¨, a tale of two cities
In general, social networks appear to have conditioned the migratory
routes and patterns of settlement of the majority of respondents. Mi-
grants’ networks form ‘human links’ (King 1995: 27) or ‘social bridges’
(Portes 1995: 22) between places, which in our case becomes easier be-
cause of the proximity of neighbouring countries and border regions.
As we have seen, when the locality of origin has particular cultural and
historical links with the destination place, social networks are built
upon the remnants of an erstwhile cross-border relationship. In the
historically common Balkan space there have been several examples of
links and bonds of various kinds between different localities11; today,
new kinds of flows (migration, trade, capital investment) and new geo-
graphies of exchange redefine those historical ties. A unique example
of such a place-specific, cross-border, interactive migration system
based on newly formed transnational networks and old patterns of mo-
bility and exchange is represented in the case of Thessaloniki and
Korc¸e¨. Not only do many Albanians in Thessaloniki come or originate
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from this particular town, but also over two thirds of those who came
directly to Thessaloniki are from Korc¸e¨. Nearly one third of the Greek-
Albanian participants are Korc¸e¨ans, although most stressed their Vlach
origins12.
Korc¸e¨ was never a centre of the ethnic Greek minority in Albania,
but rather a town with a large Vlachophone population13. Thessaloniki,
on the other hand, used to be one of the cores of commercial activity
in the Balkans, with links to major Balkan cities, especially those in
the southern part of the region. It provided an exit to the sea and was a
key transit place on the west-east route to Istanbul; moreover, its an-
nual trade fair, held every September, was of transnational significance
(see Todorov 1986; Katsiardi-Hering 2003; Stoianovich 2003). In some
cases, bonds superseding the economic level were formed because of
population mobility and settlement, and this seems to be the case in
Thessaloniki’s links with Korc¸e¨, among other towns. The relationships
between Korc¸e¨ and Thessaloniki are rooted back in the nineteenth cen-
tury and were shaped by commercial links and by the presence of
small Greek, and Vlach or Albanian populations in both cities respec-
tively. The geographic location of Korc¸e¨ and the commercial routes in
the Ottoman era directed Korc¸e¨an merchants towards Thessaloniki,
with Florina and Kozani being in-between destinations.
In my interview with representatives of Epirote House (see Section
8.2.1), I was told that one of the issues that arose after Korc¸e¨’s autono-
my from Ottoman rule (in 1917) was to twin the city with Thessaloniki,
and also that in 1940 there were approximately 350 families of Kor-
c¸e¨ans registered with this association. Contact remained ‘frozen’ for
nearly half a century following the Second World War, and was re-es-
tablished again in the 1990s, this time through migration, but also
other forms of mobility (trade, investment, business travel, etc.). As
mentioned by some of the respondents and highlighted by Epirote
House’s representatives, the opening of the borders re-established a tra-
dition of migration to Thessaloniki, which had been among the chief
destinations of Korc¸e¨ans’ abroad, along with North America and Istan-
bul. In 1999, this special relationship between Thessaloniki and Korc¸e¨
was institutionalised by the formation of a cultural association named
the ‘Union of Friendship between Korc¸e¨ and Thessaloniki’, which
forms part of Epirote House.
Such historical bonds are reflected in the personal stories of Korc¸e¨an
interviewees. Andreas, for instance, told me the story of his father, who
was born and grew up in the city: ‘He used to come to the market in
Thessaloniki … [ for] trade … After the borders closed, this stopped.’ As
his narration unfolds, it uncovers particular cultural bonds between the
two cities:
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They are similar. I speak about Korc¸e¨, not about Tirana or
Shkodre¨ … They [the locals] … are very much like the people of
Korc¸e¨ … and the music is similar, there are songs that we sing
in Albanian, songs that my father used to sing, and I listen to
them now in Greek … All things are similar, songs, food,
houses.
The account of Emil is very similar. Of ethnic Greek origin, his family
history had likewise passed through Thessaloniki:
From what we had heard, some other people had been here be-
fore us, we had more [ familiar] elements here … My mother,
fifty years ago, had lived here for a period. And she had relatives
too. Her first cousin was here, so there were many reasons for
coming here … And there were, traditionally, relations between
Korc¸e¨ and Thessaloniki. I mean that most people from Korc¸e¨
come here, to Thessaloniki, it is closer than Athens and the tra-
ditions, the way of life is similar … I grew up in Korc¸e¨, there we
used to have the old traditions, as you had them here in Thessa-
loniki, the songs and the feasts.
Another Albanian interviewee’s family not only originated in Thessalo-
niki, but possessed property as well, a house belonging to her grand-
mother, which she was not able to claim back due to usufruct laws:
All our roots are found here in Thessaloniki. My grandfather
was from here, he was a merchant and then he exercised his
profession in Albania. The Turks were after him for some rea-
son and that’s how he settled in Albania. (Kaiti)
On these grounds, one could arguably confirm the existence of cross-
border, trans-local social networks (see Guarnizo & Smith 1998: 13) be-
tween Thessaloniki and Korc¸e¨. Rooted in historical and cultural bonds
and facilitated by geographic proximity, such networks have shaped in-
itial decisions about migration and settlement in the host country, and
they also determine the continuation of the migration chain and the
persistence of various kinds of relations and flows between the two ci-
ties14. Regarding Albanian immigrants’ incorporation in the local so-
ciety, this specific relationship is important, since both the size of the
Korc¸e¨ans’ community in Thessaloniki (larger than any other migrant
group) and the density of interpersonal ties are crucial factors in re-
spect to the effectiveness of the operation of a migrant network (see
Portes 1995: 9), as we will see in a later section (8.2). The possibility of
similar interplays between history, communities of origin, social net-
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works and settlement in Thessaloniki for other groups (Vlach Alba-
nians, Bulgarians from Plovdiv, Sarakatsani) remains a challenge for
future research.
4.3 Some comments on preliminary findings
What do the above findings tell us about the dynamics of migration be-
tween Albania, Bulgaria and Greece? How are we to interpret them in
relation to the processes of incorporation of migrants in Thessaloniki?
A first outcome is a picture of the composition of the Albanian and
Bulgarian migrant populations in the city. The figure of the ‘typical’
migrant has been drawn to the extent that common features apply to
the majority, but it appears that this figure is neither a single one, nor
is it unique: in the new era of mobility, ‘typical’ migrants are no more.
Despite dominant characteristics, we see differences between the two
migrant groups, between males and females in each nationality, be-
tween people of the same sex and different nationalities, ethnic Greeks
and ‘others’, urban and rural residents, highly educated and the low-
skilled, professionals and workers. Beyond the general and common
picture of male-dominated Albanian migration, the survey sample un-
covered other features of Albanian and Bulgarian mobility that are
equally important in the understanding of incorporation, despite their
lower representation. For instance, a more independent female migra-
tion pathway in the Bulgarian case; or a certain number of educated
professionals from both countries that challenges the dominant percep-
tion of the ‘poor, rural, illiterate Balkan migrant’; or specific categories
of people that keep coming and going to satisfy immediate needs and
thus they might not be ‘here to stay’.
Moreover, there are some additional elements that come out of this
first account of the survey’s background findings which show us ‘hid-
den’ aspects of the dynamics of migration within this three-country sys-
tem: network factors and historical links, family strategies and the im-
portance of place. We have seen, for example, how migration can be an
‘option of necessity’ for divorced women; how factors such as love and
marriage play their role in what is usually seen as movement due to
economic reasons; how places of destination are not always a casual
choice or an estimation of benefits and losses, but depend on historical
or relational factors. Proximity has been highlighted as a distinct fea-
ture of the migration system between Albania, Bulgaria and Greece
that determines mobility patterns, certifying the importance of geogra-
phy and suggesting that the dynamics of migration involve elements of
transnationalism.
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The heterogeneity observed in the composition of the sample, as well
as the variety of reasons, modes and routes, suggests a multiplicity of
individual migratory journeys, strategies and plans that explain the di-
versity we are later going to ‘discover’, despite – or together with – the
common and general patterns in the incorporation process. In addi-
tion, proximity between Greece and the countries of origin of the
groups studied here not only has conditioned the reasons for migration
(e.g. Greece being an ‘easy’ destination), and the structure of the mi-
grant population as a whole, but also continues to play a role (and will
do so in the future), with back and forth migratory flows inducing
other forms of mobility, including the development of transnational
networks and practices that are part and parcel of the incorporation
pathways of these migrants in Thessaloniki.
Finally, there is the question of time. As the years pass by and mi-
grants settle in the city, many of their background characteristics lose
the significance they might have had at an initial stage, since experi-
ences now refer to ‘here’, or at least ‘in-between’. Practices are chan-
ging, adapting or reacting, new relationships are formed and old ones
break down, identities are constantly renegotiated, while the host so-
ciety, its structures and institutions, but also its population, values and
ideologies are transforming as well. Migration, after all, is a process of
transition.
This picture does not point to a homogenous and unitary category of
‘immigrants’. On the contrary, even by simply looking at general back-
ground characteristics, the sample uncovers a high degree of heteroge-
neity between and amongst the two migrant groups, which mirrors the
diversity characterising the indigenous population as well. The explana-
tory framework presented in the previous chapter provides the basis
for ‘treating’ analytically such a diverse and heterogeneous population.
As will be argued in the conclusion to the analysis that follows, the
term ‘immigrants’ refers more to a socially constructed category than
to a distinct social group (see Petrakou 2001). The unifying elements
producing this category – in Greece still an ongoing process – are to be
found in the exclusionary mechanisms that can be located in each of
the different contexts of incorporation: policy, society and culture, econ-
omy and space. The migrants themselves respond individually or col-
lectively to these, and they develop certain practices and understand-
ings of their position within the host society. This dual account of in-
corporation processes forms the core of my analysis, which starts in
detail in the next chapter.
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5 Confronting the state, facing society
The focus of this chapter is on the effects of Greek immigration policy
on the process of migrants’ incorporation: in other words, how their le-
gal status and the practical implementation of policy influence immi-
grants’ lives. The discussion draws mostly from the qualitative analysis.
The chapter is in two parts. The first section, 5.1, begins with an ac-
count of the period when the migrants were undocumented and of
their experiences regarding the first regularisation programme. It then
turns to details about the respondents’ legal status at the time of the
fieldwork and criticises the policy framework by locating its contradic-
tions and the practical problems that arose. The second section, 5.2, is
on socio-political reactions and the public discourse. Like 5.1, it is in
two subsections, dealing first with party rhetoric, the media discourse
on immigrants and the issue of racism in Greek society, and, second,
with the civil-society responses.
5.1 On the controversies and problems of a restrictive policy
framework
5.1.1 From illegality to regularisation: problems and prospects
Probably the most outstanding feature of Greece’s exclusionary policy
framework in its initial phase was the issue of prolonged illegality. The
vast majority of immigrants had either crossed the border illegally, or
they had overstayed their visas and had not had any opportunity to ap-
ply for regularisation until 1997. The only exception, apart from the
ethnic Greeks, was a minority of ‘elite’ migrants, professionals who
had been invited to work or who had managed to make their way to-
wards highly skilled positions, many of whom had come to Greece be-
fore 1991.
The lack of documents had certainly contributed to the large-scale
absorption of migrants by the informal sectors of the economy and to
their exploitation by Greek employers, as will be discussed in the next
chapter. But living under clandestine status involves much more than
working informally: it affects a person’s everyday existence. Irregular
migrants live a life in fear, and they have to ‘hide’ themselves. They ex-
perience a constant insecurity, afraid of being arrested by the police.
Many have not seen loved ones for years; they will not take the risk of
travelling back home because of the difficulty and risk of clandestine
re-entry. They become ‘invisible’ and limit their public presence to
what is necessary. The analysis of interviews uncovers many such ex-
periences and feelings, highlighting the effects of Greek ‘non-policy’
on the lives of individual migrants. In their own words:
It was a different life then. We were living 100 per cent in fear. I
was illegal until 1997, when we started applying for our papers.
(Gjion)
There was this fear, this insecurity. Today you were here, work-
ing … and tomorrow a policeman could expel you. We didn’t
have any protection. (Ani)
From 1992 to 1998 we were hiding … maybe I was lucky be-
cause I was never stopped by the police. (Nadi)
Since we were illegal, we were always afraid of the police … be-
cause they used to have these blocks [where] they used to collect
us and send us back. (Ivan)
Obviously, direct confrontation with police authorities was not the case
for all; however, many were affected. Stops by the police for document
checks were daily routine; inspections also took place at the workplace,
or even at migrants’ homes. Deportations were frequent, and some of
the respondents had experienced being arrested in one of the so-called
‘skoopa’ operations, or they had such a story to tell about a relative or
friend. In addition, when a period of detention before deportation was
involved, conditions were far from appropriate1. Migrants’ treatment
depended largely on the attitude of individual policemen, and it was of-
ten offensive; incidents of verbal, and even physical, violence were not
rare. Among the respondents, 30 per cent of the Bulgarians and 40.6
per cent of the Albanians described the attitude of police authorities to-
wards them as ‘hostile’. Some, mostly Albanians, said they had been
expelled. The following testimonies of some of the interviewees give an
idea about such experiences:
I was working for one or two years, without going back to Alba-
nia … I was arrested by the police … Fine, we didn’t have papers,
you know, they sent us back. I returned here again. OK, this has
happened many times. I have been arrested about twenty or
thirty times … It’s better now, but then [at the beginning] it was
very difficult (Ferin).
They arrested us on the bus. I was with my girlfriend … they
kept us at the police station for a night … there were some peo-
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ple [policemen] who were playing the tough guys … to scare the
people inside … Then … they took us to a building like a prison,
where all the immigrants were [the Police Transportation De-
partment – Metagogon]. We stayed there for another night, and
then they sent us to the border on a bus. (Milen)
Something serious happened to my parents-in-law … They didn’t
have the Green Card. The police made an inspection, as they
should do, and they said ‘You don’t have papers, deportation to
Albania, OK?’ Fine, deportation. At least … don’t be so cruel …
My father-in-law was having lunch and the policeman forced
him to stop eating and stand up … And he said to my mother-
in-law ‘Now you stand up too.’ And they got dressed, and they
were taken to the police station. (Spyros)
It appears that female migrants were not as vulnerable to the possibi-
lity of being arrested and expelled. In the words of Dalina, an Albanian
interviewee, for women, ‘I don’t think it was that hard, but for men, in
general, it was difficult.’ But even for women, there were definitely ex-
ceptions: as Liliana, from Bulgaria, said, ‘A woman alone in the street
is more likely to attract the policemen’s attention.’ And the testimony
of Maria, an Albanian interviewee, reflects experiences many immi-
grants have gone through, when undocumented. She had problems
with policemen chasing her at work, a nightclub where she was em-
ployed as a cleaner, and she had inspections even at her apartment.
She has been arrested and deported three times, and three times she
has returned illegally the same way.
Within this context, the news regarding the first amnesty pro-
gramme (in 1997) was welcomed; a way out of fear and insecurity
could now be envisaged. Among migrants surveyed in 2001, 46 per
cent said that legalisation would allow them ‘to walk around freely,
without fear’, 34 per cent said they could now ‘work legally’, 29 per
cent that they could ‘travel back home and return’ and 16 per cent re-
sponded that they would have access to social insurance and public
health2. In addition, the regularisation programme gave the opportu-
nity to those left behind, usually women, to rejoin their relatives in
Greece, in some cases by taking the risk and paying the high cost of
another illegal entry, in order to apply:
It was in 1998, when we started doing our papers for the first
time. I was in Albania at the time. I went there to give birth to
my daughter … We had decided that I would stay there alone
and my husband came back here … I came on the twenty-first of
May … I left my daughter there, she was forty days old then. I
entered illegally again. I bought a [ forged] passport and a visa in
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Albania, 220,000 drachmas [about 645 euros], and I came by
plane, from Tirana to Thessaloniki … They asked me what I was
doing there and I replied ‘I am a student.’ … I used a different
name, a different passport … I had to enter the country by any
means, in order to be on time for applying for my papers … and
I went directly to apply. (Valbona)
Many of the respondents had applied during this first phase, but talked
also about their more recent experiences of the second regularisation
programme. As mentioned earlier (Section 2.2.3), the process itself was
marked by several problems. The most common ones, according to the
interviewees’ experiences, concerned the following3:
– The financial costs of legalisation: each applicant, including minors
above fourteen, had to pay a fee of 50,000 drachmas (150 euros)
every time s/he applied (even if it was for a renewal of the stay per-
mit)4.
– Several documents required for the application (birth certificates,
etc.) had to be issued by the home country authorities, thus forcing
immigrants to travel to their country and complicating the whole
process; certified translations of numerous documents added to the
total cost.
– Unregistered employment, often on a casual basis, which is still the
case for the majority of migrants, forced many to buy the social se-
curity stamps required, increasing the total cost of legalisation even
more5; those who did not manage were excluded from the amnesty
programme.
– Bureaucracy and delays in the issuing of the Green Cards, lack of
information about the programme itself and about the application
process, plus the language problem, generated difficulties and ex-
cluded many from the process.
Nevertheless, despite problems and constraints, it seems that the two
first regularisation programmes gave the majority of migrants the op-
portunity to obtain legal status. Table 5.1 shows the distribution of re-
spondents according to their legal status at the time of the fieldwork.
Only four people were undocumented, all with less than three years’
residence in the country (three of them from Albania). Another three
migrants from Albania had a temporary visa, again, with less than four
years of residence in Greece. The majority (62 per cent) were holders
of the so-called ‘Green Card’, the stay permit applying to all third-coun-
try nationals; about one quarter of them, though, had not yet received
the card itself, but were issued instead with a special temporary docu-
ment (a certificate of application). About 30 per cent were documented
under an ethnic Greek status: 31.9 per cent among Albanians and 25.7
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per cent among Bulgarians (all the Sarakatsani). Eight people had been
granted Greek citizenship, six of them Bulgarians with long periods of
residence in Greece or women married to Greek nationals (all but one
of those who were granted citizenship had been living in Greece for
eight years or more). Two more women had the special status for those
married to Greek citizens, again, both had been in the country for
eight years or more.
Apparently, the minority who lacked regular status at the time of the
fieldwork did unregistered work, and thus lacked social security
stamps:
Now I found myself without papers … I used to have a stay per-
mit for six months, now it has expired … I’m going to apply
again, but I don’t have insurance, so I don’t know if I’m going to
get the papers, without social security stamps … if you don’t
have them, you can’t get one. (Mira)
By contrast, the acquisition of citizenship solved all institutional pro-
blems for the few who did manage to get it:
It was a little paper … which finally changed so many things in
my life … It has opened the doors. (Stefania)
However, citizenship requires five years of proven legal residence in
the country, the relevant application fee is quite high (1,470 euros),
and national identity considerations may create obstacles for particular
migrant groups, especially economic migrants who are not of ethnic
Greek origin and who are not connected to a Greek citizen (e.g. by
marriage). All interviewees appear fully aware of the exclusionary pol-
icy framework; interestingly, this also applies to ‘elite’ migrants who,
having to undergo the same procedures as most other foreign na-
tionals, comment on this as the only problem they face in Greece:
Table 5.1 Immigrants’ legal status, by nationality and gender (N, %)
Nationality Gender Total
Status Albanians Bulgarians Female Male
Illegal 3 2.2 1 1.4 2 2.6 2 1.5 1.9
Visa 3 2.2 – .– 1 1.3 2 1.5 1.4
Stay permit not issued yet 22 15.9 10 14.3 14 18.4 18 13.6 15.4
Valid stay permit 64 46.4 33 47.1 29 38.2 68 51.5 46.6
Ethnic Greek status 44 31.9 18 25.7 22 28.9 40 30.3 29.8
Greek spouse – .– 2 2.9 2 2.6 – .– 1.0
Greek citizenship 2 1.4 6 8.6 6 7.9 2 1.5 3.8
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[The legal framework was] always related to a conservative policy
to keep the country clean. The law changed three or four times,
but it was never clear, never correct. The law does not differenti-
ate between highly educated people and unskilled migrants.
Now, after ten years here, I still have to renew my stay permit
every year (Alexander).
The only differentiation exists for ethnic Greeks, although with them
too the legal framework is extremely fragmented. The polity’s selectiv-
ity according to ‘national’ criteria privileges ethnic Greeks in compari-
son to other migrants. However, the state created a ‘hierarchy of Greek-
ness’ on the basis of national interests related to the Greek minorities
in neighbouring and other states (see Triandafyllidou & Veikou 2001),
which resulted in different statuses for migrants of ethnic Greek origin
coming from different countries. In that respect, Greek-Albanian inter-
viewees saw themselves as ‘betrayed’ by a state that initially ‘invited
them to return’. They compared their situation with that of the Pon-
tians from former Soviet countries who were immediately granted full
citizenship. Similarly, Sarakatsani Bulgarians expressed their bitterness
and compared themselves to both the other groups. Their narratives
brought out complex national identity feelings, of being ‘foreigners in
their motherland’, and also revealed practical problems regarding cer-
tain rights, free mobility and permanent settlement.
In general, the most controversial feature of the existing legal frame-
work is that it does not guarantee a stable and long-term feeling of se-
curity. The law is being constantly revised; long-term residence is still
denied to the majority; there is no established system for permit renew-
als running throughout the year; bureaucracy and delays generate pro-
blematic situations; prejudices and discriminatory attitudes by officials
are rare, but exist; immigrants’ informal employment and lack of insur-
ance make it difficult for them to remain regular; the list of existing
and/or potential problems in detail could be endless. What they high-
light in sum is that the development of a coherent, realistic immigra-
tion policy in Greece, which solves more problems than it creates, is
currently at the nursery stage. Meanwhile, things are evolving slowly,
with the majority of the migrant population being in a state of uncer-
tainty, as the following quote suggests:
When I came we were all illegal, then this changed. We became
legal. Now it’s all a bit confused again, you cannot make deci-
sions … you cannot make plans. (Milen)
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5.1.2 Immigrants and the state: a problematic and controversial
relationship
In respect to the incorporation of immigrants in Greek society and the
everyday reality faced by many after the implementation of legalisation
measures, we can distinguish between three main categories of issues
that appear to be important. The first one is connected to the practical
problems of bureaucracy, lack of information, inexperienced public ser-
vants, delays, and so forth, which, although to an extent involve preju-
dices and/or discriminatory attitudes, mostly reflect the more general
negative characteristics of public services in Greece, which equally af-
fects the local population. The second relates to the implications of the
specific criterion of (proven) registered employment as an essential
prerequisite for being eligible for regularisation: by this the state ne-
glects one of the most problematic features of the Greek labour market
(informality) and puts total responsibility on the individual applicant,
without touching the root of the problem (regulating the labour mar-
ket, penalising employers). The third has to do with the difficult rela-
tionship between immigrants and certain representatives of the state
whom they have to confront on certain occasions: although not all im-
migrants have had a negative experience of their own, most would
agree that police and border officials generally exaggerate the power
they are given.
Starting from the first issue, although the procedures have changed
with the legalisation programmes that followed the initial one, cer-
tainly now including positive features, some of the initial difficulties do
not seem to have disappeared. According to most interviewees, delays
and repeated payment of fees are among the main problems:
You have to pay every time. There is very much delay, even if
you just want to renew your Green Card and have a normal job
… In Greece there was not any law, any legislation about this is-
sue, but four years have passed now since 1998 … In four years’
time, more or less, the process should work better, I don’t under-
stand why there are so many delays. (Nadi)
Delays in the issuing/renewal of stay permits lead to abnormal situa-
tions. For instance, a card valid for a year could be delayed more than
six months; there are numerous cases where the expiry date stated on
the card is earlier than the date of issue. A solution has been adopted
since the second programme (June 2001) by issuing a Green Card cer-
tificate: an official document confirming application, which can be
used until the issue of the Green Card itself. However, owners of this
document are not in reality able to travel abroad and return; they have
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the legal right to remain in the country, and they can travel to their
home countries, but in many cases border authorities have not let
them re-enter Greece. This was a common problem among respon-
dents/interviewees from both nationalities. Pandelis, an Albanian inter-
viewee, talked about that with bitterness, since his wife and child live
permanently ‘back home’, and he had not been able to visit them for
some time:
My Green Card expired last January, and I have applied with the
new system … They gave me this certificate … until we get the
normal thing. My only complaint is about the papers … well,
apart from the delays, that is another issue … But with these pa-
pers, I mean, with this certificate they gave us … they don’t let
us go to our country … we can’t go and come back. I’ve asked
about this at the department in Athens, at their central offices,
and they replied, ‘Up to now we don’t have an order to let you
go.’ These papers are only for staying legally here. (Pandelis)
In that sense, it would not be an exaggeration to say that such condi-
tions keep immigrants ‘hostages’ of the state (see Eleftherotypia, 23 July
2003). This is reflected in the narratives of the interviewees: the expres-
sion used by Vilco, from Bulgaria, is characteristic: ‘Now they’ve locked
us in here,’ he said. In addition, the breakdown of responsibilities
among different public bodies (Police Department of Aliens, regional
administration, prefecture, municipality), without much coordination
of activities between them, creates abnormalities and confusion. For ex-
ample, there seems to exist much contradiction regarding the informa-
tion provided by different departments on the above matter (travel), as
the same interviewee’s testimony suggests:
If you go to the council here, they tell you: ‘You have docu-
ments, you can leave and go back to Bulgaria and stay and then
come back.’ Then you leave, you go through customs … and they
tell you ‘No, you can’t.’
Obviously such problems are usually overcome in practice, and some
migrants manage to travel without problems, as long as they possess
the necessary documents. But even when a solution is finally found,
this is usually after much time spent waiting, with the resulting unne-
cessary suffering:
The last time I crossed the border I had to wait for twenty-four
hours. My card had expired on the fifteenth of July, and I had …
the certificate proving that I had an extension for six months …
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They told me that my name, which was written on the card, was
not on the computer. I was trying to tell them that since my card
had expired it was normal that my name did not appear on the
computer … And they kept me there until a [new] certificate was
sent from OAED … They contacted OAED, they sent a fax, asking
about my name, information about me … [This was] when I was
returning here. The problems are always then. (Valbona)
The regularisation process itself (application for the first time or for re-
newal) involves direct confrontation with the bureaucratic services of
the Greek state for the acquisition of the various documents required
and for their submission to the relevant local offices. Despite a few po-
sitive steps towards the modernisation of the relevant services at the
practical level (decentralisation of services, a multilingual telephone
helpline), several problems exist. The interviewees’ narratives paint a
picture of a chaotic situation that is not uncommon in the Greek public
sector, with much confusion about the required criteria and the docu-
ments needed, huge queues, frustration, significant delays, etc. The re-
sponsible staff are not always patient or even properly trained; many
work on six-month or yearly contracts, and they are usually seconded
from other posts, since regularisation services operate on an ad hoc ba-
sis. For individual migrants, the result may be simply frustration, or,
worse, loss of one day or more of paid work6:
When you have to go there, you lose the whole day … you lose
the daily wage … you get so stressed. (Ivan)
The fact that the process takes place once a year rather than being a
continuous service creates excessive concentrations of people who have
to be processed within a short period by an inadequate number of pub-
lic servants. Based on recent research, Psimmenos & Kasimati (2003)
argue that as the legal framework develops, immigration control be-
comes largely the responsibility of individual public servants, who in
most cases consider Greece as a culturally homogeneous country and
migrants as ‘foreign elements’ that have to be ‘assimilated’ otherwise
they constitute a ‘danger’. Another recent survey recorded widespread
xenophobic attitudes among public servants: further restrictions on the
entry, residence and work of immigrants in Greece was supported by
90, 61 and 40 per cent respectively; 76 per cent think there are ‘too
many’ immigrants, about 28 per cent consider them ‘a threat to their
personal security’7. But while the quality of the services provided and
the treatment migrants receive by clerks may depend on individual
stances and moods, they might also reflect a more general ‘culture’
characteristic of each department. Border and police authorities espe-
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cially have been reported by many interviewees as the most proble-
matic ones:
That was the worst thing that has ever happened to me … the
fact that I had to go to the Department of Aliens … I used to be
sick a week before and a week after that … It was very difficult
… I had to renew my stay permit every year … Everything was
confusing, I could never understand what they needed … They
[the officers] were not treating you as a human being. And they
wouldn’t make a distinction, you know, somebody may have
come and committed crimes … But for you, who came here be-
cause you needed to, what’s the problem? (Stefania)
In some cases, the practical difficulties arising from the exclusionary
character of the legal framework are coupled with confusion created by
misleading information offered by officials. A specific example is given
below; although (re)married to a Greek, Liliana had problems legally
inviting her daughters from Bulgaria:
I mostly had to deal with the Department of Aliens, for the
documents I had to do at the time, when I got married, and the
problems I personally had mostly concerned my children, when
I wanted to invite them here for a visit … At the Department of
Aliens they told me … that my children cannot stay in the coun-
try for more than three months. But this is not true … the law
says that … up to the date they become twenty-three, the child
can stay in this country, since I have a stay permit. (Liliana)
National identity considerations and increased responsibilities that put
pressure on public servants to be in line with regulations may create
additional unnecessary obstacles:
I needed to get a stamp on a family certificate and I went to the
Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace to do this. My husband’s
name is Lefteris, a Greek Orthodox name, … although … his ori-
gin is Muslim … Anyway, I get to the Ministry of Macedonia
and Thrace, I meet this person and he told me, ‘This is not the
right certificate, because this name is fake.’ … Bear in mind that
this same paper, I had had it stamped by the same person doz-
ens of times. (Valbona).
Coming now to the second issue: this arises from the requirement for
a certain number of social security stamps as proof of registered em-
ployment, which is a prerequisite for application. This has been a ma-
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jor constraint that not only resulted in unsuccessful applications, but
also deterred many from applying in the first place:
In 1998, I applied for the Green Card, but we couldn’t get it be-
cause we didn’t have social security stamps. This is the problem
here: you can find a job, [but] only a few Greeks register the peo-
ple [their employees] … but other people are not interested, they
say ‘If you want, come,’ and we go because we are in need …
But when the day comes to apply for the card … (Flora)
To overcome this problem, many immigrants bought the necessary
number of social security stamps from the main insurance fund (IKA)
and finally managed to obtain the Green Card. However, those among
them who had not got their insurance guaranteed by their employers,
or were not able to find registered employment elsewhere, found them-
selves in an insecure situation regarding the renewal of their stay per-
mits, despite having acquired legal status in the first instance:
I got the Green Card, which I have [had] until now, but I will
have difficulties renewing it because I need … social security
stamps … I had to renew it … last year, and I didn’t have the so-
cial security stamps required … I had to pay for them. (Edri)
The state has thus failed to address one crucial aspect of immigrants’
presence in Greece: informal work. The central aim hidden behind the
requirement for social security stamps was to ensure that only appli-
cants who are formally employed could obtain a permit. In that sense,
the state’s attempt to regulate the labour market shifted the responsi-
bility from employers (who escape labour legislation through informal
employment arrangements and exploitation of the vulnerability/invisi-
bility of migrant labour) to foreign workers (who have no other option
but working informally, partly because of their illegal status). The find-
ings show that lacking the insurance needed for regularisation, immi-
grants would either pay for the social security stamps required in order
to apply themselves, or would not apply at all. In the latter case, no
progress has been made; but even in the former case, the possibility
for remaining legally is ambiguous. In addition, this criterion estab-
lishes a relationship of dependency between immigrants and their em-
ployers: the possibility of a migrant being able to regularise or to main-
tain regular status (card renewal) depends directly on the willingness
of their boss to pay for social security contributions. As one of the in-
terviewees put it, immigrants should ‘belong’ to a specific employer in
order to be eligible for regularisation:
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Well, you should have a boss, somebody for whom you work, to
whom you belong … [You need a] solemn statement from your
boss … that you work for him, you are not on the streets. (Ferin)
However, with the acquisition of regular status, more and more mi-
grants find access to formal employment and to social security,
although the numbers of those not being insured are still rather high
(see Section 6.1.2 for further details).
Turning now to the third issue, the relationship that has so far devel-
oped between immigrants and some representatives of the state,
namely police and border officials, appears to be highly problematic.
The excessive sense of duty of some of these officials and their, often
offensive, attitude towards immigrants reflects the repressive logic of
the legal framework, especially in its initial phase. The years of wide-
spread illegality with the emphasis on policing and mass expulsions,
together with chronic deficits in democratic values dating back to the
post-civil war period and the dictatorship years, seem to have generated
a xenophobic culture among many policemen. Operations like the ones
previously described continued to affect immigrants after regularisa-
tion, with their treatment depending largely on the attitudes of indivi-
dual officers. Such incidents appear in the narratives of some of the in-
terviewees and are characteristic of similar experiences of offensive or
unfair treatment experienced by many8. They indicate the emergence
of a power relationship between immigrants, who are de facto suspects
for having offended the law, and police officers, who have the right to
exercise the power the law entitles them to, in order to ‘protect’ the
country from illegal aliens and potential criminals. The weak position
of the migrant in this relationship is highlighted by statements such as
the one that follows:
You have to talk gently, to bow the head… They will tell us how
to behave, how to talk, they don’t understand that we do have pa-
pers, we work here. (Nicolas)
An idea of the experience of a migrant’s confrontation with the police
may be offered by the story below, told by Lazaros, another Albanian
interviewee:
I was coming back from Albania … by car … It was after mid-
night … so we decided to stop at the side of the road and sleep
for a while … But I couldn’t get myself to sleep, so I got out of
the car to smoke a cigarette. Suddenly, the cops came, they told
me, ‘Lie down on the road,’ … I asked them ‘What have we
done?’ They were shouting at me, so I got down on my knees.
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They told me to show them my passport, I also showed them
the visa that I had just got, plus the Green Card … They started
searching the car, asking us things, taking our stuff out of the
car … Finally they calmed down, they asked us, ‘Where do you
live? Where do you work?’… They wrote down our details … and
then we left. That day was one of the very few times I have been
afraid in my life.
Cases of police brutality are not rare and reports of such events appear
quite often in the press. One of the Albanian interviewees (Gjion) men-
tioned that his wife had once been stopped on her way home: after
checking her permit, the policeman threatened to tear it up. Another
Albanian interviewee (Lefteris) had such an experience himself. Verbal
abuse during inspections or arrests was reported by many:
I have personal experience … We were arrested once, on our way
to visit my brother. It couldn’t have been worse … It was one of
these operations. And despite the fact that we had our papers in
the car, they handcuffed my husband, and before I reached our
car they had already taken him in the police van. I brought the
papers that we had at the time, and, well, they finally let us go,
but they treated us very badly, they were insulting us. (Dalina)
However rare these incidents might currently be (after several revisions
of the legal framework and with increasing numbers of legalising im-
migrants), they are characteristic of the repressive spirit embedded in
the polity’s approach to immigration and of the way this affects mi-
grants’ lives daily. More common ‘adventures’ than the ones just men-
tioned relate to the frequency and personal cost of inspections taking
place in the city, which disrupt the life of individual migrants and may
cost them a day out of work. There are many cases of people being ar-
rested even when they had their documents with them, and being ta-
ken to the police station to confirm that their documents were valid:
They arrested me once. I had a copy of my [Green] card,
stamped by the police, and they didn’t believe that it was legal.
They arrested me … they kept me … until the afternoon, and
then they let me go. (Dimitris)
The establishment of the Border Guard might have been a positive de-
velopment with respect to the distribution of competencies, or perhaps
to the training of officials. But the Border Guard often exaggerates its
responsibilities in terms of the frequency of inspections and arrests,
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especially in certain places (city districts) where the same officers con-
front the same immigrants on a daily basis:
Well, these last one or two months, a new police body has ap-
peared. You go out in the morning to go to work, and they arrest
you. They ask for your papers and even if you show them your
papers, they’ll take you to Thermi [where a large police station is
located] … If you run and try to escape they may hit you some-
times … They take us there to check us … they keep us there for
five or six hours and then ‘You may go now, you are free.’ But …
next day ‘Here are my papers, have a look, I have everything,’
because it’s not fair, I may lose my job … I’ll lose the day’s wage
… And the thing is that this … happens continuously. (Ferin)
On the other hand, for many immigrants who might not have had
such negative experiences with the police, direct confrontation with the
authorities is limited to customs when they travel to their home coun-
tries. There, especially during periods when mobility takes place on a
massive scale (summer, Christmas and Easter holidays), lack of organi-
sation and insufficient members of staff contribute to the generation of
problematic situations, while, most importantly, the behaviour of offi-
cials is far from being professional. Many interviewees reported inci-
dents of offensive treatment, while some commented on this as one of
the most difficult situations they continue to face after years of legal re-
sidence in Greece. Below I quote some of the interviewees’ responses
to my question on ‘unfair treatment by the Greek authorities’:
I can only tell about the border … I don’t like it there, not at all
… We are humans, we are not animals … But there, they may
take a piece of wood in their hands and shout ‘Back! Back!’ …
When we go there, with our papers, we are legal, we have our
Green Card and everything. Why should they behave like that?
(Mira)
Well, at the border, at customs, there are many problems. Going
from here to Korc¸e¨, without any stop, it takes four hours [by
car], it’s close. But at customs they don’t let you go. I don’t know
why, you may stay there for six, seven, twelve hours … When
you come back it’s worse. (Dimitris)
On the border this is something usual … Well the bus has prior-
ity … but by car, especially at Christmas and the Easter holidays,
because it is so crowded, you may be waiting day and night to
cross the border. And to tell you ‘Go back, you Albanian.’ This is
the kind of behaviour on the border. (Kaiti)
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Albanian immigrants reported that most problematic incidents take
place at the Krystalopigi customs office (the eastern one, closer to Thes-
saloniki, and mostly used by those travelling from Korc¸e¨). The last two
quotes in the set above are from interviews with ethnic Greek mi-
grants, showing that there is not much differentiation in their treat-
ment or the conditions they face. The situation at the Bulgarian border
appears to be similar, despite the recent liberalisation of movement be-
tween Bulgaria and the EU:
At the borders, this attitude is quite bad … even now … even if
you just go on holiday … It’s not everybody, it’s just a few speci-
fic people. (Milen)
5.2 On socio-political reactions and the public discourse
5.2.1 The public discourse: party rhetoric, the media and some notes on
racism
Despite their restrictive policy agendas, parliamentary parties nowadays
increasingly take into consideration migrants’ presence and voice,
whether this is done on the basis of policy measures, ideological agen-
das, or electoral interests. The two main governmental parties have ob-
viously been directly involved in policy-making: the first ‘aliens’ law’ to
appear was introduced by the conservative (New Democracy) govern-
ment (Law 1975/1991), and it was characterised by the strict ‘police’ lo-
gic described earlier. This framework did not change much when the
socialists (PASOK) came into power, although there has been a differ-
ence at the integration level, particularly with the regularisation mea-
sures. Although it is rather early to make such assumptions, it cur-
rently seems that the return of New Democracy to government in
March 2004 has not much affected the positive steps made under so-
cialist rule.
Both parties seem to have developed a ‘managerial’ approach to im-
migration, aimed at effective border control and combating ‘illegal’ mi-
gration, on the one hand, and at measures for the smooth integration
of immigrants already present in the country, on the other. Migration
and immigrants are now part of the policy agenda in Greece; obviously,
this does not refute the criticism and the problems outlined earlier. In
addition, the rhetoric of the main parties, particularly with respect to
the stances and statements of individual politicians and local party
branches that sometimes escape official lines, is much influenced by
calculations of the political cost involved in provoking the ‘national sen-
timent’ of citizens, contributing thus to the reproduction of widespread
prejudices. Traditionally, the conservative New Democracy party in
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Greece represents the Right, a notion connected to traumatic historical
memories of the period that followed the civil war and lasted until the
fall of the dictatorship, and it is much more prone to nationalist ideol-
ogy. PASOK, on the other hand, is located on the centre-left side of the
political spectrum, with strong union representation, and it is inclined
towards a more populist discourse. To give an example of such a con-
flict between nationalist and populist considerations between the two
parties, it is worth mentioning the fears of New Democracy before the
last elections regarding the supposed intention of the (then) socialist
government to grant citizenship to 300,000 (!) Greek-Albanians in or-
der to attract votes and be re-elected (Kathimerini, 10 June 2003); an in-
tention which was obviously never realised. The nationalistic discourse
of the Right is particularly apparent in the local environment of Thes-
saloniki, with about fifteen years of conservative control of the munici-
pality and, ultimately, with the election of a New Democracy politician,
representing the nationalistic Orthodox section of the party, as head of
the prefectural council. In general, however, at the local level, especially
in Athens but also in Thessaloniki, both parties have tried to build a
liberal multicultural profile, by including ‘foreigners’ in their electoral
lists (mostly migrants of ethnic Greek descent and people who had ac-
quired citizenship after long-term residence in the country).
Regarding the rest of the parliamentary parties, the democratic left
(Coalition of the Left, of Movements and Ecology – SUN) has perhaps
been the most active mainstream political force advocating for mi-
grants’ rights and organising public events, giving voice also to mi-
grants’ representatives. The Communist Party (KKE) has included ‘for-
eign workers’ in its rhetoric and has managed to mobilise individual
migrants in union participation, particularly in the branches it has a
strong influence in nationally or locally (e.g. construction sector, tobac-
co industry)9.
Of particular interest (and a reason for concern) is the recent rise of
LAOS, a newly formed party of nationalist-populist and religious ideol-
ogy, led by a former conservative MP, which has a clear anti-immi-
grant/anti-Muslim stance10. It took a 2.2 per cent share in the recent
national elections (March 2004) and reached 4.1 per cent in the Eur-
opean elections (June 2004); even more successful were its electoral re-
sults in Greater Thessaloniki, with 4.4 and 7.7 per cent in the national
and European elections respectively. It has a potentially strong influ-
ence due to its ownership of a small Athens-based TV channel (Tele-
city) and its support of TV programmes on local Thessaloniki channels.
These particular programmes, as well as the overall discourse of the
channels on which these appear, point to the existence of a small but
strong minority of extreme Right propagandists and activists at the lo-
cal level who engage in certain ‘open’ events (protests, clashes with left-
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wingers); they formally asserted their presence for the first time in the
last local elections, with a local party inventively entitled ‘Thessaloniki:
City of Greeks’ (which gained 1.2 per cent of the votes), and ultimately
found political expression in the LAOS party mentioned above. Apart
from other factors related to the phenomenon, populist media of this
kind should be regarded as major contributors to the spread of xeno-
phobic perceptions and attitudes that have resulted in the successful
electoral performance of the far Right. This particular side of the local
media discourse had been noticed by some of the immigrants ques-
tioned/interviewed, especially the Albanians:
Only on Telecity … they say, ‘We want the Albanians to leave the
country’ … Only there. I don’t listen to what they say. I watched
it once. (Mira)
There is somebody who speaks, on this TV channel … Best
[channel’s name]. He says ‘They [Albanians] are going to rape
our wives.’ (Nicolas)
Despite the rather marginal presence of such openly racist perceptions,
however, xenophobic prejudices and attitudes are quite widespread
within contemporary Greek society. Traditional stereotypes about ‘the
Turks’, ‘the Blacks’, or the country’s northern neighbours have been re-
inforced, or have given place to new ones directly related to the pre-
sence of immigrants (see Tsimouris 2003). The initial, and to a certain
degree expected, xenophobic reactions towards the massive influx of
immigrants have unfortunately led to openly racist feelings. Problems
such as the high unemployment rate and the rise in criminality during
the 1990s have been the main arguments used in racist discourse, con-
nected directly to the coming of immigrants. The experiences of Alba-
nian and Bulgarian immigrants in Thessaloniki clearly confirm this si-
tuation. The detailed interviews uncover experiences of discrimination
or offensive treatment of both nationalities. In the case of Albanians,
this is more evident, due to their generally negative public image,
which connects them to dirty, hard work, illegality and hence criminal-
ity, and backwardness. Albanians have been the victims of a wide-
spread ‘Albanophobia’, in some cases manifested in very extreme ways
by both the state, as we have seen, but also by locals (massive deporta-
tions, violent attacks). Negative experiences among Bulgarians are
clearly less common; offensive language, in their case, is inspired by
historically originating hostility (e.g. the Balkan wars) or from the re-
cent ‘connection’ of Bulgarian women, along with other Eastern Eur-
opean women, to prostitution. The slogan ‘Bulgarian women forthcom-
ing’ was a common ‘joke’ during the mid-1990s, after it was written
on the advertising boards of nightclubs in rural Greece to promote
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events with strippers and prostitutes. Such expressions of racism and
xenophobia are reflected in the experiences of most of the people ques-
tioned and highlighted in a variety of ways in the interviewees’ narra-
tives:
People were saying, ‘What do you want here, you immigrant?’ I
mean, particularly regarding Albanians, there is something here,
not that all Greeks say such things, but there are some reactions
against us … And I have felt this personally. Many times they
told me, ‘What do you want here? Go back to your country, find
a job there. You can’t stay here.’ (Pandelis)
Well, people say that all Albanians are thieves, that they are bad.
(Ferin)
Swear words … ‘Fuck your Albania.’ They don’t like Albanians at
all. (Maria)
There is this other thing, ‘You came from up there and took our
jobs.’ They say this without thinking about that … We may hear
it on the bus. (Adriana)
[She was told once:] ‘All Bulgarian women are whores … How
much money do you want me to pay you so that you sleep with
me?’ (Maria)
How are we to explain xenophobia and the growth of racism in the
Greek context? To an extent, it has appeared as a spasmodic reaction to
the ‘immigration boom’ and the massive arrival of Albanians in the
early 1990s. The transition of the country towards a de facto host so-
ciety took place quite suddenly, and the migrant population is often
perceived as alarmingly large, especially compared to what is referred
to as the ‘demographic problem’ in Greece, i.e. the declining fertility
rate and the ageing population (especially noticeable in rural areas). Re-
search on xenophobia in northern Greece has identified a widespread
feeling of ‘excessive numbers of foreigners’ among the local population
(Kafetzis et al. 1998). Another factor that contributed significantly to
the rise and spread of xenophobic sentiments, as noted earlier, has
been the legal framework itself: the ‘police’ logic of governmental pol-
icy stigmatised migrants through the criminalisation of their clandes-
tine status, thus building the stereotype of the ‘illegal immigrant = Al-
banian criminal’ (Karydis 1996).
Such stereotypes have been widely used in the mass media, espe-
cially television, through ‘the common use of an overtly racist and of-
fensive language’ (Triandafyllidou 2002: 157). The media in particular
have cultivated sentiments of alarm by exaggerating the numbers of
‘foreigners’ living in the country, by focusing on their harsh living con-
ditions and highlighting the ‘invasion of the poor’, by showing repeat-
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edly images of mass arrests of clandestine migrants, and by emphasis-
ing the contribution of immigrants to rising criminality. Stereotypes
and prejudices about people from Balkan countries in particular are
the most common11. The contribution of the media in creating a nega-
tive image of immigrants in Greece, particularly among Albanian inter-
viewees, is highly emphasised:
People believe what they see on TV. The news may exaggerate
with a simple event. People don’t think that good Albanians may
also exist … ‘All of them are like that, since the TV and the news-
papers say so.’ (Gjion)
You know, they insult them [Albanians] … they say that they are
bad people, to tell you the truth. I watch TV a lot, at nights,
when I don’t go out, and they insult everybody, not only us. They
insult the Pontians too, the Romanians. (Ferin)
I believe that in the beginning, the media created an initial im-
pression … I mean that something that was done, by an Alba-
nian or by anybody, would be given priority, in order to impress
the public opinion and attract the audience. And this has passed
to the people … What is left is the first impression. (Ani)
From the petty thefts of hungry newcomers in the early 1990s to the
isolated actions of desperate people who had seen their lives devastated
(e.g. the May 1999 incident of the hijacking of an intercity bus, which
resulted in the deaths of the young Albanian protagonist and one of
the hostages; see Papailias 2003), and from images of ‘skoopa’ opera-
tions, or arrests of trafficked Eastern European women forced into
prostitution, to endless TV debates on the right of locals to protect
themselves with the use of arms against foreigners who stole ‘a bag of
potatoes’, the media discourse is largely responsible for the spread of
the myth of immigrants as criminals. As Pavlou (2001) has noted in
the case of Thessaloniki, local media have created this negative image
in four ways: by being selective with the information they publish,
choosing to promote news of foreign nationals involved in crime; by
‘inventing’ daily affairs through references to past events as if they
were current; by adopting a style of reportage much resembling police
reports, focusing on the nationality of the offender; and by presenting
high concentrations of immigrants in specific districts as worrying si-
tuations. On the other hand, TV series passed from their initial neglect
of migrants’ presence in Greece to the reproduction of dominant per-
ceptions and prejudices, cultivating the new exclusionary ideology of
xenophobia and racism. The figures of the immigrant appear in a
stereotypic way, but always remain in the background, playing the role
of the domestic servant in middle-class homes, the prostitute, the work-
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er, or the criminal, and occasionally being either used as a tool for co-
medy, or portrayed as victims or victimisers.
But what do the facts tell us about the supposed connection of immi-
grants to criminality? Certainly, the participation of foreigners in illicit
activities is beyond dispute: crime has nothing to do intrinsically with
nationality, and there is no doubt about the involvement of nationals of
various countries, including customs and police officers or public offi-
cials, in transnational criminal syndicates. However, the contribution
of foreigners to criminality does not greatly exceed their share in the
country’s population, with the exception of serious offences. Even this
difference fades if we take into account the criminalisation of the mi-
grants’ undocumented status, the authorities’ prejudices towards them,
and the socio-economic and legal conditions that push desperate peo-
ple to illegal activities (see Karydis 1996; Kourtovic 2001). An addi-
tional explanation could be the flourishing criminal syndicates and the
emergence of new ‘Mafias’ in countries of the former Eastern Bloc (of-
ten connected to Western organised crime), as a result of political and
economic instability and of sharpening inequalities; instability, ethnic
conflict and war in the Balkans have offered a fertile ground for the
proliferation of such activities. In the Albanian case specifically, the
‘pyramid crisis’ of 1997 led to a collapse of law and order and resulted
in large nuumbers of convicts fleeing into Greece. According to official
data (NSSG 1999), among 8,885 prisoners in Greece in 1998, 25 per
cent were foreign nationals (one third of them Albanians), of whom 24
per cent were facing charges related to ‘illegal entry and residence in
the country’ (29 per cent of them Albanians). According to statistics
published by the police in 2002, the share of offenders of foreign na-
tionality was high regarding document falsifications (85.9 per cent),
smuggling (49.3 per cent) and sexual exploitation (41.8 per cent), that
is, in the kind of illicit activities most related to international criminal
syndicates; regarding other serious offences, foreign nationals were
also involved in murders (32.7 per cent), in rapes (31.2 per cent), and
in thefts and robberies, including vehicle thefts, (30.6 per cent), while
their share was very high among offenders charged with ‘begging’
(68.9), which is regarded as a minor offence and more reflects harsh
socio-economic conditions. Two further points need to be clarified
when interpreting crime statistics: firstly, many of the most serious of-
fences are actually of an ‘intra-criminal’ nature (affecting people in-
volved in crime anyway); secondly, offences by ‘foreign nationals’ do
not necessarily point to ‘immigrants’.
The interviewees themselves acknowledge a certain degree of partici-
pation by their co-nationals in crime, but they distance themselves and
they feel offended at how generalisations are made on this basis
against all immigrants in Greece:
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We should say the truth, not all Albanians are good, there are
bad ones too. (Nadi)
I believe that this has to do with politics, not with what we do,
because they may turn a simple, small event into something
very important. (Pandelis)
Above all, the public discourse on immigration reflects the exclusion-
ary construction of the Greek national identity, which defines the con-
cept of ‘Greekness’ on the basis of religious, linguistic and genealogical
criteria, rather than civic ones (Triandafyllidou 2000). As Lipovac
(1993) writtes, Greek political culture is based on the conception of
Orthodox religion as an integral part of the national myth, which iden-
tifies itself in a line of historical continuity from ancient Hellas to the
modern Greek nation-state, directly passing from, and incorporating,
the Byzantine Orthodox tradition. Research in northern Greece located
widespread sentiments of mistrust towards distinct national and reli-
gious identities of the migrants, particularly ‘the Albanians’ and ‘the
Muslims’ (Kafetzis et al. 1998). This finding not only points to the fear
of the ‘other’ in a society that had long and largely perceived itself as a
homogeneous one, but also highlights the particular weight of ele-
ments prominent in the Greek national self-image (ethnicity, religion)
which crucially determines stances towards immigrants. Religion
(Orthodoxy), for example, has returned as a value commonly shared by
many during the 1990s, while the present Archbishop’s attempts to
play an important political/ideological role reminds us of the controver-
sial reality of a Church never separated from the structure of the (mod-
ern) state (see for instance Lipovac 1993). On the other hand, the na-
tionalist paroxysm of the early 1990s, stimulated mainly by the ‘Mace-
donian question’ and by a crisis in Greco-Turkish relations
(Triandafyllidou et al. 1997)12, has indicated a revival of nationalistic
ideology at the turn of the millennium, which coincided with the trans-
formation of Greece into an immigrant host country and significantly
influenced the population’s perception of the ‘other within’. But apart
from its overall negative effect in the social ‘reception’ of the migrants,
there are cases where nationalism directly defines ‘host-stranger’ rela-
tions, drawing from particular historical disputes between Greece and
some of its neighbouring Balkan countries; ‘traumas’ of the past are
symbolically brought back into the collective memory in a selective way
(see Lipovac 1993). Such elements are reflected in the experiences of
the interviewees regarding the reactions of Greek people towards them:
Albanian migrants are treated with mistrust or thought to be criminals,
while Bulgarians have also faced negative attitudes, articulated in the
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context of the Balkan wars; both are expected to ‘look’ physically differ-
ent, although they are obviously not:
Many times, when I used to socialise with a lot of people and go
out with them … ‘Where are you from?’, ‘Albania,’ I was telling
them. ‘No way,’, ‘Why no way? I am Albanian,’, ‘Are you a
Christian?’, ‘No, I’m a Muslim.’ Then they looked at me in a
strange way … ‘Well, not everybody is like you, Maria.’ (Maria)
In any case, what happened in the past, happened then … Espe-
cially here, in northern Greece, you might have discussions like
‘Do you know what Bulgarians did then?’ Well, yes, I know, but
it’s not my fault. (Stefania)
Furthermore, there is also a socio-economic, class-related, aspect of xe-
nophobia: the ‘other’ is not simply different from ‘us’, ethnically and
culturally; the ‘other’ is also, and primarily, recognisable because of the
conditions s/he lives in, and, crucially, the work s/he does. As we are
going to see in the next chapter, most immigrants do dirty, badly paid
jobs unwanted by most Greeks. As the Balkans are now imagined in
Greece as the country’s ‘hinterland’, largely due to ‘poor’ Balkan immi-
grants ‘here’ doing the dirty work and ‘clever’ Greek businessmen
‘there’ exploiting opportunities and people, xenophobic attitudes may
imply feelings of superiority which are born through relations of de-
pendency13. Thus, despite widespread prejudices, towards Albanians
mostly, the roots of racism lie in class relations as well; as Balibar &
Wallerstein (1990) have argued, racism is embedded in the inner logic
of the capitalist system itself. The inclusion of ‘elite’ migrants in the
sample has been useful in order to capture such differentiations on the
basis of class and/or status: Albanian and especially Bulgarian profes-
sionals with a high socio-economic status mostly face the problems
posed by the legal framework, not so much discriminatory or racist
treatment as such, as they generally tend to be better accepted and cer-
tainly more respected. By contrast, the majority of the interviewees of
both nationalities complained about offensive attitudes expressed by lo-
cals, in respect to their or their countries’ socio-economic conditions:
People think that because we speak about poverty in Bulgaria,
we are also of a lower class … and sometimes they offend us.
Some really mean it, and they do it on purpose, and some peo-
ple do it without really intending to offend … For instance, there
was this lady that I used to go to, to clean her place. In the be-
ginning, she kept telling me ‘What do you Bulgarian women
know about houses? You don’t have houses up there in Bulgaria,
how do you know to clean them?’ (Liliana)
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In the shops, in the street, many times people tell me ‘You don’t
look like [an Albanian]’ and I’m getting angry, I say ‘What do I
have to do in order to look like one, do I have to write it on my
face?’… When we go on holiday, we rent a room next to two or
three other families, they start asking you details … questions
that insult you, ‘How can an Albanian go on holiday?’ (Mimoza)
Nevertheless, there is a certain degree of ignorance connected to the
novelty of the phenomenon that should be taken into account in order
to understand the particularities of xenophobia in Greece. In the words
of Milen:
I wouldn’t call it racism, but to some extent it exists. And I think
that this is quite natural … There are some people who have
never been abroad, who are quite closed, who have not read
many things, and they don’t understand.
Additionally, almost fifty years of separate histories and closed borders
imposed by the Iron Curtain have resulted in a certain degree of ignor-
ance regarding Greece’s northern neighbours. This formed the terrain
on which prejudices and stereotypes were built during the 1990s, un-
der the influence of governmental policy, due to exposure to negative
media images, and on the basis of the explanatory factors analysed
here.
However, as contact between immigrants and locals is enhanced and
interpersonal relationships are developed over time on the basis of mu-
tual trust, collaboration, friendship, etc. (see Section 8.2.2), perhaps
also as a result of regularisations that gave migrants an opportunity to
lead normal lives and acquire a public presence, xenophobic senti-
ments gradually fade and racist attitudes become characteristic of only
a small minority among the local population. The curative effect of
time should be considered as an element of crucial importance regard-
ing immigrants’ incorporation. Not only do policies move towards a
more comprehensive set of measures which facilitate integration, as al-
ready stated, but also the material conditions of immigrants as well as
other aspects of their lives in Greece improve over time, as we are
going to see in later chapters. In respect to the social perceptions and
attitudes towards the migrant ‘other’, a similar pattern of the smooth-
ing of host-stranger relations can be observed in both the public dis-
course and the experiences of the migrants themselves. The media, for
instance, now take more seriously the relevant anti-discriminatory reg-
ulations, and positive portraits of migrants are more frequently pic-
tured14, while some state TV and radio channels have included multi-
lingual programmes for immigrants (e.g. ET3 TV channel has a Sun-
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day afternoon programme in Russian and Albanian). This overall posi-
tive development in their level of acceptance was mentioned by some
of the interviewees and is highlighted in Nadi’s testimony below:
That was mostly in the beginning. Now it still happens, but it is
not that strong. The first years, people here were not prepared
for this, there were many negative reactions. Now it’s different,
gradually the situation gets better. People start understanding
what’s going on, they start learning how to distinguish who is
good and who is bad … Before, we were all the same, people
could not distinguish who was a criminal and who was an eco-
nomic migrant, a normal person, anyway … The Greeks are hos-
pitable after they get to know you.
5.2.2 Non-state actors in support of immigrants: the response of civil
society
Some of the gaps in governmental policy for the welfare of immigrants
have been covered to an extent by non-state initiatives: community as-
sociations, NGOs, left-wing parties, anti-racist groups, trade unions,
the Church, etc.; in short, what can be described by the term ‘civil-so-
ciety organisations’, the community, voluntary and non-profit sectors.
Since the early 1990s, there have been growing positive responses
from such initiatives, whether state-funded institutions or grassroots
collectives, aiming to support immigrants and to defend their rights.
Their activities vary as much as the types and nature of the organisa-
tions themselves15: initiatives offering welfare services directly (medical
treatment, provision of food and shelter, counselling and psychological
support), vocational training (language and other courses) or legal as-
sistance exist, as well as institutes researching migration, racism and
related issues, and organisations advocating immigrants’ rights, or
launching campaigns which involve mobilisation and/or participation
of the migrants themselves. A listing of such organisations in Thessa-
loniki is provided in Table A5, Appendix A. The outcomes of such at-
tempts are rather limited in scope, in geographical scale and in the
numbers of people they affect; but their role should not be underesti-
mated, especially regarding their growing potential and particularly
with respect to their importance at the local level. In addition, the mor-
al/political but also practical support from these sections of the host so-
ciety encouraged and/or assisted migrant groups to get organised in as-
sociations and hence to acquire their own institutional ‘voice’.
The number of participants who had benefited from, or simply were
aware of, such initiatives is rather low. However, it would be an impor-
tant omission not to take them into account. During the fieldwork re-
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search, background information was collected on the principal initia-
tives of this kind that were active in Thessaloniki at the time, and this
was kept updated until late 2004, with material appearing in the daily
press or on the Internet. We can categorise these initiatives into two
groups according to the type of services they provide, or the main ac-
tions they undertake: (i) social and welfare services; and (ii) vocational
training and Greek language teaching.
Language and vocational training courses. Within the framework of re-
levant EU programmes (e.g. INTEGRA, EQUAL), the Greek govern-
ment funds non-profit initiatives offering courses of vocational training
to migrants and other target groups. ‘Returning’ ethnic Greeks, immi-
grants, refugees and asylum seekers comprised 11 per cent of the
EQUAL budget for vocational training programmes for vulnerable so-
cial groups16. The Ministry of Labour funds special Greek language
educational programmes for legal migrants and ‘returning’ ethnic
Greeks; courses are organised by private (non-profit) Centres of Voca-
tional Training (KEK). In late 2002, the prefecture of Thessaloniki had-
provision for fourteen such programmes, with a total capacity of 664
benefactors and a budget of 2.1 million euros (Macedonia, 11 December
2002). But apart from state-funded programmes, there have also been
independent (self-funded) initiatives, such as the NGO Odysseas, com-
posed of a group of volunteer teachers, which provides free language
courses to immigrants, refugees and other foreign nationals, in rooms
provided by the Macedonian Institute of Employment (MAKINE), a re-
search and training body of the city’s labour centre. In 2002, there
were 350 regular participants in their three levels of classes (Macedonia,
11 December 2002). Another example encountered during the field-
work is a group of volunteers of anarchist/libertarian ideology (Steki
Viologikou) offering free language courses in an squatter university
room. In addition, there are similar language programmes for regular
immigrants only, run by bodies of the social services divisions of the
council and of the prefecture. Finally, there is the Greek language
school at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, which charges tuition
fees and mostly serves foreign students.
Social and welfare services. Here the landscape appears more diverse.
Well-established local branches of international NGOs such as Me´de-
cins Sans Frontie`res, Doctors of the World and the Red Cross are active
in providing health services, as well as counselling and psychological
support. The former two run clinics which provide free medical treat-
ment to low-income people, including immigrants and refugees, what-
ever their legal status. In addition, some church parishes used to pro-
vide shelter and food for a period, and assist in finding jobs, or support
people in need, including migrants, by collecting and distributing used
clothes or household equipment. Since the early 2000s, the Refugee
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Reception Centre has provided food, temporary accommodation, coun-
selling and other forms of support for asylum seekers in the city. Addi-
tionally, a number of organisations exist that focus specifically on coun-
selling, advice on employment and insurance matters, and legal sup-
port (including assistance with stay-permit applications). Apart from
NGOs, organisations working in this field include community associa-
tions like Epirote House, EU-funded projects such as the Centre for
Reception and Support of Immigrants and Refugees (hosted by MA-
KINE and funded through the INTEGRA Community Initiative), initia-
tives by trade-union bodies such as an office for migrant workers at the
Thessaloniki labour centre, left-wing groups and networks, as for in-
stance the local branch of the Network for Social and Political Rights
or the European Social Forum.
Obviously, the vast majority of immigrants in the city are not neces-
sarily aware of all those activities aimed at supporting them. Among
the respondents in my survey, one fifth of the Albanians and 15 per
cent of the Bulgarians had benefited from Greek language pro-
grammes. Another six Albanian migrants had participated in voca-
tional training seminars. One (Bulgarian) interviewee mentioned the
Me´decins Sans Frontie`res clinic as her way of accessing health services.
Two respondents said they had received the help of their local church
parishes at an initial stage. Based on this, the impression one gets is
that civil-society organisations do indeed play an important role at the
local level, but the number of people they affect is fairly marginal. Not
only are the capacities and infrastructures of the initiatives mentioned
above rather limited as far as the numbers of potential benefactors are
concerned, but also immigrants’ access to information about the exis-
tence of such programmes is problematic. Linguistic obstacles play a
role in this, as well as the migrants’ legal status, that keeps them ‘hid-
ing’, as we have seen, or that makes them ineligible for many of these
services; but there are factors that make it far more difficult for immi-
grants to participate in or find out about such initiatives. These range
from the spatial concentration of most of these organisations in the
central areas of the city, to the everyday reality migrants face in respect
to their working hours, family duties and leisure time, as well as to
their availability, interest and willingness to participate. Crucially, also,
the services provided are not of the same nature: medical treatment for
instance, or legal support and assistance/information regarding the
documents required for regularisation, are services much more needed
and thus more welcome, than, for example, increasing the human ca-
pital potential through vocational training and language courses. Never-
theless, however limited the scope of such activities by civil-society or-
ganisations, the number of benefactors seems to be gradually growing:
for instance, the language-teaching initiative Odysseas, who started
134 MIGRATION IN CONTEMPORARY GREECE
with less than ten students during their first steps in 1997, has seen
student numbers jump to a few hundred in 2002, upgrading its status
from a grassroots collective of volunteers to a registered NGO. Accord-
ing to my information, it is reasonable to assume that any assessment
of the experience of other organisations would find similar progress, in
addition to the very fact that the number of such initiatives in the city
has multiplied.
In parallel, the influence of the activities of a diverse range of organi-
sations17, which advocate for immigrants’ rights, campaign on behalf
of individual cases and try to spread a spirit of tolerance among the lo-
cal population has been growing. Initially, they took the form of soli-
darity with ‘immigrants’ in general, focusing on anti-racist and pro-mi-
grant propaganda, through the organisation of public debates, publica-
tions related to issues of migration, human rights, xenophobia, etc., or
through demonstrations and other forms of activism. In the recent past
such activities were rather marginal, often trapped in the political isola-
tionism of traditional radical Left activism, on the one hand, or in the
limited influential power and elitism of small think-tanks, on the other.
However, through networking and the coordination of activities, but
most importantly through the mobilisation of migrants and the forma-
tion of associations, there are currently signs of an emerging anti-ra-
cist, pro-migrant social movement in Thessaloniki, characterised by or-
ganisational, political and ideological diversity (see Glarnetatzis 2001).
It is the local equivalent of the (now) well-consolidated Network for the
Support of Immigrants and Refugees, based in Athens, with which it
maintains links; that was the first attempt in Greece, in terms of wide
participation and successful campaigning and lobbying, which also
managed to mobilise individual immigrants and migrant organisa-
tions.
This movement currently comprises many of the above-mentioned
organisations, plus other NGOs (e.g. Antigone, part of the EUMC RAX-
EN network, the local branches of Amnesty International and the Inter-
national Helsinki Federation for Human Rights), trade-union bodies
(e.g. MAKINE), left-wing activist groups (e.g. Network for the Support
of Social and Political Rights, the Anti-racist Initiative of Thessaloniki
– one of the principal coordinators of activities), etc. Its public presence
in the city seems to be increasing and is not solely based on marginal
demonstrations and radical propaganda any more; rather it focuses on
coordinated protest and advocacy activities embracing wider sections of
organised civil society. It engages itself in other actions that apply to a
wider public and include immigrants. For instance, public lectures and
open debates are organised in collaboration with academics and re-
searchers working on immigration, racism, intercultural education,
etc.; relevant press releases appear quite frequently in daily newspa-
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pers, and some of the participant organisations, including migrants’ as-
sociations, have a voice in the above-mentioned local Sunday TV pro-
gramme for immigrants and ethnic Greeks. Furthermore, cultural
events celebrating diversity take place from time to time in various dis-
tricts of the city, sometimes with the support/funding of local councils,
and with the participation of both immigrants and locals (e.g. the an-
nual Anti-racist Festival, an international food festival, musical events,
art exhibitions, etc.). By such means, the movement has contributed
significantly to bringing immigrants’ problems and rights to the fore-
front of the public discourse, denouncing state policy (particularly
events of police brutality), as well as to responding to racist propagan-
da. In that sense, and despite the fact that the majority of immigrants
in the city are neither aware nor part of the movement as such, the
overall outcome could be assessed as a positive one, and its contribu-
tion, existing and potential, should not be underestimated.
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6 Employment and labour-market integration
The economic integration of immigrants is perhaps the most crucial
aspect of their experience, to the extent that it determines most of what
can be described as the material dimension of their existence, their liv-
ing conditions and the fulfilment of life-projects and migratory plans.
Addressing the processes of economic integration presupposes an in-
sight into their occupational characteristics, their position in the labour
market, their working conditions, payment and so on. On the other
hand, the patterns of migrants’ labour-market integration tell us much
about the host economy itself, the indigenous demand for migrant la-
bour, and even the dynamics of class relations: the local productive and
employment structures form the socio-economic context whereby mi-
grants are ‘inserted’, and they are affected subsequently by the pre-
sence of the migrant labour force. However, as we have seen, many mi-
grants had previously lived and worked in other parts of Greece before
moving to Thessaloniki; their employment history is thus crucial in or-
der to understand their pathways in the Greek labour market. In this
chapter, I follow the migrants’ employment trajectories, starting from
the occupations they held at the time of the fieldwork. Looking back
into their past experiences, I develop a dynamic perspective to explain
the process of labour-market integration. Findings are also to be under-
stood within the context of the basic socio-economic features of Greece
and Thessaloniki as already described in Section 2.2. The narrative
builds around an analysis of the survey data, which are backed up, en-
riched and extended by the use of extracts from the in-depth inter-
views.
6.1 A cheap and flexible labour force
Exploring the quantitative material from the questionnaire survey al-
lows some initial key observations regarding the basic characteristics of
immigrant labour in Thessaloniki: the kind of jobs they perform and
the types of companies that employ them, the sectors of the economy
they mostly work in, and the differences between male and female mi-
grant labour. The discussion then turns to a description of the mi-
grants’ employment conditions, with the focus being on the length of
their working days, their payment, whether they are registered or not,
and their relationships with employers and colleagues. An overview of
the migrants’ job-finding strategies and their period of employment in
the position held at the time of the interview closes this section.
6.1.1 Sectors of employment and types of work
The vast majority of the respondents are waged employees (77.9 per
cent). A share of 12 per cent are self-employed (or freelance profes-
sionals), 3.4 per cent (seven people) are entrepreneurs and 1.9 per cent
(four people) work in the family business. Unemployment concerns
only 2.9 per cent (six people), all of whom had been working until
shortly before the fieldwork. Four respondents (1.9 per cent) were not
working at all: two men were pensioners though who had worked
some years in Greece, and two women were housewives. The employ-
ment position and skills of those working at the time of the interview
are presented in Table 6.11 according to their sector of employment.
More than two thirds were employed in permanent full-time positions,
while 10 per cent said their job arrangements were temporary. Seven
per cent were doing casual or part-time work and an equal share were
holding more than one position (combining either two part-time jobs,
or a full-time one with part-time work or self-employment). A detailed
account of the respondents’ professions by sector can be found in Table
A6 in Appendix A.
Table 6.1 allows for a first key observation concerning the concentra-
tion of migrant labour in two basic types of jobs: either manual posi-
tions in construction and manufacturing, or posts on the lowest rungs
of the service-sector ladder. The principal sectors of migrants’ employ-
Table 6.1 Employment position and level of skills by sector (%)
Employment Position Nature of Post (skills) Total
employer* self-
employed
waged minimum skilled
manual
white
collar**
manufacturing 9.1 8.0 29.6 20.8 47.1 4.5 25.8
construction .– 12.0 18.5 18.4 19.6 .– 16.7
personal services .– 32.0 15.4 24.0 5.9 .– 16.7
maintenance & repair 9.1 20.0 3.7 1.6 19.6 .– 6.1
hotel & catering 18.2 .– 9.9 12.8 3.9 .– 9.1
trade & retail 27.3 12.0 13.0 20.0 3.9 .– 13.6
other services 36.4 16.0 9.9 2.4 .– 95.5 12.1
Total 5.6 12.6 81.8 63.1 25.8 11.1 N=198
* Including assistants in family businesses
** Including professional posts, businessmen and entrepreneurs
138 MIGRATION IN CONTEMPORARY GREECE
ment are manufacturing (25.8 per cent, including small workshops, car-
pentry, etc.), construction (16.7), personal services (16.7 per cent), trade
(13.6 per cent, both retail and wholesale), hotel and catering (9.1 per
cent), maintenance and repair services (6.1 per cent)2 and other branches
of the tertiary sector (12.1 per cent)3.
A second observation relates to the nature of work migrants do,
which is usually physically demanding, often of a servile character,
and, for most of them, in low-skilled positions. The vast majority of the
respondents work in jobs requiring either no skills at all or very basic
ones (63.1 per cent). One quarter of them are domestic workers (clea-
ners, carers, maintenance/repair workers), about 40 per cent are man-
ual labourers in manufacturing and construction, and one fifth work
as assistants in retail stores and trading companies. Of the 25.8 per
cent who do skilled manual work, almost half are employed in factories
and workshops (machine operators, craftsmen), about one fifth in con-
struction (skilled builders, painters, cement mixers, etc.) and another
fifth are technicians (electricians, plumbers) or workers specialising in
maintenance and repair tasks (painters, etc.). Professionals, entrepre-
neurs and white-collar workers form a share of 11.1 per cent, and all
but one are employed in services.
A third observation has to do with the types of employers that tend
to rely on the work of immigrants: these are usually small- or medium-
sized enterprises, in many cases family-owned, on the one hand, and in-
dividuals or households, on the other. Among those in industrial employ-
ment, few work in big factories (metal machinery, clothing); for most,
small- and medium-scale manufacturing is the case, especially in sec-
tors that were at a ‘take-off’ stage fifteen years ago (shoes and clothing,
plastics and chemicals), or in those that were then in decline (metal-
lurgy, metal products), as well as small units such as carpenters’ and
metal-processing workshops4. Employment in the construction sector
for the majority is also mostly with small workshops where the em-
ployer is usually a Greek foreman, rather than with big building com-
panies undertaking large projects. Similarly, trade concerns mostly (for
9.6 per cent of the total) small retail trade (corner-shops, small stores,
bakeries, petrol stations, etc.), and to a lesser extent larger trading com-
panies and storerooms (3.5 per cent). Most of those in the hotel and ca-
tering industry work as waiters/waitresses, kitchen assistants and deliv-
ery boys in restaurants and fast-food joints (5.1 per cent), waiters/wait-
resses in cafe´s and bars (4 per cent), plus one working room service in
a hotel.
The increased participation in ‘personal services’ for individuals or
households, mostly in ‘reproductive’ activities such as care work (33.3
per cent among those working in this sector), domestic help and clean-
ing (42.4 per cent), and house-repair tasks (18.2 per cent), leads us to a
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fourth observation regarding the different employment niches male
and female migrants cover in the local labour market. Table 6.2 shows,
among other things, immigrants’ employment by gender. Of all the
men in the sample, most work as manual labourers on construction
sites (25 per cent), in factories (22.7 per cent) and workshops (7.6 per
cent), in maintenance and repair (7.6 per cent),and in trading compa-
nies and storerooms (6.1 per cent). Another 7.6 per cent are assistants
or shopkeepers in small retail stores, bakeries and petrol stations, while
6.1 per cent work in cafe´s and restaurants. A share of 4.5 per cent, who
are casual manual workers, perform ‘personal services’. The rest are
employed in various branches of the tertiary sector, as businessmen
and/or professionals, with the exception of three working as manual
assistants in services. Women, on the other hand, comprise more than
one third who are domestic servants and carers, factory workers (14.5
per cent, almost exclusively in small- or medium-sized clothing manu-
facturers) and waitresses or assistants in cafe´s, bars and restaurants
(13.2 per cent), while 7.9 per cent of them work in retail shops. Thus,
they are mainly concentrated in traditionally ‘female’ sectors. The per-
centage of women (18.4 per cent) who work as white-collar employees
or professionals is far greater than men5. Finally, four out of the six un-
employed respondents were women.
Extracts from some interviews presented below highlight both the
variety of job types performed by migrants, and the contrast between
male and female employment:
This is what I chose, and it suits me because now I keep my en-
tire wage … I don’t pay rent, for phone calls. (Lioupa, looks after
an old man as a live-in carer.)
Well, what I do now I have been doing since the beginning.
Houses … cleaning houses and stairs … many houses. (Melina,
domestic cleaner.)
Now I work in this office, I help with the translation … I mostly
do admin work. (Dalina, secretary in a translation office owned
by a Greek-Albanian.)
I still work now … in a clothing factory as a packer … I’ve
worked there for one year and two months. (Valbona, manufac-
turing worker.)
I work in the field I studied, as a mechanic. In the machines de-
partment, in an aluminium factory … it employs about fifty peo-
ple. Eight hours per day, five days per week and my wage is sa-
tisfactory. (Ani, mechanic in a factory.)
I am a construction worker, a skilled worker, a builder. I’ve
learned the job here; at the beginning I was only helping, but I
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had to learn the job, I had to get some more money. (Gjion, con-
struction worker.)
I am in charge in that bakery now. There are three people, and
in the morning the boss comes and says ‘We have to prepare
this and that, bread, this amount in kilos …’ (Spyros, works in a
bakery.)
I drive around all the construction projects and I buy the sup-
plies required for each. I also supervise some workers, Alba-
nians, Bulgarians, who I train on the job … It’s quite a responsi-
ble position. (Milen, driver/foreman for a large construction
company.)
Many things, I do … gardening, painting, stone-setting, fences,
doors. (Kostas, casual manual worker.)
Table 6.2 also shows some differences in the sectoral employment of
immigrants by nationality and ethnic origin. For female migrants,
manufacturing work is more common among Albanian women, who
also work to a great extent as domestic servants and cleaners. The hotel
and catering industry is much less important for them, compared to its
significance for the employment of female Bulgarians. Bulgarian wo-
men are far less likely to be employed in manufacturing. Personal ser-
vices for them almost exclusively concern caring for elderly or ill peo-
ple (the five live-in carers of the sample are all Bulgarian women). The
largest shares of Bulgarian men, on the other hand, work in construc-
tion, and maintenance and repair tasks, mostly due to the weight of
the Sarakatsani, half of whom are employed in these sectors. More Al-
banian men work in bars, restaurants, retail shops and trading compa-
nies. The large share of (non-ethnic-Greek) Bulgarian migrants in the
tertiary sector may reflect the over-representation of highly skilled pro-
fessionals in the sample. The highest percentage of employment in the
tertiary sector though is observed among ethnic Greek Albanians:
Table 6.2 Immigrants’ employment by nationality, gender and ethnic origin (%)
Albanian Migrants Bulgarian Migrants All
women men EGR* women men EGR* women men EGR*
manufacturing 17.1 29.9 21.3 11.4 31.4 5.0 14.5 30.3 16.4
construction .– 22.7 6.4 .– 31.4 40.0 .– 25.0 16.4
personal services 39.0 4.1 17.0 31.4 5.7 15.0 35.5 4.5 16.4
maintenance & repair 2.4 6.2 2.1 2.9 11.4 10.0 2.6 7.6 4.5
hotel & catering 4.9 7.2 6.4 22.9 2.9 15.0 13.2 6.1 9.0
trade & retail 9.8 17.5 17.0 5.7 11.4 10.0 7.9 15.9 14.9
other services 19.5 8.2 21.3 17.1 5.7 5.0 18.4 7.6 16.4
unemployed & inactive 7.3 4.1 8.5 8.6 .– .– 7.9 3.0 6.0
* EGR = migrants of ethnic Greek origin
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about one fifth of them are white-collar employees or professionals,
and this is largely because of the women. By contrast, Sarakatsani men
are far less likely to do white-collar work.
Entrepreneurship and self-employment are more common among
men: five out of the seven business-owners are men. Managers of lar-
ger companies are exclusively men, while women entrepreneurs (two,
both from Bulgaria) tend to run smaller companies. Four women are
assistants in the family business; for two of them, their Greek hus-
bands are the owners. Most entrepreneurs (five out of seven, plus two
assistants in family businesses) are of ethnic Greek origin. Among the
self-employed, one third (six people) are women. For men, self-employ-
ment refers mostly to migrants undertaking small-scale construction,
painting or house-repair projects (tiling, roofing, etc.), or to specialised
technicians (electricians, plumbers), often in partnership with relatives
or friends, and after ‘learning the art’ during their previous years in
Greece6. This explains the high degree of self-employment among
those in personal services and maintenance and repair, as shown in
Table 6.1. Examples from the interviews offer an idea of how some
migrants see their involvement in self-employment/entrepreneurship:
Regarding our job, several tasks … painting, plaster … [I work]
with my brothers … One of them is an electrical engineer … The
other is a mechanical engineer … We work at construction sites.
Our elder brother does the studies [the projects] … For instance,
currently we are renovating a building opposite the White Tower.
It’s a good job … We never run out of work. (Louzim, self-em-
ployed in construction, undertakes repair/renovation projects
with his three brothers.)
I got married … I stayed at home for a period … and then we
decided to start this business … This is why we started this busi-
ness, so I wouldn’t have to seek work somewhere else, I could
be together with my husband. (Liliana, running a cafe´-bar to-
gether with her Greek husband.)
I am the owner of this [translation] service … I have faced the
same problems that a Greek can face when he starts his own
business. I have five full-time employees and many external col-
laborators. The external collaborators are mostly Greeks. Well,
some of them are foreigners, because we offer translation ser-
vices and we need people who speak foreign languages. My em-
ployees are all ethnic Greeks and Albanians, because they have
to know the Albanian language, since the big bulk of our work
has to do with translations from Greek to Albanian and from Al-
banian to Greek. (Stavros, owns a translation office.)
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For all these ten years, I have been working in a kiosk … I was
working as an assistant in the kiosk for four or five years, then I
rented it together with my brother. During the last six years, I’ve
been working there … In the beginning I had a problem with
the papers [the permit to open a kiosk], because in order to get
the papers you have to have a stay permit, which they wouldn’t
issue during those years. (Emil, runs a kiosk together with his
brother.)
6.1.2 Access to employment and working conditions
The working conditions and payment of the respondents reflect to an
extent the cheap and flexible labour offered by immigrants. The main is-
sues addressed here concern the respondents’ daily working hours,
payment and social security, as summarised in Table 6.3. To start with,
working days for most of the interviewees are in line with the usual
Greek standards (five or six days per week), depending on the nature
and the needs of each job. However, for men in construction or in ca-
sual manual work, and for women in care work and domestic service,
work can be highly seasonal or occasional, respectively, sometimes in-
volving long working weeks and employment during weekends and
bank holidays. On the other hand, as shown in Table 6.3, for many the
working day is much longer than the usual eight-hour one. A working
day of up to eight hours is the case for 38.1 per cent. For an equal
share, the working day usually exceeds eight hours (about 15 per cent
actually work for more than ten hours a day, including the female live-
in carers). The remaining 23.8 per cent, who said their daily working
hours were not fixed but varied, were mostly men employed in manual
jobs requiring minimum or no skills (construction and casual house
maintenance/repair workers, retail shop assistants), or women working
as domestic servants/cleaners and shop assistants.
Furthermore, according to Table 6.3, slightly less than half of the re-
spondents earn between 20-29 euros a day, and about one third makes
more than 30 euros, with 12.4 per cent earning 40 euros or more7. A
daily wage of less than 20 euros is the case for about 10 per cent of the
respondents, while 11.9 per cent said their wage is not fixed but de-
pends on the availability and hours of work, or if the ‘business goes
well’. Payment below 20 euros a day mostly concerns Albanian domes-
tic servants and cleaners, since employment in personal services is gen-
erally less likely to pay well. Employment in construction and mainte-
nance/repair usually pays between 30-39 euros a day, but these sectors
are also the ones where wages fluctuate more, especially for the self-
employed. As expected, those working in white-collar employment and
in highly skilled positions (other services) are far more likely to receive
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higher wages. Now, comparing the average daily wages (means) of the
158 respondents who did state the actual amount of their wage, we find
significant differences in terms of gender and ethnic origin. Men earn
about 30 euros a day, women about 26. Ethnic Greek migrants earn
more than 30 euros, but this accounts mostly for men (Greek-Albanian
women make 29 euros on average). Non-ethnic-Greek female Alba-
nians as a group have the lowest average daily wage (21.2 euros a day).
Figure 6.1 represents these differences schematically.
Clearly the sample shows a certain degree of heterogeneity; the inter-
views reveal that wages first depend on the type of occupation and the
position held, but also on the period a person was working for the
same employer, the hours of work and the kind of relationships with
bosses. The daily wage for a manual worker in (metal- or wood-proces-
sing) workshops and on construction sites (general manual tasks,
building, cement-mixing, painting) varies from 23 to 32 euros. For a
domestic servant/cleaner it lies between 10-30 euros per day, depend-
ing on the hours of work and the good will of the employer. Care work
(looking after children or old people) can start from 90 euros per
Table 6.3 Working conditions by sector of employment
Hours of Work per Day
(N=181)
Daily Wage (in Euros)
(N=154)
Social
security
8 or less 8+ not fixed < 20 20-29 30-39 40+ not fixed
manufacturing 60.0 33.3 6.7 4.0 74.0 16.0 6.0 .– 68.6
construction 27.3 45.5 27.3 3.0 24.2 48.5 6.1 18.2 75.8
personal services 12.9 45.2 41.9 33.3 33.3 18.2 3.0 12.1 30.3
maintenance & repair 33.3 11.1 55.6 9.1 36.4 27.3 .– 27.3 75.0
hotel & catering 40.0 33.3 26.7 5.9 52.9 5.9 17.6 17.6 66.7
trade & retail 36.0 56.0 8.0 7.7 53.8 19.2 3.8 15.4 59.3
other services 47.8 21.7 30.4 4.2 20.8 4. 2 58.3 12.5 83.3
Total 38.1 38.1 23.8 9.8 45.4 20.6 12.4 11.9 64.1
Note: Percentage within sector of employment
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
female male
unstable less than 20 20-29 30-39 40 and more
Albanians Bulgarians Greek origin
Figure 6.1 Category of daily wage, by nationality, gender and ethnic origin (in
euros)
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month for a part-time position and rise up to 380 euros per month for
a full-time one, or stay at 300 euros for a live-in maid (since accommo-
dation and food are provided). Unskilled workers in small manufac-
turers get paid around 20 euros for eight hours of work; skilled ones
in bigger factories may receive more than 700 euros a month, depend-
ing on the employee’s position and qualifications and on the period of
working for the same employer. Low payment was one of the problems
commented on by the majority of the interviewees, while a comparison
with Greek workers’ wages is unavoidable, especially when it concerns
the same type of work8:
To tell you the truth, for the job I do, I don’t get the money that
I deserve. (Ferin, manual worker in a metal workshop.)
Now I get 11,000 drachmas [33 euros]. Again, this is not the dai-
ly wage a skilled worker should take, but I profit again, and the
employer profits, because we have a deal. (Gjion, construction
worker.)
We can’t earn what a Greek skilled worker earns. We get paid a
bit less, but we are satisfied. (Kostas, casual manual worker.)
There is a slight difference [between Greeks’ and Albanians’
wages], there always is one, but it’s not as big as it was in the be-
ginning. (Nadi, mechanic in an aluminium factory.)
Another interviewee commented on both the longer working hours
done by immigrants and the lower payment they receive as an ‘advan-
tage’ for being preferred by Greek employers:
[The Greek] at ten o’clock wants to have a coffee break … at 12
o’clock he wants to eat for half an hour … at two o’clock, a fif-
teen- or twenty-minute break for coffee and a cigarette … Here
all the Greek bosses don’t want Greek workers … at all small fac-
tories … this is why they hire Albanians, Russians, Bulgarians,
because we work for less money. (Raicko, skilled worker in a
metal-processing workshop.)
Unregistered work is still the case for many – only 64.1 per cent had
social security at the time of the fieldwork. Even for those who did, in
some cases there is no fixed-term employment contract, while many
had managed to register only shortly before the fieldwork. There were
many examples of interviewees having bought their social security
stamps from IKA in order to be able to apply for regularisation or re-
newal of their stay and working permits. Some, especially those with
previous experience in agricultural work, prefer buying OGA stamps
because they cost less. A small number of people who were self-em-
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ployed and entrepreneurs were registered with TEBE. Another strategy,
most common amongst people who work on a freelance basis, such as
self-employed construction workers, electricians or plumbers, and do-
mestic servants/carers, is to get self-insured at IKA, sometimes paying
part of the fees themselves while the rest is covered by their employers.
In many cases, social security is partial, covering health insurance but
not pension contributions9. Since registered employment is a prerequi-
site for the issue of stay and work permits, one understands why insur-
ance is one of the migrants’ greater concerns:
[I am] a stitcher-sewer. It is a small one [manufacturer]. I am
worried, because I can’t go [leave the job], but I want to go be-
cause the money is not good. I want to find a job offering social
security. (Katerina)
I work … for eight hours per day, and I get 130,000 drachmas
[390 euros] per month … I take care of the children, I iron, I
wash dishes … I am not insured. (Kaiti)
As also shown in Table 6.3, registered employment is more common
among those in white-collar/professional employment, followed by
construction and maintenance and repair. For people working in perso-
nal services it drops to 30.3 per cent, and this obviously particularly af-
fects female migrants: 61 per cent of Albanian women and 48.6 per
cent of female Bulgarians were lacking social security at the time of
the survey. Finally, unregistered work was also high among ethnic
Greek Albanians, with 51.1 per cent of them not being insured, again
mostly due to the preponderence of women.
Union participation rates are extremely low: only eight people, or 4
per cent among those employed, were members of a trade union. Nota-
bly, seven of them have been in Greece for nine or more years, six are
married and four are between 30-39 years old, while only two are wo-
men. Five were employed in manufacturing, all in the metal-machin-
ery sector, one in construction and two were white-collar service em-
ployees. Certainly, the widespread informality and the nature of the
jobs migrants do (casual work, domestic service) partly provide the ex-
planation for such limited union membership, together with fear, lack
of information, limited language competence and perhaps a degree of
mistrust towards collective organisations. What fieldwork findings
failed to capture is an increasing number of migrant construction
workers registering with syndicates in this sector and sometimes ac-
tively participating in strikes/campaigns; this is revealed by the con-
struction workers’ trade union’s statements and articles in the daily
newspapers, and was also mentioned by an Albanian interviewee who
works as a translator:
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The only exception is the construction workers’ trade union. I
know this because I have done their translations. There are
many registered there, Russians, Albanians and everything. It’s
a very big trade union … because of the Communist Party. The
people I met were from the Communist Party. (Adriana)
Membership though seems not to mean active participation. Two Alba-
nian migrants, Nadi and Ani, both working in metal-machinery fac-
tories, stressed this fact, since the only thing they do is to go on strike
when the union decides to, or otherwise to just ‘count as a member’;
an elderly Sarakatsani Bulgarian who is a construction labourer spoke
with bitterness of the way his union ‘does nothing’ in practice and ex-
pressed his willingness to opt out. On the other hand, the precarious
character of migrant labour is precisely what makes it so flexible, and
thus so in demand, while the immigrants’ vulnerable position and in-
security makes them reluctant to organise themselves in the face of
highly exploitative working environments and conditions. Lazaros’
story below is self-explanatory:
This is one of the bad things in Greece [the way syndicalism
works and the way employers react]. I’ll tell you a story, about a
guy who used to work at Pizza Hut with me. He was a univer-
sity student … He used to work there and he had contacts with a
union. Some people from the union came once to speak to us.
The result? The guy was fired. The bosses found an excuse to
fire him. I was new there, but I could understand what was
going on. And those people from the union never came again.
Furthermore, regarding access to employment, the findings suggest
that migrants tend to rely largely on informal relationships of support
and solidarity in order to make their way through the local labour mar-
ket. Only 16.8 per cent said they found their job at the time of the
fieldwork ‘alone’, and other job-finding strategies appear even less sig-
nificant. Some 5.3 per cent of the sample, exclusively men, were in a
position they found through the so-called ‘piazzas’ – meeting points
where immigrants gather and where Greek employers know that they
can find labourers to work for them. Few made use of the newspapers’
job pages (3.4 per cent, mostly women), or of official employment
agencies, whether public (OAED, 2.4 per cent, again mostly women),
or private ones (another 2.4 per cent, exclusively Bulgarian women
who work as carers and domestic servants). A lower percentage of wo-
men looked for work alone (12.7 per cent, compared to 20.6 per cent
of men). More than half of all respondents (58.1 per cent) found their
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current jobs through information provided by, or through direct help
from, relatives and friends, or sometimes also by Greek people they
knew. Some differences, though, are evident between the two national-
ities: greater percentages of Albanian immigrants made use of their so-
cial networks (68 per cent, compared to 46.9 per cent of Bulgarians)
or looked for work alone (20.8 per cent, compared to 12.5 per cent of
Bulgarians), while more Bulgarian migrants went through vacancy ads,
or through OAED. Finally, the higher percentage of Bulgarian respon-
dents who found their current post through job-finding piazzas (12.5
per cent, compared to 2.4 per cent of the Albanians) has to be attribu-
ted to the Sarakatsani, who work mainly on a casual basis and in tem-
porary positions. In conclusion, it appears that the main sources of in-
formation about job opportunities, or of assistance in job finding, are
the migrants’ own social ties and relationships. Sometimes they are
even necessary, in order to facilitate access to employment, as shown
in the example below:
I found it from an ad. I went for an interview and they told me
… ‘We will call you.’ I waited for two or three weeks. I had no re-
ply, so I called and they told me, ‘We haven’t decided yet,’ and fi-
nally I pulled a few strings … Somebody I know, who knew the
boss, spoke to him and said, ‘Take him, he is good for this job.’
(Ani)
Temporariness in working arrangements is the case for many immi-
grants in Thessaloniki, adding more fuel to the argument about the
flexibility of migrant labour. Apart from the earlier mentioned 10 per
cent who said their employment agreement was for a (fixed) limited
period, there are also many who had started working not long before
the time of the field survey10. For the majority (43.4 per cent), their
current occupation dates back no more than a year. Slightly more than
one third had been working at the same job from one to five years,
while only one in five had been in more stable positions for more than
five years. The average (mean) period in the last job was three years,
with a fluctuation of five or six months more for men and less for wo-
men. Ethnic Greek Albanians tended to have more stable positions,
working in a single post for 4.5 years on average – unsurprising, per-
haps, as most of them were among the first to migrate.
6.2 Immigrants’ trajectories in the Greek labour market
Most of the respondents have worked in various occupations during
their stay in Greece. Looking at their employment history, we find that
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individual migrants have done many different jobs in different parts of
the country. Not surprisingly, white-collar work or entrepreneurship
weighted much less in the overall employment profile of the sample.
On the other hand, agricultural employment has been the case for
many, especially during their first years in Greece and obviously before
moving to the city. This heterogeneity of immigrants’ working experi-
ences, despite their concentration in particular labour-market niches,
uncovers two basic characteristics of foreign labour in Greece, both re-
lated to migrants’ trajectories in the Greek labour market:
– Firstly, a single migrant is likely to have changed occupations many
times while in Greece, performing various different tasks, in many
cases unrelated to one another. This means that, being in urgent
need, immigrants had to accept any job that was offered to them,
despite their qualifications and experience back home. Thus, apart
from constituting a ‘pool’ of cheap, hard-working labour, unregis-
tered for the most part, they are also extremely flexible regarding the
types of jobs they do. These are the issues discussed in the rest of
this section.
– Secondly, there are significant shifts in the occupational structure
of the sample. Initial conditions were harsh, including high levels
and various forms of exploitation by employers. At the time of the
fieldwork, none was working in agriculture and fewer people were
working in the leisure and catering industry, in personal services,
or were employed as general manual workers. Now there are more
industrial workers, shop assistants, skilled workers, technicians and
white-collar employees, including some in highly skilled positions.
This suggests that, after a period in Greece, immigrants in Thessa-
loniki tend to find better jobs, a fact that points to a certain degree of
occupational, and possibly socio-economic, mobility over time. This
is the topic of Section 6.3.
6.2.1 Doing ‘any’ job: trajectories and pathways of access
At the time of fieldwork, only 26.9 per cent of the respondents had
been practicing the same profession since they arrived, but even in
such cases it was exceptional to have been doing this for the same em-
ployer. And for people who had been working continuously for one em-
ployer, their responsibilities and type of work did not remain the same
over time. Some of the interviewees recalled numerous different jobs
they had done, sometimes at many places. For obvious reasons, the ear-
lier a migrant had come to Greece, the more likely s/he was to have
done many different jobs. Frequencies among 144 detailed responses
give the following shares11: 29.9 per cent were previously employed in
hotels, cafe´s and restaurants, 25.7 per cent as general manual workers,
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gardeners, painters and technicians, 22.9 per cent in cleaning and do-
mestic work, 22.2 per cent in construction, an equal share in agricul-
ture, cattle-breeding and fishing, 16.7 per cent as general manual work-
ers, 13.2 per cent as carers and nurses, 10.4 per cent in manufacturing
and another 10.1 per cent as shop assistants. Women were more likely
to have done the same profession since the beginning (32.9 per cent),
and this adds to the argument of labour-market segmentation accord-
ing to gender and the existence of purely ‘female’ sectors of employ-
ment. Women of both nationalities have mostly worked in the leisure
and catering industry (48.8 per cent), as carers and nurses (41.5 per
cent), as domestic servants (31.7 per cent) or cleaners (26.8 per cent),
but also in agriculture (26.8 per cent), manufacturing (14.6 per cent)
and in retail trade (14.6 per cent). Bulgarian migrants are less likely to
have been doing the same profession since the beginning (17.7 per
cent, compared to a 31.1 per cent of Albanians); most have worked in
cafe´s, hotels and restaurants (39.2 per cent, compared to 26.9 per cent
of Albanians), as general manual workers (38.1 per cent, compared to
20.4 per cent of Albanians), or as carers and nurses (23.5 per cent,
compared to 9.7 per cent of Albanians). Also, higher proportions of
Bulgarians have worked in agriculture, cattle-breeding and fishing
(39.2 per cent, compared to 19.4 per cent among Albanians), but the
percentages rise to an extent due to the presence of the (male) Sarakat-
sani. Ethnic Greeks of both nationalities have changed jobs many times
(only 15.6 per cent of them have been in the same profession since the
beginning): many have worked in the leisure and catering industry
(31.5 per cent). Examples from the relevant section of the questionnaire
follow some respondents’ trajectories in the Greek labour market:
– Female Albanian from Tirana, 24, married, came in 1999: 1. cleaning
houses ® 2. waitress in a cafe´ ® 3. room service in a hotel ® 4.
domestic service.
– Female Albanian from Sarande¨, 27, single, came in 1993: 1. advertising
leaflets ® 2. waiteress ® 3. cleaner ® 4. assistant in a beauty par-
lour.
– Female Bulgarian from Chirpan, 46, divorced, one child, came in 1994:
1. agricultural worker, picking olives ® 2. agricultural worker, pick-
ing tomatoes ® 3. cook in a hotel ® 4. bar in a hotel ® 5. live-in
carer of an ill woman.
– Female Bulgarian from Kazavluk, 38, single, came in 1992: 1. worker
in a fruit-canning factory in Kavala ® 2. agricultural worker (olives,
tomatoes, grapes), various places ® 3. room service in a hotel in
Rhodes ® 4. waitress/cleaner in a cafe´ ® 5. assistant/cleaner in a
fast-food restaurant ® 6. kitchen assistant in a restaurant.
– Male Albanian from Elbasan, 27, married, came in 1992: 1. agricultur-
al worker, harvesting olives ® 2. assistant in a store selling bath-
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room equipment ® 3. harbour worker ® 4. agriculture worker, to-
bacco ® 5. worker in a confectionery supplier.
– Male Albanian from Korc¸e¨, 22, single, came in 1992 with his parents: 1.
manual worker in a plaster materials company ® 2. kitchen assis-
tant in a restaurant ® 3. carpenter’s assistant ® 4. carrying boxes
for a transport company ® 5. working in a factory producing plastic
boxes.
– Male Albanian from Korc¸e¨, 28, single, came in 1991: 1. waiter in a fish
restaurant in Athens ® 2. agricultural worker in Larisa for six years
® 3. construction worker in Lamia for two years ® 4. builder for a
small construction company in Thessaloniki.
– Male Bulgarian from Ruse, 60, widowed, came in 2001: 1. cattle-breed-
ing ® 2. agricultural worker (tractor) ® 3. worker in a small factory
producing detergents.
It is also interesting how some of the respondents emphasised the spe-
cific details regarding the numerous jobs they had in different parts of
the country:
– Male Sarakatsani from Pernik, 59, married with two children (who live
in Bulgaria but come occasionally to work), came in 1990 for the first
time and initially followed a ‘back and forth’ path. He worked in agri-
culture, in various places: picking peaches in Veroia, apples in Agia
(Larisa), oranges in Argos, olives in Korinthos, watermelons, grapes,
tomatoes, peaches in several villages around Larisa. For six months
he was a gardener in a big hotel in Halkidiki. Currently he works
casually as a gardener and manual worker in Thermi.
Many of the barriers potentially imposed by the market, or by the lim-
ited knowledge migrants have about its geographies and its conditions,
as well as language barriers, are overcome in practice, not only by the
flexibility and the low cost of their labour, but also because they posses
a particular ‘advantage’ in terms of social capital. This refers to the
strength and density of their social networks, i.e. the informal ties and
interpersonal relationships that are naturally developed between indivi-
duals. In the case of immigrants, networks played an important role in
their decision about migration and determined their ‘journey’ and set-
tlement in Greece, as we have seen; when the question turns to their
labour-market integration, networks also function as an important
source of information about job opportunities in particular places, or
are of direct assistance in finding employment. Among the multiple
answers given by the respondents, at least half of them recognised that
their main way of finding work since they arrived in Greece has been
through the help of relatives, friends or acquaintances. Only 21.2 per
cent had previously found work through newspapers, and 16.2 per cent
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(exclusively men) mentioned the piazzas. Social networks appear to be
even more important among ethnic Greek migrants (79.7 per cent).
One third of the respondents said they had also found work ‘alone’ (i.e.
on their own initiative), but this answer has probably a limited explana-
tory value, since it fails to capture the function of networks as sources
of information. In that sense, the 40 per cent of women who said they
had found employment ‘alone’ may be hiding other strategies of job-
finding, especially newspaper advertisements and private agencies,
both appearing more significant for female respondents. But again, the
nature of many of the jobs migrant women do, especially those work-
ing as domestic servants, cleaners and carers, is more individualistic
and does not allow for much socialisation at work. By contrast, men in
construction, for example, might be asked by their employers to tell
their friends that there is a need for workers.
The in-depth interviews highlight better the crucial role of social net-
works, because, going into more detail, they help to clarify such obscu-
rities. For instance, even those interviewees who complained about the
lack of solidarity and support among their compatriots acknowledged
the fact that, between relatives and friends at least, information ex-
change about job opportunities can be a help in smoothing individuals’
pathways into the labour market. Social networks provide a guarantee
for securing access to employment, especially for those who have been
in Greece for longer periods and who also have contacts with locals.
Some relevant quotes from the interviews:
My acquaintances helped me … when I came to Greece I knew
some people here that helped me very much in order to find
this [ first] job. (Soultana).
Mostly through friends, Greeks … ‘Andreas, come here, there is
work,’ … ‘How much?’ … and I work. (Andreas).
Since I was working there, I could ask the boss ‘I have a friend,
he’s a nice guy, can he also work here?’ So my friend would start
working, then he might bring two, three, four, or more friends
of his, to work there too. (Lazaros)
Well … everything I did, I did it on my own, myself and my hus-
band. We didn’t have any great help, except the help my cousin
offered us in the beginning, as I told you. And, OK, my husband
found employment through an Albanian … Me too, at the fac-
tory where I worked for one or two days per week, where there
was necessity. [I found this] through some Albanian women.
(Valbona)
Well, usually it happens between friends, Albanians, who help
each other … For instance, the boss at work says, ‘Bring me
152 MIGRATION IN CONTEMPORARY GREECE
more people,’ and he’s going to tell some relatives first … then
friends. (Flora)
Brother, cousin, friend, somebody we know from the village [in
Albania], anybody we can help, we do. For example, I don’t work,
my brother-in-law does, or he knows about some jobs for me,
that’s the way we help each other. (Gjion)
On these grounds, long-term and/or structural unemployment has not
been the case so far. However, during their period in Greece and in be-
tween different occupations, many migrants have experienced shorter
or longer periods of unemployment. Almost half of the respondents
have found themselves unemployed for periods longer than one
month. Almost exclusively, such an experience can be described by
what economists call ‘natural’, rather than ‘structural’, unemployment.
For men, that would usually mean a temporary lack of work availabil-
ity, particularly between two jobs (when fired, or abandoning a post to
look for something better), or because of a move to another place in
Greece. In a few cases, unemployment came as a result of coming back
to Greece after a short return to the home country. For women it was
also connected to the female life course, birth and maternity, involving
a necessary absence from employment during the pre- and post-natal
period, and the difficulty of finding work immediately after taking the
decision to return to the labour market. For a limited number of people
of both sexes, there were periods of ‘voluntary’ or ‘strategic’ unemploy-
ment in order to find a job according to their qualifications or simply
offering more in terms of pay and security than their previous one. Fi-
nally, some respondents mentioned problems finding employment at
an initial stage, when they first entered the country, connecting their
experience to their limited knowledge of the language and local condi-
tions:
At the beginning, I didn’t have a job, I didn’t know the language,
nothing … for about two months … Then I worked at a firm pro-
ducing slippers, I worked for twenty months there. Then… that
was in 1998 … there was a problem with our papers, the factory
shut down and I found myself unemployed again. (Pandelis)
Between the two jobs, there was about one year of unemploy-
ment … I was looking for something better, I couldn’t find any-
thing, until I found this one. (Ani)
We left there [Kastoria] and we came to Thessaloniki. And then
I found a job here … but I spent about a month and a half un-
employed. (Liliana)
There was a period I was looking for a job and could not get
any. I don’t remember now for how long. That was after my
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daughter was born… because I had to stay with her when she
was a baby … But then I started looking for a job … I was look-
ing in the yellow pages. I was looking for a job in an office, or a
saleswoman, this kind of job, and I couldn’t find any until I
found this one. (Dalina)
6.2.2 ‘I’m not afraid of hard work’: ‘de-skilling’ and work as a ‘value’
Generally, however, immigrants in Greece have not faced serious diffi-
culties of access to the labour market. What seems to be the norm for
the overwhelming majority is concentration in specific sectors of the
economy, at the margins of the formal labour market, in badly paid
manual jobs of a deeply ‘servile’ character, for which indigenous labour
supply is insufficient and which would not be done in the absence of
foreign labour. But while this might be true for migrant job-seekers
who go for unskilled or low-skilled positions, it does not seem to be
the case for migrants who look for more qualified posts in sectors
where competition is sharper, even among Greeks. We have seen that
employment in non-manual skilled jobs is the case for just one tenth
of the respondents, while only one quarter work as skilled manual
workers, technicians and craftsmen. These figures contrast sharply
with the educational and professional background of the migrants: in-
deed, a significant number of the respondents are specialised or quali-
fied. As shown in Chapter 4, the shares of those with a university or
technical/professional education reach 27.9 and 29.3 per cent respec-
tively. Also, keeping in mind the high percentage of people without
previous work experience in their home countries (23.8 per cent, ex-
cluding missing cases), about two thirds of the respondents who used
to work were occupied in skilled positions: one fifth in skilled manual
jobs or posts involving certain skills and responsibilities (drivers,
nurses, policemen), and more than 40 per cent in white-collar employ-
ment or as teachers, scientists and professionals.
Migrants are thus ‘forced’ to do the jobs available in Greece, despite
their educational qualifications and professional experience. In that
sense, it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that migration in-
volves a significant devaluation of the individuals’ employment profile
and occupational status. It has a deep ‘de-skilling’ effect, since what
used to be a rich educational capital in the countries of origin becomes
almost useless and obsolete in the Greek labour market, where the
high demand for foreign labour is for the bottom-end jobs in the em-
ployment pyramid. In that respect, the experience of migration can be
seen as downward social mobility at the individuals’ level12, as shown
in the following examples:
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– Dimitris, 39: Accountant in Korc¸e¨, construction worker in Thessalo-
niki.
– Spyros, 36: primary school teacher and part-time journalist in Sar-
ande¨, assistant in a bakery in Thessaloniki.
– Valbona, 30: primary school teacher in Burrell, now works in a
clothing factory on the outskirts of Thessaloniki.
– Gjion, 35: policeman in Mirdita, construction worker in Thessaloni-
ki.
– Mimoza, 39: office secretary in Tirana, occasionally cleaning houses
and shops in Thessaloniki.
– Lioupa, 54: Nursery teacher in Petric, live-in carer of an old man in
Thessaloniki.
– Kostas, 52: Former army officer in Plovdiv, retired, now a casual
manual worker in Thessaloniki.
How can a skilled worker or a qualified person move towards low-sta-
tus, low-skilled occupations? In some cases, this appears to be partly a
result of linguistic or cultural obstacles, or due to ‘outdated’ qualifica-
tions:
– Soultana, 36, worked as a secretary at Karlovo: Initially, it was difficult
for me, because I couldn’t speak the language very well … of course,
I couldn’t practice the profession I was doing in Bulgaria …
– Panoraia, 36, was an accountant in Gjirokaster: Well, in Albania we
didn’t use computers at work … So if some day I decide to work as
an accountant I’ll have to learn computers first …
The language factor obviously plays an important role: while more than
one third (36.3 per cent) of the sample speaks Greek perfectly, as al-
ready mentioned, less than 10 per cent write fluently as well. For uni-
versity graduates, there is also an ‘institutional’ factor concerning the
highly bureaucratic procedures for the recognition of foreign degrees.
The process also involves written examinations in certain subjects,
making things even more difficult because of the language barrier
(although the process itself is the same for all, including Greeks who
study abroad). And certainly, there are the problems arising from the
uncertain legal status of immigrants in Greece, as we have seen. Such
problems are highlighted in the following interview extracts:
I work … as a mechanical engineer … But my boss cannot regis-
ter me as an engineer, since my diploma is not yet recognised
here … which is impossible to do, as far as I know … The system
with the Green Cards is not stable yet, it changes every year …
since the Green Card is not sorted out yet, which is the most ba-
sic thing … you can’t go further, take exams, anything … So, I
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work in my profession, but I am not registered as an engineer.
(Nadi, studied engineering and practiced his profession before
emigrating.)
I thought about that [working in his profession] in the begin-
ning, but it was quite difficult to get a job here, I had to take
some exams. It was difficult. (Emil, studied economics and sta-
tistics in Albania and now runs a kiosk in Thessaloniki.)
I finished my degree and I waited for three years to get the ID
card for Northern Epirotes. I had already applied to DIKATSA
[the centre for the recognition of foreign degrees] and I had to
be examined in four courses. I was registered at the university,
and I got the books and I started studying. Once I went to the
university for information, and I was asked where I came from.
Then I was told that the examinations were very difficult even
for native Greeks. It would be more difficult for me since Greek
is not my mother tongue. Also, I’d been out of school for some
years. I didn’t have much time because I was working. So finally
I gave up. (Kaiti, biology graduate, works as a childminder and
domestic worker.)
But these factors seem inadequate to fully explain the phenomenon. Is
it really a direct outcome of the migrants’ educational capital and
knowledge of the Greek language that they tend to work in low-skilled
manual jobs? It would be quite naive to overestimate such parameters
at the expense of the structural conditions that seem far more impor-
tant for understanding the patterns of immigrants’ insertion in the
Greek labour market. Throughout this chapter, it has been made evi-
dent that the demand for immigrant labour in Greece is precisely for
the low-skilled manual and servile posts where most of the respon-
dents work. When immigrants seek to get out of the space ‘reserved’
for them in the labour market, they face difficulties of access, structur-
al and institutional obstacles, discrimination and sometimes complete
exclusion. Especially for migrants who have a university education, in-
stitutional barriers together with linguistic difficulties make things
even harder. Working in the public sector is not an option, partially
due to recruitment procedures but mostly to the legal framework that
excludes non-Greek/non-EU nationals from public-sector employ-
ment13. And many of those employed in ‘personal services’, especially
men, as we have seen, are in most cases manual workers or assistants.
So the proportion of migrants who do non-manual work in skilled
posts in ‘mainstream’ economic sectors is even lower. Thus, the step to-
wards better positions is not an easy one, particularly for qualified mi-
grants.
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But, apart from the highly qualified positions, this is also true for
certain specialisations for which competition is sharp in the local econ-
omy. Such is the example of Edri, an Albanian interviewee who, being
a medical school graduate from Tirana University, was employed in
Greece as a private nurse, a profession which she abandoned after de-
ciding that she wanted a change in her career. She re-trained in a pri-
vate professional institute in Thessaloniki and became a hairdresser,
but when she tried to look for a job she faced only closed doors: ‘There
is too much supply, and I know that I am the last one because I am a
foreigner.’
Kaiti’s experience was similar. A biology graduate from Korc¸e¨ who
speaks four languages, Kaiti currently works as a childminder and do-
mestic helper:
I tried to learn computers and languages to work as a secretary
… I have taken computer courses … But I have not found a job
as a secretary. I have told our friends, our relatives, but up to
now nothing. I am still on a waiting list.
So the question posed earlier should be put in a different form: why do
qualified migrants accept this type of work? The answer then looks sim-
pler: the economic conditions in the home countries, which have been
at the root of people’s decision to emigrate, and the family or personal
needs generated by the transition to a market economy push people to
‘throw away’ – at least for a certain period – what can be characterised
as acceptable standards of dignified employment. Hence, they accept
any job in order to survive or to support their family back home, by sa-
crificing the present to gain a future life of dignity. As it emerges in
the qualitative material, work seems to have become an important va-
lue for immigrants, an indicator of their virtue and dignity and a path
to well-being, something that ‘you shouldn’t be ashamed of’. This prob-
ably explains the relatively low percentage (28.3 per cent) of the respon-
dents who said they were not satisfied with the working conditions
they met in Greece. Hard work is connected to both the condition of
the migrant, and his/her status as a foreign (non-EU) national in
Greece, described in legal documents and in policy discourse by the
term ‘alien’. In answer to my question ‘What does it mean for you to
be an Albanian in Greece?’, Ferin, 22, from Albania, replied: ‘Well, an
FalienF as you say here, somebody who works for the [minimum] dai-
ly wage.’ This phrase reflects both the dominant idea about the posi-
tion of immigrants in Greece and their own perception of this idea: the
immigrant as a worker. Obviously, this relates to the propensity of mi-
grants to accept any job; but it also shapes, partly at least, their identity,
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as well as the way Greeks ‘see’ them. Similar views were highlighted
by many interviewees:
My only thought was to start working, to get paid what my boss
would pay me. (Pandelis)
I’ve worked as a construction worker since the beginning. It’s a
heavy job, as you know. It was difficult for me, because I had
never performed any job of this kind, but I needed to work and
I wanted to live in Greece … that’s why I don’t mind working in
any job. (Dimitris)
Any job, I can do it, tiles, painting, everything … I’m not afraid
of hard work … (Andreas)
We foreigners, when we came here we came for work … any
work. We did heavy jobs here, jobs that Greeks don’t do at all.
All of us, I’m not talking only about the Bulgarians [but about],
all foreigners. (Lioupa)
Such narratives reflect the very nature of Albanian and Bulgarian emi-
gration: economic necessity and the need to work and secure an in-
come were the main reasons for leaving the home countries in the first
place; hard work is thus a necessity for migrants in order to survive
and realise their plans. But hard work might affect their daily lives in
very precise ways, if we pay closer attention to individual experiences.
The interview quotes below are only moderate examples of the pro-
blems emerging as a result of hard work, for instance in the migrants’
family lives and regarding personal health14:
Ivan, 35, now a driver for a transportation company, speaks about
his experience of health problems at work: Then I started having
health problems. Lifting lots of heavy things in and out of the
refrigerators … my hands started giving me pain … and I
decided to stop, so as not to sacrifice my health.
Lazaros, 40, now a delivery boy for Pizza Hut, recalls the problems
during the period he and his wife spent working as shop-keepers: We
worked there for a period. Too many hours, my kids could not
see me. I was leaving in the morning and coming back in the
evening. And we finally reached a point when the kid asked
‘Who is he?’ … He was not seeing his father at all. And we said
enough, it’s better be in a more difficult economic situation than
destroy our family.
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6.3 Stories of exploitation and stories of success
The aim of this section, as already indicated, is to compare and con-
trast the immigrants’ employment characteristics described earlier in
the chapter, with the situation they faced initially. A relative improve-
ment of their position is generally evident, including some particularly
‘successful’ trajectories, pointing to a process of upward socio-economic
mobility overall. Yet, this finding should not divert our attention far
from other essential features of migrant labour in Greece, its exploita-
tion being certainly one, especially during the first years, but still the
case for many.
6.3.1 Initial conditions: various forms of exploitation
Initial conditions were harsh for the vast majority of the respondents.
Living under clandestine status and with little money in their pocket,
with limited knowledge of Greek and needing to survive, most mi-
grants felt vulnerable, afraid and insecure, so that they were forced to
accept the situation they were faced with. Employment was not scarce,
but it would offer little in terms of payment, it would be very demand-
ing, and it was not a matter of choice. Employment arrangements were
temporary or seasonal; in many cases, migrants used to work for a few
days here, a few days there, changing frequently not only employers,
but also tasks and types of work. Job-finding was based on word-of-
mouth strategies of information exchange between relatives, friends, or
simple acquaintances from the same place of origin. However, it often
involved days of wandering around, or hours of waiting at piazzas.
Many of the interviewees recalled these first years by referring to their
need for pure survival, to their extremely low wages, and to their lack
of previous experience of the work they were asked to do:
I found this small workshop … the boss understood I was Alba-
nian. She invited me inside, she started speaking to me, but I
didn’t understand anything that she was saying … I started work-
ing there. She offered me the job, and I was living with her par-
ents, her father and mother. They had a little house. I stayed
there for a year and a half. I worked at their daughter’s small
business. She was paying me very little money, 1,000 drachmas
[3 euros] per day … and I used to work for twelve hours, sixteen
hours sometimes. (Maria)
Well, at the beginning I worked … in a small factory. I was sew-
ing, at the machine … I didn’t know [the job] … [It] was paying
me very poor money … for me, it was fine, because in Albania I
wouldn’t earn any money, so it was fine … I was working for
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twelve hours and earning 3,000 drachmas [9 euros], very little
money … without social security stamps, without anything … I
worked there for a year and a half … and at the end, they owed
me 100,000 drachmas [300 euros] … Finally I got it, with a lot
of difficulties. I was lucky … Then I quit that job. (Lela)
The beginning was … very difficult, with the language especially
… In the beginning, I worked at a butcher’s, I was cleaning the
place. Later, I got the knife in my hands. I was also carrying the
meat, I was cutting it, everything. (Lazaros)
In Veria I used to work at a small clothing firm … When we first
came, it was much less. To tell you the truth, in the workshop I
was getting paid 2,000 drachmas [6 euros], from the morning
until three in the afternoon. But I didn’t know anything, I was ti-
dying up, I was cutting thread, such things, until I learned …
and then it reached 3,000 drachmas [9 euros] … after five years
I was almost like a technician, because I was working with all
the machines. (Flora)
I went to Crete, I lived there for seven months. I worked in sev-
eral jobs. I didn’t know you see, I was used to living in a town, I
didn’t know what a hoe was … I’ve learned to work with that,
this is the kind of job I did in Crete … [In Albania] I used to
work in a factory … In Crete I worked in the fields … I was cut-
ting grass, clearing the fields. Fields, mud, I used to pick olives
too. (Nicolas)
For four years, I was cleaning houses, staircases, and I was iron-
ing … The salary was, and still is, ridiculous. For a job I had in
Panorama, six days a week, Monday to Saturday, from 8 a.m. to
4 p.m., after one year [of work] I was receiving 100,000 drach-
mas [300 euros] per month, about 3,800 drachmas [11 euros]
per day. (Kaiti)
Accounts like these confirm the flexibility of migrant labour and clearly
indicate its high degree of exploitation by Greek employers. In the rele-
vant section of the questionnaire, more than half of the respondents
themselves acknowledged that they had received poor treatment by em-
ployers, in terms of low payment, long working days, no social security,
etc. The in-depth interviews confirmed this situation with many exam-
ples of the migrants’ experiences:
This is something I don’t like here … if they could [the em-
ployers], they would take your soul … it’s just not fair to work
that much and get paid only 5,000 drachmas [15 euros] a day.
(Maria)
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The employer wants to make profit out of you, that’s why he
employs you, because he doesn’t pay for your social security
stamps. That’s how it is. I know … people who have worked,
let’s say, five years for the same employer … and when they start
asking for social security stamps, they are fired. They [employ-
ers] fire them and threaten that they are going to call the police
if they complain … They want to make profit out of us, that’s for
sure. There is exploitation. (Dalina)
We could make 20-30,000 drachmas [60-90 euros] per day, but
I would get only 5,000 drachmas [15 euros] and I would leave
home at 9 a.m. and return at 9 p.m. Once, we made a deal,
75,000 drachmas [225 euros] for a week, I would do the whole
electricity installation in a week. I finally got only 25,000 drach-
mas [75 euros] for this, the maximum I could get was 30,000
[90 euros]. The materials didn’t cost that much, I was buying
them myself, I knew the prices. The guy would make 400,000
drachmas [1,200 euros] out of it and I would get only 25,000
drachmas [90 euros] … Come on, I’m not a jerk, this is called
exploitation. (Lazaros)
Employers have profited greatly from the migrants’ desperate need to
work. For the majority, exploitation has been expressed in many hours
of work a day, lack of insurance and poor wages; however, it used to be
particularly intense and far more common during their first years in
Greece, also as an outcome of their weak bargaining position15. This
was certainly connected to their clandestine status, but it can also be at-
tributed to their poor level of spoken Greek, their limited knowledge of
the conditions in the host country, and their urgent need to work to
survive and to support their families. There are stories of semi-slavery
conditions, with employers not paying migrant workers and threaten-
ing to inform the police about their clandestine status. As Emil, one of
the interviewees reported, ‘There are people who work at construction
sites or in the fields and they don’t get paid.’ The cases below are iden-
tical:
My nephew who came here with his family … they worked in a
village. The boss would give them food everyday … but he never
gave them money for those six months … He finally gave them
a cheque, he said: ‘Go to Thessaloniki and get the money.’ They
came here to Thessaloniki, to me, but we went to the bank, and
he had no money in the bank. (Lioupa)
In all the shops he had [his previous boss], I did the electricity
installation myself … In my next life they may pay me … so far,
they haven’t … Because we knew him, he could exploit us … He
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was like ‘We are all one single family, guys, I’ll pay you when I
can.’ (Lazaros)
Exploitation towards women has also taken the form of sexual harass-
ment by (male) employers. Such experiences appear to have been lim-
ited among the female participants in my own survey; nevertheless the
experience is indeed cruel and, apart from leaving traumatic memories
and bitterness for those who face it, it creates additional problems to
female migrants’ employment. As we have seen in the previous chap-
ter, such attitudes come out of particular expressions of racism related
to feelings of superiority towards immigrants and an imaginary con-
nection of foreign women, especially Eastern Europeans, to prostitu-
tion. Lela, an Albanian interviewee who had such an experience at the
workplace, decided to leave her job in order to escape. A young Bulgar-
ian woman, one of the unemployed respondents, was so disappointed
by continuously encountering such incidents at several bars she had
worked in, that she lost the will to look for a job, and was facing ser-
ious financial problems at the time of the interview. The story of Maria,
from Bulgaria, might give a more precise idea of the issue:
Once I found this job at Hortiatis, five or six years ago, in a ta-
verna … The guy told me, ‘I had a Bulgarian woman working
here before, we had a relationship.’ Well, I was supposed to
work there Fridays, Saturdays and Sundays, and because it’s
quite far, we had agreed that he would drive me up to Panora-
ma, from where I could get a bus. So, one night he told me:
‘You’ll stay here to sleep.’ I asked, ‘Where can I sleep?’ I was
thinking he meant there, in the taverna. But he said: ‘At home
… my wife is not in.’ … When I complained … he started shout-
ing at me … ‘Who are you, you dirty Bulgarian!’
6.3.2 Integration dynamics: the issue of socio-economic mobility
In general, however, things seem to get better over time. It is clear
from the material presented so far that there are significant changes in
the types of jobs and in the level of remuneration of immigrants in the
city. Many of the questionnaire respondents and most of the partici-
pants in the in-depth interviews have experienced a gradual improve-
ment of their position in the labour market, and their wages have risen
– even in real terms – since their arrival. The rather humiliating initial
conditions are not the case any more for the people interviewed. There
is strong evidence of many successful employment trajectories, as the
following examples clearly indicate:
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– Male Albanian, 29, single, came from Bulqiza in 1994: 1. seasonal
agricultural worker ® 2. casual manual worker ® 3. builder ® 4.
technical assistant in a hotel ® 5. plumber in a company.
– Female Albanian, 31, married, one child, came from Tirana in 1992: 1.
cleaning staircases ® 2. cleaning storerooms ® 3. cleaning a work-
shop and a coffee shop ® 4. domestic service ® 5. assistant to a
craftsman making ceramics for tourists ® 6. baby-sitter ® 7. NGO
secretary.
– Female Bulgarian, 35, married, one child, came from Samokov in 1991:
1. agricultural worker, picking tomatoes ® 2. brick-layer ® 3. do-
mestic worker ® 4. kitchen assistant and cleaner in a restaurant ®
5. owner of a taverna (renting the business from her previous boss).
– Male Bulgarian, 29, single, came from Sliven in 1996: 1. worker in a
metal workshop ® 2. plumber in a company ® 3. live-in manual
worker (house-maintenance/repair, gardening) together with girl-
friend ® 4. worker in an aluminium-processing workshop ® 5.
construction worker ® 6. driver and foreman in a large construc-
tion company.
Many interviewees expressed satisfaction about their progress in the
Greek labour market. A gradual improvement in conditions seems to
compensate for (although never justifying) the years of hardship. Hard
work in that sense has not been for nothing: as the years pass by, con-
ditions get better, certainly due to regularisation, but also because of so-
cial security, language fluency, more effective networks and relation-
ships with Greeks, or a combination of all these factors. Some com-
ments by the interviewees themselves:
– Kostas, 24, from Albania, came in 1997: In the beginning, when I
couldn’t even speak, I could only understand a few things. I was
getting [paid] 80,000 drachmas [240 euros] per month … without
social security … Now, gradually … it has risen and I reached 580
euros per month, or 180,000 drachmas, with social security.
– Nadi, 37, from Albania, came in 1992: Before the legalisation law
came out, before the migrants could register with IKA and get so-
cial security stamps, there was a huge difference in wages. Now,
after all these years … this difference has been reduced, because
now they pay the immigrants the same as the Greeks. There is a
slight difference, there always is, but it’s not as big as it was back
then. In the beginning we were getting paid 3,000 drachmas [9
euros] and a Greek doing the same job was getting 6,000 [18
euros]. Now the difference is very small, how can I tell you, 1,000
drachmas [3 euros].
– Ferin, 22, from Albania, came in 1993: When I came, I couldn’t com-
municate with people here … I used to work in the fields, in gar-
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dens and such things. After that I worked with a foreman at con-
struction sites, then I left. For two and a half years now I’ve worked
in a metal workshop. I’ve learned many jobs here … in the begin-
ning my wage was 3,500 drachmas [10.5 euros per day] … not eight
hours, just the whole day. Now it’s fine, I work eight hours, I’m get-
ting paid 10,000 drachmas [about 30 euros], plus the social security
stamps.
– Soultana, 36, from Bulgaria, came in 1991: In the beginning, I used
to work in a small clothing business … I was assistant to the head
of the department. After that, because the visa was for two months
… I had to come and go all the time, in order to be able to go on …
After this factory, where I worked for a couple of months, I went
back to Bulgaria, and then I came here again and started working
in a shop selling furs, downtown. I worked there for a period as a
saleswoman, because I knew the languages, Bulgarian, Russian,
Serbian, etc. I was dealing with customers from these countries.
After that … I met my husband … who owns a [ jewellery] store, and
I started working in his store.
Sometimes, what has been previously described as a devaluation of the
individuals’ human capital, imposed by necessity and by conditions
that force migrants to accept any low-skilled post, is succeeded, after a
period, by a reverse process of re-skilling, although in a different field.
Immigrants who stay in the same trade tend to specialise and become
skilled workers. This is true in the case of construction workers, who
start by doing general manual tasks, often on a casual basis, but later
acquire certain skills related to their profession and improve their con-
dition in terms of responsibilities and payment:
Now, I am a construction worker, a skilled worker, a builder. I’ve
learned the job here. At the beginning, I was only helping, but I
had to learn the job … I had to get some more money. (Gjion)
In some cases, as we have seen, such an experience may lead to self-
employment or entrepreneurship in small construction projects and
house-repair work. Similarly, qualified migrants gradually make their
way towards more responsibilities and duties that correspond more clo-
sely to their academic and professional experience, even if the institu-
tional problems remain, putting obstacles in the way of a higher status
and wage:
Since 1992, when I came, I have been working in the same fac-
tory. I started there, I’m still there … I don’t do the same job …
my duties have changed … In the beginning … I was doing very
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heavy jobs, then, gradually, I started working at the machines.
Now I work … as a mechanical engineer … But my boss cannot
register me as an engineer, since my diploma is not yet recog-
nised here. (Nadi)
Finally, there is a minority of highly educated people who have mana-
ged, over time, to work in their profession or find some other solution
for building a career. Such is the case of Pyrros, 63, of ethnic Greek ori-
gin, who holds a Ph.D. and has worked as a researcher in architecture
and as a preserver-restorer of Byzantine/post-Byzantine monuments,
churches and traditional houses (an occupation that cost him internal
displacement in the years of Enver Hoxha’s dictatorship in Albania).
After a period spent working on construction sites, he met colleagues
in Greece who acknowledged his work, and he finally managed to be-
come a partner in an architectural office undertaking projects for
monument restoration. Another example can be drawn out of Stavros’
experience: of ethnic Greek origin as well, 44 years old at the time of
the interview, he worked at the National Library of Albania in Gjiroka-
ster. His migratory route, although exceptional, epitomises in a sense
the pathways of many immigrants in the Greek labour market: he has
done numerous different jobs, in various places, and he managed to
continue with his studies and to build a successful entrepreneurial ca-
reer. He told me:
Up to now I have had twenty-nine professions. First of all, I
worked in a pizza house, then as a waiter, as a construction
worker, as a cleaner, twenty-nine different jobs … In 1998, I
used to work in a cafe´ … as a waiter. But the business shut down
… and I had to look for another job. I already had a postgraduate
degree, and then I realised that I should use … all my qualifica-
tions. So, I started doing a Ph.D., and in parallel, I … thought of
starting a translation business, which today covers all Balkan
languages … Recently I’ve worked on several university projects
as a tutor … until last year I used to teach – that was part of a
project run by the University of Athens, reception classes for Al-
banophones. And I also teach Albanian at the School of Balkan
Languages at the Institute of Studies of the Aemos Peninsula
(IMXA) … [Now] I am the owner of this service [a translation of-
fice, with five employees and some external collaborators].
Obviously such examples are rather isolated cases; but, coupled with
the other positive experiences of many, they confirm the process of up-
ward occupational mobility, which is sometimes equivalent to an up-
grade of the socio-economic conditions of individuals and households.
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Apart from an improvement of the migrants’ material position in the
labour market, one should also consider the more general amelioration
of factors not directly related to the market that are however crucial in
order to understand the patterns of integration over time. Thus, it is
not only mobility towards better posts, payment and working condi-
tions that time brings, but also better relationships with employers and
colleagues, as well as satisfaction and fulfilment from work.
With my colleagues I have nice relationships … well, not with
everybody, but generally, it’s nice. I mean, I am satisfied, in
comparison to other workshops [I have worked in]. This is the
first one, the only one, I can tell, where I feel comfortable, and I
can talk more. (Valbona)
In the beginning … I was simply a labourer, like everybody. They
used to treat you in a quite different way, but now, as time
passes, when they get to know you, especially when you work
with the same people … they’ve started understanding who I
am. (Milen)
My boss is a very good man, and the working conditions are
good, and I’m doing a job that I like. This is basic, to do the job
that you like … Until recently, I was doing a job that, well, I
didn’t like, but I needed to work in order to survive. (Ani)
Nevertheless, this does not mean to say that migrants always overcome
the obstacles put by the legal framework and the labour market, or that
they do not face exclusion, discrimination and exploitation in several
forms and at various levels. Neither do such examples of upward em-
ployment trajectories imply any idealising stereotype of the ‘successful
immigrant’. But assuming that immigrants in Greece are eternally des-
tined to perform the same types of jobs in the same exploitative condi-
tions is equally misleading, and ‘victimises’ the migrants’ experience.
The phenomenon of socio-economic mobility rather reflects the fact
that immigrants form a dynamic section of the labour force and also
recognises an important temporal factor in their labour-market integra-
tion. At the individual level, the migratory route might lead to an im-
provement of the migrant’s condition over time, even if this is not ne-
cessarily accompanied by a shift towards ‘decent’ employment within
mainstream sectors of the economy. This is clearly evident in the inter-
viewees’ narratives, as shown above, but it is also supported by statisti-
cal evidence from the sample as a whole. The following tables show
that, for individual migrants, things might get better over time.
I have applied chi-square tests and correlations between the mi-
grants’ period of residence in Greece and a number of variables related
to their labour-market integration. In Table 6.4a, chi-square values are
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statistically significant, indicating thus some sort of relationship be-
tween the period migrants have spent in Greece and the nature of their
occupation (in terms of skills), their position, and the likelihood of
them being insured. Chi squares do not tell us much about the nature
and strength of the relationship, but the figures in the table clearly in-
dicate that migrants who have long been in the country are more likely
to do skilled and white-collar work, to be self-employed or entrepre-
neurs, and to have social security. In addition, the correlations confirm
significant, although not particularly strong, statistical relationships be-
tween the number of years migrants have lived in Greece, the period
they have been working in the post held at the time of the interview,
and the level of their daily wage. In other words, what Table 6.4b actu-
ally shows is that migrants who have been in Greece longer tend to
have more stable jobs and earn slightly higher wages, while the longer
a migrant has been working in a single post, the better payment s/he
receives. Interestingly, this is confirmed by other studies (e.g. Labriani-
dis & Lyberaki 2001). The survey of Hatziprokopiou et al. (2001),
which was addressed to employers, found that immigrants’ daily wages
in Thessaloniki grew by 68 per cent between 1990-1998 (more than in
any other place); in 1998, employers paid on average 22.1 euros (high-
er than in the rest of the country apart from Athens).
Table 6.4a Evidence of upward socio-economic mobility: Cross tabulations and chi-
squares
Years in Greece Nature of Post (skills) Position Social Security
minimum skilled
manual
white
collar*
employers** self-
employed
waged yes no
up to 2 13 10 2 – 2 23 12 16
3-4 29 13 2 1 3 40 24 23
5-8 45 13 2 – 7 53 39 22
9+ 38 15 16 10 13 46 53 19
Total 125 51 22 11 25 162 128 80
Pearson's 2 value Df Sig. 2 value Df Sig. 2 value Df Sig.
chi-squares 19.87886 6 0.00291 22.25803 6 0.001087 10.88893 3 0.012342
* Including professionals and entrepreneurs. ** Including assistants in family businesses
Table 6.4b Evidence of upward socio-economic mobility: Correlations
Months in Current Job Daily Wage
years in Greece (N=158)
Pearson Correlation (R=) 0.409 0.267
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.001
months in current job (N=125)
Pearson Correlation (R=) 0.437
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000
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Obviously, ‘time’ as such, i.e. the period migrants have lived in
Greece, is not an explanatory variable per se. It rather reflects the influ-
ence of other factors that develop over time, and which are crucial for
migrants’ well-being and pathways to incorporation. The acquisition of
legal status is certainly one of them, as we have already seen. With le-
gal documents in their hands, migrants feel secure, and they are more
likely to move towards registered employment, escaping the highly ex-
ploitative conditions of the informal sector. Higher wages are then pos-
sible, while migrants may also move towards better jobs that suit their
home-country qualifications or the skills they have learned in Greece.
The interaction between migrants and locals and the new relationships
and social networks formed locally may function as effective social ca-
pital, given the crucial, although informal, role of acquaintances and
‘mediators’ in the Greek labour market. In addition, the enrichment of
the human-capital potential of individual migrants may also lead to up-
ward social/occupational mobility; for example, as a result of the use of
working skills acquired in the host country, or simply due to greater
language competency over the years.
Regarding the latter, fieldwork findings allow an assessment of the
effect of language skills on immigrants’ position in the labour market.
As shown in Table 6.5, fluent Greek speakers are more likely to work
in services, in white-collar and highly skilled positions, with daily
wages exceeding 30 euros and with social security.
To conclude, the temporal perspective on Albanians’ and Bulgarians’
incorporation into Greek society is clearly very important, despite the
short span of time that has elapsed since these post-1989 migrations
Table 6.5 Language fluency as an asset in the labour market (%)
Level of Spoken Greek Pearson's Chi-Squares
sector beginner intermediate fluent
construction 28.6 16.3 13.7 Value 19.0
personal services 33.3 32.7 13.7 df 6.0
manufacturing 23.8 16.3 15.1 Sig. (2-sided) 0.004
trade & other services 14.3 34.6 57.5
skill level
minimum skills 71.4 68.3 53.4 Value 11.1
skilled manual 23.8 26.0 26.0 df 4.0
white collar & highly skilled 4.8 5.8 20.5 Sig. (2-sided) 0.026
wage scale (euros)
20 17.6 13.7 5.1 Value 19.1
20-29 58.8 60.0 35.6 df 4.0
30+ 23.5 26.3 59.3 Sig. (2-sided) 0.001
social security Value 6.7
yes 36.4 63.6 65.8 df 2.0
no 63.6 36.4 34.2 Sig. (2-sided) 0.0
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began. Too often, comparative analyses of migrants’ ‘performance’ –
either before and after migration, or comparisons of different migrant
groups (e.g. Iosifides & King 1998) – are based on cross-sectional
‘snapshots’ which miss out the dynamic element of continuous change
and (possibly) improvement. My evidence of Balkan immigrants’ trajec-
tories in Thessaloniki certainly vindicates the value of a dynamic time-
based approach. The impact of the two regularisations that had pre-
ceded my fieldwork has certainly been important and should be em-
phasised, since this development clearly highlights a turning point re-
garding the position of immigrants in Greece. But the role of other fac-
tors brought about over time, some of which have been mentioned in
the analysis above, should not be underestimated.
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7 Housing and socio-spatial integration
The story of migration unfolds in specific local communities; it is told
through people’s everyday lives, practices, experiences, relationships,
etc., which are attached to particular places. We have seen so far that
the conditions of immigrants’ incorporation are determined by the par-
ticular local environment where they settle: their labour-market integra-
tion depends on the structures of the local economy; the degree to
which they are generally accepted, or not, is related to local socio-cul-
tural peculiarities, to the form the public discourse on immigration
takes, and to the level of development of inclusive civil-society institu-
tions. But, for the migrants themselves, the locality where they settle
becomes their place. Therefore, the socio-spatial level of migrants’ inte-
gration is about their area of residence and housing conditions, i.e.
what is generally related to the private sphere of living; but it also refers
to their lives outside of home, at places of work or leisure, at spaces of
action and interaction amongst themselves and with the locals. In
other words, it has to do with both their socio-spatial conditions and the
way space is experienced and perceived. Apart from affecting the living
and working conditions of migrants, we will see in this chapter how
space also reflects broad socio-spatial mechanisms of exclusion and dis-
crimination, while, at the same time, it constitutes the terrain wherein
migrants build their lives.
7.1 Spatial distribution, housing conditions and residential
trajectories
7.1.1 Access to housing and residential conditions
The vast majority of the respondents (80.8 per cent) live in rented flats;
home ownership is the case for only 9.1 per cent. The remainder live
in accommodation provided by their employers, or are hosted tempora-
rily by relatives or friends. Among those who rent, 40.7 per cent pay
less than 200 euros per month; those paying more than 250 euros con-
stitute 29 per cent of the sample. Nearly 71 per cent of the respondents
live with their families, especially women (73.2 per cent), Albanians
(75.8 per cent) and ethnic Greeks (77.3 per cent). The rest live with
other relatives (12 per cent) or friends (13.5 per cent) and a small sec-
tion with their employers (3.6 per cent, mostly female live-in carers).
The percentage of immigrants who live in inappropriate/bad-quality ac-
commodation, such as basements and storerooms converted to flats, or
on the unpopular ground floors, exceeds one quarter of the sample1.
The majority though (about 45 per cent) occupy flats on the first and
second floors and nearly one in four lives on the upper floors (with
some of the wealthiest ones living in quite luxurious apartments in the
historical centre or by the seafront). There are 5 per cent who live in
houses, which perhaps mildly distorts the data since, for many, this re-
lates to old inner-city properties or inappropriate dwellings on the out-
skirts, rather than comfortable suburban middle-class residences. Prop-
erties with central heating are enjoyed by only 26.9 per cent, while
10.6 per cent had no heating at all; the majority uses oil/wood stoves
or, in a few cases, electric heaters. Regarding accommodation size,
most of the respondents (nearly 65 per cent) have less than one room
per person, while only 13 per cent have a living space of more than one
room per person. These details are summarised in Table 7.1 for the
sample as a whole.
There are some differences between the different subgroups of the
sample and according to certain characteristics of the respondents, i.e.
by nationality, ethnic origin, gender, family status, fluency in Greek,
education level, etc. However, no clear pattern can be observed apart
from a general tendency among some categories of migrants to enjoy
better housing conditions (Greek-Albanians, Bulgarians and women in
general, but also the highly educated and those speaking Greek flu-
ently, etc.), but this stands more as a fact rather than providing any di-
rect explanatory elements. One explanation could be that this informa-
tion concerns the household, not the individual, and thus depends on
household types and sizes. Other elements might also play a role: e.g.
Table 7.1 Immigrants’ housing conditions (%)
Period in Current Property (N=175) Housemates (N=192) Rent (N=145)
less than 6 months 29.6 family 70.8 50-150 17.9
6-11 months 12.6 other relatives 12.0 151-199 22.8
1-3 years 20.1 friends 13.5 200-249 30.3
3-5 years 17.0 employer 3.6 250+ 29.0
5 years or more 20.8
Size of Property (N=207) Floor/Type (N=170) Heating (N=208)
up to half room per person 32.9 inappropriate/ground 25.9 central heating 26.9
half to one room per person 31.9 1st 25.3 no heating 10.6
one room per person 22.2 2nd 19.4 oil/wood stove 62.5
more than one room per person 13.0 3rd & higher, house 29.4
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the presence of ‘elite’ migrants among Bulgarian respondents, different
migration strategies or even lifestyles. Rather, the quality of the mi-
grants’ housing conditions seems to depend on, and reflect, their posi-
tion in the labour market2.
Figure 7.1 illustrates immigrants’ residential distribution in the city
(see also Table 7.3 in Section 7.2.1). The majority (53 per cent) of the re-
spondents live in the municipality of Thessaloniki and another 30 per
cent in the rest of the conurbation; in total, 94 per cent live in the me-
tropolitan area3. Albanian immigrants appear to be spatially dispersed
all over the city, though more than half (60.2 per cent) are in the cen-
tral part (municipality), mostly in areas just outside the city centre, and
neighbourhoods to its north and east. The percentage of Bulgarians in
the municipality is lower (38.5 per cent). North-western districts, where
rents are relatively cheaper, are expectedly popular – one third of the
Albanians and 37.2 per cent of the Bulgarians live there. Migrants liv-
Figure 7.1 Areas of residence of Albanian and Bulgarian immigrants in Thessaloniki
Housing and socio-spatial integration 173
ing in the municipality, especially its central, northern and eastern
parts, and in the north-western districts of the Thessaloniki conurba-
tion, tend to occupy smaller properties, and higher shares of them rent
bad-quality accommodation in basements or on ground floors. On the
other hand, the presence of immigrants in ‘nice’ areas, mostly in the
south-east, where 12.5 per cent of all respondents live, is related to fac-
tors ranging from work availability to the role of social networks. This
confirms both their spatial diffusion and the mixed social geography of
the city. Ghetto-like situations, i.e. the concentration of large numbers
of immigrants in specific ‘downgraded’ neighbourhoods, displacing lo-
cals, have not been observed so far. The only notable concentration is
to be found among Bulgarian migrants: 22 per cent, almost exclusively
Sarakatsani, live in the wealthy suburban area of Thermi (in the south-
eastern part of the metropolitan area – see Figure 7.1); this case is gi-
ven special attention in Section 7.2.24. In general, despite a tendency
for the affluent classes to relocate to suburban areas, especially to the
east, the inner city remains popular for diverse categories of the popu-
lation, including many migrants, so we cannot speak about any mani-
festations of sharp segregation.
Although the findings do not imply a clear pattern of rent gradients
according to specific areas, they do show that the inner city tends to be
more expensive, with an average monthly rent of 225.6 euros (com-
pared to a total average rent of 209.2 euros for the sample as a whole).
But do the monthly rent immigrants can afford and the area where
they live correspond strictly to what they earn? The share of those earn-
ing more than 40 euros a day who live in central Thessaloniki is about
10 per cent lower than in the whole of the sample; half of the migrants
on this wage scale live in the (presumably poorer) north-west. On the
other hand, amongst the lowest wage category (people earning less
than 20 euros a day), we find many who live in the municipality (68
per cent), most in the overpopulated northern and eastern parts where
the houses are usually older. Furthermore, the average monthly rent
paid by migrants in the highest wage category (215 euros) does not
really exceed that paid by those in the lowest wage category (214.5
euros). This evidence suggests that the level of the rent might deter-
mine more the specific properties that migrants tend to occupy than
the location of the property itself. It also leads us to consider additional
factors that shape migrants’ choice of a property and an area to live in.
The detailed interviews uncover reasons such as the quality of homes,
the size and age of the properties, but also the location of the work-
place or children’s school, the number of household members that are
wage-earners, the presence of relatives or friends in the area, and so
forth.
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To an extent, the narratives of the interviewees mirror perceptions
and realities of urban social geography; for instance, in the way the bet-
ter educated and better off among the migrants feel a need to justify
their choice of a specific area:
Konstantina, a Greek-Albanian graduate in economics from the Uni-
versity of Thessaloniki, works for a financial (stock exchange) com-
pany: It is … only recently that I moved there. I’ve always lived
in the eastern part of the city. Now I live in Stavroupoli [western
Thessaloniki] … The apartment is nice, but the neighbourhood
is not … It has a lower level, which is apparent at the shops, in
the way the salesmen, the saleswomen behave … they treat you
as ‘an Albanian’.
Nikos, a highly educated ethnic Greek from Tirana, has worked as a
university lecturer and at the time of the interview ran a consultancy
and trade business: Well, I live in western Thessaloniki, but this
was my choice. I have also bought a flat in the centre, but I live
there, at Diavata. I chose it because it’s not overpopulated, the
building is new … and I know the area, because my [ first] job
was close … and we got used to it. Anyway, I see it as a tempor-
ary residence. We rent it, we haven’t decided yet where we will
live after my daughter finishes her school, but we are definitely
going to move then.
The second of these quotes suggests that knowledge of a neighbour-
hood, convenient distance from the workplace, or the location of the
children’s school might also be important factors that migrants take
into account when looking for a property. Closer attention to some de-
tails in the interviewees’ stories reveals further elements that play a role
in the decision of individuals which are rather common for all immi-
grants. Kinship ties, for instance, keep people together. The quality and
size of a particular property suitable for family needs sometimes com-
pensates for a higher rent and makes people indifferent to a specific
area in favour of the conditions of the property itself. The interview
quotes below highlight some of these factors:
I’ve lived in Stavroupoli for a year or so … I went there because
my daughter lives there, and she has two children and we go to
help. (Andreas)
I’ve lived there for two years. Now, why I did choose this prop-
erty? Well, the building is relatively old, I can tell, but the apart-
ment is nice, it is big. When I was looking for accommodation,
I had been searching for four months, on a daily basis. All the
apartments were very expensive, while they were quite old, badly
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constructed, etc … I liked this one very much, it was big, comfor-
table. (Valbona)
The rent is a bit expensive, but what can we do? It is expensive,
and every year, as he [the owner] told us, it’s going to be more
expensive … It’s not that fair, because there is no central heating,
no elevator, nothing, and he intends to increase it, year after
year, but what can we do? I mean, we work, and we just about
survive, that’s how it is. It is difficult … We’ve chosen this place
because we needed an extra room for the children to study and
we didn’t have [space] in our previous apartment. It was a base-
ment, it was not healthy, but we had financial problems then …
Now we are a little better off … we rented this apartment in or-
der to be more comfortable, for the children, so they don’t feel
like ‘Oh, Mum, we came from Albania and we live in the base-
ment.’ (Lela)
Still, of course, the price of the rent plays a crucial role in deciding
about the area, and even more so about the property itself. Cheap ac-
commodation is preferred by the majority, and low rents, expectedly,
usually mean bad-quality housing (e.g. in the areas within and around
the inner city), properties lacking basic facilities (e.g. central heating),
or small, inadequate apartments (often on ground floors or in base-
ments). These are among the most frequent problems mentioned in
the interviews and confirmed by the percentage data presented earlier
in the chapter; they tell us that the vulnerable socio-economic condi-
tions of the majority of immigrants lead them to cheap and therefore
bad-quality housing, usually on the lower floors of inner-city buildings
and dwellings on the outskirts of the city, mostly in north-western
Thessaloniki. Home-sharing strategies and overcrowded accommoda-
tion have also been observed in individual migrants’ attempts to reduce
the cost of living expenses. The following cases give a more vivid pic-
ture of the situation:
Katerina came in 1999 and lives in a one-bedroom basement in Nea-
poli (north-western conurbation) with her brother and sister: I don’t
like the house at all, there is much dampness … but we can’t
move to some other place because we couldn’t afford to pay
more. We have a certain income, and part of it should go to the
house. If we moved somewhere else, if we rented another flat
we’d have to pay 70,000-80,000 drachmas [205-235 euros] …
and we can’t afford that.
Melina came in 1999 and lives in a basement in the northern part of
the historical centre (Ag. Dimitriou) together with her husband and
their three children; apart from the bathroom and kitchen, there is
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only a living room and a bedroom: I am not satisfied, the apart-
ment is very small, but moving somewhere else would cost too
much money. We have a lot of problems, we could not rent an-
other property now.
Raicko came in 1998 and lives in Stavroupoli (north-western conur-
bation), in an ‘old and humid’ house without central heating; he
shares a bedroom with his wife and son, while the other two rooms
are occupied by another couple and a single man: I don’t earn that
much per month, it’s not only the rent that I have to pay … So I
went for something cheaper … And we live many people to-
gether … six people in this house, we pay 60,000 drachmas
[190 euros].
The quality of a property, though, is not always clearly associated with
the rent. What has been reported by many, bad-quality housing that is
expensive at the same time, points to exploitative conditions in the hous-
ing market which favour the landlord rather than the tenant. In the
words of Kaiti, one of the Albanian interviewees:
They ask extraordinary prices. It has happened to me. I’ve called
about an apartment and the rent mentioned was 100,000 drach-
mas [300 euros]. No furniture, no telephone, no central heating.
This is a distinctive feature of a housing market where rents follow an
upward trend and many buildings, particularly in the inner city, are
old and/or lack basic facilities. Taking into account that Thessaloniki
has a large number of students who also search, like many migrants,
for temporary accommodation, it seems that many landlords increase
the rents without repairing or refurbishing their properties until a tem-
porary tenant (a student or a migrant) does so at their own expense.
Obviously, this form of exploitation applies to both migrants and locals,
but its degree varies, since the former are in a more vulnerable posi-
tion, especially when they are undocumented. The experience of Maria,
among other interviewees, clearly reflects this practice:
I have many complaints about that … All the landlords I’ve met
owned ‘rotten’ places. I had to paint them myself … the kitchens
and everything … I repaired all those places … but the landlords,
after I had repaired the properties, they told me to leave … So, I
had to go, I didn’t have papers.
Moreover, the interviewees’ testimonies uncover other forms of exploi-
tation in the housing market. A common practice that has been re-
ported is that of landlords who avoid signing a tenancy agreement, or
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even sign false ones, to escape taxation for renting the property. This
clearly puts immigrants in the vulnerable position described above,
making them unable to claim any rights. Their undocumented status
was sometimes used as a means to convince them to accept the terms
of tenancy, or even to vacate the property without notice in some cases,
under the threat (or simply the fear) of the authorities being informed
about them. Renting properties that were not built to be used for ac-
commodation, such as storerooms in the basements of inner-city build-
ings, de facto exempt from the relevant (higher) taxation, is another
practice experienced by some interviewees. And certainly the splitting
of properties in order to host a higher number of tenants, often with-
out providing basic facilities in the separated spaces (kitchens, bath-
rooms), again serves the landlord in multiple ways, through the exploi-
tation of a situation of high demand and the vulnerability of this spe-
cial category of tenants.
The field survey generally shows that, as far as access to housing is
concerned, migrants in Thessaloniki depend almost exclusively on pri-
vate-sector lettings and face exploitative conditions in the housing mar-
ket itself. Access as such is not prevented, but the vulnerable position
of the migrants in the market usually leads them towards specific city
areas and specific types of properties, often in flats or on floors un-
wanted by the majority of locals. However, the interviewees’ residential
experiences suggest that non-market obstacles also exist, which create
difficulties in the migrants’ pathways of access to housing. By this I re-
fer to the common prejudices about immigrants in Greece, and to xe-
nophobic attitudes that are apparent in their daily interaction with
(some) locals. So one of the most important features of immigrants’ ex-
periences is the discrimination they face in the housing market. Some
landlords refuse to rent their property to a foreigner, particularly to Al-
banians (and especially to young unaccompanied males). The share of
respondents who said that they had had such an experience is nearly
40 per cent, but this rises up to 43 per cent among people who are sin-
gle or divorced, 43.2 per cent among men, 43.7 per cent among people
aged between 18-29, 44 per cent among those who are not of ethnic
Greek origin and 44.2 per cent among all Albanian immigrants. In
their own words:
They don’t want to rent their place to a foreigner, they don’t want
to make a contract, or they make false contracts. (Maria)
I had difficulties because I’m an Albanian. Maybe because I was
a foreigner … other foreigners have problems too. I mean, the
Bulgarians, the Romanians and the others have problems too …
After six or seven years, they didn’t notice that I am a foreigner,
because of my accent, and they told me ‘It’s nice you’re not a for-
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eigner, otherwise I wouldn’t let you the property.’ He didn’t un-
derstand, but I left, without telling him anything. I said ‘I’ll drop
in tomorrow,’ but I didn’t go. What could I tell him, that I am
an Albanian? (Nadi)
They do not want to rent the apartment to you. When they hear
that your Greek is not good they tell you to go away. If you tell
them that you are an Albanian, they won’t rent the house to you.
(Kaiti)
Well, what impressed me was when we had found a nice big
apartment … we had signed a contract too, through a common
friend, but when the landlord realised that we were from Alba-
nia, he hesitated. He said, ‘No, I won’t rent this to Albanians.’
Well, this is his right, he didn’t want to rent it to Albanians,
what can I say about that? I could not get angry, this can happen
to anybody. Some people don’t rent their properties to students,
for instance … We saw many apartments, and when we said ‘Al-
banians’, they’d shut the door. So we got this one after telling
the landlords that we are Italians. (Mimoza)
As the last quote illustrates, the heavy discrimination exercised by land-
lords leads migrants to develop specific practices: some, mostly Alba-
nians, introduce themselves as ethnic Greeks, or foreigners of other na-
tionalities that are generally welcome; others make use of their social
networks, especially Greek employers, friends or acquaintances, as in-
termediaries that might speak to the landlord and facilitate access to a
particular property. Prospective tenants who take care to present them-
selves as ethnic Greeks, ‘family men’ or ‘stable breadwinners’ have bet-
ter chances than young single men and women. However, what we are
facing here is not an absolutely exclusionary phenomenon; the housing
market, as any other market, operates in terms of exchange, of supply
and demand: if a landlord refuses to rent his/her property to a migrant
family, someone else will accept. And in most cases, any initial preju-
dice will disappear over time, when the relationships between migrants
and landlords or neighbours reach a more personal level, as the experi-
ence of Dimitri, among many others, illustrates:
In the beginning, the landlady told me ‘There are only Greeks
living here … the rest of the residents don’t want Albanians.’ …
Now, two years later, the landlady and the neighbours are happy
with us, they love our kids, they help us.
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7.1.2 Immigrants’ residential trajectories in Thessaloniki
A more dynamic analysis of the residential experiences of immigrants
in the city would lead us to take into account their housing conditions
before the fieldwork took place. Many of the interviewees talked about
negative experiences in the past; they spoke about harsh conditions in-
itially and problems they had encountered in the course of their resi-
dential pathways in the country and in Thessaloniki. Whatever their
housing quality was at the time of the fieldwork, things had been
worse in the beginning for the majority, especially for unaccompanied
males during the first ambiguous years of their migratory journey. In-
itial conditions, clandestine status, uncertainty and fear had pushed
people to sleep at the workplace, or even out in the open air. To men-
tion only a few examples from the interviews: Ivan, from Bulgaria,
used to sleep in the lorries where he used to work loading and unload-
ing stock; Raicko and Nadi, from Bulgaria and Albania respectively,
stayed for months in the factories they had been working in, with per-
mission from their bosses; Kostas and Maria, from Bulgaria, spent
their first few days in a wagon owned by their employer; Nicolas and
Ferrin, from Albania, slept out in the fields before finding stable jobs.
In total, the share of respondents who had been offered a place to sleep
initially by their employers (usually at the workplace itself) exceeded 10
per cent; 30.5 per cent had been hosted by relatives or friends, while
another 31.6 per cent, almost exclusively Albanians, had stayed in
cheap hotels during their first few weeks in Greece. Some had lived
with many others in overcrowded properties in order to save money on
the rent. Some others, especially among the pioneers, had received the
kind help of locals, who offered them a place to sleep for a few days.
Two migrants from Albania said they had spent a period in the state re-
ception camps the government had set up at the border to respond to
the emergency of the initial immigration ‘boom’. Five people said they
had slept out in the open air, on construction sites or in fields, before
making their first money that allowed them to rent a property. The fol-
lowing selection of interviewees’ narratives sheds light on some details
regarding initial experiences:
I lived in another flat, two families together … This was when I
first arrived, for a short period until I settled, I found work. My
brother-in-law had come first with his wife and his kid. Before I
brought my wife here, I was looking for a place so that every-
thing was ready. Everywhere we would go, he would take his
wife with him, because they would not rent a flat to singles, only
to families. Once they told us that they would not rent their flat
180 MIGRATION IN CONTEMPORARY GREECE
to Albanians. It is different when they see all the family to-
gether. (Gjion)
We were living in an apartment … it was in the basement …
There were four people there, we used to pay 50,000 drachmas
[about 150 euros] for rent and it was 55 m2. It had a lot of damp-
ness. (Valbona)
This is the second one [property]. When I was alone I used to
live in another place, close to the one where we live now, with
two cousins of mine. It was in the basement. There was humid-
ity, it was bad, so when my family came I had to change accom-
modation. This is why I chose this other one. (Dimitri)
This evidence underlines the dynamic element apparent also in the so-
cio-spatial level of immigrants’ incorporation. As in the previous chap-
ter on employment, it points again to the trajectories that individual mi-
grants follow in the destination place, this time in terms of residence
and housing conditions, suggesting that, for many, situations do
change over time. Following these trajectories, we see that not only do
immigrants experience a high degree of residential mobility, much
higher than that of the locals5, but also that the quality of housing con-
ditions gradually improves.
Soultana, 36, came in 1991: Being an ethnic Greek (Sarakatsana)
she knew people in Thessaloniki who helped her and her father
to rent a small apartment in Foinikas (eastern Thessaloniki, a
working-class area). When her sister joined them, they all moved
to Peraia, on the eastern outskirts of the city (near the airport),
where they lived in a basement with no heating. When she met
her (Greek) husband, they stayed for a period in his flat in the
western part of the centre, before moving to a property they
bought by the seafront (Faliro).
Andreas, 49, came in 1991: In the beginning he arrived at Anghe-
lohori, a village in the prefecture, where he stayed, together with
his brother and sister, in a little house on their employers’ farm.
After six months he moved to Thessaloniki, where his wife and
daughters joined him. He changed accommodation five times:
initially he stayed in the eastern part of the city (Italias/Makedo-
nias), later he moved closer to the centre, where he works, and
after that to western Thessaloniki (Stavroupoli) in order to be
close to where his older daughter lives.
Konstantina, 30, came in 1992: As a student, initially, she had
spent some time in university accommodation. She has lived in
four properties, all in the eastern part of the city, before moving
to the one she lives in now in the west (Stavroupoli), together
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with her husband, her daughter and her mother-in-law. This
property was bought by her husband’s family.
Nadi, 37, came in 1992: Initially he stayed at the apartment of a
friend, as a guest. Then for three years accommodation was pro-
vided by his employer in the factory where he still works (lo-
cated in the industrial complex of Thessaloniki). After that, he
rented a flat and lived alone until he got married. Now he lives
in a rented apartment in Neapoli (western Thessaloniki) to-
gether with his wife, sister and, recently, baby son.
Maria, 52, came in 1992: She first went to the Peloponnese and
stayed, together with others, on the farm where she used to
work. A friend invited her to Thessaloniki and offered her a
room at her place, in eastern Thessaloniki (Martiou), initially.
She later spent a period looking after an old lady, during which
she was living at her employer’s flat in a different area (K.
Toumba). When her daughters came from Bulgaria after gradu-
ating from school, they all moved into an apartment close to the
railway station, in the western part of the centre.
Now, what about the factors determining the residential trajectories of
the migrants? If the axiom ‘things get better over time’ suggested in
Section 6.3.2 might seem too generalised, perhaps oversimplifying and
idealising actual situations, the analysis of the in-depth interviews does
reveal, here as well, a number of key developments that often take
place with the passage of time. The acquisition of legal status in this
case seems to have played a rather indirect role: it offered migrants a
feeling of security necessary in order to invite over family still abroad,
and it has been crucial for improvements in the migrants’ employment
conditions. The main factors though appear to have been family mat-
ters (e.g. dependent family members joining from abroad, the birth of
children), and the overall improvement in the migrants’ position (move
to more stable and rewarding jobs, increase of the household income).
Other developments may range from children’s schooling to changing
lifestyle values.
Quantitative evidence supports the argument. Table 7.2 illustrates
significant relationships between the number of years immigrants have
spent in Greece and certain characteristics of their housing conditions.
The data confirm what has been sketched by the qualitative analysis,
suggesting that the longer a migrant has been in the country, the long-
er s/he tends to settle in a particular property and the more likely s/he
is to own a property or to live on upper floors. Also, greater shares of
those who have been in Greece for nine years or longer stay with their
families and enjoy a large housing space. In addition, there is a weak
correlation between the number of years migrants have lived in Greece
182 MIGRATION IN CONTEMPORARY GREECE
and the monthly rent they pay (Pearson correlation value 0.145, 0.079
significance level, N=198 cases). The share of respondents who de-
clared themselves ‘satisfied’ with their housing conditions at the time
of the fieldwork is notably high: 73.1 per cent, which reaches 74.4 per
cent among men, 74.4 per cent among those who are married, 76.3
per cent among people aged 30 and over, 81.7 per cent among fluent
Greek speakers and 83.3 per cent among Bulgarian immigrants.
Although no significant relationship between ‘satisfaction’ and ‘period
in Greece’ appears at the statistical level, the shares of those who said
they were satisfied with their accommodation increase as the number
of years migrants have been in the country rises: from 69.6 per cent
among migrants living in Greece for up to four years, to 70.5 per cent
among those who have lived there between five and eight years, and fi-
nally to 78.2 among people with nine or more years in the country.
All this evidence reinforces exactly what was argued in the previous
chapter: it is not time as such that ‘improves’ migrants’ housing condi-
tions; neither are all migrants ‘naturally’ destined to lead successful
lives. The analysis has showed that immigrants in Thessaloniki still
tend to occupy specific spaces of residence within the urban fabric and
the local housing market, just like they cover a particular ‘space’ within
the labour market; for many, these are far from being acceptable stan-
dards of living. But again, one has to develop a dynamic perspective
and to address the changes that have gradually taken place over the
Table 7.2 Housing conditions improve over time
Period in Greece (years) Pearson's Chi-Squares
up to 2 3-4 5-8 9+ Total
period in property (N=175)
up to 6 months 10 14 14 11 49 2 value 13.7270
7 months to 2 years 11 6 15 19 51 Df 6
more than 2 years 4 19 23 29 75 Sig. (2-sided) 0.03283
type of property (N=208)
own 1 – 2 16 19 2 value 28.5355
rent 21 41 53 53 168 Df 6
guest/employer 6 6 6 3 21 Sig. (2-sided) 0.00007
floor (N=170)
inappropriate*/ground 12 13 10 9 44 2 value 13.1105
1st, 2nd 11 18 19 28 76 Df 6
3rd & higher/house 3 9 17 21 50 Sig. (2-sided) 0.04131
% of those living with their
families
12.5 20.6 27.9 39 70.8
% of those enjoying a hous-
ing space of one or more
rooms per person
39.3 23.4 34.4 42.2 35.3
* basements, storerooms, wagons, etc.
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past fifteen years, including important improvements in the lives of
many migrants, which have happened despite their vulnerable position
in a quite unfavourable environment and with practically no formal as-
sistance at all. And despite all the trials and tribulations, migrants are
making Thessaloniki their new home, changing in turn the nature of
the city as a ‘place’. This last point will be further supported by the ana-
lysis in the next section.
7.2 Space as place: towards a new urban geography
The previous section discussed the residential and housing situation of
immigrants in Thessaloniki and explained them in the context of the
urban geography of the city. However, the map of immigrants’ residen-
tial distribution only partly sketches the local geography of migration;
and their experiences and uses of space are not solely limited to their
housing conditions. The interviewees’ own accounts of their migratory
journeys in Greece reveal interesting elements regarding their experi-
ences and perceptions of urban space. There are places of work, leisure
and socialisation, spaces of action and interaction, which also deter-
mine the migrants’ sense of place and characterise the urban experi-
ence of migration for the city itself: the changes brought by the pre-
sence of immigrants, the conditions affecting their own lives, the ways
people – immigrants and locals – perceive them and respectively act.
Here I examine some of these other aspects of the socio-spatial incor-
poration of immigrants. A case study of a specific neighbourhood has
been included as an example of the interplay between migrant settle-
ment, local economic structures and urban dynamics.
7.2.1 Mapping immigrants’ residence and the geography of migrant labour
Let me start from a mapping of migrant labour in the city. Fieldwork
findings suggest that the place where immigrants work does not gener-
ally depend on where they live (or vice versa). The location of the work-
place rather reflects Thessaloniki’s economic geography as well as the
peculiar nature of migrant labour in respect to three of its chief fea-
tures: its flexibility, its concentration in specific economic sectors (con-
struction, personal services, manufacturing) and the importance of so-
cial networks as a means of accessing employment. Table 7.3 shows
how weakly the location of the workplace coincides with the area of re-
sidence; it also illustrates the relationship between where in the city
migrants work and what type of job they perform.
Clearly, the results reflect key features of the urban economic geogra-
phy, as described in Section 3.3. Firstly, we have a relatively centralised
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structure: the city centre concentrates numerous activities, mostly ser-
vices of all types. Secondly, the main industrial complex is located in
the north-western part (Sindos area) and a second manufacturing zone
is found in the south-east (Thermi airport area). Smaller-scale activities
in all sectors (retail trade, cafe´s, bars and fast-food restaurants, small
manufacturing units, etc.) are spatially diffused all over the city. Immi-
grants employed in construction are not based in a fixed working place;
of those who stated their employment area at the time of the fieldwork,
significant concentrations are located in the historical centre (for reno-
vation/repair works mostly) and in the south-east (where new construc-
tion activity is intense). Lastly, immigrants working in personal services
(house repair, cleaning, domestic work, care work) tend to concentrate
in the – more affluent – central and south-eastern areas, but many of
them work for more than one employer and thus in different places
(working from ‘home’ mostly refers to live-in domestic helpers/carers).
Job location and place of residence do not coincide for the majority.
This appears to be more common among the inner-city residents,
while those living in the outer city tend to work closer to home; again,
there are variations according to different subgroups (nationality, ethni-
Table 7.3 Job location, area of residence and sector of employment (%)
Workplace Area* Total**
CN E W CNW CSE MNW MSE GNW GSE home varied
A
re
a
of
R
es
id
en
ce
*
CN 8.0 1.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.1 .– .– .– 1.6 6.9 20.2
E 3.7 5.9 2.7 0.5 0.5 2.1 0.5 .– 0.5 1.6 7.4 25.0
W 1.6 0.5 1.6 0.5 .– 0.5 .– .– .– .– 3.2 8.0
CNW 4.8 .– 3.7 3.2 .– 5.9 2.1 .– .– 1.1 4.8 25.5
CSE .– .– .– .– 2.7 .– 1.1 .– .– 0.5 .– 4.3
MNW 0.5 .– .– .– 1.6 .– 0.5 .– .– .– 2.7
MSE .– .– .– .– .– .– 6.4 .– .– .– 1.6 8.0
GNW .– .– .– .– .– .– .– 4.8 .– .– 0.5 5.3
GSE .– .– .– .– .– .– .– .– 0.5 .– 0.5 1.1
Se
ct
or
manufacturing 1.1 1.1 2.7 2.7 1.1 8.5 3.7 4.8 .– .– 1.6 26.6
construction 1.6 .– .– 0.5 .– .– 2.1 .– .– .– 12.2 16.5
personal services 1.6 2.1 .– – 0.5 0.5 1.6 – 0.5 3.7 5.9 16.0
maintenance
& repair
0.5 0.5 – – – – 0.5 – – 0.5 3.2 5.3
leisure & catering 3.2 1.1 1.6 1.6 – 0.5 1.1 – – – 0.5 9.6
trade & retail 4.3 2.7 2.1 – 1.6 1.6 1.1 0.5 0.5 – .– 14.4
other services 6.4 – 2.1 – 0.5 – – – – 0.5 1.6 11.7
Total 18.6 7.4 8.5 4.8 3.7 11.2 10.1 5.3 1.1 4.8 25.0 100.0
* CN=Municipality Centre and North, E=Municipality East, W=Municipality West, CNW=Co-
nurbation North-West, CSE=Conurbation South-East, MNW=Metropolitan Area North-West,
MSE=Metropolitan Area South-East, GNW=Greater Thessaloniki North-West, GSE=Greater
Thessaloniki South-East.
** Sums in the sector column differ from figures in Table 6.1 due to twenty missing cases.
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city, gender, age, family status, education level, etc.), but no direct one-
way relationships arise. The findings point, once again, to the flexibility
of migrant labour: not only are immigrants prepared (or forced by ne-
cessity) to accept any type of job, but also they are ready to travel any-
where in (and around) the city for work. This has to do with what Sas-
sen (1995: 113) refers to as immigrants’ ‘sensitivity to job location’ in
the context of a local labour market. Albanian and Bulgarian immi-
grants in Thessaloniki are generally looking for work; and almost any
job is welcome, wherever the workplace is located. Furthermore, the
kind of jobs they do, such as construction and repair work, cleaning
and domestic service, or other types of casual employment, means un-
stable or diverse locations. In addition, the ways through which many
find employment – waiting in the job-finding piazzas, for instance, or
through friends/relatives and word-of-mouth strategies – makes them
indifferent to the workplace location itself, perhaps even more than to
the type of work as such.
On the one hand, piazzas represent a fixed ‘market place’, where mi-
grants gather to look for work and employers know that they are going
to find cheap labour. But the work can be of any type, and it can be lo-
cated anywhere. On the other, migrants’ social networks, the basic way
of accessing employment for most, could also be seen as a non-market
factor partly determining the location of jobs. What Sassen (1995: 106-
107) calls the ‘place-based knowledge about jobs that immigrants are
most likely to do’ (again, related to the function of local labour mar-
kets) is confirmed by the findings, but is manifested in our case in a
peculiar way. Firstly, there is generally a weak connection between im-
migrants’ residential area and the location of their workplace. The for-
mer reflects to an extent the urban social geography and the conditions
of the local housing market, but it is also related to individual/house-
hold factors (condition of property, family needs, social networks, etc.).
The latter mirrors the urban economic geography, but is also related to
the ‘space’ migrants occupy in the labour market (certain types of jobs,
in certain sectors) and to the character of their labour (flexibility, low
cost). Secondly, migrants’ decisions about moving to a particular place
to take a job are not as much a factor of wages or of the job itself, but
rather more a factor of where their contacts are located. For many, their
contacts are so widely diffused around Thessaloniki that they could
practically work in a job found in any part of the city. For some, whose
networks are denser and spatially concentrated in particular areas of
the city, the place of residence is usually close to the place of work. An
example of such a neighbourhood-based interplay between social net-
works, job location and area of residence is given in the following sec-
tion.
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7.2.2 A case study of Sarakatsani Bulgarians in Thermi
Thermi is a suburb at the south-eastern corner of Thessaloniki and
forms part of the metropolitan area. It used to be a village inhabited in-
itially by locals and later (early twentieth century) by refugees from
Asia Minor; today it increasingly attracts middle-class households that
have moved out of the inner city. It is located in the area near the air-
port, where a series of different activities are being concentrated: places
of leisure and mass entertainment (nightclubs, multiplex cinemas),
large supermarkets and shopping malls, offices of large Greek and for-
eign firms, hi-tech companies, research institutes and techno-parks,
medium-sized factories, manufacturers and small workshops. The
2001 census recorded slightly more than 16,000 inhabitants in the
municipality of Thermi (i.e. 1.5 per cent of the population of the prefec-
ture and 1.8 per cent of the metropolitan zone). More than 60 per cent
are less than 40 years old and 45.2 per cent are economically active. Of
those, 56.5 per cent are between 15-39 years old, and 30 per cent have a
university education; the majority works in the tertiary sector, 24 per
cent in manufacturing and 6 per cent in agriculture. Unemployment
in 2001 was far below the city average (8.7 per cent). Thermi contains
1.7 and 3.2 per cent of the non-EU nationals in the prefecture and the
metropolitan zone respectively; non-EU nationals in Thermi account
for 6.3 per cent of the residents. There is a significant number of im-
migrants from Bulgaria, the great majority Sarakatsani; there are also
Albanian migrants.
Among the seventeen Sarakatsani in my sample, fifteen were living
in Thermi or in surrounding places (Nea Raidestos). Interviews uncov-
ered network factors that explain this phenomenon: Sarakatsani are a
‘closed’ cultural group, who tend to socialise mostly with each other, so
that it is reasonable that they chose to settle in a district where people
of the same origin are concentrated. Obviously, the availability of work
played a crucial role. According to Soultana, one of the Sarakatsani in-
terviewees:
Let me explain to you … Thermi is outside Thessaloniki, it is an
industrial area. There are many manufacturers there … So for
migrants, it’s more convenient there, also because houses [rents]
are lower … Some people settled there initially, one or two. My
father for instance was one of the first who went there and then
he was followed by many others … because they can find work
there. (Soultana)
People who arrived first found employment easily, and this attracted
compatriots from various places in Bulgaria (from the regions of Plov-
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div and Sliven mostly). The fact that the Bulgarian Sarakatsani are in
Greece under a status of temporary residence (they are entitled to a
special annual visa) makes many among them follow a cyclical migra-
tion path: they come to work for a period and then go back to Bulgaria,
where many continue working in their traditional activities (cattle-
breeding, agriculture), then returning again to Greece after renewing
their visa.
In Thermi, Sarakatsani work in the surrounding small industries,
workshops and commercial businesses, but also in construction activ-
ities, repair tasks, gardening, and domestic service in the case of wo-
men. The patterns of their integration in the local labour market are
explained on the basis of the particularities of the local socio-economic
structures. On the one hand, there are businesses that need immigrant
labour. On the other, there are relatively wealthy residents with an in-
creased demand for personal/household services who can afford to em-
ploy a migrant manual worker or a domestic servant. The ‘closed’ char-
acter of immigrants’ employment in Thermi (mostly Sarakatsani and
some Albanians who work for locals) keeps daily wages at a fixed rate
for manual and construction work: 25 euros at the time of the field-
work. The older respondents in my sample, usually male household
heads, work in order to support the household and to finance specific
plans (the purchase of a new house, the further education of the chil-
dren). Younger males follow their fathers, and they usually work to-
gether. The (few) women in this (small) section of the sample exhibit
some degree of socio-economic mobility and of ‘exodus’ from closed fa-
mily networks, due to studies in Greece, marriage to Greek citizens or
entrepreneurship.
The residential situation of Sarakatsani in Thermi appears quite var-
ied, depending on the migratory routes and plans of individuals. Males
whose families are in Bulgaria tend to occupy bad-quality properties, in
many cases storerooms or basements that are not liable for tax as ren-
tal accommodation: these are the properties they can afford to rent in a
quite expensive area. Couples and families tend to live in proper ac-
commodation in flats or houses, in a few cases provided by their em-
ployers.
The presence of immigrants is visible in the central square of the
suburb, where many gather in the mornings in order to look for work,
and in the afternoons and evenings for socialising and chatting. Immi-
grants from different nationalities occupy different parts of the square
(as Maria told me, ‘The Bulgarians are on one side … and the Alba-
nians are separate … each with his group,’). The square used to be a
piazza for seeking casual employment during past years, but this activ-
ity has now been relocated to the outskirts of the residential area (on
the way to the airport); lately (summer 2004) it was undergoing a pro-
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cess of regeneration. Most of the interviewees talked about good rela-
tions with the locals, but they have problems with the police because of
the frequent checks (although local police officers well know that Sara-
katsani Bulgarians are granted special status and thus cannot be clan-
destine). The police have forced them to move out of the square, deny-
ing them its use as a job-finding piazza initially, but ultimately also as
a meeting place; the justification for this is the ‘protection of the public
image’ of this particular space located right in the centre of Thermi:
We sit here, the police come, they tell us ‘Come on, you Bulgar-
ians, pick up your stuff and get out of here.’ … Why? (Ghiorgos)
7.2.3 Beyond residence and work: leisure, consumption and the urban
space
I have talked so far about spaces of residence and of work, as these two
seem to crucially characterise migrants’ lives in the city; and indeed, to
an extent, they certainly do, constituting the places people tend to
spend most of their time. But what happens with the space in between,
out of home, but not at work? How do migrants experience the public
space and to what extent do they make use of private spaces of con-
sumption and entertainment? And which are the new geographies and
relationships produced by their presence in the city? The majority does
indeed go out, consume and socialise, despite facing the financial bur-
den of their situation and, sometimes, discrimination and non-accep-
tance. Perhaps not as often as the locals do, or in different, less costly
ways, immigrants nevertheless make use of their free time to meet
with friends, entertain themselves, or consume: in this, the city pro-
vides the terrain.
Some material, both qualitative and quantitative, was collected about
migrants’ entertainment options and ‘going out’ in particular. At the
time of the fieldwork, 39.1 per cent of the respondents used to go out
at least once a fortnight and 18.8 per cent at least once a month; 33.7
per cent said they went out only ‘rarely’ and the rest (8.4 per cent)
would never go out. Naturally, there is a high degree of diversity, in
terms of age, family status, the area where they live, their employment
conditions, etc. Young people below 30 tend to go out more often (65.2
per cent of them said they go out at least once a fortnight, compared to
only 8.8 per cent among people aged over 50 years old); the same
holds for singles (61.1 per cent) and those who don’t have children
(53.8 per cent). Migrants who go out that often are also found in higher
numbers among those who speak fluent Greek (46.7 per cent, while
only 1.7 per cent said they never go out), who socialise with Greek peo-
ple (45.8 per cent, compared to 26.8 per cent among those who do not
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have Greek friends/acquaintances), or who have a working day of eight
hours or less (45.5. per cent). Women, possibly due to household/fa-
mily roles, tend to go out less frequently: 36.5 per cent of them go out
once a fortnight (40.6 per cent among men); also, 16.2 per cent of wo-
men said they never go out (3.9 per cent among men).
More than one third of the respondents seem to prefer the town cen-
tre, confirming the relatively centralised leisure industry of the city.
Apart from those living in the centre, residents of the western part of
the municipality and the north-west districts in particular prefer to go
downtown rather than choosing among their limited and ‘closed’
neighbourhood-based entertainment options. By contrast, the eastern
part of the city tends to concentrate numerous entertainment places of
various types, and migrants living in these areas are more likely to
choose among their local options. The majority though (37.2 per cent)
answered that they would go ‘anywhere’ in the city, depending on ‘the
company’ or ‘the mood’. Again, we can observe differences among the
different groups. The city centre, for instance, appears to be more pop-
ular among people who are between 18-29 years old (46.9 per cent) or
who are single (46.3 per cent) – even for those living in the outer
neighbourhoods – and people who socialise with Greeks (38.5 per
cent); on the other hand, ethnic Greeks, people aged 40 and over, and
married people tend to prefer the neighbourhood (the respective shares
among these categories are 32.1, 40.7 and 37.8 per cent). Despite the
concentration of bars, cafe´s, etc. downtown and in certain other parts
of the city, neighbourhood life is far from disappearing. The in-depth
interviews contain a plethora of different individual leisure/entertain-
ment options and habits, which are too detailed and case-specific to be
quoted in their entirety here. The examples are perhaps as many as the
interviewees themselves; to quote only a few:
I came here for economic reasons … I try not to go out that of-
ten and spend a lot of money … I stay mostly at home, watch
TV … I fancy bouzoukia and the like. I’ve been twice with Greek
friends, but it’s too expensive there. (Ivan)
I go out, to walk … anywhere … Not that much in my neighbour-
hood. Where can I go there? There are no places … I go out with
my brother … downtown … But I don’t stay very late … To the
movies, I have only been once. (Mira)
I am ‘locked’ at home … I can’t go out, because this is the nature
of my job, they always need me there, they are old people … and
they don’t want me to leave … On Sundays, I am free and then I
go to my cousin’s. (Lioupa, live-in carer)
Elias [his brother] goes there, me too, but not every week …
Many Albanians meet there, they play pool basically … We don’t
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talk that much about work, mostly we play [pool], we just have
company and enjoy ourselves. (Andreas)
I don’t go to coffee shops. Sometimes I go to tavernas … with
these two Greek friends that I mentioned … wherever … I have
been to Pyli Axiou [nightclub with live Greek music] three times
… Again, with my Greek friends. (Valbona)
Clearly, the financial burden explains the limited frequency of ‘going
out’; alternative options are discussed in 8.2.2 and 8.2.3, so the interest
here is in the participants’ preferences regarding private entertainment.
It generally appears that migrants tend to go to the same places as
Greeks do, depending on each individual’s lifestyle, age and cultural
background: in that sense, trendy bars and nightclubs are as common
as tavernas and traditional local coffee shops. Two important observa-
tions are relevant.
Firstly, the majority of immigrants in Thessaloniki are ‘inserted’ into
the dominant leisure-consumption culture that prevails in Greece today,
and thus tend to make use of the same private entertainment spaces.
This is particularly true for the groups studied here, both coming from
neighbouring states where popular contemporary cultural expressions
(commercial music and dance, club culture) do not really differ much
from those of the host society, as these countries have also experienced
a degree of both Western and Greek cultural imperialism (mostly nota-
ble in Albania, where Greek popular artists have occasionally per-
formed in concert halls or nightclubs in Tirana)6. It is worth noting
that some of the interviewees, especially the youngest ones, would refer
to certain city nightclubs, or to Greek pop stars. Many share the Greek
habit of going to one of the expensive but popular live-music night-
clubs on a Saturday night, or of a long coffee break in the neighbour-
hood or downtown on a quasi-daily basis. The frequency of such prac-
tices might be limited, however, due to heavy work schedules and little
free time, which contrast with the habits of the local population, espe-
cially its younger sections, as noted by some of the interviewees:
There are many guys who are rich, I suppose … They wake up
in the morning, at 9 or 10 o’clock, and they go straight to the
coffee shop. (Vilco)
The second observation is about private places that function as meeting
points (mainly or exclusively) for immigrants. This is an exception to
what was described above, but it appears to be quite common among
people of an older age, usually males. During the last decade certain
coffee shops and bars that attract migrant customers have emerged all
over the city; the owners are usually Greek, but increasingly we find
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migrants taking over. For example, Andreas, an Albanian interviewee,
talks about a billiard club where Albanian immigrants gather after
work or on weekends to ‘play [pool], have company and enjoy’ them-
selves. And, as already mentioned, I personally had the chance to visit
a bar in the city centre, which served as a meeting place for a small
Bulgarian community who would gather, particularly on Friday and Sa-
turday nights, to have drinks and dance to Greek and Bulgarian mu-
sic7.
Nevertheless, apart from private places of entertainment, the role of
the public space is crucial: the open city space, where in general mi-
grants’ presence is notable. Given the necessity of generating an in-
come and, in many cases, supporting families back home, on a limited
budget that does not allow for frequent going out and consumption,
and perhaps also because of different habits and cultural approaches to
space, the public places seem to be particularly important in migrants’
lives. Within the public urban space, migrants develop leisure practices
that somehow ‘escape’ the market: the neighbourhood itself, some pe-
destrian zones in urban streets, parks and squares, etc., become places
where migrants meet each other, socialise, chat or play. Recent re-
search has showed that immigrants’ children are much more involved
in sports than Greek children and practice it in outdoor spaces, the
neighbourhood itself, parks and fields8. The neighbourhood, in particu-
lar, has been the primary space of the immigrants’ public existence
since the beginning, located immediately outside of the private domain
of residence. On the other hand, job-finding piazzas too have initially
been among the few places where migrants could have a public pre-
sence, functioning not only as ‘market places’ where they would sell di-
rectly the only valuable thing they possess in the host country, i.e. their
labour, but also as meeting points, places of recreation and socialisa-
tion. Finally, as many respondents stated, going for a walk, especially
downtown window-shopping or a walk by the seafront (repeatedly men-
tioned as one of the city’s most beautiful parts), has been a basic lei-
sure option for years.
Once again, I am tempted to highlight the dynamic element: in this
domain too, things do change over time. The first issue regarding the
interviewees’ past experiences of space is certainly that of illegality: un-
documented status denies immigrants the right to a public presence.
Irregular migrants are trapped in a social space limited from ‘home-to-
work’. Hiding so as not to be arrested by the police, as we have seen,
and avoiding busy public places, led many migrants towards a lasting
‘invisible’ existence, suffocating between the private sphere and the
workplace:
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Without papers you are afraid … even in the street we couldn’t
walk, we were hiding … [so as] not to be caught by the police,
not to walk through places where there were police. (Andreas)
We were like, from work to home. We couldn’t go out to drink a
coffee like everybody does, it was work, home. It was very diffi-
cult. (Ferin)
Obviously, regularisation may offer immigrants a more visible public
existence. But the little free time left after a long working day might
hinder migrants’ capacity for going out and enjoying themselves long
after legal status is obtained, making thus the ‘home-to-work’ space a
permanent situation:
Only work and home … There is no time to see how beautiful
Greece is. (Raicko)
Secondly, there are the practicalities that emerge from the way the
authorities (more correctly: the police) treat immigrants on a daily ba-
sis. As we have seen in Chapter 5, even when migrants manage to ac-
quire legal status, frequent controls and arrests continue to be the case
for many, also disturbing their everyday routine regarding their leisure
time and their experiences of space:
If I go to the square to use the payphone, they will arrest me
and take me to Thermi to check me [the largest police unit to
the east] … Everyday, when I finish work I am here. I may go
out to meet a friend, to have a coffee, you know, I may go to a
bar in the evening … and they may arrest me. (Ferin)
Thirdly comes the issue of discrimination. Immigrants, especially Alba-
nians, often come across incidents of offensive behaviour, whether in
public or private places:
In the neighbourhood where I used to live, when my children
came … a neighbour had a nephew who wanted to play with our
kids, but he wouldn’t let him. He said nothing, he just didn’t let
his nephew play with our children. (Dimitri)
When we go somewhere … let’s say to a store selling clothes …
you get inside and they treat you like any other customer. From
the moment that the discussion goes on and the question
‘Where are you from?’ comes, when we say [ from Albania] …
their behaviour changes. It becomes as if the other person was
superior. (Ani)
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We have seen, nevertheless, that such incidents gradually fade from
migrants’ daily experiences; either because the basis of interaction
widens to embrace newly formed intercultural relationships, or simply
because they become rare cases lost in the vast anonymity of the city.
The latter point, for instance, was addressed by migrants who had
come to Thessaloniki after spending a period in other (smaller) parts
of Greece, where they were more ‘exposed’ and thus more vulnerable:
In the city people are different … They don’t care about who you
are, if you are an Albanian or not. (Nicolas)
However, neither prejudice nor the way the legal framework is applied
function as exclusionary mechanisms as such, in the sense of denying
migrants the right to access public space itself. By contrast, it appears
that the public urban space is being used and enjoyed to a greater ex-
tent by immigrants than by locals as leisure culture is increasingly
moving towards consumption and as entertainment options are more
and more oriented towards the private sphere. The space that remains
‘abandoned’, to a lesser or a greater extent, by the locals, is gradually
‘taken over’ and used by newcomers. Perhaps individual migrants will
gradually abandon such urban open spaces as their material situation
improves and consumerist values prevail. This is something already
present in the lifestyles of many of the participants, reflected for in-
stance in the dominant leisure culture previously described, or, as put
by one of the interviewees (Liliana from Bulgaria), ‘Now, gradually, we
start behaving like the Greeks.’
Exclusion from the use of the public space might come as a conse-
quence of developments that result in new social uses of space. By this
I refer to policies and processes of urban regeneration/gentrification
which aim to transform the image of the city and specific places within
it, in order for it to be used for private consumption, as a tourist attrac-
tion, etc. One example from my fieldwork concerned the experiences
of Sarakatsani Bulgarians in the square in Thermi, described in the
previous section. In his study of the local media discourse, Pavlou
(2001: 140-145) explains how immigrants’ exclusion from the public
space is related to ‘city marketing’ policies: he looks at public percep-
tions of the ‘proper’ use of urban space, which has to be regenerated
and therefore ‘cleaned’ of immigrants, whose presence is ‘annoying’
and who ‘destroy’ the public image of specific areas. This kind of dis-
course is (sometimes) based on existing problems of degradation, but
it connects them directly to the presence of distinct social groups (mi-
grants, Roma, beggars, drug-addicts, etc.). The discourse became more
hostile in 1997, when Thessaloniki was the Cultural Capital of Europe,
and many areas underwent processes of regeneration and reorganisa-
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tion of their social use. What is actually ‘annoying’ is the visible face of
poverty (Pavlou 2001); in other words, the view of the ‘other’, who uses
space in a different way from ‘us’.
Nevertheless, inevitably the presence of immigrants continues to re-
shape the face of Thessaloniki: certain areas (parks, squares, etc.) be-
come places where immigrants gather in order to meet each other or
to look for work. Examples are the Aristotle University campus, Courts
Square (Plateia Dikastirion) and the railway station, all in the heart of
the city, as well as other strategic points (e.g. motorway junctions,
green spaces). This development is also evident at a neighbourhood le-
vel in areas with high concentrations of immigrants, where, for in-
stance, the surrounding kiosks sell Albanian, Russian, Bulgarian and
other newspapers. The demand for specific types of services on the
part of the migrants (e.g. translations, newspapers, special products,
food) and the entrepreneurial action of both themselves and of locals,
transform the urban landscape in certain streets and neighbourhoods,
giving it multicultural characteristics. For example, in the Vardaris area
(western part of the centre), in the streets below the main street (Egna-
tia), there is a growing Chinese market that has emerged during the
past few years (mainly clothing stores)9. In Courts Square, which func-
tions as a meeting place for migrants from the former Soviet Union,
we can observe the development of several small ethnic businesses,
ranging from street traders to specialised food stores and ethnic restau-
rants with self-descriptive, place-specific names (e.g. the ‘Caucasus ta-
verna’). I should note that the groups studied here do not exhibit simi-
lar tendencies of visibility within the city, at least not in such a particu-
lar and distinct way; this points to certain aspects of cultural proximity
(in terms of food, for instance), as mentioned by many interviewees,
but also a degree of adaptability to the local environment, especially in
the case of Albanians. In general, however, immigrants add new ‘col-
ours’ and character to the changing urban morphology, and they devel-
op new social uses of space, which acquires a particular meaning for
them and becomes their ‘place’. In the narratives of many interviewees,
the city is ‘imagined’ as a new home:
It is more friendly, it is ‘warmer’, closer to us … It’s a beautiful
city. (Emil)
Thessaloniki … has become a part of my life … This is my home
now … I adore it. (Valbona)
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8 A ‘space’ for living: socio-cultural integration
This is the last empirical chapter of the thesis, and it deals with a num-
ber of additional issues related to the migrants’ pathways to incorpora-
tion. It starts with the basic issue of welfare, which, although identified
as part of the policy/institutional context of immigrants’ reception, is
treated here separately and is examined from a specific angle. This con-
cerns the extent to which migrants have access to certain basic services,
and the ways they approach these services, the problems they encoun-
ter, etc. In general, the practices immigrants develop, collectively and in-
dividually, to cope with certain daily matters is the main topic in the
discussion to follow. Apart from ways of accessing health and educa-
tion services, the analysis is concerned with the patterns of solidarity
and membership in migrant organisations, the character of informal
social networks, and with various aspects of the migrants’ everyday
lives, ranging from the possession of certain household goods to lan-
guage practices, strategies to cope with negative stances towards them,
and perceptions of identity.
8.1 Access to services and to resources
The welfare of immigrants depends on the existing social-policy frame-
work, the whole set of institutions, measures and provisions constitut-
ing the social state in the host country; and on the specific policies tar-
geting the integration of migrants. Obviously, the latter is part of the
former, which, in the Greek case, is characterised by late development,
limited services, and certain problems of corruption, clientelism, bu-
reaucracy and inefficiency. However, despite the problems and weak-
nesses, there exists a functioning welfare state based on the insurance
and pensions systems, on public health and education for all citizens,
and on certain benefits (housing, unemployment, income support,
etc.) applying to special categories of the population. This, as elsewhere
in Europe, is currently undergoing serious restructuring.
Until the early 2000s, no particular measures for the integration of
migrants had been undertaken. Regarding National Insurance and so-
cial protection, law 2910/2001 recognised equal rights, as they apply to
Greek citizens, for foreign nationals legally resident in Greece . It was
only in 2002 that the government launched a set of measures aiming
specifically at integration for the first time. The ‘Action Plan for the So-
cial Integration of Immigrants for the Period 2002-2005’ includes pro-
visions for the training, labour-market integration and health care of
immigrants, the establishment of local centres of social support, and
the promotion of cultural exchanges among the various communities.
Up to now, however, the outcomes of any implementation of the plan
remain obscure. In addition, the ethnocentric spirit and national iden-
tity considerations mentioned earlier as characteristic of policy-making
in Greece are evident here as well. Ethnic Greek immigrants enjoy spe-
cial privileges compared to ‘aliens’, although not all of them enjoy
equal rights with Greek citizens, particularly in respect to civil rights
and political participation. Nevertheless, despite the lack of relevant
provisions, many migrants have been able to benefit from certain pub-
lic services, whether due to specific legal provisions, gaps in the practi-
cal implementation of the policy framework, or, to an extent, informal
practices and the positive role of social networks.
In this part of the chapter, the main interest lies in the provision of
basic welfare services, that is, public education and health, and the re-
spective pathways of access of the immigrants. The third section deals
with additional issues related to the migrants’ living conditions, this
time in the private sphere. Not only have they managed to access pub-
lic resources in Greece, but many have succeeded in improving their
living standards in many other aspects.
8.1.1 Immigrants’ pathways of access to the national health system
Access to the national health system has been dependent on registered
employment and regular status, which was not the case for the major-
ity of Greece’s immigrants throughout the 1990s. In July 2000, the
Ministry of Health and Welfare issued a circular on the medical treat-
ment and hospital admission of nationals of countries outside the EU
and the European Economic Area. Accordingly, regular immigrants
can have access to the national health system as long as they possess a
health book issued by the insurance fund they are registered with; in
any other case only emergency cases are accepted, and the same ap-
plies to undocumented ‘aliens’. Ethnic Greek migrants, on the other
hand, can benefit from the public health services if they are able to pre-
sent the necessary documents, which include, for those not insured, a
special health book for low-income people. Although only 64.1 per cent
of the respondents had social security at the time of the fieldwork, the
percentage of those covered by a health book rises to 76 per cent, since
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dependent family members are covered by the person principally in-
sured.
Even so, since social security stamps are a prerequisite for applying
for regularisation or renewal of stay permits, insurance for most of the
respondents has been a recent development. In some cases, they had
to finance it themselves, or it has been partial, as a result of their infor-
mal employment and the unwillingness of employers to pay the social
security contributions. Nevertheless, even during this period, there has
existed a space for access to basic welfare services. Lack of insurance
meant that people had to pay fully for their own medical treatment;
this applied to many of my respondents, and it obviously proved too
costly for most of them. However, there are many examples of unoffi-
cial help from both doctors and clerks at public hospitals or in the pri-
vate sector. Regarding the latter, contacts and acquaintances have been
of particular importance in both accessing the service needed as well
as in financial terms. For some of the respondents, it had been their
(Greek) boss or a neighbour who introduced them to a doctor. Valbo-
na’s testimony below is self-evident:
When I was pregnant, six months’ pregnant, I didn’t go to the
hospital. I went to a [private] doctor recommended to me by
somebody I know, and he didn’t get paid. He was a good person.
Others benefited from informal help by hospital staff, especially in the
first half of the 1990s. Two characteristic examples are given below:
I got sick in 1995. I was very ill. I had asthma and I didn’t have
social security, and I had to call 166 [phone number for urgent
cases]. An ambulance came, and they took me to Papanikolaou
[a public hospital]. I stayed there for three days, and then the di-
rector told me that I should pay. But … we didn’t have the money
… and he said that we definitely had to pay, 160,000 drachmas
[480 euros] … By law, the director was right, anybody without in-
surance has to pay. But there was another official there and he
treated us very well … he showed pity. My husband was there
too, and he [the official] said, ‘It’s not that important, the money
that the director asks for. I am going to have a word with him
and you won’t pay anything.’ … So it was done … and we didn’t
pay anything finally, and I got better, and I had my medicine for
free, they gave it to me from the hospital … And now, since we
have arranged the papers and we have got social security, we
don’t face any problems. (Lela)
There is this Greek doctor who lives upstairs, and she has
helped me a lot, with the children. Every time I had to go to the
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hospital for my wife or my kids, she has helped me a lot.
(Gjion)
Such attempts at help often had to bend the rules in order to assist
people in need, which resulted in interesting anecdotes. Mimoza, one
of the Albanian interviewees, had such an experience when her little
boy was ill and had to enter the hospital for a few days. Neither she
nor her husband possessed a health book at the time to cover the child,
and since the procedure requires a formal registration, the hospital re-
ception clerks managed to issue a health book under the boy’s name
for only three days, as if the boy was a waged employee himself!
Research findings about the various strategies used by immigrants
for accessing the national health system while undocumented or unin-
sured are of particular interest because they uncover ‘invisible’ aspects
of the dynamics of integration. In the first place, some found out
about, applied and have been eligible for a special welfare project offer-
ing access to health services and some other benefits to low-income
people (Prόnoia – ‘Pronia’). Such was a Greek-Albanian interviewee’s
case, who found this way to compensate for not having the opportunity
to get social security, given the precarious character of her work (do-
mestic service and childcare):
I am not insured. I only have Pronia. They ask you to present
some documents, your ID card, a certificate from the revenue of-
fice, a certificate that you are not married and that there are no
working members in the family. We got married two months
ago and I haven’t yet told them. I got my health book last Octo-
ber. (Kaiti)
Obviously, this is not always a viable choice, since it cannot apply to
everyone; lack of relevant information, or of access to information (e.g.
due to language difficulties) can be an additional factor regarding the
limited use of certain benefits and rights that regular immigrants are
entitled to. On a more practical level, a common strategy of accessing
public hospitals when clandestine was the use of emergency services,
as Pandelis recalled of the period he had no documents (‘at that time
we could only go to the emergency hospitals’). This practice was so
widespread among undocumented migrants that the special (border)
police started patrolling hospitals, and medical staff are now obliged by
law to report undocumented foreigners to the police, although none of
the respondents had such an experience.
Finally, an interesting finding concerns Bulgarian immigrants, for
whom geographic proximity allows transnational practices regarding
medical treatment. Lacking social security in Greece, and obviously not
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being able to afford the cost of treatment otherwise, many prefer to go
to a hospital or doctor in their home country, given that the health sys-
tem there is cheaper and easily accessible for those who are registered
with a Bulgarian social security fund, or who have coverage due to a fa-
mily member being registered. This strategy was particularly common
among older participants.
In sum, access to the Greek national health system depends primar-
ily on legal status and registered employment: although this was the
case for a few people in the past, it has gradually become a reality for
more and more immigrants in Greece. Regularisation appears to have
considerably improved the position of immigrants as far as access to
health services and to welfare in general is concerned. There are no
signs of systematic discrimination or exclusion, and cases of maltreat-
ment by doctors or hospital staff are quite rare and isolated events.
Most of the problems reported by the respondents concerned the mal-
functions of the Greek public health system, issues of bureaucracy and
some rather isolated events of discriminatory attitudes by employees.
Sixteen per cent of the Albanians in the sample and 21.4 per cent of
the Bulgarians mentioned problems of offensive treatment and bad-
quality services in Greek hospitals.
A way of assessing immigrants’ use of health services in Thessaloni-
ki can be offered by taking the example of a particular local hospital in
a given period. Raw data on 400 cases of non-EU nationals who re-
ceived medical treatment between July 2000 and March 2001 have
been obtained from the administrative offices of one of the city’s most
important hospitals (G. Papanikolaou). More than half of the cases con-
cerned Albanian patients, 19 per cent Georgians and 18.3 per cent Rus-
sians; the remaining 3.5 per cent was composed of various national-
ities, especially Armenians, Bulgarians and Romanians. Despite the
presence of some tourists and other transients in this sample, the ma-
jority of admissions concerns immigrants who are resident in the city
and surrounding places: 57 per cent had a stay permit, and 13.5 per
cent possessed documentation applicable to ethnic Greeks. Some 14.3
per cent presented only their passports, 2 per cent had no valid docu-
ments at all, and 7 per cent had various other forms of identification
(tourist visas, certificates of inter-hospital transfers, etc). Slightly more
than one third (36 per cent) were not insured and had to pay the full
fee for their treatment. The majority (44.3 per cent) was registered with
IKA, while a share of 12.3 per cent were benefactors of the welfare fund
for low-income people (the majority ethnic Greeks) and 2.8 per cent
were registered with OGA. Three people had private insurance, and the
remaining cases were subject to special conditions. Despite possible
bias embedded in the fact that some of the cases concerned serious in-
cidents (accidents, inter-hospital transfers), it is remarkable that 70 per
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cent were received by the hospital’s emergency services. Not surpris-
ingly, there appears to be a relationship between being insured or not
and the type of hospital service received (emergency or not): those
without insurance are more likely to use emergency services.
8.1.2 Public education and the schooling of immigrants’ children
Turning now to education, since the early 1990s, there have been pro-
visions for the education of immigrants’ children. Kiprianos (2002)
distinguishes two stages in the development of the relevant educational
policies: the first period lasted until the mid-1990s and was charac-
terised by an ethnocentric spirit; the second period begins in 1996,
when policy-making takes into account the need for intercultural ap-
proaches for the first time1. In the mid-1990s the government ac-
knowledged that the numbers of ‘foreign’ pupils in Greek schools were
growing, and thus they should be able to register in any school even if
their parents were undocumented, according to a statement of the
(then) Education Minister G. Papandreou (19 June 1995). In 1999, the
government put forward a programme of reception and support classes
for the integration of immigrants’ children into the Greek educational
system. Reception classes consist of two stages: the first one lasts one
year and mainly contains language courses and a few compulsory sub-
jects (sports, arts, foreign language); the second provides two extra
years of language support parallel to the school programme. Support
classes apply to pupils with linguistic difficulties already following the
curriculum programme, providing extra hours of language teaching
and support. During 1999-2000, 500 reception classes and 701 sup-
port classes were functioning all over the country, with a total of about
13,500 foreign pupils attending. A year later, the Ministry of Education
established a foundation class programme for foreign pupils without
any knowledge of Greek. The Immigration Bill (Law 2910/2001, article
40) recognised equal rights and obligations to ‘minor aliens’ regarding
schooling, participation in educational activities, and documents re-
quired for registration. After criticism focusing on the educational ex-
clusion of children whose parents are undocumented, the law allowed
registration irrespective of the legal status of parents (Kiprianos 2002)
2. Recently, the Ministry of Education initiated a project for the ‘inte-
gration of returning and foreign pupils’, which also includes provisions
for the teaching of the pupils’ mother tongues in specific schools with
high participation of migrant children (Macedonia, 11 December 2002).
The first language would be Russian, and the initial aim was to include
about 300 schools in the project by the end of 2004.
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Nevertheless, even before the implementation of such measures, and
given the limited number of special (intercultural) settings, many ‘for-
eign’ children have been able to register in normal state schools. The
fieldwork findings show that, at a practical level, few obstacles were
posed to the schooling of immigrants’ children. About one third (34.8
per cent) of the Albanian respondents and 15.7 per cent of the Bulgar-
ians had children in Greek educational institutions, mostly in pre-
school, primary and secondary education. Among them, four Albanian
and three Bulgarian respondents had children in Greek universities
and polytechnics. In four additional cases, the respondents’ children
had attended a Greek secondary school in the past. If we take into ac-
count the fact that many immigrants, particularly Albanians, came at a
young age and had got married and had children while in Greece, we
can assume that many of the remaining respondents’ children were
too young to be at school at the time the fieldwork took place. Further-
more, some of the respondents were children themselves when they
came, following their parents, and had continued their education in
Greece. In respect to this, a small minority had received education in
Greece: three Albanians had graduated from a Greek high school,
while another seven Albanians and two Bulgarians had studied in a
Greek university3. The novelty of the phenomenon of large numbers of
foreign children in Greek schools created the only notable problem re-
garding their schooling, which has to do with registration procedures.
Registration at school can become a complicated issue in respect to the
documents and certificates required, although bureaucratic obstacles
are sooner or later overcome:
For Minas [son’s name], we had to get a birth certificate from
here, since he was born in Greece, stating that he was born in
Greece, in Thessaloniki. We got this one, we had to translate it
into Albanian, then we got another paper from the municipality
there [in Tirana] stating, ‘This person was born in Thessaloniki,
Greece’. I brought it here and I had to translate this into Greek.
(Lazaros)
In addition, some of the respondents’ children had access to the special
reception schools mentioned earlier. The daughter of Lela, an Albanian
interviewee, who was present during our interview session, spoke her-
self about her experience after returning to Greece when her parents’
documents were issued:
I had come earlier, for a year. My parents took me with them in-
itially, so I knew a little Greek, but I had forgotten it … Then we
went to this returning migrants’ school. They helped us a lot.
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We did the first year’s textbook [primary] in order to learn the
language, the letters [alphabet], and everything … We were
studying textbooks of previous classes, and then, when we fin-
ished this school, we registered normally in the Greek school,
and there was not any problem.
The numbers of both ‘foreign’ and ethnic Greek pupils, especially in
primary education, have increased considerably in the last fifteen years
and keep rising: in 2002-2003, the total number of children of foreign
and ethnic Greek origin in state schools was 130,114, comprising 9 per
cent of the total pupil population (Kathimerini, 3 January 2004)4. The
participation of foreign pupils (excluding ‘repatriated’ ethnic Greeks) in
Greek education between 1995-2000 increased by 6.5 percentage
points in primary schools, by 1.2 in Gymnasio, by 0.3 in technical/pro-
fessional Lykeio and by 0.3 in general Lykeio (Kiprianos 2002: Table 1)5.
Most of the foreign pupils are concentrated in the large urban centres:
during 1999-2000 Greater Athens accounted for more than 40 per
cent of those attending secondary schools, and Thessaloniki about 16
per cent (To Vima, 5 November 2000). In Thessaloniki, between 1999-
2002, the number of foreign pupils in secondary education grew by
34.4 per cent (To Vima, 5 November 2000; Macedonia, 11 February
2002). During 2001-2002, 14,999 foreign and ethnic Greek pupils
were studying in prefectural state schools, and their share in the local
pupil population was 10 per cent (Macedonia, 11 February 2002); about
60 per cent of them were in primary education.
As both the above figures and my fieldwork findings suggest, despite
the irregular status of most parents, immigrants’ children have not
been excluded from education in Greece, at least not in institutional
terms. There exist problems, however, regarding the integration of chil-
dren at school. These are to an extent related to the difficulties arising
from their language skills and the process of adaptation into a new
educational system. But the widespread prejudices and negative per-
ceptions about migrants in Greece, affecting both teachers and pupils,
are factors that should not be underestimated. And there are certainly
additional obstacles connected to the socio-economic position of the
migrants. The need to enter the labour market at an early age leads
many to abandon school before completing basic education, whether
this comes as a result of a family strategy or is a personal decision of
individual pupils.
Findings suggest that prejudices and/or discrimination at school are
certainly a reality but do not practically affect the majority of immi-
grants’ children: in most cases, the latter are well-accepted by other pu-
pils and supported by teachers to overcome linguistic and other diffi-
culties. However, one third of the respondents with children schooled
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in Thessaloniki complained about unfair treatment: in most of the
cases these concerned problematic relationships between pupils, while
in a limited number of cases (eighteen), discriminatory attitudes by tea-
chers and pupils’ parents were also reported. Such attitudes reflect both
the widespread prejudices about immigrants in Greece and the ethno-
centric spirit characterising the curriculum programme and the educa-
tional system as a whole. The origin of a new pupil is certainly some-
thing that attracts attention and creates some sort of distance from the
newcomer, especially at an initial stage, but this does not necessarily
result in long-term rejection of the ‘other’ in the classroom6:
He didn’t have any problem at all. Well, apart from being told
‘Look, he is from Albania,’ but these things are unavoidable.
(Stavros, talking about his son)
There are some teachers and some children who say ‘They are
Albanians,’ but not everybody. (Melina, talking about her chil-
dren)
Indeed, there is evidence that some children adapt very quickly to the
new circumstances and some perform exceptionally well. A recent sur-
vey on the performance of foreign pupils in high school showed that
more than half (52.6 per cent) score above 15 in 20, thus securing uni-
versity entrance, while 16.6 per cent achieve top marks7. Kiprianos
(2002) relates this phenomenon to the special importance attributed to
education by some foreign pupils or their parents, who see it as a form
of capital that will offer better future prospects. Sometimes, the good
performance of foreign pupils is even highlighted by teachers as an ex-
ample to be followed by fellow pupils:
There was not any injustice at the school, they [the teachers]
didn’t say ‘Look, he’s an Albanian,’ on the contrary, they were
saying, ‘Look, he came from a foreign country and he is such a
good pupil,’ they loved him … And when I went [to ask about
his progress] they were saying ‘You should be proud of your
kid.’ (Lela)
However, the intrinsic ethnocentrism of the Greek educational system,
particularly the teaching of certain curriculum subjects and the partici-
pation in national celebrations, creates obstacles to the smooth integra-
tion of foreign pupils. For instance, during the national holidays all
schools organise a parade where the top-ranking pupil carries the
Greek flag8. In 1999, in Mihaniona, a suburb of Thessaloniki, an Alba-
nian pupil became the flag-bearer, which caused a strong xenophobic
reaction that dominated the public and media discourse in the follow-
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ing days. Much of the discourse argued against the right of an Alba-
nian to hold the national flag (see Kapllani & Mai 2005). The event has
been repeated since then several times, with the same pupil as well as
in other cases. One of the interviewees referred to this incident when
talking about his daughter’s experience:
She should be a flag-bearer and she hasn’t [been], but I can’t
complain about this. There was too much fuss about that, not at
her school, but earlier, you know, with this event at Mihaniona.
(Nikos)
Such nationalistic reactions highlight the contradictions of ethnocentric
approaches to education and school life. They reflect the exclusionary
character of national identity and the populist discourse that surrounds
it (Kapllani & Mai 2005). Similarly, certain curriculum subjects such as
history, for instance, are particularly problematic regarding references
to sensitive moments in Balkan history from a nationalistic perspec-
tive. The testimony quoted below, of Albena, a Bulgarian interviewee,
although it might be an isolated case, is characteristic in terms of the
practical implications of ethnocentrism in history education:
Let’s say, at the history class, they had a lesson about [the Byzan-
tine Emperor] Vasilios the Bulgarian-slayer … And a kid who
wanted to play … said, ‘I am Vasilios the Bulgarian-slayer.’ And
my son … felt offended. Or, for instance, the history teacher …
they had a lesson on the Balkan wars … and I had told my son
about that, when Bulgarians invaded Greece … which was not
good, but he told me ‘Mum, the teacher says bad things about
Bulgaria and she looks at me.’
Nevertheless, the problems associated with linguistic obstacles and dif-
ficulties in adapting are rather more important at a practical level. They
may negatively affect the performance and progress of children at
school, creating serious delays and in some cases being a reason for
not finishing basic education:
[My son] came a bit later, he registered at school … but he didn’t
know a word of Greek … At school he only sat and listened …
without understanding. (Albena)
They [the children] faced problems at the beginning, because
they … came here, without speaking the language … it was diffi-
cult. They still face some difficulties … My son was left behind a
little in the beginning. (Melina)
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[My son] quit school, he couldn’t make it. He was old when he
came … He didn’t finish, he did two years and he stopped. ‘I
can’t,’ he said, and he left. (Flora)
Kiprianos (2002), based on an elaboration of statistical trends, reports
that a significant number of foreign pupils abandon school (usually
after the Gymnasium), mostly due to educational difficulties. Moreover,
the shares of those continuing to a technical high school are far greater
among foreign pupils compared to those of Greeks, who do not consid-
er technical schools as ‘good’; the majority of Greeks attend a general
high school, which is the route into higher education. One should also
take into account the socio-economic condition of migrant families,
which in some cases leads children towards exclusion from basic edu-
cation and early entrance into the labour market in order to add to the
family income or be financially independent:
My son does not go to school. He dropped out when he went to
Gymnasium. He attended the Gymnasium only for one month.
He could not make it … because of the language … My son said
that it was better to look for a job. (Eleni)
In a similar way, the migratory experience itself de facto excluded some
from any future educational prospect. Many migrants came at an early
age and before finishing high school, especially those from Albania.
Young teenagers followed others on the migration path, but were
sometimes unaccompanied by parents or older relatives. These people
neglected any further education or training out of necessity, and imme-
diately faced harsh employment conditions as unskilled workers in the
Greek labour market. Such is the case of Ferin, an Albanian intervie-
wee who was only thirteen when he arrived, together with a group of
schoolmates, soon after finishing primary school:
When I came for the first time, my boss told me, ‘Come, I’ll reg-
ister you at school.’ … I didn’t come here for school, I came to
have a wage, to make some money, so I didn’t go. But that was
not good, it was stupid that I didn’t go.
8.1.3 Additional issues related to the migrants’ living conditions
To live here as an immigrant, to be able to pay for a good prop-
erty, to have a good job, you need to sacrifice. You want to go
out, to wear smart clothes, to spend money … For us, with the
wage we get, we can’t do that.
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The above quote is from my interview with Milen, a young man from
Bulgaria: in a few sentences he summarises what is experienced by
many migrants and is highlighted in their narratives regarding the
kind of life they lead in Thessaloniki. ‘Sacrifice’ is the crucial word
used; and this is partly perceived in material terms, pointing to the
conditions and goods that are inevitably linked to what can be charac-
terised as quality of life: in Milen’s words, a good job, a good house,
nice clothes, going out and consumption. The basic spheres of employ-
ment, housing, education and health have been covered in my analysis
up to now; we have also seen aspects regarding the character of solidar-
ity bonds, interpersonal relationships, as well as entertainment choices,
while much earlier in the thesis the social and political reactions, and
their practical implications, were addressed. In this section, the focus
is on some additional (material) elements of the immigrants’ living
conditions.
In respect to certain household goods, some 14 per cent of the re-
spondents were lacking basic equipment at the time of the fieldwork (a
cooker, a washing machine, or a TV). One in four did not have a land-
line phone, but this is perhaps misleading since many owned mobile
phones. One third had possessions in addition to basic home equip-
ment (videos, DVDs, computers, hi-fi sets, etc). Furthermore, the share
of respondents holding a bank account in Greece was slightly below 50
per cent9: however, while it exceeds 57 per cent among Albanians, it is
only 28.6 per cent among Bulgarian migrants, largely due to Sarakatsa-
ni men (only one in twelve has an account) and divorced women (one
in nine). Sarakatsani Bulgarians (who keep coming and going) tend
not to open a bank account in Greece, while those described as ‘elite’
migrants, more represented among Bulgarians, also chose to hold bank
accounts in their home country. In addition, there appears to be a nota-
ble gender divide, reflecting respective differences between the two na-
tionalities (more dependant female migration in the Albanian case)10.
Generally though, Albanian migrants (usually male heads of house-
holds) seem to prefer to entrust their savings to Greek banks. In re-
spect to that, it is worth mentioning a recent decision by the National
Bank of Greece to include instructions in the Albanian language at its
cashpoint machines, after estimating that nearly 90 per cent of Alba-
nian households (in Greece) are customers of Greek banks, with an
average balance of about 15,000 euros (Eleftherotypia, 12 September
2004).
Part of the immigrants’ savings or earnings are used to support their
families back home. Among the respondents, 45.7 per cent said that at
the time they were regularly sending money to their relatives, and one
in five used to send consumer goods. Remittances seem to depend on
household needs and family migration strategies. Those whose spouse
208 MIGRATION IN CONTEMPORARY GREECE
and/or children are in the home countries are more likely to remit
(65.7 per cent), as well as young migrants below 30 years of age (50
per cent) or families without children (51.1 per cent). The period away
from home slightly affects the propensity to remit – 40.3 per cent of
those with nine or more years in Greece do so. While remittances ap-
pear not to be related to income (migrants earning less than 30 euros a
day remit in higher shares – 73.7 per cent), they do though depend on
financial security: nearly 60 per cent of those with a bank account send
money back home.
Possession of a means of transport was the case for 53.3 per cent of
the respondents: 31.2 per cent owned a car, 18.3 per cent had a motor-
bike and the rest had a bicycle. Differences can be observed on the ba-
sis of gender, nationality, ethnic origin, etc. For male Bulgarian immi-
grants, the Sarakatsani included, the possession of a car in Bulgaria is
common; since movement between the two countries is free, they have
the legal right to use their car in Greece for a period of six months
without having to pay taxes. A typical practice is thus to bring the car
and use it until the end of this period, then drive it back and leave it
there before taking it to Greece again for another few months. The
share of car owners is 37.1 per cent among Bulgarians and 28.3 per
cent among Albanians; the latter tend to prefer the motorbike, as 24.6
per cent of them said they have one (but only 5.7 per cent of the Bul-
garians). Car ownership is far more common among ethnic Greeks of
both nationalities (40 per cent). The shares of female car owners are
lower, 26.8 per cent and 31.5 per cent among Albanian and Bulgarian
women respectively. The possession of private transport does not seem
to reflect spatial ‘patterns’, i.e. it does not depend on the area of resi-
dence or location of the workplace. Municipality residents appear more
likely to own a car/motorbike (more than half), while outer-city dwell-
ers seem to be more dependent on public transport or to lead more
neighbourhood-based lives. Naturally, this influences common prac-
tices, e.g. in things as simple as household shopping: among car/mo-
torbike owners, 42.7 per cent said they go anywhere in the city for
shopping, including distant large supermarkets, compared to only 13.8
per cent among those who do not have any transport means.
The percentage of the respondents who go on holiday is high at 74
per cent (higher among Bulgarian migrants, 80 per cent, and ethnic
Greeks of both nationalities, 85 per cent). This seems to be a relatively
new development. Obviously, the migrants’ financial situation plays a
role: only 12.5 per cent among those earning 40 euros or more a day
said they do not go on holiday (a share which exceeds 20 per cent in
all other wage categories). Time, again, is crucial, as more and more
migrants move towards long-term settlement, stable jobs, socialisation
and full legal status. The shares of those who do not go on holiday
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drop from 50 per cent among migrants who are in Greece for no more
than two years to 11.1 per cent among migrants with nine years or
more (Table 8.1). It thus appears that, while holidays are still not an op-
tion for many (‘We used to go before … since we came here, no, we
don’t.’), increasingly some have started enjoying it during the summer
(‘Last summer we had a better time, we went to the sea … to Halkidi-
ki.’), by travelling within Greece as well as simply visiting their home
countries (which some of the interviewees would not consider as a
‘holiday’). Interestingly, the longer migrants are in the country, the
more likely they are to travel within Greece on holiday, especially Alba-
nians and ethnic Greeks, as shown in Table 8.1.
To summarise the quantitative dimensions of all these details, in-
cluding some of the information presented earlier in the thesis also,
and to treat them statistically, I have constructed an index composed of
basic indicators (ten dichotomous variables) of the migrants’ material
conditions of living – see Table 8.2a below. The new variable (the index
scores) is a continuous one and so can be used in both descriptive and
exploratory tasks. For instance, to explore differences between the mi-
grant groups, one could compare the average index scores. Accordingly,
the data presented in Table 8.2b, confirm the general validity of some
of the differences arising from the characteristics of the respondents
that have been observed earlier for individual variables. Ethnic Greek
Albanians, for instance, appear to be the better-off group, while Bulgar-
ian Sarakatsani seem to be the poorest. Female Albanian migrants are
in a relatively worse situation compared to their male compatriots, but
it is exactly the opposite for Bulgarian women. Single Albanians appear
Table 8.1 Migrants’ holiday choices according to their period in Greece (%)
Holidays Period in Greece (years) Nationality & Ethnicity
< 2 3-4 5-8 9+ Albanians Bulgarians ethnic Greeks
in Greece 24.1 42.5 55.7 65.2 52.2 50.0 61.2
in Albania/Bulgaria 35.7 34.0 47.5 56.9 42.7 52.9 53.8
no holiday 50.0 34.0 26.2 11.1 29.0 20.0 14.9
Table 8.2a Details of the immigrants’ living conditions: variables used in the index
of ’material conditions’
social
security
health
book
bank
account
own
transport
own
property
central
heating
lack
equipment
extra
equipment
going
out
going on
holiday
1=yes 1=yes1 1=yes 1=yes2 1=yes 1=yes –1=yes3 1=yes4 1=yes5 1=yes
0=no 0=no 0=no 0=no 0=no 0=no 0=no 0=no 0=no 0=no
Key: 1 have/are covered by a health book; 2 own a car or a motorbike; 3 lack at least one of
the following: cooker, washing machine, TV; 4 have at least one of the following: VHS,
DVD, PC, Playstation, Air Conditioning; 5 going out at least once a month
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less favoured than those who are married, but it is the other way round
in the Bulgarians’ case. Younger people, especially those between 30-39
years old, as well as highly educated immigrants and those who are flu-
ent in Greek, enjoy more satisfactory material conditions. Those who
have dependent family members living in the home countries and who
send money regularly seem to sacrifice their material well-being in
Thessaloniki in order to address family needs ‘back home’.
Explanations for such differences should be traced in the varied mi-
gration patterns and individual/family migratory projects. But what is
captured here as ‘material conditions’ also includes elements that have
to do with consumerist values and Westernised lifestyles. Obviously,
much of the respondents’ material situation is a function of their fi-
nancial condition, which, for the majority, depends on their labour-
market position and income. Once again, the time factor appears to be
important for the material well-being of the migrants. These last two
issues could be (partly) ‘measured’ by the immigrants’ wages and the
Table 8.2b Details of the immigrants’ living condition: comparison of means - living
conditions and migrants’ characteristics
Albanians Bulgarians All
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
All 4.5 2.2 3.9 2.5 4.3 2.3
1 ethnic Greek origin 5.1 2.0 3.4 2.7 4.6 2.4
2 female 4.3 2.4 4.3 2.8 4.3 2.6
male 4.5 2.0 3.6 2.1 4.3 2.1
3 single 4.2 2.0 4.4 1.7 4.2 1.9
married 4.7 2.2 3.8 2.7 4.4 2.4
divorced/widowed –1.0 (N=1) – 3.5 3.1 3.2 3.2
4 18-29 4.6 1.8 4.3 1.7 4.5 1.8
30-39 4.9 2.3 4.6 2.2 4.8 2.2
40-49 3.9 2.6 4.1 3.3 3.9 2.8
50+ 4.3 1.6 2.6 2.7 3.6 2.3
5 primary 3.4 2.5 1.8 (N=4) 2.6 3.1 2.5
secondary 4.1 2.3 4.0 2.1 4.1 2.2
technical/professional 4.6 1.5 3.4 2.4 4.0 2.0
university/postgraduate 5.3 2.0 5.4 2.6 5.3 2.2
6 beginner 2.5 2.82 1.88 1.89 2.27 2.49
intermediate 4.22 2.02 3.75 1.72 4.08 1.94
fluent 5.48 1.6 4.7 2.96 5.17 2.25
7 parents/none 4.63 2.03 4.56 2.25 4.61 2.08
spouse/children 2.85 2.76 2.59 2.46 2.69 2.54
send remittances 4.06 1.92 3.21 2.34 3.77 2.1
no remittances 4.79 2.3 4.59 2.44 4.73 2.34
Key: 1=ethnic origin, 2=gender, 3=family status, 4=age, 5=education level, 6=fluency in
Greek, 7=members of family in the home countries and propensity to remit on a regular
basis.
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period they have been in Greece, both continuous variables that can be
correlated with the ‘material conditions’ index scores. As Table 8.2c
shows, the relationships between these variables appear to be signifi-
cant, although not particularly strong, due to the multiplicity of factors
influencing migrants’ living standards and pathways to incorporation.
What these (bivariate) correlations indicate is that the respondents’ liv-
ing conditions improve to an extent over time, but they also depend on
their income; as we have seen though, the longer a migrant has been
in the country, the higher his/her wage tends to be. Additional factors
such as social networks and the development of personal relationships
with locals, or language skills, as shown earlier in the thesis, also de-
pend on the time immigrants have been in Greece. The impact of reg-
ularisation is rather indirect in this case, since the migrants’ material
well-being primarily depends on their socio-economic situation.
8.2 Patterns of solidarity, agency and identity
Throughout the discussion of the findings, it has become clear that im-
migrants rely to a significant extent upon personal contacts and rela-
tionships in order to access employment, rent a property, etc. Migrant
networks not only spread information about the host country or locality
prior to emigration, thus functioning as a factor influencing and facili-
tating the migration decision and journey, but also provide the basis
for mutual support in Greece, helping immigrants to overcome initial
difficulties and further problems and linking them to the home places.
As immigrants extend their stay, they increasingly interact with both
their co-nationals and the locals. At the same time, networks of a more
formal and institutionalised character develop, like various types of mi-
grant/ethnic associations, often, again, in interaction with the citizens
and institutions of the host society. In general, both formal and infor-
mal migrant networks determine senses of belonging and patterns of
membership – in a migrant or ethnic/cultural group, in the sending
country, or in the host society – hence they specify the idea of ‘commu-
nity’, playing thus a crucial role in the incorporation process. The con-
cept of ‘community’ is used here in a broad sense. It refers to formal
organised networks and establishing communities (associations, ethnic
Table 8.2c Details of the immigrants’ living condition: correlating the ’material con-
ditions’ index score
Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N
years in Greece 0.325 0.000 208
daily wage 0.273 0.001 154
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or cultural organisations), but also, most importantly, it points to the
informal networks and interpersonal relationships through and by
which migrants organise their lives on a daily basis and at a practical
level. This section is about the ‘social space’ for migrants in the city,
space being here a metaphor referring to relational and organisational
aspects of immigrants’ incorporation. The section starts with an over-
view of organised community structures, such as ethnic and cultural
associations, and an account of the conditions of participation and
membership. It then deals with the nature of relationships developed
in the host society.
8.2.1 Emerging communities: collective organisations and patterns of
membership
Overall, the organisational performance of Albanian and Bulgarian mi-
grants in Thessaloniki has been poor so far, and collective membership
appears limited in scale. However, while Albanians have managed to
form migrant and ethnic/cultural associations, this has not been the
case for Bulgarians, who lack organised community structures – save
one ‘elite’ Greco-Bulgarian organisation and the pre-existing networks
of the Sarakatsani. Certainly, this is not a finding per se; apart from de-
scribing the present situation, one has to acknowledge the short history
of immigration to Greece and the late regularisation measures. But a
comparison with other migrant groups reveals important differences in
the way and the speed by which collectively organised responses
emerge: smaller migrant communities, equally ‘new’, managed to get
organised in associations in a relatively short period of time and to
achieve higher participation rates11. Local organisations of other mi-
grant groups are presented in Table A7 (Appendix A), while Table 8.3
summarises the relevant information collected during the fieldwork for
the groups studied here.
Take the Albanians’ case first: throughout the past fifteen years, Al-
banian migrants have managed to establish various associations
throughout Greece and at a national level. In these attempts, as men-
tioned in Section 5.2.2, they were supported by local organisations
(left-wing political groups, trade-union bodies and NGOs). In addition,
by 2002 there were four Albanophone newspapers and a magazine
published in Athens, plus a website created recently, covering not only
Albanian, but also Greek news and dedicating significant space to im-
migrants’ issues, legal provisions and rights. At the time of the field-
work, there were two migrant associations in Thessaloniki: the Alba-
nian Association of Thessaloniki and the Greco-Albanian Association,
‘Progress’. There are also a number of ethnic/cultural associations
(Northern Epirote, Vlach), the most important of which is the long-es-
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tablished federation Epirote House (Epirotiki Estia). Some artistic asso-
ciations also exist (e.g. the Drita literary club). In addition, internal Al-
banian politics are reproduced among migrants in Greece and parties/
organisations are likely to have representation in Thessaloniki12. Two
examples require special attention, due to their size and role, but also
because they were the ones more commonly mentioned by respon-
dents: the Albanians’ Association and Epirote House.
Epirote House was founded in 1940. It is not a migrant organisation
per se, but rather a federation of several associations, including commu-
nity associations of people originating from the Greek region of Epiros
and three ‘Northern Epirote’ unions: (a) Vlachophones, (b) Christians
Table 8.3 Immigrants’ associations and community networks in Thessaloniki
Name Type & Actions Source
Albanian Immigrants
Albanian Association Thessaloniki Migrant organisation (formed in
1998): campaigns, networking, in-
formation, cultural & social events,
Albanian language school for mi-
grants' children
information leaf-
let,
informal chat,
observation
Greco-Albanian Association, 'Pro-
gress'
Community association: promoting
contact, social & cultural events
informal chat
Drita literary club Local branch of an Albanian cultural
organisation
information leaf-
let, interviewees
Epirote House (incorporating: Vla-
chophones' Union, Christians from
Vlorë, Himara-Dhermi Union, Un-
ion of Friendship between Korçë
and Thessaloniki
Federation of community organisa-
tions (founded in 1940): registra-
tion (initially), information (jobs,
housing, legal matters), space for
associations meetings/activities,
social & cultural events
interview, news-
papers,
leaflets, interviewees
Association of Greeks from Sar-
andë, Gjirokaster and Delvina
Community association (formed in
1998), social & cultural events,
campaigning for citizenship rights
interview
Other associations of ethnic Greek
and Vlach Albanians
Community associations
Several cafés/tavernas (across
Thessaloniki)
Meeting points, socialisation interviewees
Bulgarian Immigrants
Greek-Bulgarian Friendship Asso-
ciation, `Kyril and Methodi'
Association active since 1998: pro-
moting contact, supporting Bulgar-
ians in Thessaloniki and Greeks in
Bulgaria, social & cultural events
interview
A central café-bar owned by a Bul-
garian, several downtown cafés (St
Dimitri area, railway station area)
Meeting points, social events observation, in-
terviewees
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from Vlore¨ and (c) Himara-Dhermi Union. Before the government
managed to develop any policy for immigrants from Albania, Epirote
House was issuing a ‘registration document’, initially to ethnic Greeks
but later to non-ethnic-Greek Albanians too. Its main initiatives include
advice on legal issues, assistance in health, education and welfare mat-
ters, job-finding, support of the ethnic Greek minority in Albania and
the establishment of cultural relationships between the two countries.
My informants claimed that since the early 1990s, about 145,000 Alba-
nian citizens from all over the country have contacted Epirote House.
However, its influence and activity have faded over time, due to the for-
mation of other associations.
The Albanians’ Association of Thessaloniki was founded by regular
immigrants in 1998, with the support of the Anti-racist Initiative of
Thessaloniki. It collaborates with many local organisations, anti-racist
groups, political parties, NGOs and trade unions, as well as with other
immigrant associations. It functions as an officially recognised institu-
tion, representing the Albanians of Thessaloniki in negotiations with
local authorities and the government. It has ties with Albanians in the
rest of Greece, mainly the Forum of Albanian Immigrants in Athens.
Its initiatives include legal advice and social support, organisation of
cultural events, celebration of national holidays, participation in cultur-
al festivals and in anti-racist demonstrations. Since March 2001, it has
run free courses in the Albanian language for immigrants’ children
(the teachers are Albanian volunteers).
However, participation rates remain low: only 18.1 per cent of the re-
spondents were members or in contact with the Albanians’ Association
of Thessaloniki, which seems poor when compared to other migrant
groups which are more devoted to maintaining community ties. The
interviewees themselves appear aware of this fact and bring it out in
their narratives, as Nadi and Adriana did in our joint conversation:
The Albanians are not that organised … others have tighter
bonds, for instance, the Pontians have very tight bonds … The
Albanians are more individualists, each one for his family. They
help each other, of course, there is solidarity, but they don’t have
that tight bond, with associations … Let me tell you something
that we say in Albania … those who have tighter bonds are the
ones from Korc¸e¨ … they come here with all their family, or their
relatives. (Adriana)
I know that there are associations here in Thessaloniki, but,
how can I explain to you, even myself, I’ve learned about them
accidentally. You can imagine that the majority won’t know
about them. In the beginning, when my life was only work I
A `space' for living: socio-cultural integration 215
didn’t know … The Vlachs are more organised … the Albanian
Vlachs. (Nadi)
The quotes above point to a number of issues that were also touched
on by other Albanian interviewees. Firstly, the situation of the mi-
grants, in terms of legal status (particularly in the early years), work,
free time and family responsibilities, does not allow for frequent parti-
cipation. Secondly, the Albanian community is large and heteroge-
neous, so that ties amongst the Albanian population as a whole are
weak and information is difficult to spread. Information depends on
word of mouth, on certain TV/radio channels running programmes for
immigrants and on Albanian newspapers/magazines, especially those
published in Athens. Thirdly, membership in general might also be
hindered by a certain degree of distrust by Albanians of collective insti-
tutions, as commented on by some interviewees, the origins of which
have to be traced to the character of the regime under which they lived
for years.
There is, though, an important distinction one should make: while
migrant associations are poorly developed among Albanians in Thessa-
loniki, ethnic or cultural unions have emerged since the very beginning,
initially assisted by, or incorporated into, existing organisations. Ethnic
Greeks and Vlachs, in some cases people originating from the same
area, appear much more disposed to form and participate in collective
organisations, partly due to their smoother integration patterns, as well
as because of strong perceptions of identity dating back to their years
in Albania. There are several community associations in Thessaloniki
(see Table 8.1), and participation rates among respondents approach 30
per cent. Such associations usually serve to maintain or enhance feel-
ings of identity, sometimes along nationalistic or localist lines, but they
also provide a basis for migrants of common origin to meet each other,
to celebrate cultural events, to socialise or discuss matters related to
their home places. To some extent, they have also managed to cam-
paign (e.g. for citizenship rights) and/or support compatriots in various
ways. However, while contact has been the case for many, especially in
their early years in Greece, it seems that membership or frequent parti-
cipation is not a lasting choice for the majority. An example is that of
Panoraia, an ethnic Greek Albanian, who gave me the following ac-
count of her experience with that kind of association:
Epirotiki Estia … We contacted them initially, we would get infor-
mation from there … We used to be members … mostly for so-
cial support … it would help us, in the beginning, to find a job,
to arrange our papers … it would show us the way, where we
should go for our papers … consultancy and support … There
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was another one [association] … a Northern Epirote had opened
it, and we all used to go there … Because there was a Vlach asso-
ciation here [Vlachs from Gjirokaster], so after this had been es-
tablished, the Northern Epirotes [ethnic Greeks from Gjiroka-
ster] decided to establish their own association.
On the other hand, migrant associations (e.g. the Albanians’ Associa-
tion) have a different function: while, naturally, they operate as an iden-
tity-enforcing mechanism, they are more active in providing practical
assistance and support, and in campaigning for migrants’ rights in
general, in collaboration with other migrant communities and with lo-
cal organisations:
We don’t have much support. Only here, with our association,
we are doing something … I have been a member for the last
one and a half years. We cannot make decisions, we only talk
about what we face everyday … the papers, for instance, or about
the police … This is a good thing, everybody should be united so
we have a voice … It’s different when you are organised, you can
express your complaints … Our president, together with presi-
dents [of associations of migrants] from other states, the Palesti-
nians, for instance, they went to the ministry and elsewhere, [to
campaign] for our problems, for the migrants … [Our associa-
tion] has done many things … It has organised an anti-racist fes-
tival, a food festival, it has participated in other initiatives too.
We do what we can. (Gjion)
Ethnic Greek Albanians also participate to a relatively high degree in
Albanian migrants’ associations (19.1 per cent). Membership rates are
particularly high among migrants aged between 30-39 years (27.8 per
cent) and among those with higher education (30.2 per cent); women,
on the other hand, appear less likely to join (14.6 per cent of them do,
compared to 19.6 per cent among men). Again, the motives vary, and
membership, or contact, does not necessarily mean frequent or active
participation: some migrants initially joined the Albanians’ Association
in order to benefit from specific services, for instance the Albanian lan-
guage classes the association runs for children:
I came here because I heard that there was an Albanian lan-
guage school. My son knows reading and writing Albanian, but
my daughter, who was five years old when she came here, didn’t
know how to read and write. She speaks a little … So I wanted
her to learn Albanian … I’ve heard it on the TV, on ET3 channel,
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which I watch every Sunday, there is a program in Albanian.
(Dimitri)
The picture varies considerably in the Bulgarians’ case. The most im-
portant difference is that the community has no official ‘representation’
in Thessaloniki, despite the operation of two Bulgarian migrant asso-
ciations in Athens and the publication of a number of newspapers
there. There is only an ‘elite’ organisation, founded in 1998 under the
name Greek-Bulgarian Friendship Association, ‘Kyril and Methodi’.
This maintains ties with the Bulgarian Consulate, and it is active in or-
ganising cultural events, in supporting both Bulgarian citizens living
in Thessaloniki and Greeks in Bulgaria (students, businessmen); they
once invited Bulgarian school children to a summer camp in Greece.
However, as admitted by the president in our interview, the association
mainly addresses mixed couples and elite migrants (businessmen, mu-
sicians, athletes) and only a handful of ‘economic migrants’ had ap-
proached them to date; the founders are themselves a mixed couple
who run a private language school and a translation business. Among
fieldwork participants, only three people, all women, had approached
this association: a music teacher, a swimming coach, and a Sarakatsani
woman who is married to a Greek and happens to live close by. On the
other hand, ethnic Greeks are necessarily in contact with the Bulgarian
Sarakatsani Association: registration with this organisation is a prere-
quisite for them in order to acquire the special annual visa they are en-
titled to; but again, membership does not translate into active participa-
tion for the majority.
In the absence of an institutionalised voice, a small Bulgarian com-
munity is concentrated around a central cafe´-bar owned by a Bulgarian
woman. This is primarily a place of meeting, socialisation and enter-
tainment, but it also functions as a space of interaction, where infor-
mation about jobs and housing circulates, and where newcomers can
get useful advice regarding legal procedures and other issues. It is be-
lieved that there are similar places in other parts of the city13. Liliana’s
account, although speaking as the owner of the place, is enlightening
and explains much:
There is no solidarity. In Athens it’s different … People have
fun, and they gather during the days they don’t work … to ex-
change information, to speak in their language, to have fun to-
gether … Here they don’t … Because also in Athens, there are
more women from Bulgaria who work there without their hus-
bands, and many work as live-ins in houses, so when they have
a day off, they go out, they go to these places and they have fun.
Here in Thessaloniki, most of the people are together with their
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families, and they don’t go out to places that often … They
mostly gather at home … also to save money … this is the most
important reason.
8.2.2 Dimensions of interpersonal relationships and informal social
networks
Given the weak organisational performance of the migrant groups stu-
died in Thessaloniki and the limited membership and participation, it
is rather migrants’ informal networks that have played the most impor-
tant role. Not only did many of the respondents have contacts in Thes-
saloniki before moving to the city, including relationships with Greek
employers and friends who offered assistance in the beginning, but
also the geographical patterns of the migrants’ settlement in Greece
(Section 4.2.2) and to an extent their spatial distribution in the city
(Section 7.2.1) has depended on where their friends and relatives were
located. In addition, the overwhelming majority made use of such rela-
tionships to find employment (Chapter 6), while some had been
helped to access housing or health services (sections 7.1.2 and 8.1.1).
Even more valuable in migrants’ everyday lives, personal ties offered
moral and material support at the very human level of socialisation
and the spending of free time. As generally observed and has been
theorised, social networks function as a source of social capital for indi-
viduals and households in order to overcome barriers imposed by the
market (Portes 1995; see also Sassen 1995) and by an alien environ-
ment that sometimes turns hostile. The extent to which networks gen-
erate effective social capital depends on the size of the community and
the density of ties (Portes 1995). To investigate the character of the mi-
grants’ social networks in our case, it is useful to pay closer attention
to the nature of informal relationships formed and maintained by Alba-
nians and Bulgarians in Thessaloniki, both between themselves and in
relation to the local population.
Questionnaire data reveal little on this issue: they inform us that the
majority of the respondents socialise mainly with people of the same
origin, and nearly 14 per cent said they socialise with compatriots only,
while about one in four has friends from other countries too. The age
groups that appear more sociable are the youngest (below 30) and the
oldest migrants (50 years old or more), reflecting their life phases and
the constraints on the rest, who are busier with work and family re-
sponsibilities. Interview accounts are more valuable, revealing interest-
ing qualitative elements in addition to highlighting the importance of
interpersonal relationships for individual migrants. The extent to
which these surpass the level of socialisation and are translated into
mutual support and solidarity is a rather controversial issue. While
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most interviewees agree that there is a certain degree of support, others
believe that reciprocity is not that strong. Katerina, an Albanian inter-
viewee, mentioned: ‘I would like it if there was more support between
each other here, but there is not enough.’; and Vilco, a young Bulgar-
ian man, agreed by telling me that: ‘Not everybody does it … some shut
their eyes and pass by.’ Interestingly, many of those who claimed that
there is no solidarity and support attributed the phenomenon to na-
tional characteristics: Albanians described themselves as ‘selfish’ and
‘individualistic’ and Bulgarians talked about the ‘curse’ of not seeking
to meet compatriots abroad. By contrast, Ani and Ivan, from Albania
and Bulgaria respectively, had different opinions: ‘There is this thing,
with people from the same country, solidarity,’; ‘It’s natural … to help
each other.’
The existence of such contradictory perceptions can be explained
also by looking at the character of social relationships migrants devel-
op/maintain in Greece, which are either built upon pre-existing con-
tacts/bonds or based on new ties formed in familiar environments (the
neighbourhood, the workplace). When referring to ‘compatriots’, for ex-
ample, most migrants meant basically or exclusively members of the
extended family, and to a lesser degree people from the same town/vil-
lage. On a second level, the workplace or the neighbourhood are the
main places of interaction where new relationships are developed, with
compatriots, Greeks or migrants from other countries:
Well, yes, we help each other. Not everybody … look … I won’t
help you, I will help my sister’s husband … you know, between
relatives, then friends, but mostly the relatives … I don’t want to
have relationships with other Albanians … If they are from
Korc¸e¨, it’s OK … If they are from other places, no. (Andreas)
Well, our Albanian friends, we know them from Albania. We ha-
ven’t made new friends, only in a single case. (Edri)
My boss helped me when I needed to move, to buy something.
We have a friendly relationship … We go out, have a coffee to-
gether, have lunch together … I have friends from other coun-
tries … I have both Greek and foreigners as close friends … Not
only from work … Some of my friends were customers at the of-
fice. (Adriana)
In my job, I have two or three friends, and we have a nice time
… Russians … Greeks as well … I don’t have many relationships
with [other] Albanians. (Mira)
Often, the relationships migrants maintain/develop in the host country
are perceived according to binaries such as ‘here and there’ or ‘now
and then’: many stressed such differences regarding the kind of rela-
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tionships and the ways people tend to socialise with each other. On the
negative side, it appears that relationships do change in the host coun-
try, and sometimes migrants are distanced from each other. The inter-
viewees attributed this to their condition as migrants and the necessi-
ties and difficulties imposed by the situation: their work-loaded weekly
programmes or their geographical dispersal across the city; some also
mentioned factors pointing to the general issue of transition to the
market economy and its effects:
Relationships there used to be friendlier, truer … but since
money came, relationships have changed. (Emil)
Here people are not so close. It used to be different in Bulgaria.
People change when they leave their country … you have envy
starting then, you know, who has made more money. (Liliana)
Well, one difference is that here they work more, so they can’t
meet each other that often, as they do in Albania … relatives …
friends. (Dalina)
Again in contrast to perceptions like the ones above, some interviewees
insisted that ties between relatives and friends became stronger abroad.
In the words of Emil, from Albania, ‘Usually [geographical] distance
makes relationships tighter.’ So tight that cultural and social differ-
ences are often eliminated, and people of different backgrounds are
brought together: as a Bulgarian interviewee said, ‘Now we all became
one … just because we are in a foreign country,’ (Ivan). Many of the mi-
grants interviewed agreed on that; Konstantina’s opinion below draws
the same picture:
There are relationships built here … even friendly ones, between
people that wouldn’t come into contact there … just because you
are in a foreign land … I can see how my mother-in-law behaves.
She has some relationships with people with whom she
wouldn’t have come into contact there … You can’t avoid inviting
people, so a small community is being formed, also to celebra-
tions, name days … There is a commitment … It is imposed be-
cause of the situation. (Konstantina)
Although contradictory, both situations might be the case for different
individuals. The patterns of socialisation vary considerably according to
age, gender, family status, geographical origin, education level or finan-
cial situation: families tend to socialise with other families; men with
male colleagues, and women with female neighbours or mothers of
their children’s friends at school. In fact, it was sometimes the same
people who argued both cases: migration and the conditions in Thessa-
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loniki are responsible for both distance between people in general, but,
on the other hand, they may result in closer bonds and more frequent
contact among small groups. In addition, a more dynamic perspective
distinguishes, once again, between past and present experiences, attri-
buting the quality of the migrants’ interpersonal relationships to the
shifts in their legal status and living conditions, or in the responsibil-
ities related to the life course. Some of the interviewees gave such ac-
counts themselves:
Things were going too fast here and each of us was trying to
protect his home and his work … this is why sometimes we can-
not help each other … if you don’t help … the other person
might misunderstand. Competitive relationships are then devel-
oped, how much each one earns, etc. As time passes this
changes, there are fewer people who stay, they get closer to each
other … When people are illegal, they tend to hide, to avoid
others because they don’t want to get in trouble … now this has
changed, but there’s still not enough solidarity. (Milen)
Well, I’m married … I have Albanian friends, Greek friends. We
go out together, at least we used to go out together, because
now, since my child was born, we don’t do it that often. (Nadi)
Finally, as made evident in the interview abstracts quoted above and as
already mentioned in earlier parts of the thesis, Albanians and Bulgar-
ians in Thessaloniki – like migrants anywhere – inevitably interact with
the local population, which gradually results in the breakdown of cul-
tural barriers and prejudices. Nearly 65 per cent of the respondents so-
cialise with Greeks and some have close Greek friends14. Spaces of in-
teraction include the neighbourhood, the school, etc., but the work-
place appears to be the primary sphere where migrants and locals have
the chance to meet, cooperate, talk and socialise. Among the intervie-
wees, the majority of those who referred to close contacts with Greeks
were talking about colleagues at work or employment-related acquain-
tances. It is also interesting how, in some cases, close personal relation-
ships developed between immigrants and their employers, given that
economic exploitation is so widespread. In a few instances, the employ-
er’s familiarity with the condition of the migrant, or with his/her lan-
guage and culture, led to the development of personal relationships:
My boss had been in Germany for twenty-three years, so he
knew what it is to be an immigrant. (Adriana)
[My second employer] he spoke Bulgarian, he helped me a lot,
apart from that he taught me the job. He also taught me how
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things are here, because we had a different view then, it was dif-
ferent for us. (Milen)
In general though, it is contact between immigrants and locals – socia-
lisation, friendship, even love affairs in a few cases – that appears to
beat prejudice in the long run, or as some interviewees put it, ‘as they
get to know you’, especially employers or colleagues at work, neigh-
bours or younger people15. The majority of the interviewees themselves
seemed to consider common ground more than the distance between
themselves and the locals. Migrants of both nationalities referred to the
cultural proximity between Greeks and Albanians or Greeks and Bul-
garians as a factor facilitating interpersonal contact: a few mentioned a
common Balkan identity or tradition, others highlighted age, school, or
work. These issues lead us inevitably to an account of the migrants’
perceptions of identity, which is given in the following section.
8.2.3 Daily practices, coping strategies and issues of identity
However important in relation to their living standards, any account of
the material conditions of migrants’ lives (as in Section 8.1.3) cannot
alone give us a full picture of their incorporation patterns. As men-
tioned earlier, these patterns may principally reflect their financial si-
tuation, crucially determined by their position in the labour market;
but they also may point to different consumption values and beha-
viours as well as to a variety of migratory strategies and plans. Other
aspects of the migrants’ daily routines, for instance language practices
and the use of media, as well as certain strategies immigrants develop
to cope in the host country through a (re)negotiation of their identities
are also important in shaping migrants’ lives in the host country.
Language, to start with, is a crucial issue. Apart from the necessity
of speaking and communicating, many migrants tried hard to learn
Greek, whether on their own or with the support of others; some also
had the opportunity to take a course. To a lesser or a greater extent,
language skills improve over time, with positive effects on several as-
pects of the migrants’ everyday lives, as we have already seen16. A qua-
litative account would uncover further elements that play a role regard-
ing non-material aspects of the incorporation process. Mixed language
practices, whereby the native language is fused, to a degree, with that
of the host society, are certainly among them, indicating the quasi-nat-
ural development of transnational daily realities. Also, migrants of eth-
nic Greek origin, given their ‘comparative advantage’ in language skills,
exhibit a tendency to speak mostly Greek at home. Most importantly,
the issue of the so-called ‘second generation’, the Greek-born or Greek-
educated children, brings the language factor to the forefront of the dy-
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namic, long-term character of incorporation. More likely to speak
Greek at home, ‘foreign’, and particularly Albanian, kids impose on
their parents the necessity of learning and practicing the language of
the host country. The propensity of younger children to use primarily
Greek at home and the consequent need of parents to practise the lan-
guage is apparent in many of the interviewees’ relevant statements:
Well, we mostly speak in Greek, in order to help the children
with school … Sometimes we speak in Albanian too, but even
when we speak in Albanian, most of the words are in Greek
[she laughs]. Because, whether we want it or not, we live here,
so we are going to speak in Greek. Me too, despite that I am old-
er, I have forgotten many words, I don’t know how to say certain
things [in Albanian] … and of course, I don’t know Greek per-
fectly, but we speak. (Lela)
With the children, we mostly speak Greek now, they talk faster
in Greek. (Flora)
We mostly speak Bulgarian [at home], but we also use Greek
words, especially with the children. (Kostas)
[We speak]Bulgarian at home, but we mix it with Greek words.
My daughter speaks in Greek most of the time. (Maria)
For the older generation, perhaps more concerned about identity is-
sues, ‘losing their origins’ appears to be a problem: language was the
most important, if not the only, element that most interviewees in-
sisted should be ‘preserved’ for as long as they were in Greece, speak-
ing both about themselves and also about their children (with the ex-
ception of some ethnic Greek Albanians). As mentioned in Section
8.2.1, the Albanians’ Association runs Albanian language courses on a
weekly basis to combat this loss of language, and for some migrants
this was their only reason for approaching the association.
An additional qualitative element is the issue of free time. In sec-
tions 7.2.3 and 8.2.2, we have seen aspects of the immigrants’ enter-
tainment options and social lives in Thessaloniki. The financial bur-
den, however, does not allow going out frequently, and naturally people
need to devote some time to themselves and to their families. I have
talked about the ‘home-to-work’ space that shapes the daily routines of
most of the participants, especially the older ones and those who lead
family lives; in this respect, there is little difference between migrants
and locals. Staying at home is an opportunity to rest and to be with the
family; reading, listening to the radio, watching TV, or talking on the
phone are the most common daily habits, as well as helping the chil-
dren with their homework (especially mentioned by female intervie-
wees). Media use, apart from acquiring information on daily matters
224 MIGRATION IN CONTEMPORARY GREECE
and/or entertainment, has two additional special functions: it becomes
a link with the country of origin and a source of information about is-
sues specific to immigrants in Greece. Again, the sample is charac-
terised by great variety: many read Albanian and Bulgarian newspapers
imported from the home countries, or even the Greek dailies, while
some also buy the newspapers published by and/or for immigrants in
Greece. Younger migrants and those who are more educated, especially
those working in offices and qualified jobs, also mentioned the use of
the Internet, although this appears very limited overall. Bulgarian mi-
grants living on the outskirts to the north of the city said they can lis-
ten to Bulgarian radio stations, and some can get Bulgarian channels
on the TV. And there are migrants of both nationalities who can access
Albanian or Bulgarian TV channels from Thessaloniki using satellite
antennas, although such practices were very rare among my partici-
pants.
The extent to which Greek newspapers are read depends on lan-
guage fluency and free time willingly spent on this, but fieldwork infor-
mation is rather poor on this issue. On the other hand, there is a wide
selection of imported newspapers that are easily accessible and widely
read, although some interviewees (especially ethnic Greek Albanians)
appeared reluctant or ‘not interested’, limiting their information about
their home places to what their relatives tell them on the phone. Immi-
grant newspapers published in Athens are also popular, mainly be-
cause they publish detailed information on policy developments, legal
procedures, entitlement to rights, etc., summarised in their own lan-
guage. These newspapers also provide a basis for the consolidation of
migrant communities, as described in Section 8.2: they have articles
specific to immigrants’ lives and problems; they offer space for com-
munication and debate on political and cultural issues; they include in-
formation on social/cultural events, and give details regarding the ac-
tivities of associations.
Nevertheless, it is television that seems to be the most widespread
entertainment option for the majority, and the basic information
source present in many migrant households. The interview material re-
veals that channel and programme preferences might be very diverse,
but the role of television in helping individual migrants to familiarise
themselves with the language and the mentality of the host country is
important. The interviewees are aware of the negative stereotypes pre-
sent in the media discourse (see Section 5.2.1), bitterly described by Al-
banians since they are the ‘usual suspects’. But on the other hand, any
positive reference to immigrants was mentioned proudly by the inter-
viewees: from little stories of honest foreign workers taking a wallet
they found to the police, to the popular 2002 TV series about a love
story between an Albanian and his boss’s wife (see Chapter 5, footnote
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14). Negative images, however, are still commonplace (especially about
Albanians) not only in the media discourse, but also most importantly
in the public’s perception of the immigrant ‘other’. How do migrants
cope on a daily basis with such stereotypes? The interviewees’ narra-
tives reveal a multiplicity of reactions to the host society’s xenophobic
stances:
I feel bad … I am getting angry … It really hurts me. (Panoraia)
I don’t feel bad, I just don’t care … There are some of our people
who get angry … and ask them, ‘Why did you say this?’ but I
don’t care. (Ferin)
Before, I used to get angry, because you try to prove to yourself
that you know, that you have graduated from school, that you
have much knowledge and you want to make it here … and
there are some people who put obstacles in your way, who don’t
let you stand up. (Milen)
What is interesting is the way migrants learn to live with this reality:
in their narratives it is clear that they do not feel happy about it, but
they do not picture themselves as victims, at least not in the majority
of cases. Sometimes they even make fun of the vagueness of the
stereotypes about them; I was told some of the common ‘jokes’ about
Albanians by a couple of Albanian participants. An evocative example
of such an easy-going approach is given below with Lefteris’ sarcastic
response to his neighbours’ derogatory ignorance:
I was talking to a neighbour, a racist. He asked me ‘Did you
have hens in Albania?’, ‘We did.’, ‘Did they make eggs?’, ‘No,
they make cows,’ I answered.
However, xenophobia, and Albanophobia in particular, is so widespread
that many Albanian immigrants have developed a series of strategies
in order be accepted and to smooth their relationships with locals.
Some have been baptised Orthodox (10.9 per cent of the sample), some
have changed their names into Greek ones (16.7 per cent), some sim-
ply hide their religious beliefs (4.3 per cent), while others present
themselves as of ethnic Greek origin (4.3 per cent)17. The role of mi-
grant networks is obvious in such cases: the pioneers had opened a
path, which the newcomers followed. Names were crucially indicative
of ethnic origin, and a Greek or Orthodox name could be a ‘passport’
to ethnic Greek status. Names are changed slightly, when there are si-
milar-sounding Greek ones (Illir – Elias), or completely, when they
sound foreign or Muslim (Rushan – Ghiorgos, Fatme – Maria); in
some cases Christian or Greek-sounding names have been kept with-
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out change (Mimoza, Mira, Edi), while names with a Greek version are
simply translated (Irena – Erini). Bulgarian migrants too, in some
cases, adopt names sounding more ‘Greek’ (Lioupa – Eleni, Milen –
Makis, Vilco – Vaggelis), but this comes after their employers’ initiative
to call them something easier to pronounce. There are people (of both
nationalities) who use a different name at work, or when socialising
with Greeks, and their ‘real’ one at home or among friends and compa-
triots.
Baptism, on the other hand, appears as a ‘uniquely Greek’ expres-
sion of intercultural relationships between immigrants and locals. The
godfathers are Greeks, friends, neighbours, bosses or colleagues, who
usually propose the baptism of migrants and/or their children them-
selves. It is usually Albanians of Muslim, and to a lesser extent Catho-
lic, origin who choose this strategy, not necessarily as a result of reli-
gious faith:
We wanted our children to be baptised, not because we are very
religious, but simply because you feel racism in this field too …
so if they are baptised they’ll have fewer problems. So, when we
went there [to the church], they told us that the mother at least
has to be baptised, so it was necessary for me to get baptised …
and I did it, not because I was feeling it. (Edri)
From the immigrants’ point of view, this practice is certainly a strategy
of adjustment to the host country’s culture, in order to ‘make things
easier’ for them or their children. However, in some cases it may re-
flect actual religious feelings and an internal need to search for their
roots, or to discover faith and customs that were banned in the home
country. In fact, the rediscovery of religion is a general feature among
the populations of the former Eastern Bloc, and is equally present
amongst some Bulgarian immigrants as well. The examples below are
characteristic:
I have adopted a few things here because I liked them … They
mostly have to do with customs related to religion, which didn’t
exist there, since religion was prohibited. All those things that
entered our life, the celebrations … You try to put into your life
what was missing … faith. (Konstantina).
It is important, because … from the moment I was born, we did
not know what religion was, since Hoxha destroyed everything
and we had no faith. It is a great emptiness that we still feel
these days … [Now] I go to church, I have been to the monas-
teries on Mount Athos. (Spyros)
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I always … felt that I had missed something … because of the
fact I was not baptised … I grew up in a family of baptised
Orthodox, but the issue of religion was … not a taboo, but we
wouldn’t talk about that, it didn’t exist … I first entered a church
after the death of my grandmother to light a candle, and since
then I never stopped doing this … Ten years later I came here,
and I had this thought in my mind, I wanted to get baptised. (Ir-
ina)
However, religious expression is not the same for all; while Greece, as
a host society, has addressed the needs of those who revert or convert
to the Orthodox Church well, other religions, and particularly Muslims,
are not easily accepted or welcomed. It is true that a large share of the
migrants in Greece originates from countries traditionally belonging to
the Eastern Church, and these are even more represented in Thessalo-
niki. It is also true that the host society’s xenophobic perception of Al-
banians as mainly Muslims is misleading, putting an additional nega-
tive element to the image of the ‘Albanian’: in the Albanian context,
‘Muslim’ is more of a cultural category than a religious one, and the in-
heritance from this ‘atheist nation’ is confirmed by the share of the
‘not religious’ in my sample, and by the high degree of religious adapt-
ability of Albanians. But the rediscovery of religion, even if only as a
point of reference for many, applies also in the case of Muslim Alba-
nians, who, together with migrants from countries sharing the Islamic
tradition, face hostility and lack the space to express their beliefs.
Among the Albanian respondents, 9.4 per cent said their religious
needs were not satisfied in Thessaloniki and 8.7 per cent complained
about discriminatory attitudes against them for being Muslims or sim-
ply not religious.
One should thus consider that what has been labelled here as ‘inte-
gration strategies’ are to an extent imposed. Baptism or name-change
partly reflect the power of ethnicity and the continuing (in fact, re-
emerging) importance of the Orthodox religion in the Greek collective
imagination, as well as the xenophobic motives that push employers to
call their Albanian employee ‘Nikos’ rather than ‘Ferin’, or inspire
neighbours to baptise the Albanian children next door. Even when the
intentions are good and indicate a willingness to help, the Balkan
‘other’ is somebody inferior.
Finally, ethnic Greek migrants, despite their privileged position in re-
spect to both legal status and acceptance by the locals, find themselves
set into a particular situation of conflicting traditions. Both Greek-Alba-
nians and the Sarakatsani had the same complaint: back home they
were the ‘Greeks’, and in Greece they are the ‘Albanians’ or the ‘Bulgar-
ians’. Stories told by the interviewees highlighted aspects of what some
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described as ‘identity confusion’: in their daily interaction with locals,
they feel they have to support their Albanian or Bulgarian compatriots,
while at the same time they have to (re)confirm and explain their
‘Greekness’. However, acculturation and acceptance by the locals ap-
pear more straightforward in their case: the higher degree of adaptabil-
ity and the better conditions observed among ethnic Greek Albanians
should be, partly at least, attributed to their more favourable legal sta-
tus.
As coping strategies, name-change and baptism imply a voluntary
shift in the cultural identity of the migrant, an abandonment of the old
identity and a rather opportunistic adjustment to what is perceived as
the host society’s culture and beliefs. This (re)negotiation of identity is
not an easy path psychologically or socially; it entails personal and so-
cial conflicts, as the ‘code switch’ is neither simple nor straightforward,
and it does not always have the expected outcomes18. To an extent,
these practices point to the transnational and hybrid experiences lived
by many migrants, especially from Albania. Not only when ‘Nikos’ be-
comes Ferin when work is finished, or when Orthodox Maria celebrates
Easter in Thessaloniki and then, as Fatme, visits her Muslim relatives
in Elbasan during Ramadan. Or when ethnic Greek migrants feel con-
fused by being treated as ‘Albanians’ or ‘Bulgarians’ in the country they
consider their ancestral home, while they were the ‘Greeks’ in Albania
and Bulgaria. More crucially, because these examples are only part of
the overall common and simultaneous reference to both ‘here’ and
‘there’, to aspects of both cultures that fuse into one, with some ele-
ments lost and others gained throughout this process. Albanian mi-
grants, for instance, especially men, referred to ‘besa’ as an exclusive
feature of what it means to be Albanian. Besa is a cultural notion that
summarises several virtues of the ‘Albanian soul’, such as the word of
honour, true friendship and ‘masculinity’. Bulgarian migrants, on the
other hand, would highlight the stubborn nature of Bulgarian people,
explaining how it becomes a positive element indicating self-discipline
and consistency. At the same time, both would reject certain elements
(e.g. talking loudly in the street, or ‘being a brute’) and adopt new ones
they found attractive in the host society (language, religion, traditions,
lifestyle, etc.). All these indicate the multiple and fluid character of
‘identity’, its constant (re)negotiation, and its fragmentation according
to the different spheres of life one refers to.
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9 Migration and social change: revisiting theory
This chapter addresses the empirical material from a theoretical per-
spective. Its aims are to summarise the key findings, highlight the
main issues raised and frame the basic arguments stemming from the
research. This is done in the first part of the chapter, where the mi-
grants’ multiple pathways to incorporation are outlined and the main
explanatory factors are discussed. Early in the thesis, it was argued that
the study of contemporary migration can help us understand broader
phenomena. In the case of Greece too, migration is part of a complex
set of interconnected social processes, many of which take place in the
context of globalisation. On these grounds, the second part of the chap-
ter aims to explore the international relevance of what is taking place
in Thessaloniki and to indicate key points as areas for future research.
The results are discussed in a comparative theoretical perspective by
looking at the experiences of other urban societies beyond the Greek
case and by interpreting them in the light of theory: what happens
‘here’ happens in similar ways in other places too1. The chapter ends
by identifying the elements indicating the third component in the title
of the thesis, i.e. the trends of socio-economic change in relation to mi-
gration.
9.1 Fences and bridges: some interpretations
What the research and analysis generally show is that there are no dis-
tinct uniform patterns of ‘integration’ or ‘exclusion’. How can we speak
about ‘exclusion’ from the labour market when there are no signs of
structural unemployment and the labour-market trajectories of many
migrants appear relatively successful? To what extent can ‘exclusion’ de-
scribe the present situation, with increasing numbers acquiring legal
status, hence enjoying almost equal access to benefits and services?
After all, as we have seen, even without documents, migrants managed
not simply to survive, but also to improve their position. Discrimina-
tion and negative stereotypes are still in place – but do they really affect
immigrants as deeply in daily matters as in the recent past? In con-
trast, many of the participants express positive reactions, have good re-
lationships with locals and claim feelings of identification with Greece
as a host society and with Thessaloniki as ‘their place’. Yet, one should
be conscious of not idealising positive steps and improvements in indi-
vidual cases. To what extent can we speak about integration when the
majority of immigrants is in an ambivalent legal position of temporary
residence? What kind of integration is it that keeps migrants at the bot-
tom of the social hierarchy, doing the ‘dirty’ jobs for modest rewards?
And certainly, xenophobia, despite its decreasing influence on indivi-
dual experiences, is now well-embedded in the host society’s culture,
stimulating tensions on certain occasions. Let us recall the recent
events that followed a football match between the Albanian and Greek
national teams in Tirana (September 2004): thousands of migrants
gathered in the streets to celebrate their team’s victory, but the reaction
of the defeated Greeks resulted in violence in Athens and elsewhere.
Not to mention examples from the numerous tragic individual stories
that frequently appear in the media: situations of terribly poor condi-
tions, cases of extreme exploitation, accidents in the workplace without
compensation, unresolved problems with the leviathan of the Greek
state, unjustified expulsions – the list could be endless.
Given the above, different typologies of incorporation can be ob-
served. Some migrants, especially Greek-Albanians, seem to be moving
towards assimilation, gradually absorbed by the host society’s dominant
culture: they maintain minimum contacts with their home places and
make plans to stay forever; they try to adapt by socialising mostly with
locals and by speaking only Greek at home. Some others are partially
integrated: their social lives are based on community contacts and they
plan to stay for a set period, whether this might be determined by the
accomplishment of projects or by their children’s graduation from
school. While minority in my sample, there are also apparently a large
number of migrants, as shown in other studies2, that seem to be extre-
mely marginalised and desperate, while a few might be involved in
crime and illicit activities. Lastly, especially regarding the groups stu-
died, a figure that might prevail in the future is that of the ‘transna-
tional’ migrant, who frequently travels back and forth and maintains
contacts/relationships in both countries, actually leading a life between
‘here’ and ‘there’. Clearly, there is not an archetypal immigrant in
Greece; even the above typologies might apply to one single person’s
experiences over time, or to different members of a migrant family.
During the past fifteen years or so, contradictory forces seem to have
been in place. On the one hand, structural, political and institutional
processes have been pushing migrants towards the social margin, de-
nying them rights, confining them to exploitation, generating xenopho-
bia. On the other, factors ranging from agency to socialisation and in-
teraction with locals have helped them to overcome difficulties and fa-
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cilitate their trajectories within the host society. The first two parts of
this section are concerned with interpreting such contradictory pro-
cesses, which ultimately shed light on the two faces of immigrants in
Greece, who are at the same time victims and actors. The third part
sums up the key explanatory factors in the study of incorporation.
9.1.1 How ‘host’ becomes ‘hostile’: the migrants as victims
How is the ‘other’ perceived in the host society? Which is his/her struc-
tural position, and why? Answering these questions on the basis of the
rather copious empirical material presented in the previous chapters
has not been an easy task. In order to interpret the main findings, it is
useful to employ two key sociological concepts: roles and stances. On
the one hand, the host society has developed particular stances towards
immigrants – attitudes and perceptions, but also policy measures and
treatment by the authorities. On the other, immigrants came to per-
form specific roles within the host society, while they have also been
denied certain roles. We can identify three basic aspects of the migra-
tory experience that arise out of specific roles and stances, on the basis
of which immigrants in Greece are essentially victimised: they are
aliens, workers and strangers. These attributes emerge from a complex
set of structures and relations embedded in the socio-economic, politi-
cal-institutional and cultural-ideological spheres. The socio-spatial con-
text forms the terrain upon which these are reflected.
The other as alien is defined by the policy framework and its imple-
mentation. The term ‘alien’ (allodapόs), extensively used in legal docu-
ments and the public discourse, contains certain connotations for the
migrants themselves and for Greece as a host society. It came to mean
specifically the immigrant – not the ‘foreigner’ in general – and it is
connected to all the attributes the migrant is supposed to entail: they
take jobs away from natives, they are responsible for falling wages, they
might be criminals; above all, they do not belong to ‘us’. In its first
phase of development, the laissez-faire approach of the legal framework
left hundreds of thousands of immigrants without the opportunity to
regularise. An alien then was thus de facto ‘illegal’ (parάnomos), i.e.
someone who unavoidably flouts the law, an offender. Among the fac-
tors that have conditioned policy-making during the past decade, the
one most apparent at the initial stage has been an institutional-bureau-
cratic one, characterised by traditional structures and xenophobic atti-
tudes (Baldwin-Edwards & Fakiolas 1999), as analysed in Section 5.1
with respect to the migrants’ own experiences. The state was not pre-
pared to deal with the new situation and the initial reaction was
marked by blindness, tight control, police brutality, arrests and deporta-
tions, as well as by bureaucracy, inefficiency and national-identity con-
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siderations. On this basis, aliens became invisible ‘non-persons’3, living
in constant hiding and chased by the police. This situation has ob-
viously changed, after two regularisation programmes (that had already
taken place before my fieldwork) during which the vast majority of the
participants had the opportunity to obtain legal status – not to mention
two more limited amnesties that followed my research. Even so, most
of the migrants indeed remain ‘aliens’, since they are doomed to an
ambiguous legal position that does not guarantee them viable long-
term residence; and there is certainly a minority of immigrants who re-
main irregular (e.g. recently arrived ones), or who swing back to illegal-
ity due to an inability to find registered employment.
However, not all immigrants are necessarily ‘aliens’. The selectivity
of Greek immigration policy, based on perceptions of national identity,
has led to a distinction between good and bad ‘others’. Those who be-
long to ‘us’ are not treated as ‘aliens’ because they form part of the na-
tion: they are ethnic Greeks (omogeneίs). But even in this case, selectiv-
ity has its own hierarchy: different measures are applied to ethnic
Greeks from Albania and Bulgaria. Taking also into account the more
privileged status of Pontians, it is clear that the fragmented legal fra-
mework has contributed to the ex post construction of various cate-
gories of migrants, with direct effects on both integration processes
and the dynamics of migration as such. We have seen, for example,
that entitlement to annually renewable visas determined cyclical migra-
tion patterns for Sarakatsani Bulgarians. Also, the favourable legal con-
ditions for ethnic Greeks have led ‘other’ Albanians to the adoption of
specific immigration and integration strategies: changing names to
sound Greek, presenting themselves as Northern Epirotes and convert-
ing to Orthodoxy – the religion of ethnic Greeks – through baptism.
The ideological-cultural reception of the migrants has constructed
the other as stranger, referring to the concept introduced by Simmel
(1950)4. The ‘stranger’ is the ‘other within’, who is close to ‘us’ and par-
ticipates in ‘our’ society, but whose relationships with the rest of the
group are also marked by distance, since s/he does not belong to ‘us’
and can withdraw at any time. Immigrants are ‘strangers’ by definition:
they are foreigners, i.e. nationals of some other state, they come from a
distant place. But they are also ‘strangers’ in the theoretical sense, be-
cause they are ‘different’; they possess attributes that are ‘strange’ to
us, differentiating them and portraying them as ‘others’. They have to
abandon these attributes in order to be able to share ‘our’ cultural mod-
els and adapt to conditions ‘here’. When they do not succeed, they be-
come scapegoats, bearing the responsibility for all our misfortunes that
supposedly stem from their presence. Immigrants in Greece are per-
ceived as illiterate peasants fleeing from a state of ‘backwardness’; they
are seen as criminals by birth, and thus untrustworthy. The Balkan
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‘other’ in particular, perhaps precisely because of physical and cultural
similarities, has been strategically constructed as someone different,
and thus estranged from ‘us’.
For a population that has perceived itself as ethnically and culturally
homogeneous for nearly a century and that is now confronted directly
with the ‘other’, immigration challenges widespread notions of belong-
ing and perceptions of identity. The emphasis on the supposedly dis-
tinctive culture of the ‘other’ is characteristic of the new racist phenom-
enon in Europe, which emphasises cultural rather than biological cri-
teria, as in the past5. But the position and role of immigrants within
the social structure itself contributes to deepening prejudices, uncover-
ing the class-based roots of racism6. A segment of the working class is
pushed towards the margins and its social condition is linked to its eth-
nic origin. Thus the term ‘immigrant’ (or ‘alien’) comes to signify a
specific category, which is ultimately constructed in a paradoxical way,
because it contains both unifying and differentiating elements (Balibar
& Wallerstein 1990). Despite their heterogeneity, ‘immigrants’ are de-
fined as a single group, clearly distinguished from ‘us’. Interestingly,
those participants in the research who have been described as ‘elites’
do not actually think of themselves as ‘immigrants’.
The class of the ‘other’ is thus determined by the productive structures
and relations and by their dynamics of change. The ‘other’ is basically
a worker, s/he works hard, doing any job, in harsh conditions and for
little money. Occasionally s/he might be judged responsible for the rise
in unemployment, the fall of real wages, the expansion of the informal
economy. However, there is a particular space in the labour market,
which has ‘accommodated’ migrant labour. This space lies on the
boundaries between the formal and informal sectors, mostly in the lat-
ter – although such boundaries are not marked by distinctive lines. But
it has not been created by immigration: rather it predated it in different
forms and it now expands, taking on new characteristics with the ad-
vent of economic restructuring. It took shape because of the increased
demand for cheap and flexible labour, primarily by SMEs, on the one
hand, and by private households, on the other, for certain labour-inten-
sive productive, but also reproductive, activities. This demand has risen
due to a series of factors ranging from the competitive crisis of SMEs
to the expansion of the middle classes; it now persists because of the
availability of cheap labour offered by migrants and the increasing un-
willingness of locals to perform certain types of work. It is characteris-
tic of a context of labour-market segmentation, which it further rein-
forces and reproduces. Both an outcome and a cause of the contradic-
tions between labour-intensive and capital-intensive activities and
formal and informal sectors, labour-market segmentation leads to the
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polarisation of the labour force, which is more and more expressed
along ethnic lines.
The work of immigrants has been crucial for the survival of SMEs.
Many businesses in the traditional manufacturing sectors (food and
beverages, clothing, etc.) – particularly important in Thessaloniki and
northern Greece – have been saved from shutting down or moving
abroad, although such trends persist. But immigrants also widely per-
form ‘supporting’ or ‘assisting’ tasks and do the hard work in construc-
tion and low-level services at a lower cost: they climb up ladders, they
keep the shop, they clean, they load and unload the stock7. Given the
family character of many SMEs, their employment ‘releases’ household
members from the tasks they would normally do. Especially in cities,
even the more ‘advanced’ economic activities, such as the leisure and
tourism industries or the financial sector, are in need of this ‘support-
ing’ work: somebody has to clean, to deal with repairs, etc. This does
not mean of course that the indigenous labour supply for such jobs
has disappeared; but it gradually shrinks or moves towards supervisory
positions. With rising educational and living standards, locals go for
the difficult manual tasks less and less, while fewer will now work
there for low wages and without insurance, thereby ‘creating’ a space
for immigrant labour. On the other hand, the demand of households
for personal services is mostly related to reproductive activities: house-
work, cleaning, childminding, caring for the elderly or the disabled.
The gendered division of labour, a result of both productive-reproduc-
tive relations in the Greek social formation and traditional perceptions
of the position of women in society, is reproduced with the work of fe-
male migrants who perform the tasks exclusively done by wives,
mothers or grandmothers. The employment of migrants counterba-
lances and further facilitates the exodus of women from home, espe-
cially for the middle and upper classes – a trend common across
Southern Europe (see King & Zontini 2000). But male immigrants too
offer private supporting services related to the household’s quality of
life at relatively low cost: they do repair work, they paint, they put tiles
on the floor or on the roof and look after the garden. Clearly, migrants
do the jobs done by household members in the past, or jobs that were
not done at all.
These findings suggest that most immigrants perform specific roles
within the Greek social structure, as servants or manual workers, ‘liber-
ating’, in a sense, Greek men from repair activities, Greek women from
housework, small shop-owners from the toughest manual tasks, etc.
and helping small enterprises to stay in business. With migrants doing
the hard work, an increased number of locals save valuable time and
are now free to deal with their personal development and to engage in
leisure activities, which expands socio-economic polarisation at the cul-
236 MIGRATION IN CONTEMPORARY GREECE
tural level (Psimmenos 1995). Migrants, on the other hand, find them-
selves in a particularly vulnerable position due to institutional and
structural factors: both their problematic status (clandestine initially,
temporary and ambiguous currently) and the structure of the Greek
economy itself, as well as the necessity that led them to emigrate, do
not allow them much leeway to avoid such a role. A new ‘servant’ class
has thus been created – working hard, informally hence flexibly, and
with very modest financial rewards – which is differentiated horizon-
tally from the indigenous labour force simply because it concentrates
distinguishable ethnic and cultural characteristics and its members are
not citizens. In addition, the imaginary ‘space’ reserved for migrants in
the labour market is translated into the actual space they occupy in the
urban geography and the housing market. The studies of Psimmenos
(1995; 1998; 2001) and Iosifides & King (1998) on immigrants in
Athens draw a dark picture of old, low-quality properties, sometimes
long-abandoned or not built for accommodation, in working-class
neighbourhoods gradually emptied of their previous inhabitants, which
turn into busy and ugly run-down districts forgotten by planners.
Venturing an anachronistic parallelism, it would not be an exaggera-
tion to argue that the living and working conditions of many migrants,
especially throughout the 1990s, bring to mind those of the early in-
dustrial working class, given the largely different socio-economic con-
text of today (e.g. decreased importance of industrial capital and em-
ployment in manufacturing). To paraphrase a saying of Marx (1979:
85), a new class has emerged, which ‘has to bear all the burdens of so-
ciety without enjoying its advantages’. This ‘class’ though is not verti-
cally differentiated from the working class as a whole (even if today
such terms and boundaries are rather vague and difficult to define),
but it is located at the bottom of the social pyramid, and it is notable
because of its ethnic/cultural origin. Of course, clear-cut divisions are
simply schematic terms to allow interpretation: the Greek petit entre-
preneur or middle-class woman who might employ a migrant can
hardly be described as ‘capitalists’. But there are obvious exploitative re-
lations between bosses and workers, or ‘patrons’ and ‘servants’. Such
exploitative relations are extended in the housing market, and, in a si-
milar way, we could parallel the migrants’ conditions to those of the
early proletariat (Engels 1993). Immigrants’ position in the urban
housing markets of today’s Greece resembles to an extent the situation
prevalent during the first wave of urbanisation in Athens, nearly 150
years ago. ‘The emergent working class was thrust into an economy
that was ready to exploit them not just as labour but also as tenants.
They … had to adapt to a speculative land and housing market’ (Leonti-
dou 1990: 63). Of course, here as well differences are obvious: then
the popular strata were coming from rural areas, now many immi-
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grants originate from cities; Athens then was being built, Thessaloniki
now expands; the urban economy was at the pre-industrial stage, now
it is undergoing trends of post-industrial restructuring. What this argu-
ment implies is that the structural position of migrants as a new man-
ual/servile class has a clear spatial face, which also reflects widespread
prejudices towards ‘aliens’ or ‘strangers’ through discrimination in the
housing market.
9.1.2 Networks, strategies and identity: the migrants as actors
In the shadow of the state, partly neglecting and largely repressing the
immigrants at least until the end of the past decade, the market has
crucially conditioned migrants’ lives in Greece. The labour market, be-
cause since the beginning there has never been an issue of work avail-
ability, given the shortages in specific sectors, the rising demand for
flexibility, the nature of the informal sector, etc. The housing market, be-
cause it seems to have counterbalanced over time problems of discrimi-
nation and non-acceptance. But, since the market generates relations
of exploitation, how can we explain the gradual improvement of living
and working conditions? And what else does the migratory experience
entail, apart from work and home? Rather, it is in the non-market fac-
tors, in the reality of migrants’ everyday lives, that we can ‘capture’
their lifeworld and understand their trajectories in the host society and
their pathways to incorporation, especially during the period the major-
ity were irregular, but also in recent years, after repeated regularisation
schemes.
The discussion in the previous section touched thus on one side of
the coin. It portrayed immigrants in Greece as ‘victims’: of the legal
framework and the way it is implemented; of xenophobia, discrimina-
tion and racism; of a segmented labour market that reserves hard and
badly paid jobs for them; of socio-spatial structures leading them to
low-quality housing in deprived areas. However, the experience of the
fieldwork itself and the overall findings of the research came to dis-
solve another widespread perception of the ‘other’: that of the margina-
lised individual who leads a miserable life. In contrast to what is gener-
ally believed and despite their vulnerable and legally ambiguous posi-
tion, immigrants make their own progression within the host society.
As shown throughout the analysis, many tend to follow upward social
routes. Clearly, it was only when the option of regularisation emerged
that a way out of marginalisation became possible. But immigrants
have not remained passive in this process. They actively and con-
sciously resisted, struggling not only to survive, but also to change
their immediate situation. They developed collective and individual
ways to smooth over the difficulties and progress with their lives.
238 MIGRATION IN CONTEMPORARY GREECE
Based on their networks and on informal practices and adaptation stra-
tegies, they have managed to organise their lives in various ways.
At the collective level, migrants form associations and get organised
in order to claim rights, or to facilitate their needs of socialisation, be-
longing and identity. As we have seen, organised action has not been
the case for the majority of immigrants in the groups studied. Partici-
pation in associations remains low among Albanians, while Bulgarians
have no organised community in Thessaloniki. The limited time peri-
od, the late regularisation measures and the fact that there were no
preceding migration streams explain this to some extent. At a grass-
roots level though, migrants meet together in specific places, forming
small informal communities. The networks of migrants provide the ba-
sis for solidarity, mutual assistance and socialisation, functioning as
sources of information, means of job-finding, ways of accessing the
housing market, etc. Social networks seem to become both denser and
more open, moving beyond contacts based on kinship or place of ori-
gin and expanding towards the broader migrant community and the lo-
cal population. Relationships with Greeks start in the workplace, often
with employers (despite exploitative relations), or in the neighbour-
hood. They further facilitate migrants’ pathways of access to various
spheres of social life, from health and welfare services to mainstream
entertainment choices. In an almost natural way, the obstacles imposed
by prejudice are in practice overcome through everyday life and inter-
action.
At the individual level, migrants appear conscious of the sacrifices
they have to make in order to improve their conditions and/or accom-
plish their projects. Whether they intend to stay in Greece or go back
at some point, whether they have family to support or they simply want
to ‘live their lives’, they appear certain about their decisions and plans.
The migratory journey is not necessarily perceived as a mechanistic
exodus from economic hardship, but it rather entails a belief that it will
help migrants to improve their position, not simply in terms of survi-
val, but also in respect to lifestyle options (see Kosic & Triandafyllidou
2003, on Albanians in Italy). Immigrants cope with reality in various
ways: some appear to believe strongly in their own capacities, while
others rediscover religion as a source of hope; many build on the ‘bet-
ter days’ that will come in the future for them or their children, while
others seem to be enjoying life at present. In general, migrants try to
adapt and be accepted by developing specific integration strategies:
baptism, name-change, learning the language, encouraging children to
do well at school, etc. Lacking much in the way of financial resources,
they enjoy open public spaces, turning them into lively meeting points.
Gradually though, they get accustomed to the dominant Greek enter-
tainment habits. They manage to make their way through closed doors
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through informal or alternative paths, helped by Greek acquaintances,
accessing emergency hospital services, travelling back and forth for
health or other reasons, etc. Travel and contact with the home coun-
tries and mixed cultural practices facilitate their trajectories in Greece
in many ways.
As time passes, and especially when the condition of illegality is re-
placed by regular status, migrants acquire the self-confidence necessary
for them to (re)negotiate their wages and conditions of employment,
while some exercise self-employment or entrepreneurship. Entrepre-
neurship itself can be seen as a strategy for integration. Although there
are not particular types of ‘ethnic businesses’ that are characteristic of
these two migrant groups, the limited relevant cases could be possible
indicators of a trend that will perhaps be more prominent in the near
future. The cultural proximity between Albanians, Bulgarians and
Greeks does not allow for the emergence of visible specialised ethnic
businesses, as in other cases, apart from a small range of kiosks and
shops trading goods from the home countries (Albanian coffee, foreign
newspapers, etc.), although in many cases the owners are Greeks. The
only distinct type of ‘ethnic’ enterprise noticed is that of translation
businesses, which respond to a demand generated by immigrants, but
gradually also covers the needs of locals who have contacts of various
kinds with the countries migrants come from (partners, businessmen,
investors, students). There are though other, less distinct niches where
immigrants increasingly practice self-employment, usually in profes-
sions they have done as waged workers, such as undertaking projects
in construction, painting and house-repair.
The previous section posed the question of how the host society per-
ceives the ‘other’. Here this should be inverted: How do migrants per-
ceive themselves? How do they understand their experience? The diver-
sity of experiences, of smaller or greater difficulties and of individual
projects, personal stances or lifestyles imply a variety of reactions. Mi-
grants who experienced exploitation or unfortunate brushes with the
police tend to express negative feelings, while those who found things
relatively easier appear more positive, or even grateful towards the host
country. But whatever the individual migratory journeys, immigrants
see themselves as neither victims, nor as ‘others’. Although they stress
the practical problems generated by the key exclusionary mechanisms
(policy, xenophobia, exploitation), the general feedback from most of
the participants has been an overall positive assessment of their experi-
ence. Among respondents, nearly half of the Albanians and over 60
per cent of the Bulgarians said that they were generally ‘satisfied’ with
their lives, while only 16.7 and 11.5 per cent respectively said they were
unhappy. Fulfilment and pride for all that they had managed to achieve
‘with their own hands’ seem to compensate for earlier harsh condi-
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tions. Relationships built with Greeks ‘as they get to know you’ and
personal ways of coping reduce the psychological cost of xenophobic
hostility. Feelings of belonging and identification now include Greece
and Thessaloniki. The main obstacle to security and long-term plans
thus remains the ambiguous legal framework. The interview segments
below, a synthesis from various narratives, are characteristic of the
multiple ways migrants understand their position and their identity:
I don’t feel a migrant, I feel like a local … Neither a local, I don’t
feel this … between an immigrant and a local … You are a stran-
ger anyway, but I couldn’t say that everything is black … You
even feel a local, some people make you feel like that … On the
other hand, your country attracts you, you cannot avoid this … I
don’t feel like a visitor, because my wife and I, we are seriously
planning, we are thinking of settling here …
9.1.3 Explanatory factors in the study of incorporation
The empirical findings confirm more or less what has already been
pointed out by other studies and by official data. This compensates for
the statistical limitations of the quantitative material and allows for
generalisations regarding the patterns of incorporation, especially in
what concerns the local context, on the basis of the qualitative ele-
ments. In general, it seems that the ‘price’ of Greece’s transition to a
migrant receiving country was high, and to a great extent it has been
paid by the migrants themselves. Although the situation continues to
be difficult, the findings indicate a tendency towards stable employ-
ment, sometimes better jobs and certainly better working conditions
over time. The option of regularisation should be regarded as a turning
point in this process. This may be translated into upward social mobi-
lity, as it is usually accompanied by longer-term and better-quality
housing and an overall improvement in living conditions. My analysis
reveals that instead of stable situations of ‘exclusion’ or ‘integration’,
various patterns of incorporation can be observed. Given the initial
aims of the research, its main contribution lies in the explanation of
the factors on which incorporation depends. This section aims at sum-
marising key factors and processes, discussing them from a general
and comparative perspective.
Firstly, the characteristics and background of the migrant population
are highly diverse, and this is reflected in the multiplicity of forms
and/or degrees of integration at the individual/household level. It ap-
pears that factors like gender and age, nationality and ethnicity, cultur-
al or religious origin, as well as pre-migration socio-economic status
and human capital, do have a certain weight. For instance, different in-
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formal practices have been observed in the ways that Bulgarian and Al-
banian migrants cope with their daily realities. Ethnic Greeks seem to
be a privileged group, due to favourable legal provisions and lower de-
grees of stigmatisation, in contrast perhaps to the widespread Albano-
phobia. Clear distinctive lines characterise the labour-market integra-
tion of women as compared to that of men. Education, class and status
in the home country are sometimes reproduced in the host society, as
the differences between ‘elite’ and other migrants suggest. But
although the characteristics of the migrants may influence their path-
ways to incorporation, they do not produce them as such. Rather, it is
the social context in the host country that determines them. It is la-
bour-market structures that confine women in reproductive activities
and educated migrants in unskilled manual tasks. It is the Greek na-
tional myth and its policy implications that define certain groups as
‘unwanted’.
Secondly, the patterns and dynamics of migration are also important.
On the one hand, individual or family migratory projects and strategies
have largely conditioned immigrants’ lives in Greece. On the other,
proximity and ease of entry have directed migrants to Greece, initially
as an immediate solution, but they also determined contact with the
places of origin, travel back and forth, cyclical migration, etc., facilitat-
ing new and old transnational practices. Historical cross-border rela-
tions seem to be taking shape again with the migrants’ networks, and
not only condition to an extent their routes and settlement in the host
country, but they also influence identities and senses of belonging. The
Balkan context of transnational migration is given special attention in
Section 9.2.2.
Thirdly, the exclusionary logic of immigration policy has condi-
tioned, albeit only partly, immigrants’ relationships with the authorities.
To some extent, this relationship has been problematic because of cer-
tain malfunctions in the administration system and the provision of
services, such as inefficiency, bureaucracy and delays, which are com-
mon in other contexts (Kosic & Triandafyllidou 2003, report on the Ita-
lian case) and apply equally to the indigenous populations. Legal status,
of course, plays a crucial role: when it is obtained, this indicates a turn-
ing point in the life of a migrant and not only brings equal rights in ac-
cessing welfare, or in the labour market, but also signals or facilitates
various other improvements. By contrast, those immigrants who have
not managed to regularise, whether as a result of continuing informal
employment, or because they are newcomers, find themselves in the
vulnerable position of illegality, as described and analysed in several
parts of the thesis. However, legal status as such should not be re-
garded as a panacea, since it is the productive and employment structures
that ultimately determine the migratory experience. Particularly in
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Southern Europe, given the size of the informal economy and the high
numbers of illegal immigrants, regularisation cannot alone solve what
appears to be a problem embedded in deeper structural factors, i.e. the
labour market itself (Reyneri 1999; Reyneri & Baganha 1999). More-
over, culturally or ethnically different segments of the population
might be excluded, to a lesser or a greater degree, despite their access
to rights and services. This is revealed by the experience of other coun-
tries in Europe8 and elsewhere, or from the situation of specific
groups, e.g. the Roma who have long been citizens in Southern Eur-
opean states. True, irregular status may confine migrants to the under-
ground economy, but this may go on long after migrants are legalised.
After all, this is not necessarily an indicator of social exclusion, at least
not in the way it might be perceived in Northern European contexts. In
Greece, as in Southern Europe as a whole, the informal sector covers
many mainstream economic activities – not necessarily connected to il-
licit or criminal practices – and informal strategies are traditionally
widespread and accepted.
On the other hand, socio-spatial inequalities, combined with certain
characteristics of immigrants concentrated in specific local settings,
may generate conditions of marginalisation, as the studies of Psimme-
nos (1995; 2001) and Iosifides & King (1998) about Athens reveal. This
might even apply to groups who have been subject to more favourable
legal provisions, as in the case of Pontian immigrants in western
Athens. According to Halkos & Salamouris (2003), the concentration
of large numbers of ethnic Greeks from the former Soviet Union in
this downgraded, traditionally working-class neighbourhood, together
with low language competency and difficulties adapting to the free
market system, among other reasons, have contributed to high unem-
ployment rates and exclusion. Thus, apart from legal status, additional
measures are necessary, especially at the level of welfare and with speci-
fic reference to the local context. While in Greece the laissez-faire ap-
proach of the state was extended at the level of local government,
which is weakly developed anyway, in other Southern European coun-
tries more attention has been paid to the social support of immigrants
in local contexts. In Catalonia, for example, the Generalitat(the autono-
mous regional government) maintains a strong role in promoting inte-
gration (King & Rodriguez-Melguizo 1999).
Place does indeed matter in many ways, since the same groups
might have different experiences in different settings, despite the com-
mon policy framework and similar patterns of employment at a na-
tional level. In the case of Athens, with much more organised and in-
stitutionalised civil-society structures, polarisation is sharper and more
visible at the spatial level. In fact, civil-society organisations, more ac-
tive in large cities, might be there precisely because social divisions are
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more intense. In that sense, the observations of King & Rodriguez-Mel-
guizo (1999) and of King & Mai (2004) regarding the crucial role of ci-
vil-society institutions in Catalonia and Northern Italy, respectively, can
be perceived in terms of supply and demand: they offer valuable ser-
vices to people in need9. In smaller places, with fewer opportunities
and weaker forms of organised solidarity, it appears that interaction
and informal contact with locals have been easier. This is the case, for
instance, in some rural areas of Greece (Kasimis et al. 2003), as well as
in towns in the south of Italy (King & Mai 2004).
Migrant networks constitute another factor. They do provide a source
of social capital, but their impact on integration might not always be
positive. Granovetter (1985) reminds us that it is weak ties, rather than
strong ones, that are usually more effective. Waldinger (1997), studying
immigrants in Los Angeles, found that closed social networks might
entrap individuals in specific economic niches. Thus, differences in
community ties do not necessarily uncover higher or lower ‘degrees’ of
integration. We have seen that immigrants in Thessaloniki rely more
on informal contacts than on organised communities, but they increas-
ingly interact with the local population. This might not be the case for
other groups, with stronger community institutions but limited access
to the wider society, as Can˜ete (2001) argues in the case of Filipinos in
Greece. But the nature of community ties depends not only on specific
migrant groups, but also on the local setting. In Athens, for example,
there are more and stronger associations, reflecting the patterns of mi-
grants’ settlement (much higher concentrations) as well as the capital’s
centrality in respect to policy-making, a stronger and more diverse civil
society, etc. However, the number and size of associations do not ne-
cessarily mean higher participation levels, or smoother integration pat-
terns. Generally speaking, the role of formal or informal social net-
works, together with individual strategies and transnational practices,
highlight the importance of agency in the incorporation process. In our
case this has been marked by admirable flexibility and adaptability on
the side of the migrants, which seems to be a rule rather than an ex-
ception10.
The time factor has been highlighted in several parts of the thesis.
The most crucial development time brought during the 1990s was the
regularisation programmes, which had an overall positive effect on liv-
ing standards and to an extent guaranteed better employment condi-
tions and access to basic welfare services. But this seems to have been
dependent on additional factors that have also developed over time: the
gradual improvement of the migrants’ language skills; training or ex-
perience acquired in Greece; settlement in Thessaloniki and a sense of
identification with the place; the consolidation of locally-based social
networks and the emergence of ethnic communities; closer relation-
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ships with locals; personal adaptation strategies; and a greater degree
of self-confidence, etc. Changes in the dynamics of migration and indi-
viduals’ migratory plans also played a role: their decision to stay perma-
nently or to return (and when), if they have family at home or if they
have cut most attachments to their country of origin, etc.
The important finding about gradual improvement of the migrants’
position over time, hence social mobility (see also Hatziprokopiou
2003b), confirms what has been revealed by other studies about Alba-
nians in Thessaloniki (Labrianidis & Lyberaki 2001) and extends these
to Bulgarians, whose compatriots in Athens have also been found to
enjoy more secure lives after regularisation (Markova 2001). This trend
is common in rural settings too (Kasimis et al. 2003), while similar im-
provements in the migrants’ socio-economic conditions have been ob-
served in other countries (e.g. Triandafyllidou & Kosic 2003, and King
& Mai 2004, regarding Albanians in Italy). But how does it fit with the
conclusions of other researchers, which suggest high levels of exclu-
sion11? The ‘space’ that migrants occupy in the labour market should
be perceived as fluid and dynamic, constantly re-supplied by the most
vulnerable sections of workers. The migrants who obtain legal status
and follow upward social routes might eventually be replaced by clan-
destine newcomers: a clear distinction should be drawn between legal
and illegal migrants, or ‘pioneers’ and ‘newcomers’. This space is thus
a pool of labour, not of humans. Migrants themselves form a dynamic
section of the labour force and gradually become an organic part of the
host society, characterised by a heterogeneity that might reproduce so-
cial hierarchies.
Needless to say, it would be naive to simply assume that ‘things
eventually get better over time’. The extent to which this trend will con-
tinue, especially with respect to the second generation, depends on the
dynamics of migration, on individual life plans, on the rationalisation
of immigration policy with emphasis on integration and long-term re-
sidence, but crucially on the transforming structures of local and na-
tional economies. In the long run, ‘time’ might lead to direct competi-
tion with locals for the same categories of jobs, whether as a result of
migrants’ upward social mobility (many second-generation migrants
will soon be graduating from Greek universities), or of the increasing
precariousness of some locals’ position at times of crisis, stimulating
hostility and social tensions. Therefore, we should be wary of oversim-
plified, idealising neoclassical approaches that see the economic suc-
cess of immigrants as solely dependant on their human and social ca-
pital, language fluency and level of ‘assimilation’ (e.g. Chiswick 1978).
Such perspectives overstress the individuals’ characteristics and fail to
address the dialectical interrelationships between migration, incorpora-
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tion and social change, and to capture the dynamics of the economic
system and the relations of production in the host societies.
Immigrants’ trajectories from rejection to survival and then to inte-
gration, as evocatively described by King & Mai (2004), are certainly an
issue largely underestimated in the literature on migration to Southern
Europe. However, the experience of other countries should turn our at-
tention towards potential developments that could possibly reverse the
situation that has up to now conditioned the relatively smooth path-
ways of immigrants in Greece. The forces of globalisation and restruc-
turing can have devastating effects on the fabric of a society and can
lead more and more people towards economic ambiguity. These issues
are explored in Section 9.2.1.
9.2 From global forces to local lives: dimensions of comparison
The purpose of this part of the discussion is exploratory. The experi-
ence of the Southern European immigration model and the limited
comparisons drawn in the previous part of the chapter suggest that
there are common trends in Greece/Thessaloniki and in other settings.
To an extent, some of these trends can be seen as part and parcel of
wider international developments that transform national or local con-
texts of reception. My aim here is to interpret the empirical issues un-
der a theoretical view. Obviously, no detailed analysis can be provided
here; the points made could be topics of future research and theorisa-
tion. I limit myself to identifying key elements in the way globalisation
trends affect, or are manifested in, processes of migration and incor-
poration in Greece, developing from arguments presented elsewhere
(Hatziprokopiou 2004a). The first section aims at exploring the rela-
tionship between international trends and economic, political and cul-
tural change in Greece with respect to recent migration. The second lo-
cates transnational elements in the unifying Balkan space. The third
returns to the local setting and deals with issues of space, evaluating
Thessaloniki’s recent experience of migration and urban change in the
light of history.
9.2.1 Migration and globalisation: Greece, Southern Europe and beyond
To start with, immigration per se can be seen as one of the global forces
affecting the country. Theoretically, it implies a clash between human
rights and national sovereignty, since settlement remains a right of
states while movement is regarded as a human right (Soysal 1994; Ta-
pinos 2000: 306). In a globalising world, it becomes increasingly diffi-
cult for states to open their borders for various other flows and close
246 MIGRATION IN CONTEMPORARY GREECE
them to migrants (Castles 2000). Thus, illegality might have been a
key feature in the Greek case, but irregular movements are characteris-
tic of contemporary migration trends on a global scale (Ghosh 1998).
This paradox reflects and confirms the contradiction between devel-
oped and developing countries, with the former closing their doors to
intensifying migratory pressures from the latter. In our case, this con-
tradiction has been connected to the post-1989 developments in the
former Eastern Bloc, as most of Greece’s immigrants come from the
Balkans and especially from one single country, Albania, the least de-
veloped country in Europe. Although Greece’s experience is situated
within the Southern European immigration model (King 2000a), its
Balkan dimension points to what has been described as ‘regionalism’
in global migration patterns (see Baldwin-Edwards 2004b). The prolif-
eration of illegal trafficking networks in the Balkans, which make huge
profits by exploiting both the agony of the migrants and the apathy of
the West, seems to be a side effect of a globalising speculative capital-
ism. At the same time, Greece is also affected by today’s geopolitical
developments, echoed for instance in the growth in numbers of Af-
ghan and Iraqi refugees following recent crises and military interven-
tions12, while new ‘global’ migrations like the Chinese (e.g. Pieke
2004) are increasingly represented in the Greek case.
Turning now to the social and political responses to immigration, it
appears that the political-institutional and socio-cultural contexts of in-
corporation reflect to an extent the contemporary crisis in the functions
and role of the nation-state and in the collective national imagination.
Take immigration policy first. According to Baldwin-Edwards & Fakio-
las (1999), Greek immigration policy throughout the 1990s also de-
pended on the country’s external relations with the Balkans and the
EU. Much of the criticism of the initial Greek response has attacked its
repressive and exclusionary logic. This, however, should also be partly
attributed to Greece’s need to conform to European guidelines (Karydis
1996). The state had to address an immediate problem, but it had also
to cope with obligations arising from its membership in the EU and
the Schengen Group. Such obligations might be common to all mem-
ber states, but were perhaps more urgent in Greece due to its geo-
graphic location at the south-east corner of the EU, surrounded by
‘third’ countries. Regarding the Albanian exodus in particular, both
Greece’s and Italy’s ‘emergency’ responses were largely influenced by
EU/Schengen criteria (Baldwin-Edwards 1999). Thus the ‘closed doors’
and ‘non-tolerance’ spirit of the 1990s was in accordance with the ‘For-
tress Europe’ ideology. It was not accidental that Law 1975/1991 was
characterised by the leader of the French National Front Jean-Marie Le
Pen as ‘a paradigm for Europe to follow’13. One can assume that the re-
vised legal framework is also influenced by the current EU agenda,
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although from a more realistic perspective aiming at ‘immigration
management’ and combining tight controls with integration measures.
It has been argued that Greece’s new ways of applying immigration
control reflect broader trends of globalisation and restructuring (see
Psimmenos & Kasimati 2003).
In that sense, the way Greek immigration policy has developed is in-
dicative of the state’s loss of autonomy and retreat to supranational in-
stitutions. Moreover, Greece’s diplomatic interests in the Balkans, espe-
cially regarding its minorities in Albania and Bulgaria, have also condi-
tioned its policy towards immigrants from these countries. This is far
more evident in the former case, given the large numbers of people
who migrated: the legal framework for Greek-Albanians in Greece has
been a tool serving ‘Greek political interests … to maintain the Greek
minority in Albania’ (Triandafyllidou & Veikou 2002: 203). In general
though, the presence of Albanians in the country has become a means
of pressuring the Albanian government (see Papailias 2003: 1061-
1062). But national identity considerations in policy-making might
have also determined the patterns of movement. The granting of citi-
zenship to Pontian Greeks ‘returning’ from former Soviet states has
caused further migrations of Russians, Georgians, Ukrainians, etc.,
some of which might have been facilitated by cases of corruption in
the Greek diplomatic bodies, through which passports were issued to
non-ethnic-Greeks, as reported several times in the media.
However, both the polity’s emphasis on national identity and espe-
cially the social reactions to immigration mirror the changing character
and meaning of identity today. The rise of xenophobia and extreme
Right activism in Europe, the reawakening of nationalisms and of reli-
gious fundamentalisms at the turn of the millennium, although fed by
intensifying inequalities and deep political changes, are – indirectly at
least – related to this general crisis (see Hobsbawm 1992). On the one
hand, globalisation involves a trend towards a homogenised mass cul-
ture of consumption; on the other, the previous frameworks of collec-
tive reference have been deconstructed: boundaries between ‘Left’ and
‘Right’ are not clear anymore, and class identities have lost their past
relevance. Theorists like Hobsbawm (1992) and Castells (1997), among
others, have associated these trends with the contemporary search for
identification with ‘imagined communities’ of the past: religion, ethni-
city and the nation. In Greece too, national identity is transforming
with the advent of Europeanisation and the changing world order (see
Tsoukalas 1993), but also as it is confronted directly with the ‘other’
who is now here and among ‘us’. Not by chance, religious and nationa-
listic values re-emerged in the 1990s, in parallel to what was taking
place in the Balkans: e.g. the objections to the name of Macedonia, or
the support of the (Orthodox) Serbs in Yugoslavia’s civil war. Such phe-
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nomena have not been unrelated to the rise of economic uncertainty
and unemployment, nor to the way Greece experienced the collapse of
the Soviet Union internally, as expressed for instance in a government
coalition between the Communists and the Right in 1989. The con-
temporary face of racism in Greece focuses on cultural difference, as
in other European countries. The ‘right to difference’, a left-wing con-
cept, has become an argument used by right-wing intellectuals, who in
the Greek case claim the rights of the majority over the minorities that
erode ‘our’ identity and culture. Feelings of superiority towards the Bal-
kan ‘other’ are built upon perceptions of backwardness, but are rein-
forced because of the social position and role of immigrants in Greece.
Elsewhere in Southern Europe too, one can observe similar expressions
of cultural racism ‘without colour’14.
Welfare is another issue particularly relevant to incorporation. The
basic problem relates to the (still) uncertain status of migrants in the
country, at a time when insurance systems have proved to be ineffi-
cient and social-security funds are facing serious fiscal difficulties. The
ongoing internal political discussion on the future of insurance sys-
tems reflects what Mingione (1997) describes as a deepening crisis of
the European varieties of welfare state. In Greece, with its poorly devel-
oped social state, welfare restructuring has taken the form of decentra-
lisation and the shift of responsibilities to individual officers, indicating
a transition from ‘citizens’ or ‘welfare recipients’ to ‘clients’ (Psimme-
nos & Kasimati 2003). As we have seen, these trends do not seem to
have affected immigrants so far, since the major problems hindering
access to services have been illegal status and informal employment.
Moreover, as in other European countries, some of the gaps in the pol-
icy framework have been covered to an extent by the reaction of civil-
society organisations. Apart from international NGOs, smaller initia-
tives coordinate their activities and build contacts with their European
counterparts, while some are supported by EU funding. The experience
of the ‘Sans Papiers’15 movement in France inspired grassroots organi-
sations active in advocacy and campaigning to move beyond traditional
left-wing politics and modernise their forms of action.
Since much of what is associated with globalisation has to do pri-
marily with economic trends, it is in the patterns of immigrants’ em-
ployment that processes of restructuring are more explicitly mani-
fested. The low cost of migrant labour in Greece reflects a rise in the
global demand for cheap labour (Psimmenos 1995; 1998; Castles &
Miller 1998). Similarly, the demand for flexibility – the cornerstone of
economic restructuring – is imposed by the dynamics of the market
and by intensifying international competition, which in Greece primar-
ily affects SMEs. Migrant labour crucially offers this much-needed flex-
ibility, but, given the rigidities of the labour market, this takes place
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within the underground economy. Despite its ‘traditional’ origins, the
informal economy has been revitalised by restructuring processes in
Southern Europe as a whole (King & Rybaczuk 1993; Vaiou & Hadjimi-
chalis 1997; Reyneri 1999). Similar trends towards informality and
black-market work have been observed across the EU (Williams &
Winderbank 1995) and are particularly evident in large cities across the
world (Castells 1989; Sassen 1996). The further tertiarisation of urban
economies, involving both high-level services and low-skilled ‘support-
ing’ or personal services, generate conditions of segmentation in the la-
bour market, as described by Sassen (1991; 1996) in the context of glo-
bal cities. This leads to the polarisation of the urban labour force,
which, with the concentration of migrants at the bottom of the social
pyramid, tends to reproduce the contradiction between development
and underdevelopment at the level of the city. Similar elements and
common trends characterise Mediterranean metropolises (Malheiros &
Ribas-Mateos 2002), although their scope is certainly not global. Iosi-
fides & King (1998: 223) argue that increasing social polarisation in
Athens brings to mind the hierarchical structure of nineteenth-century
industry, while it reflects at the same time contemporary socio-econom-
ic restructuring processes in global cities. The socio-spatial implica-
tions of such processes, with particular attention to the case of Thessa-
loniki, are examined in Section 9.2.3.
Thus the employment of migrants in services is part and parcel of
the dynamics of economic restructuring (Pugliese 1993). Part of the
services offered by immigrants concerns ‘reproductive’ activities, i.e.
domestic work and cleaning, care for children and the elderly, which
have traditionally been ‘female’ jobs. The ‘household deficit’ for such
activities, particularly evident in cities across Southern Europe, has
been the outcome of several changes also related to processes of re-
structuring (King & Zontini 2000). In the EU as a whole, female mi-
grants now offer a cheap form of reproductive work that is crucially
very flexible, reproducing the gendered division of labour on ‘ethnic’
lines (Anderson 2000). On these grounds, Ribas-Mateos (2002) talks
about a ‘globalised domesticity’, arguing that patterns of employment
of migrant women in cities reflect the impact of globalisation not only
on the process of production, but also on the patterns of reproduction
(see also Phizacklea 1998). Changes in lifestyles and life prospects lead
to growing and diversifying consumption attitudes, which are crucially
connected to the increasing employment of migrants in private/perso-
nal services. The studies of Iosifides & King (1998) and Psimmenos
(1995; 1998) underline the role of growing personal consumption in
the high demand of households for immigrant labour in Athens.
Although beyond the scope of the thesis, this partly explains the in-
creased demand for ‘pleasure services’, currently supplied disproportio-
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nately by foreign women (and children) through the trafficking net-
works: the share of foreign sex workers in Greece increased from 21
per cent in 1991 to nearly 60 per cent in 1996, according to Emke-
Poulopoulos (2001: 4). However, the empirical results suggest that to-
gether with the ‘maid’ and the ‘prostitute’ that King & Zontini (2000)
describe as the dominant figures of the female migrant in Southern
Europe, in Thessaloniki we can observe a third one: the manufacturing
worker. Despite the decreasing importance of industry, or perhaps pre-
cisely because of the crisis that certain sectors currently face, employ-
ment in manufacturing incorporates considerable shares of migrant
women in ‘female’ industries (e.g. clothing) that are keenly affected by
internationalisation and global competition.
Theoretically speaking, the labour-market characteristics of migrants
in Greece can be seen as a specific expression of the ongoing antithesis
between capital and labour. At a macro level, market forces do shape
contemporary migration patterns, especially labour-market structures
in countries of origin and destination, which are increasingly interde-
pendent (Tapinos 2000). As Sassen (1999) has argued, it is not poverty
as such, or overpopulation, that generates migratory flows; Tapinos
(2000) reminds us that it is neither the poorer who migrate, nor the
least developed countries that are primarily affected by population out-
flows. It is, rather, relations of dependency, and the restructuring, reor-
ganisation and relocation of economic activity (Sassen 1999). Globali-
sation and restructuring generate new forms of exploitation, with the
deregulation of markets, the ‘precarisation’ of working regimes, rising
unemployment, increasing polarisation between and within countries,
etc. (Sassen 1991; 1996; Mingione 1997). Immigrants across the world
are one of the groups most affected – in a dual way, since the side ef-
fects of globalisation push many to emigrate in the first place. In the
emerging world economic order, migrants constitute part of the global
proletariat (Cohen 1987; Harris 1995). In fact, they form one of its
most mobile sections, a ‘transnational working class’ (Guarnizo &
Smith 1998: 18). Migrants’ hard work and flexibility make them ‘bor-
rowed men’ (and women) ‘on borrowed time’16, as if they are here only
to satisfy their employers’ needs. As Cohen (1987) has put it, referring
to Marx, they are ‘free’ to sell they only thing they have – their labour –
potentially in any part of the globe, although their movement remains
dependent on state regulations and border-control regimes.
However, as we move the focus from the macro to the micro, from
global processes to concrete phenomena concerning particular migrant
groups in specific social formations, we come across a diversity of ex-
periences that cannot be simply attributed to the structural basis of so-
ciety. Rather they uncover the role of agency or everyday resistance, the
factor of social networks and the small things that matter in people’s
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daily lives and in their ways of coping with reality. Increasingly, many
of these phenomena today reveal various expressions of transnational-
ism (Smith & Guarnizo 1998), which can be seen as a form of ‘globali-
sation from below’ (Portes 1997). Similar trends can be observed in
our case, although they are crucially determined by proximity between
the country of destination and the countries of origin, in a regional
(Balkan) transnational context.
9.2.2 New bonds: the Balkans as an emerging transnational space
Certain aspects of transnationalism have emerged throughout the ana-
lysis. Findings presented at several points in the thesis uncovered
transnational strategies practiced by (some of) the participants. These
are facilitated by proximity and through the newly formed migrant net-
works that link localities of origin and destination, which are some-
times built upon historical/cultural bonds between places, as we have
seen in the case of Thessaloniki and Korc¸e¨. Practices of this kind in-
clude remittances, usually sent through informal channels like relatives
or compatriots who go back home (Section 8.1.3), to support family
members left behind, in some cases spouses and/or children. Many
migrants read newspapers brought from the home countries and a
small number were involved with Albanian or Bulgarian political par-
ties; one could also assume that many vote in their countries’ elec-
tions17. Visits to home villages/towns are commonplace, whether for
holidays or other reasons, such as the issue of certain documents (birth
certificates), or access to health services (in the case of Bulgarians).
Strategies of cyclical migration – of coming and going on a temporary
basis – have been observed among participants, eased by proximity and
by factors such as familiarity, contacts, language competency, etc. accu-
mulated over the years. Such practices have a crucial effect on incor-
poration, since they smooth difficulties and facilitate acculturation.
The increased mobility from Albania and Bulgaria to Greece con-
firms the scale of ‘back and forth’ movements. Statistics from the Na-
tional Tourist Organisation (GNTO) for 2002 counted 1,255,738 and
470,232 arrivals of Albanian and Bulgarian ‘tourists’ at the borders re-
spectively; Albanians were the third most numerous tourist group that
year and Bulgarians were the seventh (see Figure A3, Appendix A). Mo-
bility and contact between countries of origin and destination might go
on after the end of the individuals’ ‘migration cycle’: migrants who re-
turn home tend to maintain relationships and various forms of contact
with Greece. In their study of Albanian return migration, Labrianidis
& Hatziprokopiou (2005) found that Albanians returning from Greece
and Italy maintain relationships with friends/relatives who are still
abroad, while some travel to the host country at least once a year; sig-
252 MIGRATION IN CONTEMPORARY GREECE
nificant shares have Greek professional partners, and some buy house-
hold goods or business equipment from Greece after their return. The
dynamics of migration and return are shaped by proximity in a dual
sense (Labrianidis & Hatziprokopiou 2005). On the one hand, as long
as life prospects are better in Greece the possibility of permanent re-
turn is reduced, since proximity allows contacts and visits while abroad.
On the other, it might be the other way round, i.e. short-term return
with the option of seasonal/cyclical movements for work remaining
open. Both possibilities already apply to many migrants from Albania
and Bulgaria in Greece, who appear to support livelihoods between
places of origin and destination.
Let me recall at this point that, as set out in Chapter 2, migration is
just one aspect of post-1989 relations between Greece and the Balkans:
another is capital and goods moving in the opposite direction, i.e.,
from Greece to Balkan countries. In particular, as argued by Labriani-
dis et al. (2004), a special capital-labour relationship is in place, with
inflows of labour being accompanied by outflows of capital (FDI), both
reflecting the increased demand of a section of Greek capital, especially
SMEs, for cheap and flexible labour. To an extent, the character of the
relations between Greece and its northern neighbours can be under-
stood within a context of imperialism, dominance, dependence, etc.
Obviously, Greece is neither the only nor the major player in the area;
but being a Balkan country itself, it is currently in a relatively privi-
leged position, in many respects. The Balkans function as a ‘tank’ of
cheap labour, a ‘reserve army’ that can be easily exploited both ‘here’
and ‘there’. Much of the discussion in the thesis, especially in Chapter
6, has analysed how this takes place in the former case. But the latter
possibility, i.e. the relocation of Greek companies to Balkan countries,
is not unknown to some of the interviewees:
Raicko, skilled worker in a metal-processing workshop: Greeks say,
‘You take our jobs, we don’t have jobs.’ This is not the way it is
… all Greek bosses went to Bulgaria and started businesses
there, because they pay less.
Valbona, worker in a clothing factory: The factory used to be a very
big one … now part of it has moved to Bulgaria … From the
three hundred people that were working here when I came, now
there are only about sixty left.
Apart from capital movements, there has been a growth in commercial
activity. Although Balkan countries constitute secondary trade partners
for Greece, trade with the Balkans in the 1990s was highly dynamic,
and its share in total imports-exports has been increasing steadily since
1989 (Labrianidis et al. 2004). Not only are certain Greek products
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now manufactured in Balkan countries, but increasingly they are ex-
ported there as well. Favoured by proximity and cultural and human
links, Greece has been the first country to enter these new virgin mar-
kets (Labrianidis 2000; Kamaras 2001). Naturally, flows of goods and
capital are also translated into human mobility. Together with Greek
companies moving abroad, there are also movements of Greek citizens
who travel back and forth: merchants and distributors, business execu-
tives and various categories of professionals, bankers and investors.
The Greek presence in the Balkans is currently so strong that some
analysts argue for the emergence of a ‘Greek capitalist Diaspora’ in the
region, constituted by a network of corporate entities and individuals
(Kamaras 2001). To give an example, according to the National Statisti-
cal Institute of Bulgaria (NSIB), among 132,576 people who travelled to
Bulgaria for professional reasons during January-September 2002,
Greeks had the largest share, 12.9 per cent.
The erstwhile impenetrable northern Greek borders are now easily
and frequently crossed for various purposes. The new border dynamics
and patterns of mobility bring to mind some of the features of other
border zones (e.g. the US-Mexico border, especially the Tijuana area).
An interesting example is the long-discussed ‘Transborder Free Indus-
trial Zone of Economic Exchange’ (DEBZOS) that is to be established
in the border area of Ormenio in Thrace, at Trigono, a town just eight
kilometres from Edirne (Turkey) and ten kilometres from Sviligrad
(Bulgaria). Most of the companies planning to move to the area are la-
bour-intensive ones, especially clothing manufacturers (Labrianidis
1998); 60 to 80 per cent of the workers will be coming from Bulgaria
on a daily basis18. But market dynamics impose new situations long be-
fore these are institutionalised: agricultural workers from Macedonia
and Bulgaria are already commuting daily or weekly to the border areas
of Kilkis, Serres and Drama. Minev et al. (1997) report on Bulgarian
fruit-pickers coming and going, especially in the Rodopi region. The
municipality of Trigono itself, in conjunction with the Bulgarian muni-
cipality of Sviligrad, has already established a job-finding agency to re-
cruit Bulgarian commuters for agricultural work (Eleftherotypia, 29 De-
cember 2004). All these suggest that the labour markets of Balkan
countries are increasingly interdependent; as Minev et al. (1997: 10) ar-
gue for the case of Bulgaria and Greece, it is actually the informal la-
bour markets that are primarily connected.
It thus seems that we are now at the beginning of a new era for the
Balkans; new cross-border relations, interdependence and various types
of networks produce dynamics that go further from the Greek invest-
ment/Balkan immigration dipole. Tourist mobility, trans-border con-
tact, international students and organised crime provide additional ex-
amples. More Greeks are now travelling to the Balkans: between Janu-
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ary-September 2002, 266,458 Greeks travelled to Bulgaria for tourist
purposes, being the fourth-largest tourist group (NSIB). In 2003, the
Greek TV channels were reporting on Greeks from northern towns/vil-
lages, including Thessaloniki, visiting places on the other side of the
border like Petrich (Bulgaria) or Gevgeli (Macedonia), for shopping,
but also for other reasons (e.g. having their teeth filled at low cost by a
local dentist). Remote border areas of Greece, poor, emptied by internal
migration and ‘forgotten’ by the state are revitalised not only economic-
ally, i.e. due to migrant labour, as Kasimis et al. (2003) suggest, but
also demographically, in the context of cross-border mobility. For exam-
ple, in the above mentioned Trigono area, there is a trend of young
people, especially women, leaving for the cities, which results not only
in loss of labour force, but also in a growing number of men who ‘are
left without brides’19. Since 2000, 50 mixed marriages have taken
place between young locals and Bulgarian women from nearby Svili-
grad and 85 children were born. Furthermore, there was a tradition of
young Greeks studying in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Romania even be-
fore the 1980s, which didn’t cease after 1989. Recently, there is a trend
in Greek universities to attract young Eastern Europeans to study,
many of whom come from the Balkans – an issue underestimated in
public debates and academic research.
There is, finally, the issue of organised crime and Mafia-type net-
works, smuggling in guns, tobacco, drugs, oil, pirated CDs, etc.20. For
rather obvious reasons, relevant information and academic research is
scarce and lacks detailed evidence. Such criminal networks also control
the trafficking businesses involved in forced prostitution (IOM 2001;
2002). The border cities of Petrich and Sadanski in southern Bulgaria
are described as ‘the Balkan centres of white slavery’ (Emke-Poulopou-
los 2001: 15). While in the 1980s most foreign sex workers in Greece
were mainly from Asian countries (Thailand, the Philippines), by the
mid-1990s the majority were from Central and Eastern Europe and
nearly one third were from the Balkans (Emke-Poulopoulos 2001: 4).
Not only are women who end up as sex workers in Greece channelled
through certain sites in the Balkans, but also there is a trend of Greek
men crossing the border to Bulgaria or Macedonia for cheap sexual ser-
vices.
The relationships, networks and ‘back and forth’ movements that are
being developed in the post-1989 Balkans are indicative of various ex-
pressions of transnationalism. After all, the era of globalisation is
marked by similar cross-border relationships and integrations at a re-
gional level. Relations of production are stretched across national bor-
ders, which are now crossed by various types of flows, new forms of de-
pendency and exchange, and new types and patterns of mobility. The
nature of interdependence between Greece and some Balkan countries
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suggests a migration system characterised by a relationship between
capital and labour mobility, fitting to an extent the analysis of Sassen
(1999; see Labrianidis et al. 2004). But the bridges built by the human
factor should not be underestimated: migrants and their networks es-
tablish new bases for social and cultural contact. In that respect, the ex-
perience of Greece is not unlike that of other Southern European coun-
tries. As the Portuguese geographer Malheiros (2002: 107-108) notes:
‘… non-formal links resulting from historical and cultural processes …
and specific social relations … have a strong influence on the establish-
ment of particular geographic interactions’. In the Spanish case, for in-
stance, a similar migration system can be observed, shaped, there as
well, by proximity and historical links rooted in Moorish domination
and Spanish imperialism (King & Rodriguez-Melguizo 1999). Local
sites do matter and transnationalism emerges as a ‘multi-local process’
(Guarnizo & Smith 1998: 6, 12). The fact that Thessaloniki is not only
the base of many of the companies investing in the Balkans (Komninos
& Sefertzi 1998), but is also linked to places of origin because of both
historical ties and contemporary relationships could thus be seen as an
example of what Malheiros (2002: 108) calls ‘a new territorial logic’ of
‘polycentric networks’.
In Eastern Europe ‘there is a history of borders moving across people
and their communities’ and what takes place today is not simply a
‘flood from East to West’, but a ‘much wider field of mobility’, with the
majority of movements being short-distance and cross-border (Rogers
2000: 8, 10). The Balkan space, fragmented after years of separate na-
tional histories and divided by nationalist conflicts, is gradually regain-
ing the unified character it used to have in the years of the Ottoman
Empire (see Mazower 2000). The Ottoman area was anyway traversed
for work, and the nomadic culture of some particular groups (Vlachs,
Sarakatsani) has been shaped by such temporary movements related to
pastoral activities. Mai & Schwandner-Sievers (2003) underline the his-
torical precedents of Albanian transnationalism, expressed for instance
in the cultural significance of kurbet (temporary migration for work).
In the early twenty-first century, and despite persisting problems, the
Balkans can be pictured as an emerging transnational space, or at least
a space of transnational mobility. Perhaps this can be a new way of
‘imagining’ the Balkans (see Todorova 1997); but certainly, this is the
context whereby the processes of migration and the incorporation of
migrants in Greece take place. To what extent new and further transna-
tional practices will be generated among Albanian, Bulgarian or other
migrants in Greece, and the long-term implications of cross-border
movements – especially with the coming EU enlargement – are issues
that will become clearer over time.
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9.2.3 Migration and place: Thessaloniki’s (second) path to multiculturalism
Thessaloniki has a rich potential for a crucial role, not only for reasons
of proximity. With its long multicultural history, the city has become a
new home for immigrants from the Balkans in a period of transform-
ing local geographies and of growing interaction beyond national bor-
ders. As has been argued throughout the thesis, the character and di-
rection of incorporation processes reflect to an extent the local social
structure, not simply in strictly economic terms, e.g. the productive
structures, but generally regarding the wider set of economic, socio-cul-
tural and political-institutional relations. Most importantly, the place of
residence is the environment determining the lifeworld of immigrants,
i.e. their direct experiences and daily lives. ‘Small things’, inevitably at-
tached to space, shape migrants’ everyday realities far more than ab-
stract social mechanisms. Moreover, the presence of immigrants and
their interaction with the local community changes the physiognomy
of the city: it challenges established uses of the urban space, altering
its landscape, and hence questioning its identity.
During the past two decades or so, the city has been undergoing
deep socio-economic and socio-spatial changes. In their analysis of im-
migrants’ exclusion in Athens, Iosifides & King (1998) discuss the ex-
tent to which the Greek capital experiences trends similar to those ob-
served in the so-called global cities. According to Sassen (1991; 1996),
these include trends towards the tertiarisation of the economy, the re-
structuring of consumption, the informalisation and precariousness of
employment, and intensifying polarisation, which are common in
other Mediterranean metropolises (Rome and Milan, Barcelona and
Madrid, Lisbon). Such post-modern characteristics in southern cities
predated the trends of post-Fordist restructuring as alternative, rather
than traditional, patterns of urban development (Leontidou 1996).
Now these change with the advent of restructuring, with certain impli-
cations for both space and people. To an extent, Thessaloniki too exhi-
bits characteristics similar to those observed in global cities, although
on a much smaller scale and regional scope. On the one hand, it is un-
dergoing parallel trends, affected by the same processes of internatio-
nalisation, economic restructuring and socio-spatial reorganisation. On
the other, as the major European cities become nodal centres of the
global economy or regional centres of economic importance, Thessalo-
niki attains a similar function in the south-east corner of Europe, by
‘regaining’ its Balkan hinterland in an increasingly unified transna-
tional space. At both levels, migration now plays a dynamic role.
The city is expanding in all possible directions. Pollution, traffic and
parking are problems even more apparent than in Athens. The key ur-
ban trends that Leontidou (1990) identified in the case of Athens are
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evident here as well: speculation in the housing market, suburbanisa-
tion of the middle classes, increasing homogenisation of the urban
space with clusters of wealth and poverty speckled across the city. In-
dustrial decline continues with the shutting-down of enterprises, the
decentralisation of large industries and the relocation of manufacturers
abroad, with Balkan countries being the main destination. As urban
economies are increasingly connected to the international environ-
ment, the patterns of urban development are transformed, with visible
impacts on erstwhile familiar landscapes. Urban planning is directed
towards regeneration projects targeting the hosting of European-wide
infrastructure, the attraction of dynamic economic activities and the re-
vitalisation of areas marked by technological devaluation (Giannakou &
Kafkalas 1999). In Thessaloniki, these trends are reflected, for exam-
ple, in the Ladadika district, located in the historical centre, and in iso-
lated cases of empty factories, port warehouses or abandoned military
camps, which are transformed into cultural and entertainment spaces
(mostly private ones). On the other hand, the city attracts institutions
with an international character: apart from the long-established Inter-
national Expo, such examples include the Balkan Exchange Centre, the
CEDEFOP and others. Finally, there is a general trend of spatial reloca-
tion of economic activity: the leisure industry expands in the historical
centre while it also moves towards the eastern suburbs; trade is mostly
concentrated downtown (small specialised shops) or on the outskirts of
the city (large commercial houses), etc. But old forms are still apparent
and coexist with new ones: historical buildings and blocks dating back
to the sixties and seventies stand next to post-industrial spaces; high-
tech services might be found in areas with labour-intensive workshops;
open public spaces continue to be used by people even in zones of pri-
vate entertainment.
At the same time, Thessaloniki has been at the heart of major events
that shook Greece’s public life throughout the 1990s. At the beginning
of the decade, it was the epicentre of nationalistic demonstrations ob-
jecting to the use of the word ‘Macedonia’ in the name of the neigh-
bouring state. In the mid-1990s, the Church organised massive de-
monstrations to object to the use of a restored Roman monument (Ro-
tonda) as a cultural centre, as it was planned by the authorities, and
finally succeeded in turning it into a temple. When it hosted the Cul-
tural Capital of Europe in 1997, local authorities decided to highlight
its Byzantine Orthodox past, neglecting, or at best downplaying, Otto-
man and Sephardic traditions. In the early 2000s, the city was shaken
again by massive demonstrations organised by the Church against the
non-inscription of religious beliefs on the new ID cards issued by the
state. Of course, immigrants could not escape being affected in such a
xenophobic environment. It was here that severe cases of police brutal-
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ity took place at several points throughout the 1990s: the most striking
example is an incident that took place in 1998, where off-duty police-
men tortured an Albanian migrant until he collapsed, while drinking,
dancing, singing slogans praising the dictatorship and occasionally fir-
ing guns. And it was here (in the suburb of Mihaniona) that a clever
Albanian pupil was not allowed to become a flag-bearer, with xenopho-
bic reactions and endless debates on ‘what it means to be a Greek’.
(Kapllani & Mai 2005).
So, what is the place of immigrants in Thessaloniki? What is the role
of space in the dynamics of their incorporation? How does migration
fit in with the transformation of urban structures? The previous sec-
tions revealed much about the position and role of immigrants in the
local economy and society. But as the analysis in Chapter 7 has shown,
urban development processes now include the dynamics of migration
and incorporation. Space, after all, is a social product; rather than re-
maining the unchanging scenery of a static social geography, it is
transformed accordingly and develops. With respect to the incorpora-
tion of immigrants, three key elements need to be stressed: their path-
ways in the housing market in relation to the transforming social geo-
graphy of Thessaloniki; their daily experiences of urban space in rela-
tion to its changing social use; and the migrants’ perceptions of, and
identification with, the city, in relation to its character and identity.
Here as well, contradictory forces are evident.
Migrants’ pathways to the housing market reflect their employment
conditions, since they are equally marked by exploitation, discrimina-
tion and informality. These apply to other urban cases in Southern Eur-
ope, from Athens (Iosifides and King 1998) to various Italian cities
(King & Mai 2004; Kosic & Triandafyllidou 2003) and from Barcelona
(King & Rodriguez-Melguizo 1999) to Lisbon (Malheiros 2002). In the
absence of a strong and open social housing sector, migrants tend to
rent old, cheap properties. In many cases, these properties and/or areas
were inhabited by refugees from Asia Minor or internal (rural) mi-
grants in the past, which also resembles the historical patterns of set-
tlement in other Mediterranean metropolises 21. Although traditionally
Southern European cities are generally characterised by relatively
mixed residential geographies, certain migrant groups exhibit higher
degrees of segregation: Moroccans and Filipinos in Barcelona, Cape
Verdeans in Lisbon, Chinese in Milan (Malheiros 2002: Table 2). Seg-
regation levels, however, do not necessarily imply socio-spatial exclu-
sion, as Musterd (2003) maintains, taking the case of Amsterdam as
an example. He reminds us that social inequalities and polarisation
might be more important than residential distributions as such. Thus,
even when sharp segregation patterns are not the case, high concentra-
tions of immigrants in specific degraded areas might be alarming, as
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Halkos & Salamouris (2003) suggest in the case of Pontian ethnic
Greeks in western Attica, and Psimmenos (1995; 1998) found for Alba-
nians around Omonia Square in Athens.
However, in the case of Thessaloniki, the analysis has suggested that
the processes of incorporation have been rather smooth, in comparison
to other urban settings. Although the general features are common,
the main difference is simply that social polarisation and segregation
patterns are not that sharp. It seems that the relative residential mix of
the population is extended and embraces immigrants, despite the ex-
clusionary mechanisms in the housing market. There is no evidence of
dense immigrant ‘clusters’, while Albanians, as we have seen, are ‘all
over’ the city. The ‘cheap’ districts where migrants tend to live are not
necessarily the most deprived ones. Along with rent prices, high con-
centrations of migrants in specific neighbourhoods reflect the function
of migrant networks and the availability of work. This results in a sig-
nificant presence of immigrants in ‘wealthy’ areas, indicating what
Labrianidis & Lyberaki (2001: 208) have called ‘the new social geogra-
phy of the city’, which goes beyond the traditional division between the
working-class west and the ‘posh’ east.
The second issue concerns the social uses of space. The role of ur-
ban planning with respect to regeneration/gentrification projects tar-
geting tourist attraction and private investment is crucial in altering so-
cial uses of space. ‘City marketing’ (Pavlou 2001) and the increasing
use of certain parts of the urban area for consumption and entertain-
ment exclude migrants, among other vulnerable groups, from the use
of particular spaces both symbolically and practically. The authorities
tend to relate existing social problems (poverty, prostitution, criminal-
ity) to the presence of immigrants, who thus have to be removed. The
example of Thermi Square (Section 7.2.2) and the Cultural Capital’s
policy towards immigrants in 1997, as described by Pavlou (2001), are
typical cases; elsewhere in Southern Europe we observe similar con-
flicts. For instance, in Piazza Garibaldi in Naples, the politics of secur-
ity and of the image of the historical centre have produced an exclu-
sionary discourse over immigrants’ presence in the area (Dines 2002).
Similarly, in Athens, the concentration of large numbers of migrants
around Omonia Square has been the subject of constant debates and
projects for reshaping the face of the area (Psimmenos 1995), espe-
cially in the context of building the new underground station and,
more recently, the preparation for the Olympics. Such issues of con-
testation over space bring to mind Lefebvre’s concept of ‘the right to
the city’.
Nevertheless, it seems that in Southern European cities these poli-
cies do not always have exclusionary outcomes. As immigrants tend to
use public spaces – perhaps forced to, to an extent, by their poor hous-
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ing conditions – a culture of ‘openness’ is reproduced, which is famil-
iar to Mediterranean societies where traditionally much activity takes
place in the open space (Leontidou 1996). As Malheiros & Ribas-Ma-
teos (2002: 303) put it: ‘The tradition of using open spaces by immi-
grants that frequently live in low-quality and surcharged dwellings is
contributing to a change in the appropriation strategies in some South-
ern European metropolises … The celebration of cultural diversity and
the new multiethnic character of the cities also takes place in the pub-
lic space.’ Processes of restructuring generate simultaneous trends to-
wards both ‘privatisation’ and ‘devaluation’ of space and locals increas-
ingly tend to ‘consume’ leisure/entertainment and abandon places that
are ‘out of fashion’. As Psimmenos writes on Albanians in Athens, in
‘socially dead’ places, immigrants organise space in different ways than
‘us’, developing alternative social uses. Immigrants in Thessaloniki use
open spaces in multiple ways: as places of rest, meeting points or job-
finding areas.
Thus, on the one hand, market forces determine the socio-spatial in-
tegration of immigrants: e.g. concentrations in cheap areas, ethnic en-
trepreneurship in districts with high migrant presence. On the other,
informal processes of settlement, neighbourhood life and socialisation
in public spaces condition immigrants’ daily experiences of space.
Place becomes a crucial component of the migratory experience, and it
acquires particular meanings for migrants (King 1995). Their mental
map of the destination place reflects their social experiences of space
(Iosifides & King 1998), in respect to work and housing, but also socia-
lisation and leisure. For many of the participants in this research,
Thessaloniki seems to have been a consciously selected choice, because
of history and old cross-border links, as well as proximity and conveni-
ence. As a large city, it offers opportunities and ensures anonymity. But
still it is not that big; it is contrasted in that respect to Athens, and it is
perceived as more humane and ‘manageable’. Its virtues – the centre
and seafront and its green spaces – are highlighted and defended with
strong feelings of identification: this city is now their home.
Inevitably, the image of this city is transforming because of the mi-
grants’ presence. The dialectics of incorporation produce ‘new cultural
encounters’ (see King 2000), which are place specific in character and
scope. After all, the urban space constitutes a dynamic terrain where
identities constantly interact (Papastergiadis 2000: Ch. 1). As in all the
new multicultural metropolises across the northern Mediterranean,
changes in their landscapes suggest changes in their identity also. In
Lisbon, for example, the religion of immigrants not only plays a crucial
role in integration, but it is also an important factor of cultural and
spatial change – with new ‘religion townscapes’ transforming the im-
age of the city (Fonseca & Esteves 2002). This is not yet evident in
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Thessaloniki, given the cultural background of the majority of its mi-
grants, but it is relevant in the Athens’ case, where informal temples
are already in place, while the planned building of a mosque has sti-
mulated much controversial debate. Immigrants do play a role in his-
torical and cultural processes regarding the identity of a place. For in-
stance, the role of immigrants in the strengthening of Catalonia’s re-
gional identity has been crucial, with an increasing number speaking
the Catalan language instead of Castilian Spanish (King & Rodriquez-
Melguizo 1999). In Thessaloniki, the interplay between history, iden-
tity and contemporary processes of migration and incorporation is of
particular interest and importance for the character of the city.
Historically, cosmopolitanism and long-distance interaction shaped
the urban character of Southern European societies (Leontidou 1990).
This intercultural tradition is now ‘rediscovered’ in Mediterranean me-
tropolises through immigration (Malheiros & Ribas-Mateos 2002).
Thessaloniki was for centuries a multiethnic city of transnational im-
portance at the crossroads between East and West. Early in the thesis, I
referred to this aspect of the city’s history. Certainly, this was not al-
ways marked by peaceful coexistence; but the Jewish majority lived for
centuries next to Muslims and Christians (Mazower 2004; Veinstein
1993). Among them, other cultures added to the city’s cosmopolitan-
ism: Bulgarians, Albanians, Armenians, Vlachs, Roma, Western Eur-
opeans and others (Mazower 2004; Veinstein 1993). Rather than being
segregated in closed communities, Thessaloniki’s inhabitants used to
live together and their daily lives and relationships were based on their
locality of origin, neighbourhood contact and professional occupation,
rather than on ethnic identification (Mazower 2004).
But the spectres of history haunt present-day developments in an-
other way too. In Greek popular culture of previous decades, Thessalo-
niki is known as ‘the mother of refugees’ (proςfugomάna), a title that
the city acquired with the successful reception of Greek refugee popu-
lations from Asia Minor that followed the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-
1922. Many of those fleeing from burning Smyrna and other places in
Turkey were given temporary shelter in the old caravanserai at the
heart of the city; this building currently hosts the city’s town hall. In
the Ottoman years, caravanserais were the hostels where people would
stop for shelter and food for the night. Ribas-Mateos (2001: 36) has in-
triguingly described the ‘Mediterranean migratory space’ as a ‘new car-
avanserai’ on the road of many migrants towards a better life.
Today, Thessaloniki evolves as an important setting within this
space. The city itself becomes a new caravanserai for migrants from
the Balkans, Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and other parts
of the world. What this study reveals is that Albanian and Bulgarian
immigrants, along with newcomers of other nationalities, gradually be-
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come part of the local community; they might not break their links
with their home countries, they might be assimilated or pushed to-
wards the social margin, but they are ‘here’ and here they build their
lives. As ‘all urban residents become part of the polis’ (Malheiros & Ri-
bas-Mateos 2002: 306), emerging communities turn Thessaloniki into
a colourful mosaic. Immigrants become an organic element of the ci-
ty’s life and identity, a structural component of its development, alter-
ing both its morphology and its ways of understanding itself. Their
presence and action, but crucially their interaction and fusion with the
local population, re-establish in the emerging post-modern metropolis
of today the image of the multicultural city it had once been.
9.3 Migration, incorporation and change: identifying the trends
What do the findings tell us in general about the dynamics of change
in contemporary Greece? Where are the seeds of social and economic
transformation to be traced in relation to migration and incorporation?
My attempt in this chapter to discuss key findings in relation to inter-
national forces and the global-local interaction is only one side of the
coin. The other reveals important endogenous developments that sug-
gest that certain elements in the process of immigrants’ incorporation
are indicative of change within Greek society itself. Obviously, the em-
pirical basis is limited, and my research has not been concerned with
capturing such elements. However, the material collected in the thesis
and its ensuing analysis provide a basis for describing emerging
trends.
Naturally, a first area is the structure and composition of the coun-
try’s population. A population that was for long perceived as a homoge-
nous entity is now characterised by pluralism and diversity. Greece is
now a multicultural society, and this development crucially alters politi-
cal traditions, cultural beliefs and perceptions of identity. Faced directly
with the ‘other’, national identity is transforming and responds to dif-
ference in multiple ways. To an extent, these are reactionary, as the
spread of racist and xenophobic feelings and the growing influence of
extreme Right parties show. However, current debates on citizenship
and senses of belonging suggest that certain things that were unchal-
lenged in the past are now at least discussed. The rhetoric of the public
discourse has shifted, and immigration issues are now part of the poli-
tical agendas of the main parties. Not only has the far Right been grow-
ing, but also the range of the pro-migrant voice is expanding to the
whole spectrum of the Left. Civil-society organisations are learning
how to deal with migrants, how to interact creatively with their associa-
tions and, given their limitations, how to inspire participation and col-
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lective action. Despite the persistence of xenophobic attitudes, recipro-
city between immigrants and locals is growing at an informal level,
and there are signs that (some) locals have started to esteem the value
of diversity. As interaction increases and the second generation comes
into play, hybrid and transnational identities and practices are begin-
ning to emerge.
Education is another field where one can capture change: not only
regarding the geographical patterns of school segregation according to
the shares of immigrant children, but also due to the specific problems
and challenges that arise in respect to both the needs of these pupils
and the effective operation of the school system. Multicultural, intercul-
tural and anti-racist approaches to education are beginning to develop,
while specific programmes are designed aiming to support immigrant
children at school. Relevant debates uncover a necessity for redesigning
certain curriculum subjects (history, religious education) and certain
school practices (parades).
Another area is that of the economy and the social structure. A parti-
cular space has been created for immigrants at the boundaries between
the formal and the informal labour market, which keeps them at the
bottom of the social hierarchy through processes and relations that
turn them into ‘servants’. Such a development implies also changes in
the class structure within the Greek social formation, which is now
characterised by ethnic and cultural difference. This space has a struc-
tural function in the way forces of restructuring and internationalisa-
tion are affecting specific localities within Greece. However, it is fluid
and dynamic and its boundaries are blurred. Individual migrants may
find ways out through the acquisition of legal status and the move to
the formal labour market: in some cases towards better-paid jobs or
even more qualified posts, in others with self-employment and the set-
ting up of ethnic businesses. What these findings reveal in respect to
social change is that even under harsh and exploitative conditions, the
position of migrants within the host country is not given and may be
reversed.
The economic impact of immigration22 has been rather positive so
far, regarding the complementarity of foreign labour, the survival (or
even expansion) of certain sectors, growth in consumption, the
strengthening of insurance systems and the public budget (through
contributions and taxation). In respect to negative outcomes, economic
studies tend to emphasise labour-market issues, such as the distorted
and short-sighted development path based on labour-intensive activ-
ities, the expansion of the informal economy, the replacement of locals
by migrants in some sectors, and the impact on indigenous wages. Em-
pirical studies do confirm a low degree of substitution of indigenous la-
bour by foreign workers, in sectors such as agriculture and construc-
264 MIGRATION IN CONTEMPORARY GREECE
tion23. However, part of the replaced labour force is moving towards
better posts or supervisory positions, while the presence of migrants
seems to be creating more jobs than those it actually ‘takes away’24:
Say’s Law seems to apply so far, suggesting that (labour) supply creates
its own demand. As for the rest, these are not exclusively direct effects
of immigration as such, but also are a result of the exclusionary policy
and the failure of successive governments to regulate the labour mar-
ket. In addition, immigrants play a key role in policies aiming to keep
wages down, by offering motives (and alibis) to employers to move to-
wards the informal sector (Iosifides & King 1998). However, the overall
socio-economic effects cannot be limited solely to such ‘standard’ eco-
nomic indicators. Background material from my own research and the
findings of other studies (e.g. Romaniszyn 1996) suggest that there is
a whole range of economic activity addressed especially to immigrants.
Specific economic niches have emerged, in some cases with direct in-
volvement of migrants as entrepreneurs: from tavernas or bars serving
the migrants, to retail shops selling goods from the sending countries
(food and drinks, books and newspapers, DVDs and music, etc.); and
from translation offices or travel agencies specialising in the countries
where immigrants come from to specialised lawyers dealing with cases
of regularisation, expulsion, or human rights.
Then comes the issue of urban transformation. In cities, where re-
structuring processes are more explicitly manifested, difference and di-
versity, but also poverty, become more and more apparent at the local
spatial level. The emergence and consolidation of new ethnic commu-
nities celebrates a de facto multiculturalism, particularly visible in spe-
cific localities. The urban space itself is redefined on the basis of new
social uses and new geographies. Empty public spaces are revitalised
and areas with high immigrant concentrations and/or ethnic busi-
nesses acquire a multicultural character. However, the structural posi-
tion of immigrants has a concrete spatial face, translated into old, bad-
quality properties and into sharpening segregation patterns that may
confine migrants in specific areas. Even if the findings do not suggest
high levels of socio-spatial exclusion of immigrants in Thessaloniki,
this might be an issue of concern in the future, as polarisation in the
labour market grows and urban inequalities become more intense.
Most of the above elements are policy-relevant; but recent develop-
ments suggest that policy approaches change as well. The positive ef-
fects of the rationalisation of immigration policy have been pointed
out, while new developments include the design of specific measures
aiming at integration and non-discrimination legislation according to
EU standards. As the final lines of this work are being written, a new
immigration law is coming out (Law 3386, published on 25 August
2005 and due to start being applied from 1 January 2006), which, for
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the first time, explicitly refers to the issue of integration in its title.
Practical problems persist, but reflect wider malfunctions in the public
sector, which perhaps are experienced more by migrants due to wide-
spread xenophobic attitudes. Together with issues applying specifically
to migrants (naturalisation procedures, access to health care and bene-
fits, etc.), these problems underline the necessity for a redefinition of
policy, but also of the culture of service delivery. The successive legali-
sation programmes gave the opportunity to migrants to acquire docu-
ments, and thus be entitled to basic rights. However, their ambiguous
status in Greece regarding a variety of issues – from long-term resi-
dence to pensions and civil rights – constitutes a major problem with
respect to welfare. To what extent Greece will manage to integrate mi-
grants at a time of restructuring and social change is both a concern
and a challenge for the future.
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10 Conclusion: faraway so close
In his account of the diversity and complexity of contemporary migra-
tion trends in Europe, Russell King (2002: 94) poses a crucially impor-
tant question: ‘Is migration the exception or the norm?’ He answers by
pointing out that almost each of us is related to some form of mobility,
even if international migration as such concerns a relatively small
number of people. The Southern European experience and the Greek
case within it, as analysed here, reveal that mobility is only one among
many factors that make migrants not really ‘different’ from the host po-
pulations. History is one reason for that. To an extent, the ‘other’ re-
minds ‘us’ of our past, memories of which are still alive for certain sec-
tions of the population. Given the obvious differences (setting, pat-
terns, conditions, period), the situation of the migrants has much in
common with that of the working class in earlier times. Their experi-
ences of uprooting, survival, discrimination, but also success, bring to
mind the pathways of refugees from Asia Minor or the trajectories of
internal and international emigrants. Their construction as scapegoats
and constant pursuit by the authorities can be paralleled to the experi-
ences of left-wingers until 1975. Each country has a history of stigmati-
sation of distinct groups, which is now directed towards the immi-
grants.
Even more crucially, immigrants tell us much about ‘our’ present.
As Tsimouris notes (2003: 15), ‘immigrants constitute a mirror through
which Greek society watches its own image’, although in a distorting
and estranging way. It is in this mirror that aspects of social change
are reflected. One reason for this relates to the heterogeneity character-
ising not simply the migrant population as a whole, but also specific
migrant groups. The diversity of migratory experiences, despite com-
mon patterns and trajectories, reveals differences not only in the char-
acteristics and background of the migrants, but also in their perspec-
tives, plans, expectations and approaches to life. Such diversity consti-
tutes a reality among the host population too, who are not as
homogenous as binaristic perceptions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ tend to as-
sume, either ethnically or culturally, or in terms of class or lifestyles.
Another factor has to do with the socio-economic and institutional
context of reception. Some of the strategies immigrants develop, the ex-
tensive reliance on kinship ties and social networks, informality, the
use of open spaces, etc., are not as unfamiliar to Greek customs and
culture as they could be, say, in Northern Europe. This context, relevant
to most Southern European cities, allows what Leontidou (1996: 188)
describes as ‘polyvalent forms of social integration’, for example: ‘multi-
ple employment at the individual and family level, moonlighting and a
multitude of strategies for income improvement and income sharing,
including semi-illegal ones’. Such forms and practices seem to be re-
produced in the processes of migrants’ incorporation, bringing them
even closer to ‘us’. In addition, while the underground economy has
absorbed migrant labour to a significant degree, it continues to apply
to an extent to locals, especially young people, women, pensioners, un-
skilled workers, etc. Finally, many aspects of the problematic relation-
ship between migrants and the state (public services, regularisation
procedures, etc.) might have to do with their specific situation, but they
are also connected to the weaknesses of the Greek administration,
which affect immigrants and locals alike.
Within this context, the phenomenon of social mobility among mi-
grants should not be surprising: it might apply to them as it does to lo-
cals, especially as legal, institutional and cultural obstacles disappear
over time. And it depends, again in similar ways as it does in the case
of the local population, on constraints and opportunities arising from
class, status, education, geographic origin, social networks, and so
forth. Moreover, the time factor affects people in similar ways, at least
as far as the life course itself is concerned. After all, its unpredictable
nature challenges both distinctive lines between ‘us’ and ‘them’, as well
as neoclassical conceptions of ‘rationally acting individuals’. To refer
for the last time to the interviewees’ narratives, I quote Nadi’s simple
but evocative comment:
When you see that you can’t have what you need there, then you
look for something else. If you can’t find this at the place where
you live, you are going to look for this somewhere else. Since I
could come to Greece, I came here, but I didn’t really know …
what exactly I was looking for … My only thought was to come
and work … Then … I was thinking to … have some savings and
start my own business in Albania. But time passes and you go
on thinking, and then you are suddenly married and have a baby
… You can’t anticipate life; nobody can.
Needless to say, we are all affected, although in varying degrees and
ways, by the deep structural changes related to globalisation and re-
structuring. With so many things in common, the question asked ear-
lier has to be rephrased (King 2002: 94): ‘Are the migrants therefore
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still to be regarded as the ‘‘Others’’ who are different from us?’ In mor-
al or political terms the answer should be no. But in the light of the
analysis, it seems that the ‘others’ become ‘strangers’, ‘aliens’ and
‘workers’, paradoxically rejected by the polity and the society, but much
needed for their labour. Thus ‘immigrants’, as Petrakou (2001) has ar-
gued, have been ‘constructed’ as a distinct category on the basis of the
exclusionary mechanisms generated in each of the contexts examined
in the thesis: the restrictive immigration policy, the spread of xenopho-
bic attitudes, and the particular space migrants occupy in the labour
market. Their housing and living conditions in the city are an outcome
of the interplay between the above exclusionary processes, which keep
them at the bottom of the social hierarchy. Even so, however, within a
short period (of only eleven to twelve years at the time of the field-
work), we can observe a multiplicity of forms and ways of adjustment
and of building a life in Thessaloniki. Gradually, immigrants become
an organic element of the host society.
The academic (and political) debate on immigrants in Southern Eur-
opean countries, especially in Greece, has been much concerned with
the problem of social exclusion. The argument focuses mostly on the
tendency of immigrants to work informally, on their illegal status and
on a variety of issues ranging from racism to poor living standards,
segregation, etc. Albanians in particular, in both Italy and Greece, have
been portrayed as one of the most deprived groups, experiencing exclu-
sion and discrimination at several levels. For various reasons, social
science seems to reproduce dichotomous perceptions between ‘us’ and
the ‘others’, whether by treating immigrants as a solid, homogeneous
category, as distinct (social, ethnic, cultural) groups, communities or
individuals. The migrants are seen as victims (of racism, capitalism,
the state), or as a solution (to demographic stagnation or labour
shortages) and their situation is regarded as unchangeable. One of my
initial concerns when I first undertook this study was to avoid falling
into such categorisations. This was not an easy task, and I am still not
sure to what extent I have been successful. I had first to overcome my
personal illusions and political convictions, without paying the cost of
losing my enthusiasm for the general topic of migration and the speci-
fic project of the D.Phil. itself.
The experience of the fieldwork and the analysis of the material col-
lected revealed the five key points that have been highlighted in the
thesis, which offer an alternative approach that moves beyond binaries
between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The first concerns the great heterogeneity of
the migrant populations, equally apparent in the two nationalities stu-
died here as well as in other migrant groups. Especially in large com-
munities, like the Albanian one, such heterogeneity should be ex-
pected, not only regarding its composition, but also with respect to the
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variety of experiences and trajectories. The second point has to do with
the dynamics of incorporation. This study has underlined the importance
of time, not as a vague category, but in all that it may entail, i.e. the ra-
tionalisation of immigration policy, the upward employment mobility
and the gradual improvement of living conditions, the development of
patterns of socialisation and interaction within each migrant group and
between different communities and the local population. The third
point is agency. Rather than being passive victims of a hostile and alie-
nated environment, migrants take action, whether collectively or indivi-
dually, formally but mostly informally, and they exhibit admirable capa-
cities of adaptability and flexibility in coping with the difficulties and
problems that arise from the institutional and socio-economic context.
The fourth point is place. The local social structures constitute the con-
text of reception, through which national policies or international
forces are filtered. At the base, however, migration remains a social
process and a human experience with a place-bounded character and
meaning for both migrants and locals. The fifth point concerns proxi-
mity in the Balkan context and its relevance to the dynamics of migration
and incorporation; not only it allows various expressions of transna-
tionalism, but also it suggests that immigration to Greece is only part
of a wider framework of mobility and exchange in the area. The Bal-
kans have been pictured as an emerging transnational space, whereby
we can currently observe diverse types of movement and various kinds
of flows, most of which are directly or indirectly related to migration.
The processes that we can identify in this regional context are indica-
tive of the way globalisation forces are manifested at a smaller scale.
Rather than searching for single factors and one-way paths leading
to integration, the main conclusion is that incorporation is the out-
come of a combination of interdependent factors at the level of struc-
tures and institutions, on the one hand, and at the level of agency and
relationships, on the other. It thus appears that neither ‘integration’,
nor ‘exclusion’ are definite and stable one-way processes. They are both
subject to time, thus they may evolve in parallel directions, and they
may be reversed, whether for specific groups or for individual mi-
grants. In addition, it is not only migrants that adjust, but the host so-
ciety itself is adapting, in conflicting ways, to the new situations im-
posed by the fact that it is now a multicultural society – and develops
as such. The incorporation of immigrants is characterised by a series
of contradictions, expressed in the diversity of experiences and reflecting
broader social mechanisms, processes of economic restructuring, politi-
cal trends and institutional changes. What this reveals is the key issue
of social change: Greece, as a host society, is changing anyway, but now
it does so because of, and with, the immigrants. Migration becomes
part of the dynamics of socio-economic transformation, therefore it
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should be understood as a ‘critical force in history’ (Papastergiadis
2000: 53).
In a rapidly transforming reality, where Greece has found itself to
have become a multicultural society within a decade or so, no certain-
ties apply. Having said this, I ought to acknowledge the weaknesses of
the research presented in the thesis and the limits of the explanations
and conclusions to which the analysis have led me. The first weakness
relates to the possibility of bias concerning the size of the sample (rather
small) and its selection (through ‘safe’ channels). However, I can point
out that my sample’s statistical characteristics do not differ much from
the more complete official statistics; so I do have some confidence in
the non-bias of my sample. In addition, the combination of different
sources and methods has hopefully averted the possibility of bias. The
over-representation of certain categories of migrants in the sample (e.g.
‘elite’ migrants, Sarakatsani Bulgarians) allowed me to address these
groups as well, largely neglected previously in empirical studies, and to
examine similarities and differences in their incorporation patterns.
Another category of possible bias has to do with place, i.e. the strict fo-
cus on Thessaloniki. But the research aimed at capturing the dynamics
of incorporation at the local level of the city; as more research takes
place in different settings, our knowledge base is enriched, improving
our understanding. Given the general aim of the research to both cap-
ture individual experiences and explore general ‘objective’ mechanisms
and processes, no other approach is believed to be more relevant and
useful than the multi-instrumental, interdisciplinary, combined and
comparative methodology used here. If any biases may be found de-
spite the conscious efforts to avoid them, they should rather be attribu-
ted to the limitations of the researcher himself, not to the research
methods employed. In this connection, I should recall the self-criticism
I made in Chapter 3 concerning my own positionality as a member of
the host society interviewing immigrants largely through the medium
of the Greek language.
The second major weakness relates to the limited comparative basis
of the thesis; I have based this on the range of empirical studies that
lay within my capabilities. The problem is that the ones concerning
Greece focus on a small number of groups (most studies deal with Al-
banians); thus generalisations of the conclusions to other migrant
groups lack empirical evidence and might be based on assumptions.
On the other hand, the international dimension has built largely on
theory. Research, reading and critical evaluation and incorporation of
the vast literature would be impossible; however, the effort made in the
thesis is a starting point for future interpretation.
Finally, perhaps the most important weakness stems from the very
fact that the phenomenon is still unfolding, which suggests that things
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may change constantly, and it is particularly difficult to make projec-
tions at this stage. Scripta manem, maybe, but they are often day by day
outdated by history. At best, I have described the emerging trends and
set out a framework for research and analysis in the future. The em-
pirical findings as such concern the current situation, and they are ana-
lysed in the light of current knowledge. They offer an account of the
particular migratory experience of a specific city, which seems to be re-
gaining its old multicultural character in a new context; and of the lives
and conditions of a group of migrants to whom I owe this work.
Having outlined the weaknesses, I write a final word regarding what
I consider to be the strengths of this research. At an empirical level,
this is an up-to-date evidence-based study of Albanian and Bulgarian
migrants in Thessaloniki. Apart from simply describing immigrants’
characteristics, the thesis has sketched typologies and patterns of incor-
poration by looking simultaneously at different spheres of migrants’
lives and different incorporation contexts. Despite the fact that much
research has been done on Albanians, few studies focus on Thessaloni-
ki, while Bulgarian migrants have not been studied much anyway,
especially in the context of the city and regarding their various migra-
tion patterns. Furthermore, although policy and labour-market issues
have been extensively addressed, certain elements have been captured
empirically for the first time. These include: the dynamic unfolding of
incorporation at several levels over time; the importance of informal
networks and practices in the trajectories of immigrants in Greece;
some dimensions of the interaction between migrants and locals; the
issues of space, its dynamics and its use; and the emergence of trans-
national elements, regarding networks, practices or aspects of identity,
which are to be understood in the context of Balkan transnationalism.
The focus on the city itself is important, to address the place-bounded
character of the migration experience and the effects on the local set-
ting, given Thessaloniki’s history and its multicultural past.
At a methodological level, the research involved combined methodol-
ogies and a rich range of sources and types of data, including systema-
tic observation and participation. Through the in-depth interviews, mi-
grants have been given a ‘voice’, which has been important in order to
take their point of view into account, by engaging them as participants
in a research about them. At an analytical level, the thesis benefits from
a dynamic and dialectical account: incorporation is seen as a dynamic
process that develops over time; social structures have been analysed
without ignoring the role of agency; the dynamics of social change
have been explored with respect to both the interaction of immigrants
with the host society and wider processes of socio-economic transfor-
mation. At a theoretical level, the analysis has developed an interna-
tional perspective that located the case of Greece within the Southern
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European experience and the global map of migration. Aspects of the
global-local interaction have been identified, especially within the con-
text of Balkan transnationalism. Finally, the dynamics of incorporation
in urban contexts have been generally addressed, in an attempt to ex-
plain the links between migration and socio-economic change.
The thesis started with a reference to population movements in the
history of Greece. Although contemporary migration processes are tak-
ing place within a very different and rapidly transforming environ-
ment, the experience of the phenomenon at a human level is not that
new. The accommodation of refugees from Asia Minor in the 1920s
and 1930s, despite early harsh conditions and hostility, has been a suc-
cess story overall, albeit within the context of nation-building and statal
integration. And this was the success of a then poor and politically un-
stable country. Cultural diversity too has its historical precedents, espe-
cially in Thessaloniki where different communities lived together until
the recent past, in the context of the Ottoman Empire.
The context of today is globalisation, transnational mobility and the
transition towards multiethnic formations and cultural pluralism. The
trajectories of Albanian and Bulgarian immigrants in Greece so far
have been based largely on informal practices, kinship ties and social
networks, which obviously cannot replace social policy. A realistic and
inclusive policy framework is certainly necessary, but it is not enough
alone. Multicultural coexistence presupposes transnationalist-interna-
tionalist practices and perspectives, and a redefinition of the relation-
ship between ‘us’ and the ‘others’. The study of the ‘other’ uncovers the
multidimensional character of identity itself, providing a basis for such
a redefinition. After all, the notion of identity, vague and ambiguous,
refers to a fragmented and fluid social reality, which essentially reflects
the multifaceted social grid, the dialectics between the material world
and its image, the clash between structural, institutional and cultural
contradictions. Within this complex set of relations that constitute so-
cial reality, we are all subjects, actors and participants. Cultural, na-
tional or other forms of identification compose the mosaic of the
beauty of the world. Multicultural societies may function with the
peaceful coexistence of divided communities. The challenge, however,
is to explore ways of how we can live together.
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Notes
Chapter 2
1 Some of the effects of immigration in the host countries are discussed in the context
of the findings. The effects of emigration on the countries of origin are connected to
the problems of development and involve a series of issues that are certainly impor-
tant, but far from the interests of the thesis.
2 Other publications that have been consulted include: Mousourou (1991); Findlay
(1996); Papastergiadis (2000); Labrianidis & Lyberaki (2001: Ch. 2-3); Tapinos
(2000); and Ammassari & Black (2001).
3 According to classical economic theory (Smith’s absolute and Ricardo’s comparative
advantage), trade and migration are perfect substitutes: a country where labour is in
abundance (and hence its cost is low) can either export goods produced through
labour-intensive practices or export labour. Neoclassical theory took the argument
further: when free trade is established between two countries, the differences in the
prices of production factors are reduced and so is, in the long run, the potential for
migration.
4 New Growth Theory (e.g. Grossman & Helpman, 1991), for instance, underlines that
trade liberalisation should be accompanied by technology transfers to developing
countries, which can be achieved through FDI: foreign companies open the path for
the introduction of innovations, which might result in technological convergence;
this in turn might speed up growth in migrant sending countries, reducing the emi-
gration potential in the long run.
5 In that sense, migration is considered as an investment that the migrant makes, ex-
pecting to have net positive returns in either earnings or human capital or both.
6 Despite their differences, the theories of dependency (Frank), uneven (Petras) or un-
equal (Amin) development and the world-systems school (Wallerstein) can all be seen
as historical-structural perspectives inspired, to a lesser or a greater extent, by Marxist
economic theory.
7 World systems theory stresses the distinction between core, periphery and semi-
periphery, according to the different position and role of countries in the interna-
tional division of labour, which is dominated by the capitalist mode of production
(Wallerstein 1974). Rather than referring to a global economy, it assumes a world sys-
tem, based on a dynamic world economy that is increasingly integrating. Its weak
point is the rather economistic logic of analysis, almost totally ignoring cultural fac-
tors.
8 This is primarily concerned with the implications of a homogenising mass-media
based culture for national identities and local communities. Rather than implying a
specific school of thought, this approach is drawn out of a special edition of Theory,
Culture and Society (Featherstone 1990), with contributions from many well-known
social theorists (Robertson, Bauman, A. D. Smith, Touraine, Appadurai, J. Fried-
mann, Wallerstein, and others). As a weakness, this analysis is limited in focusing
on the negative effects of homogenisation, ignoring other factors and neglecting pro-
cesses of differentiation.
9 The theoretical insights of D. Harvey (1989), A. Giddens (1991) and R. Robertson
(1992) are relevant here. They all develop a historical worldview linking globalisation
to modernity; human society gradually moves towards an interconnected world and a
respective global consciousness of people.
10 This approach sees globalisation as the result of the development and expansion of
the capitalist mode of production, which embraced the globe exponentially after the
1970s’ crisis (Ross & Trachte 1990).
11 For an account of the sceptics’ view, see the introduction in Held & McGrew (1999).
12 This distinction stems from the different meanings of the terms ‘international’ (im-
plying that sovereign nation-states are the crucial actors in the international scene)
and ‘global’ (suggesting that states are losing importance, while supranational institu-
tions and market forces prevail).
13 The terms ‘capitalism’, ‘capitalist system’, etc. have their origins in the tradition of
classical political economy and the Marxist intellectual heritage, and, despite the fact
that they refer to politically loaded concepts, they are widely used today in different
social science disciplines (sociology, political economy, critical human geography,
etc.) without a need for precise definitions. As employed throughout the thesis, basi-
cally in this chapter and in Chapter 9, the terms describe, in abstract terms, the pre-
sent system of economic organisation, which has been evolving over the past five
centuries or so, passing from different stages of development and with many na-
tional or regional variations. In general, its key characteristics can be summarised in
three basic elements: the domination of the free market, capital accumulation and
wage labour.
14 See Hobsbawm (1992). Castells (1998: 2) locates the reasons for the collapse of the
Eastern Bloc in ‘the inability of statism to manage the transition to the information
age’; this is a rather simplistic explanation, overemphasising exogenous develop-
ments and ignoring internal problems and political oppression.
15 Key factors indicating the decline of the nation-state are: regional integrations and in-
creasing economic interdependence; internationalisation of national economies and
abolition of most forms of protectionism; prevalence of policies promoting privatisa-
tions and dismantling the social state; adoption of common rules at the international
level and transfer of many decision-making procedures to supranational institutions;
international migration, formation of new minorities and deterritorialisation of cul-
ture; awakened nationalisms and regionalisms; decreasing citizen participation and
trust towards the state.
16 S. Strange refers to the ‘Westfailure system’, pointing to the international system of
nation-states that emerged in nineteenth-century Europe during the period that suc-
ceeded the Treaty of Westphalia.
17 These are obviously connected, representing different aspects of a single process.
The distinction is rather methodological, addressing both the socio-economic basis
(the capitalist world system) and the cultural roots (modernity, as a system of thought
and civilisation) of globalisation in history.
18 Since the discovery of America and early modern technological advances, people’s
perception of the world has changed dramatically: not only did we realise that the
Earth is not flat and rotates, but also our knowledge expanded and we achieved an in-
creasingly more universalistic awareness. However, the discovery of the ‘other’ has
passed through the violent path that characterises human history.
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19 Lenin’s account of imperialism located its chief characteristics in the domination of
financial over industrial capital, the role of MNCs in the global scene, and the in-
equalities generated in a global system in which the development of certain regions
produced the underdevelopment of others. Playing with words, we could argue that
globalisation today may be seen as the ‘highest stage of imperialism’.
20 History, of course, is linear only when looking back. We could learn the lesson that
the greatest steps are taken after radical breaks with the ‘norms’ of linear historical
development.
21 ‘Fordism’ refers to the system of production organisation prevalent in the West dur-
ing the twentieth century; it depended on monopoly capitalism and national develop-
ment and was characterised by standardised industrial production in large units, di-
rected to mass consumption. It was established on the basis of a Keynesian social
contract guaranteeing full employment and prevailed as a model antagonistic to the
Soviet one, with which though it had much in common in terms of economic devel-
opment.
22 Although the account of King & Rybaczuk (1993) lies in the context of new produc-
tive structures and migratory trends in Southern Europe, it reflects broader changes
and more general trends.
23 Castells (1983: 307) distinguishes between the Marxian term ‘mode of production’ (i.
e. ‘the way surplus is appropriated’) and the term ‘mode of development’ i.e. (‘the
way surplus is increased’). I. Ramonet, editor of Le Monde Diplomatique, has evoca-
tively compared the industrial revolution, which replaced the human hand through
the use of machines, to the present-day information revolution, which is replacing
the human mind through the use of computers, with multiplying social and econom-
ic effects.
24 Changes in the characteristics and synthesis of the ‘bourgeoisie’ and especially the
‘proletariat’ make the Marxian definition of class difficult to apply to the new context.
Neo-Gramscian views suggest the emergence of a ‘transnational capitalist class’, a
global ruling elite, mobile across core areas of the world economy (Sklair 2001). But
what used to be the ‘working class’ in the past (proletarian = s/he who has no posses-
sion of other production means than her/his labour power) is now a fragmented no-
tion, including various and very different social groups: office employees and blue-
collar workers, highly paid manual specialists and low-paid service workers, part-time
workers and the unemployed.
25 Changing consumption patterns and the increasing demand for services by middle
and lower strata represent the consumption effect of the restructuring process. The
shift of demand towards quality and the homogenisation of consumption patterns
point to the emergence of consumerism as the dominant ideology/culture of contem-
porary capitalism. As the ‘ruling class’ increasingly dominates the livelihood and life-
style of other social groups within and beyond the sphere of economic production
(Touraine 1971), consumerism becomes the global ideology of the masses (Sklair
2001).
26 The division between a formal and an informal economic sector, resulting in primary
and secondary labour markets, is not that distinctively apparent in real life; it is
rather a theoretical abstraction to explain polarisation in the labour market (Piore
1979; for more details see Section 2.1.1).
27 The emergence of NGOs as major actors in social policy and practice is rather contra-
dictory. While they seem to operate as an alibi for the reduction of the welfare state,
replacing some of its old functions, they also appear as a response to this crisis, offer-
ing social protection to social groups that are vulnerable, or targeting countries that
are too weak to confront globalisation forces. Thus, despite questions concerning cor-
ruption and/or relations with governments, one should acknowledge that many
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NGOs are historically linked to ‘new’ social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, and
directly participate in today’s struggles, forming also part of the anti-globalisation
movement.
28 In addition, as Papastergiadis (2000: 78) notes, ‘the bulk of global trade is focused
on speculative options, future shares, insurance, finance and real estate, rather than
the commodity market.’ This obviously favours developed countries, whose econo-
mies are based on an advanced financial sector, while developing countries depend
on material production (and mostly have urgent material needs).
29 Hirst & Thompson (1996) have challenged this argument by stressing that most
TNCs are legally domiciled in developed countries (mainly Europe, USA, Japan).
Sklair’s (1999) response emphasises the fact that most TNCs operate outside their
home countries, express the interests of those who control them (rather than national
ones) and develop global strategies (rather than focusing on ‘foreign investment’).
30 Partial exceptions are the countries that joined the European Union in 2004 and the
ones scheduled to join in 2007, although income polarisation and serious economic
problems are characteristic of them too.
31 Such as the Newly Industrialising Countries, particularly the so-called East Asian ‘ti-
gers’; also, to different extents, Mexico, Brazil and Chile (where, however, inequalities
remain intense); finally, India, and particularly China, which has emerged as a global
economic actor with rapid growth rates and extreme contradictions.
32 I owe this expression to my friend G. Ververis; it refers to contradictory trends that
can be seen as opposite sides of the same coin. For instance, in the political-cultural
field, we may face a homogenising mass culture (Americanisation, McDonaldisation,
etc.), but we also witness trends of individual or collective quests for ‘safe’ identities
and ‘imagined communities’ (religion, nationalism, etc.).
33 See Castles & Miller (1998), Muus (2001), Findlay (1995) and King (2002).
34 See for instance: King (1995); Castles & Miller (1998); Koser & Lutz (1998); Castles
(2000); Tapinos (2000); Urzu´a (2000); Papastergiadis (2000); Muus (2001).
35 An important aspect of this changing geography is that contemporary migration is
not solely directed towards the industrial centres and the big cities of the developed
world, but, increasingly, towards important sites in developing countries. The emer-
gence of Southern Europe as a new destination for migrants is also indicative of the
‘changing global map of migration’ (King 2000a).
36 Services have become the basic sector of immigrant employment in the developed
world. This has led scholars to stress the ‘post-industrial’ character of contemporary
migrations, in contrast to the industrial migration of the post-war era (Pugliese
1993). The rise in the global demand for a cheap labour force functions, in the devel-
oped countries, as a pull factor for immigration, by creating employment opportu-
nities for migrants even when unemployment is high (Piore 1979; Castles & Miller
1998).
37 According to the definitions by Esping-Andersen (1990).
38 The brief analysis that follows draws mainly from Mousourou (1993); King & Rybac-
zuk (1993), King et al. (1997), King (2000a).
39 The underground economy in Southern Europe originates from traditional produc-
tive structures and informal employment arrangements, further supplemented by
trends of restructuring and strategies of flexibility, as well as by the expansion of illi-
cit activities (Vaiou & Hadjimichalis 1997: 52-53).
40 Informal economic activities in Greece are also stimulated by clientelist relations be-
tween political parties and the private sector, as well as by widespread practices of tax
evasion and non-adoption of labour norms by many individuals and firms, due to the
high costs of taxation and of social-security contributions (Fakiolas 2000: 62). In ad-
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dition, the family character of many of the numerous small companies further facili-
tates informal employment arrangements on the basis of kinship.
41 Average monthly household spending increased by approximately 18 per cent during
the period from 1993-1994 to 1998-1999 (NSSG, Family Budget Survey: Table 3).
42 The rest had not declared. Results are from a survey by the National Centre for Social
Research, reported in the newspaper Eleftherotypia (3 March 2002).
43 Nevertheless we should stay sceptical towards early ‘enthusiastic’ exaggerations, like
that of Sarris & Zografakis (1999), who suggested – despite a lack of reliable data –
that immigration in the 1990s has contributed 1.5 per cent to the growth of the
Greek GDP, with overall positive effects in the growth of private investment, in de-
creasing (!) consumer prices, and in job creation, and thus in the general prosperity
(see criticism by Labrianidis & Lyberaki 2001: 141-143).
44 During the fieldwork, I ‘discovered’ (and included in my study) the migration of Sara-
katsani ethnic Greeks from Bulgaria; their numbers must be small, and I have not
been able to locate any official data concerning them.
45 Figures are for the ‘Real Population’. What the NSSG calls ‘Usual Resident Popula-
tion’ is counted at about 10,934,000 people, of whom 761,800 are foreign passport
holders and nearly 644,000 come from countries other than the EU-15 and EEA,
Malta, Cyprus, Monaco and Andorra, and also excluding North America, Oceania
and Japan (see Table A3 in Appendix A). Among this last category, the share of Alba-
nians approaches 70 per cent, and Bulgarians come in second place with 5.6 per
cent.
46 It is beyond the scope of the thesis to examine Greek immigration policy in detail,
since much has already been written about that (see for instance: Kourtovic 1994; La-
zaridis 1996; Karydis 1996; Baldwin-Edwards & Fakiolas 1999; Triandafyllidou
2000; Baldwin-Edwards 2001; Kourtovic 2001; Georgoulas 2001; Fakiolas 2003; Si-
taropoulos 2003). This section offers an introduction to the development of the policy
framework, which is necessary in order to understand incorporation processes as
analysed later in the thesis – starting from its effects on the migrants’ daily lives in
Chapter 5.
47 An initial provision aimed at excluding migrants from neighbouring countries, but
this was withdrawn following criticism and mobilisation of trade unions, NGOs,
anti-racist groups and migrant associations.
48 See, for instance: Baldwin-Edwards & Fakiolas (1999); Baldwin-Edwards (2001); Fa-
kiolas (2003).
49 The data are from the newspaper article by P. Galati in the newspaper Kathimerini
(26 June 2004).
Chapter 3
1 For instance, Samers (1998) has proposed instead the term ‘negotiation’, meaning
more or less the same thing, i.e. the ways migrants approach the dominant lan-
guages, labour markets, social services and administration bodies, failing though to
capture the dynamic interaction of structural and institutional factors. ‘Integration’,
on the other hand, as used in the previously mentioned studies of Musterd et al.
(2000) or King & Rodriguez-Melguizo (1999), does not differ much from what I call
incorporation. Furthermore, Heckman (2004: 4) offers a holistic approach by defin-
ing integration as a process of ‘inclusion of migrants in the core institutions, rela-
tions and statuses in the receiving country’, which is indeed an interactive process be-
tween migrants and the receiving society.
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2 This includes over 130 titles published between 1970-2001, around sixty of them in
Greek and the vast majority of the remainder in English.
3 See for instance Psimmenos (1995; 1998) on undocumented Albanians; Romaniszyn
(1996) on Polish immigrants; Minev et al. (1997); Markova & Sarris (1997) and Mar-
kova (2001) on Bulgarians; Lazaridis & Romaniszyn (1998) on Albanians and Poles;
Iosifides & King (1998) on Albanians, Filipinos and Egyptians; Droukas (1998) on
Albanians; Lazaridis (1999) on ethnic Greek and ‘other’ Albanians; Lazaridis & Wick-
ens (1999) on Albanians and EU citizens; Can˜ete (2001) on Filipino migrants; Lab-
rianidis & Lyberaki (2001) on Albanians.
4 See for instance Vaiou & Hadjimichalis (1997) on ‘cities, regions and informal la-
bour’, or various chapters in several edited volumes on ‘social exclusion’ (Kassimati
1998; Sakis Karagiorgas Foundation 1998) and ‘identity’ (Kostandopoulou et al.
1999), among other publications.
5 For example, the research of Psimmenos (1995; 1998) on social exclusion of Alba-
nians in Athens provided a thorough analysis of the mechanisms of migrants’ mar-
ginalisation, underestimating though the early phase of migration at the time (early
1990s). The research of Labrianidis & Lyberaki (2001) on Albanians in Thessaloniki
was the first major work to ‘see’ the migrants’ pathways to integration, followed by
my own contribution (Hatziprokopiou 2003b), derived from fieldwork for this thesis.
6 See previous footnote. Also of relevance here is the economistic logic apparent in
some studies, despite their analytical thoroughness (e.g. Linardos-Rylmon 1993; Lia-
nos et al. 1996; or even Labrianidis & Lyberaki 2001). Pointing out, for instance, that
the jobs migrants do are mostly in the informal sector and ‘would not be done’ with-
out foreign labour is certainly true and useful, but – apart from downplaying the is-
sue of exploitation – assumes either that migration is temporary, or that migrants
(and their children) will always perform these kind of jobs.
7 Of 1,470 people surveyed in 1997-1998, 40 per cent had employed migrants. The
sample was structured according to the basic geographical and demographic charac-
teristics of the population.
8 E.g. highly skilled professionals who escape the average ‘labour migrant’ category in
Greece, migrants who took Greek language courses, ethnic Greek (Sarakatsani) Bul-
garians.
9 In general, throughout the fieldwork, several insights have arisen about how the
questionnaire could have been better designed: for instance, some questions could
have had a simpler answer format in order to be coded more easily, while some other
questions could have been completely avoided.
10 Some basic textbooks on statistics have been particularly useful in order to refresh
knowledge from my undergraduate years and to understand better the procedures
and tests I wanted to apply (Kindis 1984; Paraskevopoulos 1990; Heiman 1996). On
how to work with SPSS, I relied upon both general and specialised introductory
books (Bryman & Cramer 1997; Bryman 2001: Ch. 11-12; Robson 2002: Ch. 13), and
also consulted the Help tool of the statistical package itself. Quantitative data are dis-
cussed throughout the analysis and basic results are summarised in tables and fig-
ures.
11 When I refer to fieldwork findings though, ‘Greater Thessaloniki’ includes a subur-
ban village to the north (Liti, administratively outside the Thessaloniki area). This is
where the snowball effect brought me: the (Bulgarian) participants I spoke to there
used to commute on a daily basis and most of their activities, relationships, etc., were
in the centre of the city.
12 NSSG, National Accounts, regional data. All data used here are from various tables,
publications and online material of the National Statistical Service of Greece, unless
stated otherwise.
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13 Table A4 in Appendix A illustrates the main local socio-economic indicators during
1991 and 2001.
Chapter 4
1 Two people from Albania became Protestants, after being converted by American
missionaries in the early 1990s, while one Bulgarian woman is Muslim, belonging
to the Muslim minority of the south-eastern part of Bulgaria.
2 Albanian women form a share of 42.1 per cent in the survey of Labrianidis & Lybera-
ki (2001). Census data (2001) count the share of women at 40.5 per cent among all
Albanians in Thessaloniki, but only 23.8 per cent among those employed. Among Al-
banian regularisation applicants in 1998, only 18.3 per cent were women (Cavounidis
& Hatzaki 1999). By contrast, the shares of women among Bulgarian migrants are
significantly higher: 75 per cent in Markova’s (2001) first sample, 54 per cent in the
aggregate census data, 43.7 per cent among the employed Bulgarians and 46.2 per
cent in regularisation applications.
3 It is worth noting that relatively large shares of divorced or separated women were
also found in Markova’s study of Bulgarian immigrants in Athens (2001: 256).
4 The findings of King et al. (2003) about many Albanian migrants in the United
Kingdom who had spent some years in Greece suggest that this may be a more gen-
eral trend among Albanian migrants in Greece as a whole.
5 Female migration to Greece appears to be following a ‘tradition’ of inter-ethnic mar-
riages as well, in some cases, as an outcome of relationships formed between Greek
students in Bulgaria and local women. However, the boundaries between such cases
of ‘love migration’ and the bride-trade, trafficking and the illicit activities forcing wo-
men into prostitution are not that clear anymore: a simple Internet search on this is-
sue can lead to commercial websites involved literally in a ‘bazaar’ of Eastern Eur-
opean women whose dreams for a better future might be easily exploited by profit-
making networks.
6 This particular individual may be an exception in my study, but it further confirms
the fact of pre-1989 mobility in the Bulgarian case, supporting the argument about a
‘tradition’ in Greco-Bulgarian marriages. The existence of the Greek-Bulgarian Friend-
ship Association, ‘Kyril and Methodi’ in Thessaloniki, and of a similar organisation
in Athens, where members are mostly mixed couples of Greeks (usually men) mar-
ried to Bulgarians, offers additional proof of this trend (see Section 8.2.1).
7 The narratives of the migrants interviewed reveal to an extent what numbers hide,
such as the feelings and experiences of being ‘clandestine’. Valbona, an Albanian par-
ticipant told me ‘It’s all very complicated … I was feeling scared, I can say. I was very
nervous, anyway … I didn’t know what the future would be,’ before bursting into
tears.
8 These cases are counted under the category ‘illegal entry’ in Table 4.4, whereas those
who had to pay appear in ‘illegal entry (trafficking)’.
9 Only one Greek-Albanian respondent came as a seasonal worker: this could be proof
of the inefficiency of the bilateral agreement on recruiting seasonal workers signed
in 1997 between Greece and Albania, but it is most likely to be related to the geo-
graphic (urban) scope of my research: the agreement had to do with seasonal work
in agriculture mostly, that is, in rural areas, and thus it is not applicable here.
10 Four Albanians had worked in Italy before coming to Greece; all had relatives in
Greece and three decided to come during 1996-1997, when the first amnesty pro-
gramme was announced by the government. Information about the regularisation
programme through friends was a factor for the only Bulgarian respondent who had
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been to a different country (Spain) before re-emigrating to Greece. Two young wo-
men, one Albanian of ethnic Greek origin and one Bulgarian whose father is a Greek
citizen, had been studying abroad (in Romania and Germany, respectively) before
joining their families in Greece.
11 On networks between cities and the commercial routes linking places in the Otto-
man Balkans, see for instance Todorov (1986), Katsiardi-Hering (2003) and Stoiano-
vich (2003).
12 Both Vlachs and non-Grecophone Orthodox Albanians are considered ‘ethnic Greeks’
(Voreioepirotes) by the Greek state, and those who were in a position to prove their
roots have been treated favourably.
13 The regional position of Korc¸e¨ in what is now the south-eastern corner of Albania
and its economic role were improved in the aftermath of the devastation of Moscho-
polis (1770s), a city that had been an important merchant town in this part of the
Balkans and one of the centres of Vlach culture for centuries.
14 In the context of Bulgarian migration, a similarly interesting case for future research
might be Plovdiv (again a city with a strong Vlach element in the past) given the
commercial links and the parallel cultural and social development with Thessaloniki
(see Miteva 2001). According to my findings, Plovdiv and its surroundings is the sec-
ond major region of origin of Bulgarian migrants to Thessaloniki, which contrasts
with Markova’s (2001) evidence that most Bulgarians in Athens come from northern
cities.
Chapter 5
1 For instance, the Greek ombudsman reported several problems regarding the deten-
tion conditions of those awaiting expulsion in the General Police Directorate of Attica
and other police departments (Cert. N. 1956, 10 December 2001): not only was the
period of detention often longer than the six months stipulated by law, but also the
hygiene conditions were bad and the numbers of people detained exceeded the capa-
city of the place where they were kept.
2 The survey questioned a random sample of 2,000 people who called the 1464 tele-
phone helpline operated by the Centre for Citizens’ Support (KEP, a body of the Min-
istry of the Interior) to ask for information about the procedures of the second regularisa-
tion during summer 2001 (Eleftherotypia, 1 August 2001: 46).
3 Problems of a similar nature continued to exist after the revision of the legal frame-
work (Law 2910/2001) and they were highlighted in a report of the Greek ombuds-
man entitled ‘Suggestions for the simpler, more effective and fair realisation of the
policy of Law 2910/2001’, that was sent to the Ministry of the Interior on 23 Septem-
ber 2003 (cert. N. 4603).
4 In addition, under the provisions of the new law, the application fee required for the
issue of a work permit (separate from the stay permit) was set at 294, 440 or 880
euros for permits lasting 1-2 years, 2-6 years and more than 6 years, respectively
(Eleftherotypia, 29 May 2001: 59).
5 The cost of buying all of the 250 social security stamps required was calculated as fol-
lows in 2001: about 1,380 euros for the IKA fund, 1,430 euros for TEBE and 293
euros for OGA (Eleftherotypia, 31 May 2001: 20).
6 Such conditions produce further difficulties and create space for exploitation and cor-
ruption. Some migrants (those who can afford it) may pay a lawyer to prepare their
applications and submit them on their behalf, so that they can escape both the end-
less queues and the loss of days out of work; there have been reported cases of law-
yers and ‘counselling offices’ financially exploiting the situation (Eleftherotypia, 28
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May 2001; 22 January 2003; 13 July 2003). Lawyers are given priority in public ser-
vice departments between 11 a.m. and 1 p.m. (on the basis of a law dating back to
1955), so applicants who are still in the queue have to wait longer or come again the
next day. Another issue has been the emergence of illegal businesses producing and
issuing forged documents (e.g. Imerisia, 21 June 2003).
7 The survey was based on questionnaires distributed to public servants in 29 public
sector bodies, as part of a project entitled ‘Investigation of problems in serving mi-
grants, returnees, refugees’, realised by the Institute of Urban Environment and Hu-
man Potential of Panteion University (Athens) during the first trimester of 2003 and
under the supervision of Panteion professors P. Getimis and X. Petrinioti. The preli-
minary findings quoted here were published in Eleftherotypia (1 July 2004). The re-
search highlights an interesting contradiction between the stances and the values of
public servants: negative perceptions, particularly towards specific nationalities (Alba-
nians, 58.2 per cent; Romanians, 32.4 per cent; and Bulgarians, 29.7 per cent) coex-
isted with values such as the need to combat racism, to promote social solidarity, to
support human rights, to protect individual liberties, to fight poverty. Researchers in-
terpret this on the basis of the problems involved in the process itself, most of which
are mentioned above.
8 The National Commission for Human Rights, in its 2001 report, talks about ‘bad de-
tention conditions’, ‘inadequate legal support’ and ‘racist treatment’ by Greek police
officers towards aliens arrested for lacking documents (2002: 45-47). Amnesty Inter-
national’s 2003 report on Greece denounces cases of ‘torturing’ and ‘ill-treatment’ of
alien detainees ‘during arrest and in custody’.
9 Another two parties deserve special reference due to their short-lasting influence dur-
ing the 1990s. The first, DH.K.KI., split from PASOK, representing its populist left
wing. It combined a working-class rhetoric with `patriotic' ideology, but it has never ser-
iously included immigrants in its agenda apart from general statements against govern-
mental policy; ultimately it has seen its electoral power diminishing, and it did not partici-
pate in the last elections. `Political Spring', POL.AN., split from New Democracy led by
a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was the first Greek official to `welcome' ethnic
Greeks when the Albanian border opened (the separation of his group caused the fall of
the conservative government in 1993); although not directly xenophobic, it induced a na-
tionalistic discourse particularly popular at the time of the demonstrations for the `Mace-
donian cause' (early 1990s), but since then its influence has gradually faded until the last
election, when the `turncoats' rejoined the party.
10 LA.O.Σ are the Greek initials for `People's Orthodox Alert'. Logging on to the party's
website, we read (in Greek): `The People's Orthodox Alert was formed on the 14th of
September 2000 with the aim of changing the rotten political climate and having reborn,
for all of us, the ideals of Faith, Religion and Family…' Among the banners appearing on
the screen, there is one stating: `Yellow card for unemployment, bogus immigrants and
non-meritocracy'.
11 The Balkan Neighbours Project, which monitors national media in Albania, Bulgaria,
Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Turkey, produces a quarterly report on the
perceptions of the Balkan ‘other’ and of internal minorities as they appear in the
press; the autumn 1996 report for Greece featured negative stereotypes in main-
stream newspapers, particularly of Albanians (Lenkova 1996).
12 The Greek state objected to the right of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
to use the name ‘Macedonia’ and certain symbols, because they ‘belong’ to the Greek
national inheritance, and could be used for ‘minority claims’; apart from an econom-
ic embargo that injured the two countries’ diplomatic relations, the issue in Greece
led to a reawakening of nationalism, which was extremely popular and successful in
terms of mobilisation. Greco-Turkish relations reached the razor’s edge at the end of
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1995 when a group of Turks landed on the deserted rocky island of Imia (or Kardak,
in Turkish) and raised the Turkish flag.
13 It is worth interpreting this in relation to what Lipovac (1993: 36) calls ‘a love-hate re-
lationship’ between Greece and Western Europe. Accordingly, this relationship is
manifested in traditional feelings of inferiority towards the West (due to economic
and political dependency, historically), that are played out through perceptions of ‘jus-
tification’ (400 years of Ottoman rule) and attitudes of ‘devaluation’ of the Western
world as opposed to the Greek (‘dumb Westerners’ or ‘koutofragkoi’ in Greek, refer-
ence to the glorious ancient past). In a similar way, within the new post-1989 Balkan
context, such feelings and attitudes reappear in the reverse: now ‘we’ have found
somebody to exploit, somebody who depends on ‘us’ for survival and/or politico-eco-
nomic stability, thus somebody towards whom ‘we’ can feel superior.
14 It is worth mentioning here the example of a recent TV drama series that touched
the issue directly, although in a rather romantic manner, telling the story of the for-
bidden love between a young Albanian worker and his employer’s wife in a rural set-
ting (‘Love Came From Far Away’, 2002). The series lasted for a year on one of the
most popular TV channels, and despite its heavy reliance on cliche´s and stereotypes,
it has certainly been an exception to the rule regarding migrants’ portrayal on Greek
TV, therefore it is very likely to have had a positive impact on common perceptions;
it certainly made a good impression on many of the interviewees, who mentioned it
with an element of pride. More recently, a young Albanian girl was included among
the participants in the 2004 series of the ‘Fame Story’ reality show. Obviously, such
examples indicate a degree of ‘absorption’ of immigrants by the dominant culture;
but they certainly reflect a change of attitude in the Greek media.
15 Apart from long established institutions (mainstream parties, trade unions, the
Church) and a few branches of international organisations, the emergence of civil-so-
ciety groups in Greece not only came at a quite late stage, but its presence, influence
and capacity to mobilise was – and still is – marginal. Thus, the development of orga-
nised civil society coincided with the transformation of Greece into a host society; it
is connected to factors ranging from the decline of the welfare state or the decentrali-
sation of public services, to the expansion of the role of international NGOs globally,
the availability of resources and funding (e.g. from the EU), and the decline of tradi-
tional forms of political participation, mobilisation and protest (traditional left-wing
and working-class politics). Governmental research in 2000 found that 45 per cent
of registered NGOs were employing waged staff, and that waged employment in the
sector accounted for 3.3 per cent of the total; nearly 45 per cent of the NGOs surveyed
were based in Attica and one fifth in Central Macedonia (Ministry of Labour and So-
cial Security 2002: 73-74).
16 Ministry of Labour and Social Security, National Action Plan for Employment 2002,
Pillar II, 7th Guiding Line: Combating discrimination and promoting social inclusion
through access to employment.
17 Think-tanks, research institutes, NGOs, grassroots initiatives, left-wing groups, trade
unions, etc.
Chapter 6
1 Percentages from now on are among those working (N=198), unless stated other-
wise.
2 ‘Personal services’ refers to work offered directly to individuals and households: do-
mestic service, cleaning, private care, casual maintenance and repair work (garden-
ing, painting, roofing, tiling, etc.). A share of those working in the ‘maintenance and
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repair’ sector is actually employed by individuals and households as well. The reason
for treating them separately is because in this case they are employed as waged work-
ers by private specialised businesses (as cleaners, electricians, plumbers, etc.), or they
are regular workers (maintenance, repair, cleaning) in companies and other institu-
tions (e.g. university).
3 ‘Other services’ includes educational institutions (music or language schools), business
companies (accountancies, investment, web design), and other services (translations,
architects, NGOs) and refer to migrants doing both white- and blue-collar work (Ta-
ble 6.1; for details see Table A6 in Appendix A).
4 One fifth (ten people) of those in manufacturing work in such small workshops (four
in metallurgy and another four in carpentry). Of the remaining 40, one fourth work
in factories producing metal machinery, another fourth in clothing factories, five peo-
ple in furniture and bathroom equipment, three in oil, plastics and chemicals, an-
other three in shoe factories, and two in food and beverages. The remaining seven
have not specified (see Table A6, Appendix A).
5 ‘Other services’ for men include musicians, language tutors, economists, an engi-
neer, an architect, a public servant; for women, music and language tutors, office
workers, translators, economists, a university professor, a doctor, a lawyer, a web de-
signer, a swimming coach.
6 The larger businesses run by immigrants are two companies offering specialised
business and trading services and a translation office. Of the women entrepreneurs,
one runs a cafe´-bar and the other a restaurant. Family businesses include two retail
shops, a jewellery store and a small clothing manufacturer. Among the self-employed
women, there is a hairdresser, a painter undertaking tasks together with her hus-
band, a shop-keeper, a web designer and two music tutors. Self-employed men work
mostly in construction, while there are also two craftsmen, an architect, a kiosk own-
er and a corner-shop owner.
7 Where relevant, the amounts earned were converted from drachmas into euros. For
the respondents who stated their monthly salary, daily wages have been calculated by
dividing this amount by twenty working days. In the few cases where respondents
stated their hourly rate of pay this was multiplied by eight hours of work per day.
Forty people did not state the exact amount they earn, but said their payment was
‘very low’, ‘high’ or ‘unstable/not fixed/depends’ and were processed in SPSS under
the relevant categories (‘less than 20’, ‘40+’, ‘not fixed’, respectively). In four cases,
there was no response. Statistical procedures (e.g. means, correlation) were based on
exact amounts, excluding those not working.
8 As a basis for comparison, IKA statistics (September 2003) tell us that the average
daily wage of (insured) construction workers in Thessaloniki was 46.4 euros (about
2.5 euros below the national one). Obviously the level of productivity is not taken into
account when drawing such comparisons on the basis of individual immigrants’ ex-
periences.
9 Given an initial lack of detailed knowledge on these matters, the relevant section of
the questionnaire was not designed to capture such specificities. The exact numbers
of migrants who followed the above pathways of access to social security remain ob-
scure, apart from a few notes kept during the interviews when a special reference
was made by the respondents themselves.
10 Information on that concerns about 80 per cent of the sample (N=166), and 76 per
cent stated the exact period they had been working at their current occupation.
11 This information (employment history) is impossible to present here in a systematic
way, due to the variety of different tasks performed by a single person. The relevant
answer format in the questionnaire allowed for multiple responses. Of the results
presented, I have excluded 53 cases of people who have been doing the same job-type
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since the beginning, as well as 5.3 per cent of missing data: each different occupation
performed by a single individual has been counted only once. The high percentage
aggregates reflect the multiple responses inherent in the questions asked about dif-
ferent jobs done.
12 This idea came from a conference presentation by Pajo (2001), theorising from the
Albanian case.
13 The only respondent who worked as a public servant is an ethnic Greek Albanian
who was granted Greek citizenship and who acknowledged the role of intermediaries
(people he knew in responsible posts) in assisting in his recruitment.
14 Immigrants’ health problems, often caused by hard work in insecure environments
and bad living conditions, is a crucial issue surprisingly underestimated in the litera-
ture on migration to Greece. The daily press often reports on ‘occupational accidents’
of migrants at work. According to data from the Labour Watch Service of the Minis-
try of Labour, the number of immigrants dying in occupational accidents in construc-
tion and manufacturing rose from 20 in 2000 to 39 in 2001 and reached 40 in
2002, which is attributed mainly to the nature of the jobs performed, the limited
safety measures undertaken by employers and the low skills migrant workers gener-
ally have (Eleftherotypia, 18 January 2004).
15 See Jahn & Straubhar (1999).
Chapter 7
1 However, cases with diverse housing conditions have been included in this category.
Ground floors in outer Thessaloniki buildings should not always be considered as ‘in-
appropriate’, neither are they less popular among locals. At the other end of the spec-
trum, there are examples of people who lived in wagons or sheds converted into
rooms situated in the courtyards of the factories where they work, without water and
with outdoor self-made toilets. Or the unique case of a Sarakatsan man who comes
for short periods of work and, in order to save money (to finance his daughters’ stu-
dies at a Greek university, as he told me), he sleeps in his car and accommodates his
other needs at the homes of his more settled compatriots.
2 For instance, those employed in white-collar and highly skilled positions, those who
are employers or self-employed and those who earn 40 euros or more a day are more
likely to have their own property, to live on upper floors, or to enjoy central heating
and a larger housing space.
3 Refer back to Section 3.3 for definitions of these geographical units. There is a possi-
bility of slight spatial bias, related to the overrepresentation of central Thessaloniki
and certain neighbourhoods in the way the sample was generated; but my findings
do not contrast much with the 2001 census data, which however do not include dis-
aggregated information on the distribution of the specific migrant groups studied
here (see Figure A2 in Appendix A).
4 The fact that the residential distribution of Bulgarian immigrants exhibits higher
concentrations in a particular area might reflect bias in the selection of the sample.
This was to an extent intended and has been useful in order to address, on the one
hand, the special case of the Bulgarian Sarakatsani, and, on the other, to examine the
interplay between migration and socio-spatial dynamics at the neighbourhood level.
5 At the beginning of the 1990s, research on the housing market in Thessaloniki
showed that about 70 per cent of the households in the conurbation lived in their
own accommodation (Velentzas et al. 1996: Ch. 7.4), which implies lower degrees of
residential mobility among the local population, at least at the time that most immi-
grants arrived.
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6 One possible exception that should be noted here has to do with the background and
socio-economic status of the migrants. Those in the sample who have been described
as ‘elite’ migrants, people of high educational level who do specialised, qualified jobs
(scientists, artists, etc.) – proportionally far more highly represented among Bulgar-
ian immigrants – expressed different cultural values in respect to leisure and thus
preference for different types and places of entertainment (theatre, opera, etc.).
7 On bars and cafe´s that function as small ‘community centres’ see also Section 8.2.1.
Some of these places might be used as meeting points for people from the same
area, town or village in the home country, although nothing like that was encoun-
tered during the fieldwork.
8 Survey by the Paediatric Clinic of the Regional General Hospital at Athens (Ta Nea, 3
May 2004: N58).
9 During the fieldwork, I personally witnessed the expansion of a small ‘Chinatown’ in
Thessaloniki, counting four shops (shoes and clothing mainly) on the main street in
2000, twenty-one in 2002, while many more had mushroomed in the surrounding
streets by my last visit in 2003.
Chapter 8
1 As early as 1992 a ministerial council recognised the necessity for establishing recep-
tion/support classes for immigrants, based on the related provisions applying to eth-
nic Greeks. In 1996, an educational law (2413/1996) raised the issue of intercultural
education for the first time, acknowledging the needs of children with ‘educational,
social and cultural particularities’ and the consequent necessity for the establishment
of ‘intercultural schools’ (Chapter 1, articles 34-37). This provision allowed for the re-
cognition of foreign communities’ schools (Polish, Russian), but left the responsibil-
ity for the foundation of intercultural schools to local authorities, community organi-
sations and the Church.
2 Regarding this, there seems to exist an ongoing conflict between the Ministry of the
Interior and the legal framework. I. Sotirhou, in Eleftherotypia, 29 December 2003,
reports on a memorandum sent by the Minister of the Interior to the Ministry of
Education, calling on state schools to expel the children of undocumented migrants,
which is against both the law and the Constitution and was denounced by the om-
budsman; Education officials insist on facilitating enrolment procedures for these
children.
3 This finding points also to a trend which is not specifically revealed by the fieldwork
material, neither is it supported by available official statistics: the numbers of foreign
students in Greek universities have grown immensely during the past decade. The
principal countries of origin happen to coincide with the countries many immigrants
come from: Albania and other Balkan and Eastern European or former Soviet coun-
tries, as well as Asian, African and Western European countries.
4 Of them 75.5 per cent are of ‘foreign’ origin, 42.7 per cent have spent six years or
more in the country, 10.7 per cent were born in Greece; 72.4 per cent were born in
Albania, 3 per cent in Bulgaria, 2.2 per cent in Georgia, 2.1 per cent in Russia, 1.5
per cent in Ukraine, 1.2 per cent in Romania and 1.1 per cent in Armenia. 31,873 chil-
dren are of ‘ethnic Greek’ origin: 15.4 per cent were born in Greece, 22.6 per cent in
Georgia, 19.6 per cent in Russia, 8.2 per cent in Kazakhstan; Greek-Albanian pupils
form 13.6 per cent, while 5.3 and 2.1 per cent are children of returning migrants from
Germany and the USA respectively. The newspaper reported on a study by the Insti-
tute of Diaspora Greeks’ and Intercultural Education (IPODE).
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5 Secondary education in Greece is broken into two stages: ‘Gymnasio’ refers to junior
high school (the first three years of secondary school) and its completion ends the
nine years of obligatory education. After that, pupils might go on to a general Lykeio,
or senior high school (final three years), which leads to Apolytyrion (Lyceum degree)
and includes preparation for university entry; or they can attend a technical/profes-
sional Lykeio.
6 A survey by KAPA Research done on behalf of UNICEF with a sample of 2,343 Greek
parents, teachers and pupils in Athenian and Thessalonikan schools uncovered the
following stances towards foreign pupils: their presence at school is considered ‘posi-
tive’ by just 11 per cent of parents, but by 72 per cent of pupils (Imerisia, 20 March
2001).
7 The research was carried out by the IPODE and the results were published in Kathimer-
ini (5 December 2003, article by A. Lakasas); the survey was based on a countrywide
sample of 35,049 foreign pupils (more than one third of their total population), taking into
account second- and third-year senior high school examinations.
8 This happens on two occasions: on the 28th of October, when the refusal of Greece
to allow (Fascist) Italian troops into the country in 1940 is celebrated; and the 25th of
March, a day commemorating the symbolic initiation of the Greek struggle for inde-
pendence from the Ottoman Empire in 1821.
9 It should be noted that the relevant question was aimed at information about indivi-
duals, not households; thus the figure might appear lower due to dependent family
members expressing their personal situation.
10 Only 36.8 per cent of women have an account. Interestingly, while among Albanians
the share of women having an account is lower (39 per cent, compared to 65 per cent
among men), among Bulgarians it is the other way round (about one third of wo-
men, compared to only 22.3 per cent among men).
11 Apart from relying solely on the accounts of the interviewees, much of the informa-
tion presented in this section is based on informal chats, observation, brochures and
leaflets published by migrant associations and other organisations, etc. In three cases
(Epirote House, Association of Greeks from Sarande¨, Gjirokaster and Delvina, Kyril
and Methodi), I conducted personal interviews with the associations’ leaders. All this
material also provided a basis for a comparison between the Thessaloniki experience
of Albanian and Bulgarian migrants and the situation in Athens and elsewhere, re-
garding other migrant groups as well. In that respect, several of the texts written by
community representatives in the second part of the volume edited by Marvakis et al.
(2001: 333-388) have been particularly helpful, especially the overviews by E. Markova
and K. Kuka on the Bulgarian and Albanian cases, respectively.
12 Both the Socialist and the Democratic parties of Albania have representation in Thes-
saloniki, as well as the Greek minority’s party (Omonia) and other organisations. Six
respondents said they are or used to be in contact with one of the above. I personally
was present at a demonstration against the NATO bombings of Yugoslavia during
the Kosovo events, where a local (Albanian) member of the Democratic Party tried to
discourage Albanian protesters from taking part. Representatives of both Epirote
House and the Association of Greeks from Sarande¨, Gjirokaster and Delvina in-
formed me about minority politics in Albania and said they had contacts with mem-
bers of the Greek minority party.
13 This was mentioned by two younger interviewees and the owner of the cafe´ described
above herself. It appears though that these places, strategically located near the rail-
way station and the area around St Dimitrios Church, where many Bulgarian mi-
grants live, were owned by Greeks.
14 A higher share (74.6 per cent) of ethnic Greek migrants in particular tend to interact
with locals, perhaps due to language and less prejudice towards them. The percen-
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tage of women socialising with Greeks is lower than that of men (55.3 and 70.5 per
cent, respectively), which points both to the differences between male and female
employment (e.g. female domestic workers and carers who work alone) and the fa-
mily division of labour (as women bear most of the weight of housework and child-
care duties).
15 An interesting example is reported in Kathimerini (17 October 2004: 34). Data from
the Athens Council Registration Service reveal that during 2003 and the first eight
months of 2004, about 10 per cent of the marriages that took place in the capital
were mixed ones. The majority are foreign women marrying Greek men, while the
chief nationalities are Albanians, Ukrainians and Bulgarians.
16 Obviously, ethnic Greek migrants might be in a more advantaged position in this re-
spect, but language fluency might also depend on education received in Greece as
well as on factors stemming from the individuals’ characteristics (age, self-study, so-
cialisation with Greeks).
17 I have to acknowledge the possible reluctance of the respondents to tell the whole
truth to somebody coming from the host society. In my interview with Ferin, for ex-
ample, it only came out that this was his real name near the end of our conversation;
for the most part I called him by the name he had introduced himself with in the be-
ginning: Nikos. In the survey presented in Labrianidis & Lyberaki (2001: 174), the
percentage of the (Albanian) respondents using Greek names is as high as 34 per
cent.
18 Interestingly, quantitative data show no positive relationship between the migrants’
well-being and the adoption of such integration strategies. By contrast, respondents
who practiced such strategies received on average lower wages and had a lower aver-
age score in the ‘index of material conditions’ (results for the Albanian section of the
sample). Obviously, quantitative accounts of material elements of this kind might
hide positive aspects at other levels (e.g. inter-ethnic contact). But again, this finding
indicates a relationship only, not causality: it might be the most deprived among the
migrants who choose to change their name, pass for ethnic Greeks, get baptised or
hide their religious beliefs.
Chapter 9
1 It is impossible to include here numerous cases for extensive comparisons: this is
not a comparative study anyway. The point is, on the one hand, to see what happens
in Athens and other places in Greece and to highlight similarities and differences.
On the other hand, it is important to evaluate the findings of this case study in the
light of what is known about other settings; a reference to theory is therefore appro-
priate, enriched with examples from the Southern European urban experience of mi-
gration.
2 For instance, Karydis (1996), Psimmenos (1995), Kourtovic (2001), Halkos & Sala-
mouris (2003).
3 See Iosifides & King (1998); also King & Mai (2004) on Albanians in Italy.
4 Migrants can be understood as ‘strangers’, as proposed by Papastergiadis (2000: Ch.
3); Lazaridis & Wickens (1999) have offered such an interpretation specifically for
the Greek case.
5 See Mousourou (1993); also Anthias & Lazaridis (1999: 1-12).
6 See Balibar & Wallerstein (1990), especially chapters 12 (‘The class-based racism’)
and 13 (‘Racism and crisis’) by E. Balibar.
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7 Obviously, agriculture is also a sector concentrating large numbers of migrant work-
ers. Given the urban focus of the research however, it is not accounted here. For de-
tails on that, see Lianos et al. (1996) and Kasimis et al. (2003).
8 E.g. Turks in Germany, North Africans in France, Bangladeshis or Black Caribbeans
in the United Kingdom, etc., despite differences in the legal position of these groups
in each of these countries.
9 Primarily Moroccans in the former case and Albanians, among other migrant
groups, in the latter.
10 Other groups, in Greece or in other countries, develop similar strategies. Polish im-
migrants in Athens, for instance, learn the language, get baptised, take Greek names,
build relationships with locals, go on holiday in the host country, etc. (Romaniszyn
1996). Kosic & Triandafyllidou (2003) and King & Mai (2004) observed similar stra-
tegies among Albanians in Italy.
11 See, for instance, Anthias & Lazaridis (1999) on the Southern European experience.
On Greece, see Psimmenos (1995; 1998), Iosifides & King (1998), Lazaridis (1999),
Lazaridis & Psimmenos (2000).
12 Fakiolas (2003: 548) reports on an information note issued by the Ministry of Public
Order on 15 November 2002: among nearly 219,600 migrants arrested for illegal en-
try/residence in 2001, 4.8 per cent were Iraqis and 1.9 per cent were Afghans; the
share of Iraqis in 2000’s arrests was lower (4.4 per cent), while Afghans were not re-
presented in that year’s arrests (at least not in significant shares).
13 See Deltio Thielis, magazine of the Network of Movements for Social and Political
Rights (May 1998).
14 E.g. Daly & Barot (1999) on Tunisians in Italy, or Trimikliniotis (1999) on immi-
grants in Cyprus.
15 The origins of the movement lie in an August 1996 event, when three hundred un-
documented migrants from Africa were violently evicted by riot police from St Ber-
nard’s Church in northern Paris, where they had found sactuary for several months.
It currently has expanded to a network of grassroots organisations (‘collectives’) sup-
porting and campaigning for undocumented migrants (‘sans papiers’, as commonly
referred to in French) with ‘branches’ across France and in several other EU coun-
tries (for more information, see: pajol.eu.org).
16 This is a phrase Smart (1997) uses to describe the role of migrants to Canada in Al-
berta’s agriculture. Despite notable differences in migration contexts and patterns,
this distant case does not differ much from the way migrants in Greece function as
flexible labour, e.g. in construction or personal services.
17 In respect to this, the (Greek) Macedonian Press Agency reported on 21 October
2001 that about 260 Bulgarian nationals living in Thessaloniki were expected to vote
in the Bulgarian national election of 11 November 2001 at the city’s Bulgarian Consu-
late.
18 The idea is to provide incentives for companies to move there instead of relocating
abroad, thus helping them to escape the unstable environments of Balkan countries
without losing the asset of low-cost labour. The gains for the local community –
among the poorest regions in the EU – are obvious, but overall benefits for the na-
tional economy are also expected, by keeping economic activity within the country.
The infrastructure was supposed to start being built in 2002, while similar initiatives
are being designed for other northern border regions, on the basis of the institutional
framework ‘Free Zones of Economic Exchange’, EU Regulation 2913/92, Article 166.
For further details see Labrianidis (1998).
19 Reported in Eleftherotypia, 29 December 2004.
20 See, for instance, Eleftherotypia, 21 November 2004, article by G. Linardos.
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21 High concentrations of migrants in specific working-class districts of Athens that
hosted refugees and internal migrants in the past have been noted in the studies of
Psimmenos (1995; 1998) and Halkos & Salamouris (2003). Similarly, in Barcelona’s
central districts, Morrocans tend to ‘replace’ Andalusian immigrants (King & Rodri-
guez-Melguizo). In northern Italian cities, immigrants occupy spaces previously in-
habited by migrants from the south (King & Mai, 2004).
22 For a theoretical account of the economic impact of immigration see for instance
Borjas (1994) and Jahn & Straubhaar (1999). The issues touched on here are those
addressed by studies looking specifically at the Greek case: e.g. Lianos (1996; 2003),
Fakiolas (1999), Labrianidis & Lyberaki (2001), Lyberaki & Pelagidis (2000), Sarris &
Zografakis (1999).
23 E.g. Lianos et al. (1996); Labrianidis & Lyberaki (2001).
24 See Sarris & Zografakis (1999); also Labrianidis & Lyberaki (2001).
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Appendix A Additional tables and figures
All tables and figures are my own elaboration of data from the sources
stated.
Figure A1 Age structure (%), fertility and mortality (per 1,000) of the Greek popu-
lation, 1971-2001
0
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0-14 15-64- 65+ death rate birth rate
Source: NSSG, censuses 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, as presented in NSSG (2003: tables
Ia, Ig).
Table A1 Foreign nationals employed in 2001, by sector and sex
Sector Employed Foreign Nationals
% men % women all
agriculture & cattle-breeding,
fishery, forestry 19.8 12.4 68,682
mining 0.2 0.0 648
manufacturing 13.7 7.9 46,553
energy 0.2 0.0 569
construction 35.1 0.9 96,003
trade & repair, hotel & catering 13.8 19.9 61,497
transport & storage, communication 3.2 1.7 10,721
banking & finance 0.3 0.6 1,506
other services 6.6 51.8 80,488
n.a. 7.1 4.8 25,007
total 270,771 120,903 391,674
Source: NSSG, Census 2001: Employed Aliens.
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Figure A2 Non-EU citizens in Greater Thessaloniki
Source: NSSG, Census 2001, Usual Resident population
Table A4 Thessaloniki Prefecture, key socio-economic indicators, 1991, 2001
Census 1991 Census 2001
total men women total men women
Total Population 946,864 48.2 51.8 1,057,825 48.4 51.6
Age structure
15-29 25.2 – – 23.8 – –
30-34 32.5 – – 32.2 – –
35-65 38.0 – – 38.1 – –
65+ 10.7 – – 14.1 – –
Education level
Postgraduate 0.6 0.9 0.3 1.1 1.4 0.8
University 7.8 8.9 6.8 10.7 10.9 10.5
Polytechnic 1.7 1.7 1.8 3.8 3.6 3.9
Other post-secondary 0.5 0.6 0.4 4.3 4.1 4.5
Secondary 28.1 29.5 26.8 30.8 32.6 29.1
Three years' secondary 11.1 11.7 10.5 11.6 12.7 10.6
Primary 36.4 35.5 37.2 28.0 26.8 29.1
Not finished primary but literate 9.6 8.6 10.5 7.7 6.6 8.7
Illiterate 4.3 2.6 5.9 2.1 1.4 2.8
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Census 1991 Census 2001
total men women total men women
Total Labour Force 372,652 64.8 35.2 457,138 60.6 39.4
Sector of employment
agriculture 6.0 7.1 4.0 4.8 4.8 4.9
mining 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0
manufacturing 23.4 21.7 26.5 17.9 18.7 16.6
water, electricity, gas 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.2
construction 6.2 9.5 0.2 7.4 11.7 0.9
trade, repair 16.9 17.8 15.2 17.0 17.4 16.3
hotels & restaurants 3.3 3.6 2.8 5.4 5.2 5.8
transport, storing, communication 5.8 8.1 1.6 5.9 8.1 2.3
financial organisations, real estate
management
6.1 5.3 7.5 8.8 7.1 11.4
public administration, defence,
insurance
5.9 6.3 5.0 5.1 5.7 4.3
education services 5.9 3.8 9.7 6.8 4.3 10.8
health & welfare 4.6 2.8 7.7 4.9 2.9 8.0
other services 3.5 2.9 4.6 4.9 3.2 7.5
young, not classified 12.0 10.4 14.9 10.5 10.3 10.9
Position at work
employers 9.4 11.7 5.1 12.3 14.8 8.3
self-employed 21.3 25.7 13.3 12.3 14.7 8.6
waged 59.4 55.6 66.3 67.7 64.9 72.0
assistants 3.6 2.1 6.3 2.6 1.2 4.8
not declared 6.3 4.9 8.9 5.1 4.4 6.2
Unemployment rate by age group
Total unemployment 7.6 5.9 10.8 11.4 9.6 14.2
10-19 – 23.5 30.4 – 44.9 49.1
20-24 – 15.7 21.9 – 23.9 26.5
25-29 – 8.5 12.6 – 13.0 16.1
30-44 – 3.4 5.5 – 6.5 10.3
45-64 – 3.0 4.3 – 5.4 11.1
65+ – 1.4 3.0 – 0.0 0.0
Unemployment composition by age group
10-19 – 13.1 16.3 – 11.4 7.9
20-24 – 28.8 35.9 – 24.0 22.8
25-29 – 18.9 19.8 – 18.9 19.1
30-44 – 22.2 20.6 – 28.1 32.2
45-64 – 16.8 7.4 – 17.5 18.1
65+ – 0.3 0.1 – 0.0 0.0
Source: NSSG, Censuses 1991 and 2001, various tables
Table A5 Pro-migrant civil-society organisations in Thessaloniki
Organisation* Type & Action Source
Social & Welfare Services
Médecins Sans Frontières NGO: Open polyclinic leaflet, interviewee
Doctors of the World NGO: Open polyclinic leaflet, interviewee
Greek Red Cross Charity: Consultancy, support leaflet
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Organisation* Type & Action Source
Centre for the Reception and
Support of Immigrants and
Refugees
INTEGRA action for 'Employ-
ment' Community initiative
(run by MAKINE)
European project: Consulting, ad-
vocacy, information, legal support
visits, informal chats,
leaflet, interviewees
Epirote House Federation of community associa-
tions: registration, consultancy,
legal support
interview, interviewees
Refugees' Reception Centre NGO : food and shelter, social
services, legal support
leaflet
Church: various parishes Food and shelter, material &
moral support
interviewees
Greek Language Courses
Aristotle University of Thessalo-
niki
Language courses leaflet
Odysseas NGO, free language courses,
theatre group
visits, observation,
informal chats, inter-
viewees
NELE (Prefecture Committee for
People's Education)
Local administration: Free
language courses
leaflets, interviewees
Steki sto Viologiko: social centre Free language courses visits, informal chats,
observation, intervie-
wees
Advocacy & Campaign
Macedonian Institute of Labour
(independent body
of the Thessaloniki labour
centre)
Trade-union body: Research, voca-
tional training, providing space for
INTEGRA and Odysseas
leaflet, website
Antigone: information and docu-
mentation centre (national focus
of EUMC, part of the RAXEN
Network)
NGO, European project: informa-
tion, documentation, research
website
Local committee against racism
and xenophobia
Advocacy (long inactive) leaflet, observation
SOS Racism Advocacy (long inactive) leaflet, observation
Amnesty International, Thessalo-
niki Branch
NGO: advocacy, human rights'
watch
Campaign brochures
Anti-racist Initiative of Thessalo-
niki
Left-wing organisation: cam-
paigns, advocacy, networking, sup-
port of associations & individuals
participation, observa-
tion, campaign bro-
chures, interviewees
YRE: Youth Against Racism in
Europe
Left-wing group: campaigns, advo-
cacy
campaign brochures
Black Sun Collective: None is il-
legal
Anarchist group: campaigns, advo-
cacy
campaign leaflet
* The list is by no means complete; I only included organisations for which I had obtained
first-hand information.
Source: fieldwork findings, as stated in the third column
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Table A6 Detailed profession of immigrants by sector of employment
A B C D E F G H I J K L Total %
shoes & clothing manufacturers 13 – – – – – – – – – – – 13 6.3
metal machinery factories 10 – – – – – – – – – – – 10 4.8
oil, plastics & chemicals 5 – – – – – – – – – – – 5 2.4
bathroom equipment manufacturers 3 – – – – – – – – – – – 3 1.4
other manufacturers 9 – – – – – – – – – – – 9 4.3
carpenters & other craftsmen 6 – – – – – – – – – – – 6 2.9
metal processing workshops 4 – – – – – – – – – – – 4 1.9
drivers – 1 – – – 1 – – – – – – 2 1.0
construction workers, builders – 32 – – – – – – – – – – 32 15.4
general manual workers* – – 6 6 – – – 2 – 1 – – 15 7.2
electricians & plumbers – – – 6 – – – – – – – – 6 2.9
domestic service & cleaning – – 14 – – – – – – – – – 14 6.7
carers – – 11 – – – – – – – – – 11 5.3
hairdressers, beauticians – – 2 – – – – – – – – – 2 1.0
store assistants, retail shopkeepers – – – – – 10 – – – – – – 10 4.8
assistant workers in trade companies – – – – – 7 – – – – – – 7 3.4
assistants in petrol stations – – – – – 3 – – – – – – 3 1.4
assistants in bakeries & confectioneries – – – – – 4 – – – – – – 4 1.9
waiters/assistants in fast-food/restaurants – – – – 9 – – – – – – – 9 4.3
waiters/assistants in café-bars** – – – – 7 – – – – – – – 7 3.4
businessmen & entrepreneurs – – – – 2 2 2 – – 1 – – 7 3.4
specialised professionals 1 – – – – – 2 2 1 1 1 – 8 3.8
white-collar employees*** – – – – – – 1 – – 2 1 – 4 1.9
public servants – – – – – – – 2 – – – – 2 1.0
music & language teachers – – – – – – – 2 3 – – – 5 2.4
unemployed – – – – – – – – – – – 6 6 2.9
retired – – – – – – – – – – – 2 2 1.0
housewives – – – – – – – – – – – 2 2 1.0
Total 51 33 33 12 18 27 5 8 4 5 2 10 208 100.0
% 24.5 15.9 15.9 5.8 8.7 13.0 2.4 3.8 1.9 2.4 1.0 4.8 100.0
*general assistants, repairing, cleaning, painting
** plus one hotel room-service person
*** translation
A. manufacturing; B. construction; C. personal services; D. maintenance & repair; E. hotel,
leisure & catering; F. trade & retail; G. financial & business services; H. university & public
sector; I. other education; J. translations; K. other services; L. unemployed & inactive
Source: fieldwork findings
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Table A7 Community organisations of other migrant groups in Thessaloniki
Name or Description Type and/or Actions
organisations incorporating migrants of various nationalities
Steki Metanaston: 'Immigrants' Place'
Café and meeting place, provides
space for several associations' meet-
ings & activities, also hosts the Anti-
racist Initiative of Thessaloniki.
International Federation of Foreign
Women
?
established communities & associations
Armenian Orthodox Church 'Virgin
Mary' & Armenian General Benevo-
lent Union
Church and Community association (dating back to
the nineteenth century, but supporting new Armenian
immigrants)
Pan-African Congress, northern
Greece branch1
Campaign organisation
Friends of Africa Association1 Cultural association
Union of African Students of Mace-
donia1
Student society
Community of Nigerians in Thessa-
loniki and northern Greece1
Migrant organisation
Sudanese Assocation1 Migrant organisation
Union of Congolese students1 Student society
Union of Palestinian students Student society
KASAPI: Filipino Association, north-
ern Greece branch
Migrant organisation
Community of Yugoslavians in Thes-
saloniki2
Community, socialisation and cultural celebrations
Community of Afghan refugees asylum-seekers' informal community, campaigning
other migrant groups3
Turkish and Iraqi Kurds They have small communities in Thessaloniki (dating
back in the 1980s). Many are organised alongside
radical political groups (Turkish Kurds in the PKK, and
Iraqi Kurds in the Revolutionary Party of Kurdistan),
protesting and campaigning for their cause and
raising funds by selling political publications in Greek.
Pontian ethnic Greeks from former
Soviet Republics
Various associations of Pontian Greeks from the
former USSR, many pre-existing Pontian unions/
associations, some newly formed by migrants,
according to place of origin or locally-based
other citizens of countries of the for-
mer Soviet Union
Georgians, Russians and Ukrainians in particular,
who have relatively sizeable communities in Thessa-
loniki, are likely to have formed associations. During
the fieldwork I was told by a Georgian woman about
the existence of a Georgian immigrants' association
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Name or Description Type and/or Actions
Chinese (& other migrants from
South-East Asian countries)
There is a small but growing Chinese community,
mostly engaged in trade (imports & retail) of clothes
and, to a lesser extent, shoes. Migrants from China,
and also other South-East Asian countries, are
increasingly involved in street trade, of either clothes
(in open markets and local bazaars) or cheap
electronic gadgets (both in local bazaars and down-
town).
Note: The table does not include nationals of EU member states (EU-15 and Cyprus), North
America and Japan, despite the strong presence of citizens from some of these countries: for in-
stance, the American, German and Italian schools of Thessaloniki enrol both Greek pupils and
children from the respective countries, while I also came across an institution where Japanese kids
living in the city were taught their native tongue. There is also a small Spanish-speaking commu-
nity around the local branch of the Cervantes Institute. There are also many Cypriots who work
or study with various associations and societies.
1 Despite their small size, the presence of African students and migrants from various
countries is increasingly visible. Many are involved in street trade (African artefacts, electro-
nic gadgets, pirated CDs). There are a couple of African music clubs in town, owned jointly
by Africans and Greeks.
2 I was told this by a Serbian woman working at Liliana's Bulgarian café. There also existed
an initiative supporting Bosnian Serbs during the recent Balkans war, with which however I
never came into contact.
3 Only 'visible' communities have been included here, i.e. those about which I had informa-
tion or I could observe. It is not certain whether or not other migrants groups (e.g. Polish,
Ukrainians, Pakistanis) who have established associations in Athens have managed to de-
velop organised community structures in Thessaloniki; the state of other migrant groups
(e.g. Indians, Egyptians) is also unknown.
Source: fieldwork findings (NGOs, magazines, leaflets, informal chats, observation)
Figure A3 Albanian and Bulgarian ‘tourists’ 1994-2002 (’000s and % of total tour-
ists)
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Source: Greek National Tourism Organisation, arrivals of travellers at the borders
by nationality
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Appendix B2 The interview guide
A. Interview
Date, time, place, name of the interviewee, tape number, language skill
level.
B. Demographic Profile
Gender, birth date, birthplace, ethnic background, religion, education,
marital status, number of children, previous occupations in country of
origin.
Notes
C. Migration Dynamics
C1 Why did you choose to migrate to Greece?
C2 When did you first migrate to this country?
C3 When you first came, what route did you take and what means of
transport did you use (boat, foot, bus, combination etc.)?
C4 What was your entry point into Greece?
C5 Did you migrate alone, or with other members of your family
(state which ones), or with a group of friends?
C6 What were your reactions when you first arrived?
C7 Who helped you settle in when you first arrived?
C8 Apart from (state place of interview), where else in this country
have you lived and/or worked?
C9 Why did you choose (state place of interview)?
C10 Have you also migrated to other countries? (State which ones,
when and for how long.)
C11 How would you compare those experiences of migration to the
current one?
C12 Have you been back to Albania/Bulgaria since your first migra-
tion? If so, for how long, and how many times? Was your return
migration forced or voluntary?
C13 If you have returned, what route and means of transport have you
used (air, boat, train, bus, shared taxi, etc.)?
C14 How do you see yourself here (immigrant, tourist, visitor, refugee
…)?
D. Exclusion
Exclusion/discrimination in the labour market
D1 What kind of jobs have you performed in Greece? What is your
current job? Have you ever been unemployed for a long period
(in Greece)? Please describe your working experiences.
D2 Were you able to get a job according to your educational qualifica-
tions and experience? Please explain.
D3 How did you find these jobs? How did you find your current job?
D4 How is your relationship with your employer? How is your em-
ployer treating you?
D5 How many hours do you usually work? How often do you have a
break? How long is it?
D6 Are you satisfied with your current job and your payment? What
payment is given to a Greek or another migrant worker for the
same job? Did you have any bad experiences (e.g. not receive your
payment)?
D8 Do you work with other migrants? How is your relationship with
them?
D9 Do you belong to any trade union or professional association?
Please explain.
D10 When you were working, did you experience any advances of a
sexual nature from your employer? Please describe your experi-
ences.
Exclusion from formal networks of support and citizenship rights/dis-
crimination in approaching social welfare institutions
D11 What was your legal status when you first arrived in Greece?
D12 What is your legal status at the moment? (Do you possess a
White or Green Card or other documentation for Greece?)
D13 Was it easy to issue your legal papers? Did you encounter any dif-
ficulties? Please explain.
D14 For how long is your card valid? How often do you have to renew
it?
D15 Are you satisfied with your legal status at the moment?
D16 Did you receive any support or help from a Greek state agency in
issuing legal papers?
D17 Are you registered with a social security fund or not? Please ex-
plain.
D18 Do you have access to health services? Are you registered with a
doctor?
D19 Did you encounter any problems in registering your children at
school? Please explain.
D20 Are your children treated the same as Greek children at school by
teachers and by other children?
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Housing exclusion/discrimination in the housing market
D21 Where do you live? In what other areas of the city have you lived
in the past?
D22 What type of accommodation do you live in? Please describe the
property. How many people do you live with?
D23 Do you own the property or are you renting it?
D24 Why did you choose this particular accommodation?
D25 What is easy to find a place to live? Did you encounter any diffi-
culties in renting a property? Please describe your personal ex-
periences.
D26 Are you satisfied with your accommodation? Would you like to
move somewhere else? If yes, explain why and state where would
you like to move.
D27 Do any other compatriots or members of other ethnic groups re-
side in this area?
Exclusion/inclusion from/in informal networks of support, ethnic soli-
darity
D28 Do Albanian/Bulgarians support one another in Greece? If they
do, please explain in which ways they do so. Is it different in Al-
bania/Bulgaria?
D29 Have you received any help from the neighbourhood?
D30 Do you belong to an Albanian/Bulgarian association or another
migrant or anti-racist movement?
D31 Why did you decide to become a member (motivation), and what
are you gaining from your participation? Has the association
helped you in any way? Please explain.
D32 What kind of activities does the association promote and what ac-
tion has been taken so far to achieve its goals? For example, has
the association made any formal complaints to the government?
Has it mobilised you to protest? Has it promoted cultural activ-
ities in the host country? Please explain.
D33 Are there any other ethnic associations apart from the one that
you belong to? If yes, what are their names? Are there any differ-
ences between the association you belong to and the others?
Please explain.
E. Racism and Identity
E1 Do you like it here (Greece)? Why?
E2 Please describe to me any incidents where you felt you were
being unfairly treated. Who treated you unfairly and in what way?
Please explain.
E3 Did you experience unfair treatment in the following areas: acces-
sing welfare institutions (e.g. to get a benefit, enrol in a pension
scheme, access to health care); education (schools); labour mar-
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ket, police, neighbourhood, shops, streets, other? Please describe
your experience in each case.
E4 Did your friends have any similar experiences?
E5 How do you react when you are being treated unfairly?
E6 Have you ever been a victim of violence (e.g. physical, verbal) in
Greece? Please describe your experiences (when, where and what
happened?).
E7 Has any member of your family or a friend of yours ever been a
victim of (physical and/or verbal) violence in Greece?
E8 What do you think about the treatment of Albanians/Bulgarians
in Greece? Is it fair? Why? How should things be?
E9 What do you like/not like about Greeks?
E10 In what respect are they different from Albanians/Bulgarians? In
what respect are they similar?
E11 Do you socialise mainly with people from your own country, with
Greeks, or with other migrants? Have you got Greek friends?
What do you like doing together?
E12 How do you relate to Greeks? What is your relationship with
them (e.g. close friendship, baptism, etc)?
E13 What do you like doing together with other Albanians/Bulgar-
ians? Is it different from what you like doing with Greeks? Why?
E14 How do Albanians/Bulgarians relate to one another in Greece? Is
it different from Albania/Bulgaria?
E15 What do you think about the other Albanians/Bulgarians here?
E16 Have you ever had a Greek partner? Would it be a problem?
Why? Was it different from having an Albanian/Bulgarian part-
ner? Why?
E17 Do you have friends of other nationalities (excluding Albanians/
Bulgarians and the host society)?
E18 What do you like about Albania/Bulgaria? Are there any particu-
lar aspects (values) of the Albanian/Bulgarian way of life which
you value?
E19 Are there any particular aspects (values) of the Albanian/Bulgar-
ian way of life which contrast with the Greek way of life? Which
ones? Why?
E20 What adjectives do the Greeks use (employers, neighbours, med-
ia) in everyday life to refer to Albanian/Bulgarian (and ethnic
Greek) migrants? Name both positive and negative ones.
E21 Do you consider that these adjectives are representative of the Al-
banians/Bulgarians (ethnic Greek) character and or behaviour?
E22 Who is using these expressions?
E23 How do they affect you? In which ways? Please explain.
E24 How do people react when you mention to them that you come
from Albania/Bulgaria?
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E25 Are you aware of any jokes about Albanian/Bulgarian migrants?
E26 What differentiates the Albanians/Bulgarians from the Greeks
and ethnic Greeks?
E27 Are you proud to be Albanian/Bulgarian?
E28 What does it mean to be Albanian/Bulgarian in Greece for you?
E29 What is important for you to preserve of your country and its cul-
ture in the host country? Please explain.
E30 What Albanian/Bulgarian aspects and elements would you like
your children to maintain?
E31 Do you speak Albanian/Bulgarian at home? And outside?
E32 Do you practice your religion? Is this important for you? How of-
ten do you attend religious meetings? Did you encounter any pro-
blems?
E33 Were there any occasions where you had to hide the fact that you
are Albanian/Bulgarian (and present yourself as an ethnic
Greek)? Please describe your experiences.
E34 What are the elements which differentiate Albanians/Bulgarians
from ethnic Greeks?
E35 (For ethnic Greeks) How do you feel when people treat you as an
Albanian/Bulgarian?
F. Media and Cultural Inclusion/Exclusion
F1 Do you watch/listen to/read Greek television/radio/newspapers?
Which ones?
F2 What do you like watching on television?
F3 How do you spend your free time?
F4 Who do you go with (if not answered before)?
F5 What about news? Do you read/watch it on Greek media?
F6 How about when they talk about Albanians/Bulgarians, what do
you think of that?
F7 Do you think it is a fair representation? In what respect?
F8 Do you remember any programme in particular?
F9 Do you think that what the media says corresponds to what Greek
people think?
F10 Do you think that what the media says influences the way people
behave with you?
F11 What about other foreign people living and working in Greece,
are they portrayed differently or similarly? Please explain.
F12 What do you like doing during your free time? Do you go out?
Where would you usually go?
F13 Do you go on holiday? Where? How often?
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F14 Do you have access to television and press from Albania/Bulgar-
ia? Which ones are available here?
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F15 Are there any local Albanian/Bulgarian newspapers produced
here?
F16 Do Albanian/Bulgarian people refer to these? Please explain.
F17 What do you find in Albanian/Bulgarian media produced in
Greece that you cannot find in Albanian/Bulgarian media pro-
duced in Albania/Bulgaria?
F18 How about the Internet?
G. Future Plans
G1 Where do you see yourself in ten years’ time? What is your inten-
tion for the future? Stay in this place in Greece/ move to another
place in Greece (state where)/ move to another country (state
which one)/ return to Albania/Bulgaria.
G2 How long are you planning to stay in Greece? Why?
G3 If your plan is to return to Albania/Bulgaria, what are your plans
for resettling there (employment, business, family reasons etc.)?
Do you currently send money to your country? For what purpose?
G4 When would you plan to return? And would you plan to go back
to the place of your origin, or to another place?(Where?)
G5 In general, what did you expect your migration experience to be
in Greece? And how did it work out?
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